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Abstract 
 
This thesis focuses on the development of early Kubrawī Sufism through an analysis of 
the figure of Majd al-Dīn al-Baghdādī (d. 616/1219) and his major work, the Tuḥfat al-
barara. Al-Baghdādī has not received significant scholarly attention, however his work 
will be shown to be invaluable for our understanding of this period in the history of 
Sufism. While recent studies have increasingly highlighted the importance of the 
transitional period in the history of Sufism in which communities transformed into 
orders, the early Kubrawīs have not received much attention in this regard.  
 
This study will demonstrate that al-Baghdādī’s Tuḥfa systematises many concepts found 
in Najm al-Dīn Kubrā’s Fawā’iḥ. This theoretical framework will then be shown to 
inform notions of practice and belonging in discussions regarding the relationship 
between the Sufi master and his disciples which ultimately shape the structure of the 
Sufi community. From this we will have acquired the basis for investigating al-
Baghdādī’s work in its response to the rise of antinomian groups, as well as the 
changing relationship between Sufism and political rulers. The study will show that al-
Baghdādī’ theoretical systematisation necessitates the centralisation and stratification 
of the Sufi community in order to govern the structure and affiliations of the Sufi 
community. 
 
This analysis will address gaps in scholarship regarding the development of Kubrawī 
Sufism. It will answer questions regarding the reception of previous Sufi thinkers in al-
Baghdādī’s work. It will also show that the development of theories of dreams and 
visions, which the Kubrawīs are noted for, had implications for the development of the 
structure of the community. Furthermore the study will offer a useful comparison with 
‘Umar al-Suhrawardī’s institutionalisation of Sufism, revealing similarities and 
	   v	  
divergences between the two communities, and the emergence of a self-consciously 
distinct Sufi community under al-Baghdādī.  
 
This will also allow us to reassess the contribution of al-Baghdādī and his influence 
upon later Kubrawī thinkers such as Najm al-Dīn al-Rāzī and ‘Alā’ al-Dawla al-Simnānī 
who clearly rely on, and develop further, the discussions found in the Tuḥfa. Hence, al-
Baghdādī typifies important developments in 12th and 13th century Sufism which came 
to shape the nature of Sufi thought and practice, elucidating the transition to Sufi 
orders.  
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And if the seeker looks to what is within him, he sees the earthly truths with their various 
attributes, and if he looks to what is above him he sees the heavenly things, of celestial skies 
and planets… And when wayfaring is supplanted by attraction, then travelling occurs in the 
world of the divine attributes, and this travel is without end, for the attributes of the Divine are 
infinite.1 
 
Introduction 
 
The 12th and 13th centuries marked an important point in the history of Sufism. This is a 
time when a number of pivotal Sufi thinkers and practitioners rose to prominence 
across the Muslim world. These include figures such as ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī (d. 
632/1234), ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī (d. 561/1166), Mu‘īn al-Dīn Chishtī (d. 633/1236) and 
Najm al-Dīn Kubrā (d. 617/1220). Over the next few centuries these figures became 
synonymous with the Sufi orders named after them with the emergence of the 
Qādiriyya, Suhrawardiyya, Chishtiyya and Kubrawiyya. Clearly, even for medieval 
Muslims there was a sense that these figures represented a transition in the history of 
Sufism from communities which would emerge around one or more charismatic figures 
and disperse after their deaths, to institutions which survived for generations and 
usually centred around one shaykh.  
 
These institutions came to be known as ṭarīqas. Prior to the age of Sufi orders, the word 
ṭarīqa referred to Sufi practice and method as a counterpart to the religious obligations 
of the sharī‘a, and a set of actions which were necessary in attaining spiritual 
completion, or the ḥaqīqa. However, as Sufism became ever more formalised, the 
significance of the term went beyond this tripartite scheme and came to describe the 
practice of Sufism itself. Before the establishment of orders, the term acquired an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Al-Baghdādī, Tuḥfat al-barara, 7. 
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institutional significance and was closely associated with one’s Sufi master with al-
Qushayrī asserting that one who disobeys or separates from his master has broken his 
ṭarīqa.2  
 
This transition to ṭarīqa Sufism was consolidated after the Mongol invasions of the 13th 
century, and hence coincides with a turbulent and violent period in the history of the 
Muslim world. With the establishment of orders, Sufism became an even more 
important social, political, cultural and religious force in medieval society. Patronage of 
the Sufi lodge was one of the primary ways in which political rulers gained legitimacy, 
while the lodge itself fulfilled important societal functions. Yet our understanding of 
the transition of Sufism from loosely knit communities to Sufi orders remains 
incomplete. 
 
This study will attempt to account for this transition in Sufism by focusing our study on 
the emergence of Kubrawī Sufism. The study will be doubly useful in this regard since 
the first generation of Kubrawī Sufis have not been considered for their significance in 
the institutionalisation of Sufism. Our study will highlight the importance of 
understanding early Kubrawī thought in the context of this transition by focusing on 
the figure of Majd al-Dīn al-Baghdādī (d. 616/1219). Al-Baghdādī was one of Kubrā’s 
most important students, whose work has not received the scholarly attention it 
deserves. His most important text, the Tuḥfat al-barara fī al-masā’il al-‘ashra, which 
translates to The Gem of Purity in the Ten Questions, is one of the clearest cases for the 
relevance of Kubrawī Sufi thought to the stratification of Sufi communities and will 
provide us with the primary text for our investigation. 
 
Al-Baghdādī’s Tuḥfa has not yet been the subject of an extensive study. This is therefore 
an important step towards understanding the development of Kubrawī thought and its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Al-Qushayrī, al-Risālah, 333-334. 
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relationship to the changes which Sufi communities underwent at the time. The Tuḥfa 
represents an important systematisation of Kubrā’s ideas that many later Kubrawī 
writers heavily relied upon. This thesis will attempt to detail al-Baghdādī’s theoretical 
framework as well as asking what this systematisation of Kubrawī ideas can tell us 
about the transition of Sufism in this period. This will address some glaring gaps in our 
understanding of Sufism in this period. 
  
Each chapter of the Tuḥfa focuses on some aspect of Sufi practice. However al-
Baghdādī’s answers are often informed by significant theoretical discussions. 
Psychology and cosmology are interwoven with explanations of the origins of Sufi 
practices and ideal Sufi behaviour throughout the Tuḥfa. The text is immensely 
important for a number of reasons. It reveals a systematisation of Kubrawī Sufi theory 
through its incorporation of concepts found in al-Ghazālī’s thought, and contributes to 
the gradual shift of the Sufi community towards ṭarīqa Sufism.  
 
It is divided into ten chatpers. Chapters one and two answer questions pertaining to 
Sufi practice, from which legal school to follow to dress and appearance. Al-Baghdādī 
then turns to providing definition of shaykh-hood and discipleship in chapters three 
and four respectively. Chapters five and six detail the rules of seclusion and 
remembrance practices (dhikr), as well as discussing the production of dreams and 
visions and how to distinguish between their truths and falsehoods. Chapter seven 
attempts to answer the question of the origin of the Sufi cloak and details the practice 
of investiture. Chapters eight and nine answer questions pertaining to dispensations 
from the law and Sufi practice, and whether it is possible for the shaykh to break the 
religious law in accordance with his divine inspiration. Finally chapter ten contains a 
very brief response to questions regarding the correct relationship between Sufis, 
political rulers, and wider society, as well as a more extensive discussion of the practice 
of audition concerts (samā‘). 
	   12	  
 
1 .  The Kubrawiyya 
 
The Kubrawiyya trace their origins to Najm al-Dīn Kubrā who was active in the 12th and 
13th centuries. This was a turbulent time in the history of Iran and Central Asia, and a 
crucial period in the development of Sufism. The decline of the Saljuqs in Iran in the 
12th century led to the emergence of the Khwarazmshahs as an independent empire, 
having previously been their vassals. While the first Khwarazmshah, Tekish (d. 
596/1200) seems to have established the independence of his state successfully, the 
reign of his son ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Muḥammad (d. 617/1220) was marked by internal turmoil 
and a fractured political class. With a failed march on Baghdād against the Caliph al-
Nāṣir, and internal strife between him and his mother, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s poor judgement 
eventually incurred the wrath of Genghis Khan, leading to the Mongol invasions of 
1220. This was an extremely significant event in the minds of Muslim writers and was 
characterised as one of the greatest devastations by historiographers such as al-
Juwaynī and Ibn al-Athīr. 3 
 
Yet despite the turmoil of the period, we witness a flourishing of Sufi thought and the 
increasing importance of the Sufi lodge in society during this time. During these times 
of political uncertainty, there was a need for communities like Sufism and the futuwwa 
(chivalrous groups) to provide people with a much needed sense of cohesion, stability 
and continuity.4 The Kubrawiyya are one such group whose ideas and communities 
survived, and which functioned as an order from around the 14th until at least the 17th 
century.5  Afterwards there is little evidence of Kubrawī activity, however the shrine of 
Najm al-Dīn Kubrā remained an important site of religious devotion and pilgrimage so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See Bosworth, ‘Khwārazm-Shāhs’, Encyclopedia of Islam, vol. 2. 
4 Ohlander, ‘Inner Worldly’, 15-16.  
5 Waley, ‘The Kubrawiyyah’, 103. 
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that the Kubrawiyya was assumed to be active in Central Asia even into the 20th 
century.6 
 
In the medieval period, the Kubrawiyya were an extremely influential community of 
Sufis. When the Ilkhanate was established in Iran, it was Kubrawī shaykhs who presided 
over the conversion of the Mongol rulers to Islam.7 Figures such as ‘Alā’ al-Dawla al-
Simnānī (d. 736/1336) also had close ties to the Ilkhanid court and continued to 
establish Sufi communities which derived legitimacy from the Kubrawī spiritual lineage 
(silsila). Al-Simnānī’s student, Sayyid ‘Alī al-Hamadānī (d. 826/1423) is considered to 
represent the point at which the Kubrawiyya began to function as an order rather than 
a Sufi community with a loose network of members. Al-Hamadānī is also credited with 
proselytising and converting the population of Kashmir to Islam. Thus, the Kubrawiyya 
were a prominent political and social force for a long period in Iranian and Central 
Asian history. 
 
The Kubrawiyya also produced a particular school of Sufi thought with distinctive 
psychological theories. Najm al-Dīn Kubrā made significant contributions to the 
development of Sufi psychology in his work Fawā’iḥ al-jamāl wa-fawātiḥ al-jalāl. Though 
the text is autobiographical in parts, it nonetheless represents the emergence of a 
particular psychological theory which heavily emphasises the conception of the senses, 
the imagination, the production of dreams and visions, and their relationship to the 
soul on its path to perfection. 
 
Al-Baghdādī further developed these ideas significantly and systematised them in a 
more coherent and consistent manner in his Tuḥfat al-barara. Through al-Baghdādī’s 
disciple, Najm al-Dīn al-Rāzī-Dāyā (d. 654/1256), these theories were disseminated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Deweese, ‘The Eclipse’, 46. 
7 Waley, ‘The Kubrawiyyah’, 100. 
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throughout the Islamic world as al-Rāzī fled from the Mongols to Anatolia and then Iraq 
and produced his Mirṣād al-‘ibād in Persian then in Arabic. While the school and many 
individual Kubrawīs have been the subjects of study by scholars, the figure of Majd al-
Dīn al-Baghdādī seems not to have received much attention. this thesis will show that 
al-Baghdādī was a pivotal figure in Kubrawī thought and history. 
 
By analysing al-Baghdādī’s Tuḥfa, this study will show that Kubrā’s ideas were 
significantly refined and explained by al-Baghdādī, producing a coherent 
systematisation of Kubrā’s work. Furthermore, al-Baghdādī’s influence can be seen in 
the writings of many other Kubrawīs who are indebted to this systematisation. It will be 
shown that al-Baghdādī was an influential figure who actively contributed to, and was 
representative of, a wider trend in Sufism through his systematisation of Kubrawī 
psychology, providing an important theoretical basis for the formalisation of Sufi 
behaviour.   
 
Throughout this thesis al-Baghdādī will be referred to as a Kubrawī. The applicability of 
this term in reference to al-Baghdādī is not without its problems, as whether the first 
generation of Sufis who were attached to Kubrā understood themselves as “Kubrawīs” 
has been called into question. The reasons for this however will become clear through 
an analysis of al-Baghdādī’s Tuḥfa, as answering this question is only possible after an 
extensive study, however the arugments will be summarised here.  
 
While this became the name by which the order was known due to tracing its lineage 
back to Najm al-Dīn Kubrā, it is more likely that ‘Alī al-Hamadānī marks the point at 
which Kubrā began to be conceived of as its founder. Deweese points to the 14th century 
hagiographical work on al-Hamadānī, the Manqabat al-jawāhir, to argue that by this time 
in the history of the Kubrawiyya, a sense of self-conscious distinctiveness emerges 
among members of the community, which signals its completed transition into an 
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order.8 Hence it would appear problematic to refer to a first generation of Kubrawīs 
since it is unlikely that they would have conceived of themselves as such. 
 
This throws some doubt on the suitability of the term “Kubrawī” for describing Kubrā 
and al-Baghdādī. However, it will be argued here that al-Baghdādī’s work is evidence of 
the germination of what came to be called the Kubrawiyya, and in this sense represents 
the emergence of a distinct proto-Kubrawī community. This term can be reasonably 
applied to the earlier generation of Kubrawīs for a number of reasons. While we do not 
wish to propose that Kubrā and al-Baghdādī had established an order in the form that 
was evinced in the later periods in the history of Sufism, it will be made clear 
throughout this thesis that al-Baghdādī’s work is evidence of an emerging self-
conscious distinction between his own proto-Kubrawī community and other Sufi 
groups and communities.  
 
It will be shown throughout this thesis that the existence of a self-consciously distinct 
community in al-Baghdādī’s text is dependent upon a network of Sufi members who 
share a spiritual lineage to Kubrā through al-Baghdādī, and whose shared beliefs and 
practices are built upon theories which originate with Kubrā. These shared beliefs, 
practices and identities are built on theories which originate in Kubrā’s writings and 
are developed by al-Baghdādī. Al-Baghdādī’s development of Kubrawī thought renders 
it a lived experience through by virtue of a close connection between theory and 
practice. This becomes the basis for a collective identity which is particular to a 
network of Sufis attached to Kubrā and al-Baghdādī, as the community depends upon 
specifically Kubrawī theories which distinguish it from other Sufi communities.  
 
Kubrā’s thought is central to al-Baghdādī’s formalisation of the structure of the Sufi 
community. It also consistently recurs in the works of later authors such as al-Simnānī. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Deweese, ‘Sayyid ‘Alī Hamadānī’, 140. 
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The development of theories of coloured visions, oneirology, micro-cosmology and the 
anatomy of the soul in the Tuḥfa which closely follow the Fawā’iḥ will be shown to 
inform the structure of the Sufi institution, its hierarchy, notions of lineage and 
belonging, and even the material culture of the community.  
 
Hence, al-Baghdādī’s systematisation of Kubra’s thought is not restricted to purely 
theoretical discussions. It is also crucial for the existence of the community as a distinct 
group. It is therefore reasonable to refer to this early community as a proto-Kubrawī 
community given the centrality of Kubrā’s ideas in the development of al-Baghdādī’s 
thought and practice. Hence, while the first generation of Kubrawīs may not have 
conceived of themselves as such, the term “Kubrawī” is still useful for describing a 
collection of characteristics which originate with Kubrā and are significantly developed 
by al-Baghdādī. 
 
Nevertheless, the question of continuity between the first generation of Kubawīs like 
al-Baghdādī and the Kubrawiyya order of al-Hamadānī remains difficult to determine. 
While there are consistencies in thought and practice, it is difficult to assess the 
persistence of Kubrā and al-Baghdādī’s institutions and communities. Al-Simnānī, al-
Hamadānī’s teacher, positions himself within the Kubrawiyya yet his connection to the 
Kubrawī spiritual chain through ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Isfarā’inī (d. 690/1291) rests only on a 
brief amount of time spent together and the remainder of their relationship seems to 
have been conducted through letters and spiritual visions. Despite an institutional 
continuity being somewhat tenuous in this case, it is important to accept al-Simnānī’s 
conception of himself as being a part of the Kubrawī Sufi tradition given that much of 
his thought attests to the heavy influence of both al-Baghdādī and Kubrā. The 
connection is in fact plausible, Isfarā’inī who was trained by al-Baghdādī’s student Raḍī 
al-Dīn ‘Alī Lālā (d. 642/1244), was profoundly influenced by al-Baghdādī’s articulation of 
shaykh-disciple conduct in the Tuḥfa. Given his close connection to al-Simnānī, it is very 
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likely that al-Baghdādī’s contribution to the development of proto-Kubrawī identity 
influenced these later thinkers.9 
 
Kubrā and al-Baghdādī functioned as separate shaykhs at the same time, which could 
have caused confusion over the correct sequence of lineage. Al-Rāzī, for example 
studied under Kubrā and al-Baghdādī but only refers to al-Baghdādī as “our shaykh” 
and hardly ever mentions Kubrā. Hence, it seems that al-Rāzī would be more likely to 
conceive of himself as a Baghdādian than a Kubrawī. This however does not detract 
from the applicability of the term proto-Kubrawī in describing al-Rāzī given that al-
Baghdādī largely relied on Kubrā’s thought in his own systematisation of psychology 
and practice. We will also show in this analysis that al-Baghdādī attempted to resolve 
this confusion over lineage caused by the existence of multiple shaykhs within one 
community through his discussion of the Shaykh of birth-right (wilāda) and the 
formalisation of the bond of companionship (ṣuḥba). 
 
Throughout this study, a consistency between Kubrawī thought and practice will be 
highlighted, and its centrality to the emerging self-conscious communal identity will be 
evinced in al-Baghdādī’s text. This can reasonably be described as proto-Kubrawī in 
character. This question of terminology is in a sense intertwined with the aims of this 
thesis, and only strengthens the case for urgently studying the work of al-Baghdādī as a 
figure who typifies the transition and transformation of Sufism into orders. This 
nascent Kubrawī thought and practice and its significance for the development of the 
Sufi community has hitherto been insufficiently explored and hence we may only fully 
answer the question of the applicability of the term ‘proto-Kubrawī’ after an in-depth 
study of al-Baghdādī’s thought. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See Landolt’s Introduction to Kāshif al-asrār. 
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2. Scholarly context 
 
Despite the importance of this period in the history of Sufism, our knowledge of 
Sufism’s transition to orders remains incomplete. Recently, invaluable investigations 
have been conducted on the figure of ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī and his institutionalisation 
of Sufism by scholars such as Erik Ohlander and Arin Shawqat Salamah-Qudsi, leading 
to a greater understanding of Sufism in the central Islamic lands including Iraq, the 
Levant and Anatolia during this period. By contrast the early Kubrawīs remain 
understudied in this regard and our knowledge of the development of Sufism in Iran at 
the time is patchy.  
 
Studies which detail the institutionalisation of the Kubrawiyya have largely focused on 
the later periods of their activity. Scholars such as Devin Deweese and Shahzad Bashir 
have illuminated our understanding of the Kubrawiyya in later centuries, when it began 
to function as a fully-fledged order while our understanding of the earlier period 
remains opaque. However, the relevance of early Kubrawī thought to the 
institutionalisation of Sufism has managed to evade an in-depth investigation since 
much of the literature concerning the first generation of Kubrawīs focuses solely on the 
development of Kubrawī thought.  
 
The first generation of Kubrawīs have traditionally been distinguished for their 
propensity in detailing and interpreting the internal psychological experiences of the 
Sufi. Certainly, Kubrā’s focus on dream theory, coloured visions and the psycho-
spiritual experiences of the Sufi stand out as some of the more captivating features of 
his work. However, this may also have given the impression that these early Kubrawīs 
were more interested in the internal, spiritual and mental dimensions of the human 
being, while paying little attention to the social and political importance of Sufism. 
Deweese for example, suggests that the Kubrawiyya were eventually supplanted by the 
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Naqshabandiyya due to the preference of the former for detailing dream and visionary 
experiences rather than engaging with societal and political concerns.10 In opposition 
to this, we will show that the development of oneirology and visionary theory in al-
Baghdādī’s work was directly relevant to the social and political challenges of the 12th 
and 13th centuries. 
 
This oversight is to some extent a symptom of neglecting a serious study of Majd al-Dīn 
al-Baghdādī’s thought. So far, other Kubrawī works have eclipsed the Tuḥfa in terms of 
scholarly attention. Yet al-Baghdādī provides one of the clearest examples of the 
interconnection between Kubrawī thought and the institutionalisation of Sufism. 
Looking at Kubrā’s work on its own without considering Majd al-Dīn al-Baghdādī and 
his Tuḥfat al-barara will not bring to light the connection between Kubrawī thought and 
changes within the Sufi community. Moreover, works attributed to Kubrā which do 
focus on Sufi practice such as the Ādāb al-murīdīn are of dubious authorship, as we will 
discuss.  
 
Kubrā’s most famous work, the Fawā’iḥ al-jamāl wa-fawātiḥ al-jalāl, does not tell us much 
about the development of Sufi communities. It provides much insight into Kubrā’s 
thought. However, it is somewhat autobiographical in nature, describing the author’s 
visions and experiences. Its style is fluid, shifting between theoretical expositions and 
recounting the author’s visionary experiences, and as such its discussions are not 
intended to provide a complete and coherent expositions of the author’s thought. 
Hence, it does not provide a systematic account of Kubrā’s thought, nor does it reveal 
the relevance of this to the stratification of Sufi practice, the development of communal 
bonds or the centralisation of the shaykh’s authority. As a result, its relationship to the 
transition of Sufism into orders is difficult to assess if the work is considered in 
isolation. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Deweese, ‘The Eclipse’, 79-80. 
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By contrast the arguments in al-Baghdādī’s work are more clearly set out, more 
coherently structured, and deal directly with very practical concerns. Yet the Tuḥfa is 
also an extremely theoretical work, invaluable for anyone wishing to understand 
Kubrā’s thought in more depth as al-Baghdādī goes further than his teacher in 
explaining the mechanisms behind the experiences of visions and dreaming and the 
place of the soul and the imagination within this, as well as the framework for 
diagnosing the state of the soul through dream interpretation for example. Al-
Baghdādī’s oneirology, as well as being more systematic than Kubrā’s, is also relevant to 
the formalisation and centralisation of the Sufi community. Scholarly treatment of 
early Kubrawī thought so far has not paid enough attention to the institutional 
implication behind Kubrawī thought with regard to dreams, visions, or psychology, and 
this study will aim to address this.  
 
Al-Baghdādī’s thought is crucial for understanding, not only Kubrā’s ideas, but other 
important Kubrawī figures as well such as ‘Alā’ al-Dawla al-Simnānī and Najm al-Dīn al-
Rāzī, both of whom have received much more attention than al-Baghdādī. These later 
Kubrawī authors clearly rely on the Tuḥfa. Al-Rāzī quotes directly from it in his work, 
the mirṣād al-‘ibād and it will be shown that many of the passages in al-Rāzī’s text owe 
more to al-Baghdādī’s Tuḥfa than Kubrā’s Fawā’iḥ. Yet al-Baghdādī’s influence on these 
thinkers has not been adequately highlighted or recognised.  
 
There is an abundance of material available detailing the thought of various Kubrawī 
figures. Most notably Jamal Elias on al-Simnānī, Hamid Algar on al-Rāzī, Landolt on 
Isfarā’inī, and Fritz Meier on Kubrā.  None however has focused on al-Baghdādī. Yet, 
there is comparatively little which focuses on Majd al-Dīn al-Baghdādī. This study will 
fill an important gap in our knowledge by analysing al-Baghdādī’s work which will also 
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allow us to better understand the works of the figures listed above. Hence, students of 
the Kubrawiyya will benefit immensely from an analysis of al-Baghdādī’s work.  
 
Connected to the question of the development Kubrawī thought and practice in this 
period is the rise of antinomianism, which has been addressed in recent studies. The 
work of Ahmet Karamustafa has been particularly useful in understanding the place of 
antinomian mystical groups such as the Qalandariyya and Ḥaydariyya in the 12th and 
13th centuries and in the history of Sufism more generally. Karamustafa crucially 
connects the rise of antinomianism to the increasing stratification of the Sufi 
institution and its ever closer connection to the political establishment, which 
compromised its legitimacy.11 Previously, it had been suggested that the rise in 
antinomianism was due to Mongol rule and the supposed similarity between the 
religion of these dervishes and Shamanism which encouraged the spread of Sufism.12 
 
This theory regarding the origins of mystical groups such as the Qalandarīs has since 
lost ground as scholars such as Karamustafa present us with more credible frameworks. 
Our study will lend even more credence to the idea that antinomianism should be seen 
as a response to the institutionalisation of Sufism which entailed an increased 
centralisation of the shaykh’s authority, increasing elitist notions, as well as its ever 
closer links with the political establishment. Moreover, given that the centre of power 
in the Mongol Ilkhanate was in Iran and that the rulers maintained a close connection 
to the Kubrawiyya, our study will be significant for calling into question the assertion 
that the Mongols had a hand in propagating antinomianism. Throughout our analysis 
we will show that al-Baghdādī’s centralisation of authority around the Sufi shaykh has 
marked implications for the legitimacy of non-affiliated mystics and does not confine 
this to those who belong to antinomian communities.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Karamustafa, ‘Antinomian Sufis’, 114. 
12 Trimingham, The Sufi Orders, 54. 
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While al-Baghdādī does attempt to restrict antinomianism, we will see that he does not 
single out any particular group or figure in doing so. Al-Baghdādī’s strategy throughout 
is never to deny that non-affiliated Sufis have genuine spiritual experiences. Instead he 
argues that they are not fit for institutional positions or for teaching aspiring Sufis. 
Hence he bars non-affiliated mystics from institutional positions. At the same time, al-
Baghdādī will be shown to allow some exceptions for antinomian behaviour in granting 
the Sufi shaykh some degree of freedom to dispense with what he terms the “manifest” 
sharī‘a. This dispensation is essential for the elitist conception of Sufism revealed in al-
Baghdādī’s work, whereby the Sufi shaykh is the greatest authority in Muslim society.  
 
Hence, al-Baghdādī’s work should not be seen as a polemic against antinomianism. 
Rather its core aim in this regard is to centralise the authority of the shaykh within the 
Sufi community, placing institutional restrictions on expressions of antinomianism by 
reserving any seeming contravention of Islamic law or custom as the right of the 
qualified shaykh. Such a reading lends more credence to the notion that antinomianism 
emerged as a reaction to the increasing institutionalisation of Sufism as scholars such 
as Karamustafa have suggested. 
 
3 .  Aims  
 
All the aims of this thesis will be part of an attempt to understand the significance of al-
Baghdādī’s thought for this transitional period in the history of Sufism. The gaps in our 
understanding of the development of Kubrawī Sufi communities are accompanied by 
gaps in our understanding of the development of Kubrawī thought. There are 
important contributions to be made by this study in both areas. Before detailing the 
relevance of al-Baghdādī’s thought for the development of the Sufi community, we will 
need to provide an account of his theoretical framework which may only be grasped 
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with an exposition of his psychology. This psychology is consistent with Kubrā’s 
however it is also more systematic and coherent in its approach. This will be an 
important project in itself, as it will show that al-Baghdādī systematises Kubrā’s 
thought, and reveals the importance of the adoptions of key philosophical notions 
through al-Ghazālī for the development of Kubrawī psychology. And through this 
analysis of al-Baghdādī’s psychology we will also be able to detail al-Baghdādī’s 
oneirology which is significant for understanding the institutionalisation of Sufism in 
the Kubrawī context. This will also provide new insight regarding the impact of al-
Baghdādī’s work on later Kubrawī authors such as al-Rāzī, al-Simnānī and Isfarā’inī.  
 
Works on the Kubrawiyya tend to focus either on Sufi theory or institutionalisation but 
the two are hardly discussed in tandem. This study will attempt to bridge this divide in 
scholarship, connecting theory and practice in the work of al-Baghdādī in order to 
witness his institutionalisation of Kubrawī Sufism. It will also reveal the importance of 
al-Baghādī’s role as a thinker who signalled the transformation of Sufism from 
communities into orders by proving that his development of Kubrawī theory is 
inseparable from his efforts to institutionalise the Sufi community. Hence our study 
will elucidate how early Kubrawī thought informed the institutionalisation of the Sufi 
community. 
 
We will show that al-Baghdādī employs Kubrawī theory in order to centralise authority 
around the shaykh, as well as stratify the hierarchy of the Sufi community. In addition, 
we will show that the Tuḥfa is evidence of the emergence of a self-conscious sense of 
identity which marks the proto-Kubrawī community out from other Sufi groups, 
something more commonly associated with later Sufi orders who were more fiercely 
competitive. In connection to this, our study will also offer an important comparison of 
the early Kubrawiyya and early Suhrawardiyya. The difference between the two 
communities in this early period has not been fully realised thus far.  
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This study will also elucidate the relationship between the early Kubrawiyya and the 
political class under the Khwarazmshahs. Caught between the decline of the Saljuqs and 
the invasions of the Mongols, this was tumultuous period in the history of Iran and 
Khwarazm which saw much violence and political turmoil as well as the rise of 
antinomian mystical groups. Studying al-Baghdādī’s work will provide a valuable 
insight into Sufi responses to changing social and political realities.  
 
This period is also accompanied by a rise in antinomian activity, and the question 
recurs throughout the Tuḥfa. Hence, one of our primary aims in this study is to address 
al-Baghdādī’s discussions of antinomianism and dispensations from the law and Sufi 
practice, as well as detailing his thoughts on the relationship between Sufis and 
political rulers and considering what this may tell us about Sufism in this period. Both 
these issues feature prominently throughout the Tuḥfa and our treatment of them here 
will reveal new considerations for the study of these topics. Our study will attempt to 
broaden our understanding of the relationship between Sufism and antinomianism by 
showing that questions regarding antinomianism, political affiliation, and the role of 
the Sufi in wider society are inseparable in the Tuḥfa.  
 
While on the surface al-Baghdādī’s insistence that a Sufi may not dispense with Sufi 
practice or break the religious law seems to be solely directed at heretical mystics, 
these questions also determine the extent to which Sufis may initiate lay-affiliates into 
their ranks which at times did include political rulers. In addition, the question of 
antinomianism will be shown to be directly relevant to the emerging eltisim of the Sufi 
institution which had to compete against other legal and Sufi institutions for influence.  
 
This study will show that all these questions are in some way tied to the 
interdependence of Kubrawī theory and practice which al-Baghdādī crafts and 
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emphasises. This theoretical framework is drawn upon in order to address a number of 
problems faced by the Sufi community at the time, from rising antinomianism as well 
as political and societal turmoil and dislocation. In this regard, al-Baghdādī’s 
psychological framework will prove to be an extremely useful discursive tool, able to 
address these very pertinent practical purposes.  
 
4 .  Structure  
 
In the first chapter of this thesis we will consider al-Baghdādī’s biography and context 
in order to highlight his importance which has been largely overlooked. Here we will 
bring to light evidence of al-Baghdādī’s intimate connections to the political class. We 
will discuss his position in the Kubrawī community in light of competing hagiographies 
which present problems for our understanding of the relationship between al-Baghdādī 
and Kubrā, as well as other Kubrawī figures. Crucially, we will point out al-Baghdādī’s 
significance as the shaykh of Najm al-Dīn al-Rāzī and Rāḍī al-Dīn ‘Alī Lālā, two of the 
most important figures for the dissemination of Kubrawī thought and practice who 
viewed al-Baghdādī as their primary shaykh rather than Kubrā. We will also attempt to 
make sense of the ambiguities surrounding al-Baghdādī’s death. This will serve to 
highlight that al-Baghdādī was a historically significant figure whose work was highly 
influential. 
 
We will then begin our analysis of the Tuḥfa. Our aim in the second chapter is to provide 
an analysis of al-Baghdādī’s psychological theory. This provides the framework upon 
which most of al-Baghdādī’s arguments are built. Here we will provide an account of al-
Baghdādī’s systematisation of Kubrā’s work. We will show here that the reception of 
important ideas from al-Ghazālī, Avicenna and other Sufi thinkers is extremely 
important for al-Baghdādī as it provides him with the conceptual tools for his 
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systematisation of Kubrawī thought. We will detail, here some defining features of 
Kubrawī thought such as visions of coloured lights and dreams in light of al-Baghdādi’s 
text. This will show that al-Baghdādī presents a much more coherent account of the 
relationship between the soul and the body including the inner and outer senses than 
Kubrā does. We will also highlight the extent to which this framework is consistent 
with later Kubrawī works which indicates the influence of al-Baghdādī’s ideas on later 
thinkers. 
 
In the 3rd chapter we will move onto detailing al-Baghdādī’s account of the shaykh and 
the disciple. Here we will show that the theoretical framework detailed in the chapter 
on psychology is employed in structuring relationships within the Sufi community. We 
will see that through this al-Baghdādī attempts to further centralise the authority of 
the shaykh, as well as crafting a clear hierarchy of members and developing rules which 
govern Sufi behaviour. We will show that he also establishes a sense of communal 
belonging through his recourse to oneirology. 
 
In the 4th chapter we turn to the question of antinomianism which features 
prominently in the Tuḥfa. Here we will show that al-Baghdādī attempts to control 
expressions of antinomianism through institutionalisation and further stratification of 
the Sufi community. Through these efforts, dispensation from the law becomes the 
right of the shaykh alone. This highlights the emerging elitist notions of the Sufi 
institution above other institutions such as the legal school. Again, the psychological 
framework is employed extensively to maintain these positions. This is seen in al-
Baghdādī’s development of a detailed prophetology which is intertwined with his 
discussion of antinomianism. 
 
Finally, we will discuss al-Baghdādī’s conception of investiture. This offers an important 
insight into the development of a distinctly Kubrawī Sufi identity against other 
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emerging communal Sufi identities. This identity will be shown to be a consequence of 
the strong connection between theory and practice in al-Baghdādī’s thought which 
links the discursive and institutional in the Tuḥfa. The emergence of such an identity is 
important for the transition of Sufism into orders, as it is indicative of competition 
between different Sufi groups with distinct identities. Furthermore, we will also 
highlight the relevance of discussions of antinomianism and dispensations from the law 
to the relationship between Sufis and political rulers in this chapter. 
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Chapter 1 
Al-Baghdād ī ’s  Life in Context 
 
Majd al-Dīn Abū Sa‘īd Sharaf ibn al-Mu’ayyad ibn Abū al-Fatḥ al-Baghdādī’s was born in 
565/1169-70 and died in 616/1219. Key details of his life and the circumstances of his 
death are relatively well known, and while the particulars of these accounts do differ, 
there is a consistency in placing his execution at the hands of the Khwarazmshah ‘Alā’ 
al-Dīn Muḥammad. Despite this general accord regarding the circumstances of his 
death, the causes of his death are marked by controversy. This variation in the 
information passed down to us regarding al-Baghdādī’s life and death has led to 
differing interpretations regarding his place within Kubrawī Sufism and his 
relationship with his teacher, Najm al-Dīn Kubrā.  
 
Al-Baghdādī’s standing within Kubrawī Sufism seems to have been understated. This 
may be due to the influence of the hagiographer Jāmī whose account of al-Baghdādī’s 
death asserts a rupture between al-Baghdādī and Kubrā. This may have contributed to 
the neglect of al-Baghdādī as he is not often credited as the primary shaykh of some key 
Kubrawī figures who undoubtedly viewed him as their main spiritual mentor. 
Furthermore, his systematisation of Kubrā’s thought clearly had a lasting impact on 
many Kubrawī authors. Yet the conflicting biographical and hagiographical accounts 
seem to have affected the way in which scholars have perceived al-Baghdādī’s position 
within the Kubrawī Sufi network. Many of these accounts intend to diminish al-
Baghdādī’s significance in favour of other Kubrawī figures, which has in turn led to the 
neglect of al-Baghdādī in scholarship. 
 
This chapter will reassess the details of al-Baghdādī’s life by analysing the differing 
accounts available to us from medieval historiographers, hagiographers and 
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biographers, in addition to drawing on al-Baghdādī’s own writings. Through this 
analysis, al-Baghdādī will be considered in a new light. So far his politically prominent 
position, his crucial contribution towards the development of the Kubrawī order, and 
his influence upon some of the most prominent and prolific Kubrawī figures has been 
underestimated. Reconstructing al-Baghdādī’s biography will have an important impact 
on our discussion of the Tuḥfa, allowing us to consider the implications of al-Baghdādī’s 
Sufism not only for its theoretical contribution, but for its social and political relevance 
as well. 
 
Unfortunately, we will not be able to decisively resolve all of the ambiguities which 
mark the circumstances of al-Baghdādī’s death here due to the lack of material 
available to us, as well as the scope of this thesis. However, we will posit a reading 
which corroborates the evidence presented. Despite the lack of detail, we can come to 
some important conclusions in a reassessment of al-Baghdādī’s life, context, and the 
circumstances of his death. These conclusions will provide us with important 
information regarding al-Baghdādī’s relationship with Kubrā, his attitude towards 
political rulers, as well as his standing within the Sufi community of his day. Such 
questions are directly relevant to this study as they will contextualise the Tuḥfa within 
the challenges that the al-Baghdādī and his Sufi community faced. 
 
1.  The Sources 
 
Most of the information about al-Baghdādī is found in biographical and hagiographical 
material. The latter accounts are more extensive, while the former tend to comprise of 
shorter entries. Yet the biographical works such as Muḥammad ‘Awfī’s and Ḥamdullah 
al-Mustawfī al-Qazwīnī’s are important for recounting particular meetings between al-
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Baghdādī and other prominent figures.13 We can add to these sources information from 
al-Baghdādī’s own writings such as some passages in the Tuḥfa, as well as in his letters 
to Sharaf al-Dīn al-Balkhī and his disciple Raḍī al-Dīn ‘Alī Lālā.14  There exists a 
certificate of instruction (ijāzat irshād) from al-Baghdādī to the same ‘Alī Lālā. 15 
Furthermore, ‘Alā’ al-Dawla al-Simnānī provides us with biographical details in his 
Chihil majlis, while Najm al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Mirṣād al-‘ibād contains some clues regarding al-
Baghdādī’s standing within the Sufi community.  All these figures seem to have 
considered al-Baghdādī to be a chief influence in their spiritual careers. Lālā in 
particular is extremely important for the survival of the order, as the later Kubrawī 
order derived its lineage from him, while al-Rāzī’s work achieved widespread 
popularity. 
 
Information can also be found, to a lesser extent in literary works. We are able to find 
references to al-Baghdādī in poetry which indicates that his image had entered the 
public imagination at the time. For example, Fakhr al-Dīn al-‘Irāqī’s (d. 697/1289) 
‘Ushshāq-nāma portrays Kubrā being smitten with love for the youthful al-Baghdādī and 
recounts an intimate relationship between the two friends.16 Hence their relationship 
was romanticised very early on, indicating that al-Baghdādī’s and Kubrā’s personalities 
remained in the public imagination after their deaths.  
 
However, the most extensive biographical accounts which contemporary scholars have 
relied upon are hagiographical in nature, and some appear more than a century or two 
after his death. One of the more detailed accounts is found in ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Jāmī’s (d. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Al-Mustawfī al-Qazwīnī, Ta’rīkhī Guzīda, vol 2, 215. 
14 Lālā was trained by Kubrā but was then sent to al-Baghdādī for further refinement. He received 
certificates and khirqas from both shaykhs. Lālā seems to have been a dear friend to al-Baghdādī who 
refers to him with much affection in his letters. By contrast Kubrā’s letter to Lālā seems more formulaic 
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15 Al-Baghdādī, Khirqa Hazrāmīkhī, 165. 
16 Al-‘Irāqī, ‘Ushshāq-nāma, 46-47. 
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897/1492) Nafaḥāt al-uns. It provides details regarding the origins of al-Baghdādī’s 
family, his initiation into the Sufi path, his influence on ‘Alā’ al-Dawla al-Simnānī, his 
temporary fall-out with Kubrā and the circumstances of his death. 17  While the 
importance of these hagiographical accounts for constructing al-Baghdādī’s biography 
should not be discounted, there is a need to question the narrative of al-Baghdādī’s 
death. These later narratives embellish al-Baghdādī’s death with information not found 
in older material. They emerge in the context of distinct Sufi communities and orders 
competing for social and political influence. Before we begin our analysis of these 
hagiographical sources however, it is essential to situate al-Baghdādī in the wider 
context of the political and influential figures who make up his friends and 
acquaintances first. 
 
2 .  Relations with influential  f igures and the ruling classes 
 
That al-Baghdādī was influential is of course seen in the homage paid to him by al-
Simnānī, al-Rāzī and ‘Alī Lālā. While his contributions in Sufism influenced both 
contemporary and later authors, his influence during his day goes beyond his circle of 
Sufis. It is clear that he was also a socially and politically significant figure. During the 
reign of the Khwarazmshah ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Mūḥammad (1200-1220), it appears that despite 
the political turmoil, literary and religious learning was flourishing, especially in 
Nishapur.18 This is evinced by Muḥammad ‘Awfī’s (d. 639/1242) biography of poets, the 
Lubāb al-albāb’s which comprises of an extensive amount of poems, many of which were 
composed by Sufi shaykhs and legal scholars from that region. During this time, we can 
identify a number of figures with links to the Khwarazmshah’s court and also kept 
company with al-Baghdādī. Many of these figures can be found in ‘Awfī’s Lubāb and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Jāmī, Nafaḥāt al-uns, 487-492. 
18 Nizam al-Dīn, Introduction to the Jawāmi‘, 4. 
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Jawāmi‘ and are listed as scholars and Sufis of Nishapur, indicating that al-Baghdādī did 
close connections with the scholarly community of Nishapur. 
 
Among them is the imam Abu Sa‘īd Muḥammad ibn Fakhr al-Dīn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Kūfī. 
Al-Baghdādī relates an anecdote from this figure on his own authority, indicating that 
he had met him personally. He is referred to by al-Baghdādī as “the shaykh” 
Muḥammad al-Kūfī.19 While al-Baghdādī’s references him as a Sufi, he is also described 
as a Hanafi scholar by ‘Awfī.20 This coalescence of Sufism and legal scholarship is 
common amongst contemporaries of al-Baghdādī and ‘Awfī often refers to these figures 
in both their capacity as Sufis and jurist. Al-Kūfī was close to ‘Alā’ al-Dīn 
Khwarazmshah’s father and the first Khwarazmshah, Tekish (d. 598/1200). The 
historian al-Juwaynī affirms this and states that Kūfī was one of the most distinguished 
imams of his day and held the posts of qāḍī (judge) and “shaykh of Islam” of Khurasan.21 
Al-Kufī was killed by one of Khwarazmshah Tekish’s enemies, Menqlī Beg in Nishapur in 
the year 582/1186-7.  This is an important piece of information since al-Baghdādī does 
not refer to Kūfī as having passed away in the Tuḥfa, indicating that it could have been 
written prior to al-Kūfī’s death. 
 
Al-Baghdādī also had much closer ties to the Khwarazmshah’s court. His brother Bahā’ 
al-Dīn al-Baghdādī, author of a collection of letters known as Risālat al-tawāṣul ilā al-
tarāsul, was one of Khwarazmshah’s secretaries. Bahā’ al-Dīn seems to have been more 
active in politics during Tekish’s reign and was imprisoned by Menqlī Beg after he was 
sent to conclude a peace treaty with him prior to the killing of al-Kūfī.22 He is 
mentioned again in al-Juwaynī’s history, in a discussion with the latter’s grandfather 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Al-Baghdādī, Tuḥfat al-barara, 36. 
20 ‘Awfi, Lubāb al-albāb, vol. 2, 228. 
21 Al-Juwaynī, The World Conqueror, 295. 
22 Al-Juwaynī, The World Conqueror, 294. 
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Bahā’ al-Dīn Mūḥammad ibn ‘Alī al-Juwaynī, in the presence of Tekish.23 He seems to 
have cultivated a close relationship with Tekish and is seen accompanying the 
Khwarazmshah on various travels. He appears less often during the reign of Tekish’s 
son ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Muḥammad. 
 
Another important figure, Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Khwaqī was the wakīl, or secretary of 
the Khwarazmshah. Al-Juwaynī also refers to him as a revered imam and a “pillar of the 
faith”, and mentions his efforts in mobilising the people with his sermons to the 
defence of Khwarazm against the attempted invasion of the Ghurids in the wake of 
Tekish’s death.24 It seems that despite his efforts in aiding ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Khwarazmshah’s 
empire during his early reign, Khwaqī later had doubts about his own role within the 
state. ‘Awfī mentions a correspondence between al-Baghdādī and Khwaqī, in which he 
asked al-Baghdādī for advice regarding his service of ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Khwarazmshah.25 
Barthold sums up al-Baghdādī’s reply with the following: 
 
It is no sin to be in the king's service, that he had the opportunity of helping the 
wronged and of consoling the afflicted, and of attaining in these ways to both earthly 
happiness and heavenly blessing more certainly than by means of fasting and prayers.26  
 
It seems that it was common amongst the religious classes to be hesitant in their 
dealings with the ruling classes. As we shall see, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Khwarazmshah’s reign was 
marked by much more instability and corruption in comparison to the rule of his father 
Tekish. Khwaqī’s questioning of the ethics of serving the sultan seems to accompany 
Tekish’s death and ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s rise to power. This is corroborated by ‘Awfī who 
attended the meetings between al-Baghdādī and Khwaqī in the year 600/1204. It is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Al-Juwaynī, The World Conqueror, 299. 
24 Al-Juwaynī, The World Conqueror, 322. 
25 See ‘Awfī, Jawāmi’ al-ḥikāyāt, vol. 4. 
26 Barthold, Turkestan, 376.  
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important to note here that al-Baghdādī’s interactions with the ruling classes seems to 
sour around this time as well. In his letter defending himself against accusations made 
against him by state officials, al-Baghdādī mentions that news had reached him of the 
vizier Niẓām al-Mulk al-Mas‘ūd’s death.27 According to al-Juwaynī, Niẓām al-Mulk al-
Mas‘ūd was assassinated in the year 596/1200.28 This means that al-Baghdādī’s letter 
detailing the accusations levelled against him must have been at some point after ‘Alā’ 
al-Dīn Muḥammad came to power. In the letter he goes on to complain about the 
widespread corruption of the ruling classes and expresses his desire to leave Nishapur 
and return to Khwarazm. The reference to Khwarazm here is important as it was ruled 
by the Queen mother Turkān Khatūn who was the Shah ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s main internal 
adversary.  
 
Al-Baghdādī’s popularity reached far beyond his friends, acquaintances and prominent 
political associations; his popularity had spread among the general populace too.  It is 
important to remember that ‘Awfī wrote a biography of poets and therefore indicates 
al-Baghdādī’s relevance to this genre of literature. ‘Awfī, who met al-Baghdādī, 
distinguishes him from other Sufis by referring to him as the shaykh of shaykhs (shaykh 
al-shuyūkh Ḥaḍrat-i Khwārazm). This was the official term given to a Sufi shaykh who was 
credited as the director of the main Sufi lodge in the region by state officials.29 ‘Awfī 
also tells us that al-Baghdādī was a preacher at the court of the Khwarazmshah and a 
poet, and reasserts that al-Baghdādī was unjustly executed by referring to him as a 
martyr.30 ‘Awfī also reproduces verses eulogising al-Baghdādī after his death. These 
verses were written by an imam named Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn al-Bisṭāmī to whom he refers to as a 
scholar of sharī‘a (law) and ṭarīqa (Sufism).31 The eulogy corroborates the account of al-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Al-Baghdādī, Khirqa Hazrāmīkhī, 171. 
28 Al-Juwaynī, The World Conqueror, 314. 
29 Lewisohn, ‘Iranian Islam’, 13. 
30‘Awfi, Lubāb al-albāb, 250-251; Landolt, ‘Aṭṭār, Sufism and Ismailism’, 9.  
31‘Awfi, Lubāb al-albāb, 252. 
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Baghdādī’s execution by drowning, and adds credibility to the notion that the execution 
of al-Baghdādī alienated the religious classes and institutions, both legal and Sufi, who 
mourned the shaykh’s death.32 
 
Al-Baghdādī is shown to have had some connection with other prominent figures of his 
day. It is likely that he had some contact with the famous poet Farīd al-Dīn ‘Aṭṭār (d. 
627/1230), though whether he trained the poet in Sufism cannot be known for sure. E.G. 
Browne highlights a tradition that states that al-Baghdādī had taught ‘Aṭṭār medicine, 
but states that this seems unlikely.33 However, ‘Aṭṭār does refer to a shaykh named Majd 
al-Dīn al-Khwārazmī in some versions of the Tadhkirat al-Awliyā’; however the name of 
Aḥmad al-Khuwārī is given in another manuscript. 34 Al-Khuwārī is one of al-Baghdādī’s 
disciples and this would still indicate the likelihood of ‘Aṭṭār and al-Baghdādī having 
had some connection.  
 
Furthermore, what is attributed to this figure in the Tadhkirat alludes to the execution 
of al-Baghdādī as al-Khuwārī laments over the loss of “great leaders.” Hence, Landolt 
argues that the lamentation should be attributed to al-Khuwārī, and not al-Baghdādī. In 
this case al-Khuwārī’s lamentation over “the loss of great leaders” would most likely 
refer to al-Baghdādī. Landolt has also pointed out that some shared terminology 
between the Kubrawīyya and ‘Aṭṭār.35 The appearance of particularly Kubrawī phrases 
in ‘Aṭṭār’s work does suggest some familiarity with Kubrawīs. Al-Baghdādī for example, 
often uses phrases such as travelling in God (sayr fī Allāh) and journeying in the world of 
God’s attributes (safar fī ‘ālam ṣifāṭ Allāh).36  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Morgan, Medieval Persia, 50. 
33 Browne, Literary History, Vol. 3, 508. 
34 Landolt, ‘Aṭṭār, Sufism and Ismailism’, 10. 
35 Landolt, ‘Aṭṭār, Sufism and Ismailism’, 9-10. 
36 Al-Baghdādī, Tuḥfat al-barara, 13; 7-8. 
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These phrases function as markers which distinguish a Sufi disciple from a shaykh. The 
disciple travels to God while the shaykh travels in God. That these peculiar phrases are 
repeated by ‘Aṭṭār strengthens the case of the two having had some connection.37 There 
are further similarities to be found between the two thinkers with regard to 
prophetology, as well as the notion of spiritual flight (ṭayr). Because of the prominence 
of this metaphor, al-Baghdādī seems to employ language which is echoed by ‘Aṭṭār’s 
Manṭiq al-ṭayr, or Conference of the Birds.38 The term “manṭiq al-ṭayr” also appears in the 
first line of Kubrā’s Fawā’iḥ.39 It therefore seems likely that ‘Aṭṭār could have had 
contact with al-Baghdādī. This suggests further areas where al-Baghdādī’s influence 
may have been sensed, notably, in the field of poetry and literature for example. It is 
clear that al-Baghdādī was a prominent figure in society in general. He seems to have 
contributed to poetry and literature in addition to his eminence as a Sufi teacher. 
 
The circumstance of his execution at the hands of the Khwarazmshah also tells us that 
al-Baghdādī was a politically significant figure at the time. Thus al-Mustawfī al-Qizwīnī 
mentions that al-Baghdādī was put to death due to associating (mu‘āsharat) with the 
Khwarazmshah’s mother.40 Fritz Meier asserts that al-Baghdādī married the mother of 
Khwarazmshah in secret based on a letter he wrote to Lālā, however upon closer 
inspection this seems unlikely, since the letter only mentions a marriage to a woman 
with the title Khātūn and does not specify any names. The letter also states that the 
marriage took place by the request of the queen mother Turkan Khatūn, which would 
be odd phrasing if she married him herself.41  
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39 Kubrā, Fawā’iḥ, 121. 
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Al-Baghdādī himself defends his secret marriage to the khatūn against criticisms of 
indecency and adultery levelled at him in a letter to ‘Alī Lālā, but he does not explicitly 
state that the princess was the queen mother herself.42 In any case, the marriage to a 
princess with the blessing of the queen mother would have placed al-Baghdādī in a 
powerful position since the Khwarazmshah ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s adversary and the greatest 
source of internal unrest within his empire was his own mother who exercised more 
power than her son.43  
 
Willhelm Barthold sites the advanced age of the queen mother and al-Baghdādī by this 
time and rules out the possibility of their marriage.44 Despite this he maintains that the 
execution of al-Baghdādī “offended both his mother and the priesthood” interpreting 
the reports of a love affair as a conflation of the fact that the military and religious 
classes had united against the Khwarazmshah.45 With the military elite loyal to her, she 
imposed her will in the administration of the country and proclaimed herself 
protectoress of the world and faith.46 Al-Juwaynī also states: 
 
She had her own separate court and state officials and disposed of her own separate 
stipends and fiefs. Nevertheless her power extended over the sultan, his finances and 
his high officers and officials. She used to hold secret revelries and it was through her 
that many an ancient house was overthrown.47 
 
While it is clear from his letter that al-Baghdādī did marry a princess in secret and this 
did cause accusations of indecency be levelled against him, it will become apparent to 
us that political rivalry is more likely to be at the heart of this controversy. In his letter 	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43 Morgan, Medieval Persia, 49. 
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45 Barthold, Turkestan, 375-377. 
46 Haqq, Chingiz Khan, 27. 
47 Al-Juwaynī, The World Conqueror, 466. 
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to Lālā, defending himself against these accusations, al-Baghdādī reveals hints of a close 
relationship with “Ulugh Turkān Khatūn commander of the world.”48 It seems that his 
marriage was in the interest of the queen mother, and such an alignment would indeed 
contribute to some animosity towards al-Baghdādī at the Khwarazmshah ‘Alā’ al-Dīn’s 
court. There are some important conclusions we can draw from this. It appears that the 
relationship between the religious establishment and the Khwarazmshah’s state sours 
after Tekish’s death. This coincides with greater internal conflict within the ruling 
classes with the queen mother and ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Muḥammad vying for control. Such a 
situation is likely to have created competing networks of patronage relationships which 
would disrupt the religious institutions. This is important to bear in mind for the 
assessment of al-Baghdādī’s death. 
 
3.  Competing hagiographies 
 
In Jāmī’s account of al-Baghdādī’s life, al-Baghdādī’s family is said to have come to 
Khurasan from Baghdād to serve as the Khwarazmshah ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Muḥammad’s court 
physicians. He tells us that more than one member of his family were physicians, before 
moving on to give a brief account of his early life and the circumstances of his death. 
While still quite young, al-Baghdādī abandons his courtly life to join a Sufi lodge, at 
which point his family offered to send ten Turkish slaves to serve the Sufi lodge in his 
stead, which was rejected. That al-Baghdādī came from a family with a medical 
background and had connections to the political classes is asserted in the Khirqa 
Hazārmīkhī, which states that al-Baghdādī himself was a court physician prior to his 
setting out onto the Sufi path and joining Kubrā.49 Al-Baghdādī’s close ties to courtly life 
and political classes, as well as the wealth of his family are indicated from the very 
beginning of Jāmī’s hagiography. Jāmī also describes al-Baghdādī’s appearance as 	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49 See al-Baghdādī, Khirqa Hazrāmīkhī, 165. 
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“delicate” and pleasant, perhaps based on the physical description ascribed to al-
Baghdādī by al-‘Irāqī.50 Hence, Jāmī’s account is in accord with a number of early and 
near-contemporary sources focusing on al-Baghdādī. 
 
Despite this accord between early and later sources, some events in Jāmī’s account of al-
Baghdādī’s death are contentious and are not found in earlier material. The account of 
al-Baghdādī’s death is often cited by modern scholars of Kubrawī Sufism, however that 
it is heavily influenced by competing hagiographical traditions seems to have been 
overlooked. Jāmī’s assertion of a rift between al-Baghdādī and Kubrā, and the implicit 
diminishment of al-Baghdādī’s place in the Kubrawī school which this represents 
should not be taken at face value. The tension between al-Baghdādī and Kubrā in this 
account can be explained by competing hagiographical traditions among later Sufis, as 
well as an attempt to deal with the complex relationships and networks of authority 
among Kubrawīs in al-Baghdādī’s time. 
 
Here Jāmī quotes al-Baghdādī as saying: “I used to be an egg on the edge of the river, 
and Najm al-Dīn [Kubrā] was a hen who took me under the wing of training. Now I have 
emerged from the egg and become like a duck; I enter the water while my shaykh still 
stands on the bank.”51 Kubrā receives word of this and proclaims: “May he die in a 
river.”52  Afterwards al-Baghdādī apologises to Kubrā and asks for his forgiveness, and 
while Kubrā’s forgiveness is forthcoming, Jāmī maintains that the prophecy is 
nevertheless fulfilled when ‘Alā al-Dīn Khwarazmshah has al-Baghdādī drowned in the 
Oxus river in 616/1219.53 
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51 See Algar’s introduction to The Path of God’s Bondsmen, 9. 
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53 Jāmī also lists the possible date of death as 606/1209. This is corroborated in one manuscript of Najm al-
Dīn Rāzī’s Baḥr al-ḥaqā’iq. Shpall asserts that this text which is found in Sulaymaniye library was edited 
and signed by al-Rāzī himself, however this assertion does not seem to be completely verifiable based 
only on a difference in hand writing and modes of address. While the alternate date of death may be 
	   40	  
 
While some aspects of the account of al-Baghdādī’s death in Jāmī’s Nafaḥāt accord with 
earlier sources, for example in placing the blame on the Khwarazmshah ‘Alā’ al-Dīn 
Muḥammad, as well as his drowning in a river, his assertion of a rift between al-
Baghdādī and Kubrā is unlikely and is invested with competing hagiographical claims. 
The account betrays competition regarding the inheritance of the Kubrawī lineage by 
later Sufis, as well as tensions between al-Baghdādī and other Sufis at the time. 
 
Jāmī’s account of al-Baghdādī’s death is obviously intended to emphasise Kubrā’s 
authority and rank, and despite the fact that it was written much later, most of the 
information presented in the Nafaḥāt is sourced from al-Simnānī who was born about 40 
years after al-Baghdādī’s death.54 It includes a number of stories taken from al-
Simnānī’s Chihil Majlis and even recounts a dream al-Baghdādī had where he is said to 
have asked the Prophet Muhammad about Avicenna, and learns that his method was 
mistaken and that he was veiled from truth.55 Al-Simnānī may have had access to earlier 
material and as we have seen, some of his assertions find reinforcement in al-
Baghdādī’s and ‘Alī Lālā’s exchange of letters.  
 
However, one detail present in Jāmī’s account which is missing from earlier sources is 
the supposed controversy and tension between al-Baghdādī and Kubrā. Hamid Algar 
takes Najm al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s silence regarding Kubrā, in contrast to his consistent 
mention and praise of al-Baghdādī, as evidence that there may indeed have been a rift 
between the master and his disciple.56 Yet that al-Rāzī would then choose to continue 
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56 See Algar’s introduction to Mirṣād, 9. 
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Kubrā’s Qur’anic tafsir, as Ballanfat and Elias assert,57 after omitting him from his other 
works for this reason seems odd. Elias further argues that the act of writing a tafsīr in 
the tradition of Kubrā’s would be considered an act of piety and an expression of loyalty 
to one’s teachers.58 It is more likely that al-Rāzī’s focus on al-Baghdādī is simply because 
he was his primary teacher and master. 
 
It remains difficult to conceive of either al-Simnānī or al-Rāzī, both of whom had great 
reverence for al-Baghdādī, bearing any bitterness towards Kubrā whose ideas and 
sayings they repeated, as they were clearly built upon ideas in al-Baghdādī’s Tuḥfa. 
Furthermore this story is absent from other biographies and hagiographies which 
emphasise Kubrā’s foresight in a different manner, predicting the Mongol invasions as 
God’s punishment for the execution of al-Baghdādī, without cursing him.59 In these 
narratives Kubrā is undoubtedly upset at the injustice which befalls al-Baghdādī 
without any indication of alienation between the two shaykhs. This divine retribution 
for the murder of al-Baghdādī is also contained in Jāmī’s account which seems to sit 
uneasily with Kubrā’s outrage at al-Baghdādī’s supposed hubris.60 So Jāmī’s account 
itself does attempt to resolve the uncomfortable rift it creates by having Kubrā forgive 
al-Baghdādī and turn his anger on the Khwarazmshah instead who brings about the 
Mongol invasions through his maltreatment of Kubrā’s friend and student. This results 
in some inconsistency whereby Kubrā causes, laments over, and even avenges al-
Baghdādī’s death through divinely decreed events.  
 
If we look for clues within al-Baghdādī’s own writings, we find only two incidents which 
suggest a potential tension between him and his teacher. One occurs in the Tuḥfat al-
barara where al-Baghdādī states that after a 40 day seclusion Kubrā had ordered him to 	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keep company with “the sultan.” This upsets al-Baghdādī at the time but he reveals that 
this was a test given to him by his shaykh and that after passing this trial Kubrā 
returned to treating al-Baghdādī with gentleness and kindness.61 Al-Baghdādī uses this 
example to stress the need to obey the shaykh even if it is displeasing. Kubrā here knew 
what his student required at the time to progress spiritually, and throughout the Tuḥfa, 
al-Baghdādī only speaks of Kubrā with reverence.  
 
Another area of potential tension between the two is revealed in a letter from al-
Baghdādī to a certain Sharaf al-Dīn al-Balkhī in which al-Baghdādī analyses four of al-
Balkhī’s dreams. In one of the dreams al-Baghdādī appears to al-Balkhī with black or 
dirty palms. Al-Baghdādī interprets this as a mild reproach for his own shortcomings 
but goes on to say that he himself had similarly reproached Kubrā for four faults and 
that Kubrā had been pleased that al-Baghdādī only learned of four.62 This is perhaps the 
closest we can come to a criticism of Kubrā in al-Baghdādī’s own words, yet it is clear 
that this is not a criticism at all. Fritz Meier notes in commenting on this letter that, 
“Modestly admitting one’s actual shortcomings far exceed the amount which has been 
exposed to view has long been a virtue of a shaykh conscious of his sins.”63 The 
comment then could be seen to portray Kubrā as an equally humble shaykh, al-
Baghdādī’s is therefore likely to be half praising Kubrā for his humility here. 
 
Furthermore, it seems that al-Baghdādī’s role had been increasingly elevated to a 
similar status to Kubrā’s by some of the most important Kubrawī figures, as seen in al-
Rāzī’s Mirṣād. In one manuscript of al-Rāzī’s Baḥr al-ḥaqā’iq, it is stated that al-Rāzī took 
his ṭarīqa and ijāza from al-Baghdādī while Kubrā was his shaykh of ṣuḥba, or 
companionship, a more informal relationship.64  In addition, the Khirqa hazārmīkhī 	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emphasises the role of al-Baghdādī in training ‘Alī Lālā.65 It is through al-Baghdādī that 
the Kubrawī line continues to Isfrā’inī and then to al-Simnānī. Al-Simnānī who 
proclaimed al-Baghdādī’s Tuḥfat al-barara required reading, often expresses great 
reverence for him in his works.66 For example, he recounts a vision where the great Sufi 
master al-Bisṭāmī takes the form of Jupiter and al-Baghdādī takes the form of the sun, 
superseding Bisṭāmī.67 Landolt has also posited that it was al-Baghdādī who attracted al-
Simnānī to Kubrawī Sufism.68 
 
Here, al-Baghdādī is presented as a rather eminent shaykh of his time whose influence 
may have been comparable to Kubrā’s, at least in the minds of the prominent Kubrāwī 
disciples who were essential in the survival of the order and the spread of its ideas. In 
light of this, it seems natural that later Sufis would try to understand how the two 
shaykhs relate to each other and attempt to establish a chain of succession which 
establishes a clear sequence from Kubrā to al-Baghdādī to Lālā. The matter is further 
complicated by al-Baghdādī’s death occurring prior to Kubrā’s. It may be the case then 
that there was a need to emphasise Kubrā over al-Baghdādī or to dissociate them 
slightly and stem the reverence for al-Baghdādī found in al-Rāzī and al-Simnānī’s 
writings which diverted attention away from the supposed founder of the order. 
 
As stated, the explicit establishment of a Kubrawī order occurs with al-Hamadānī who 
traced his chain of initiation from al-Simnānī, through Isfara‘inī, through Lālā, to al-
Baghdādī and then Kubrā. 69 During Kubrā and al-Baghdādī’s time however, the Kubrawī 
community is less coherently structured. There were a number of shaykhs operating in 
Iran and Transoxania at the time, and figures such as ‘Alī Lālā acquired certificates of 
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completion and instruction from non-Kubrawī teachers as well as Kubrā and al-
Baghdādī.70 Both al-Rāzī and Lālā received some training from Kubrā and al-Baghdādī. 71 
And while al-Baghdādī was Kubrā’s disciple, he had his own khānqa (Sufi lodge) trained 
disciples on his own and functioned independently from his shaykh in his later years.  
 
In one letter al-Baghdādī does mention the appointment of a Khādim (superintendent) 
by Kubrā to a lodge in Khurasan which may suggest that Kubrā did have some authority 
in lodges outside of his own.72 Yet, the content of al-Baghdādī’s letters and writings 
which we have discussed signify that he had his own lodge, issued his own initiatory 
certificates and invested disciples with a cloak himself, and that some of those who 
were under his tutelage viewed him as their most influential teacher. Such a loosely 
structured past may have undermined the identity of the later Kubrawī order which 
saw Kubrā as its founder and the ultimate authority of his day. The desire to conceive of 
a structured school in accordance with the chain of initiatic authority with al-Baghdādī 
subordinated to Kubrā is understandable and seems to have been projected back into 
history by later Sufis. 
 
This is one possible explanation for the story of a rift between the two, however later 
Sufi rivalries may also have contributed to this narrative. Deweese has demonstrated 
that competing Sufi claims over lineage in the 15th and 16th centuries, stating that later 
Sufis who traced their spiritual lineages back to contemporaries of Kubrā and al-
Baghdādī could have sought to discredit the Kubrawīs, obscuring their role in ‘Alī Lālā’s 
Sufi training.73 During Jāmī’s time, in the 15th and 16th centuries, there was increasing 
tension between Sufi communities which were transitioning from less formal 
institutions to Sufi orders. These emerging orders derived legitimacy through clearly 	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defined chains of spiritual teaching. Excluding or de-emphasising some figures in 
favour of others therefore undermined the legitimacy of certain groups. Deweese 
highlights the existence of hagiographical works which deemphasise Kubrā in favour of 
a shaykh by the name of Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn al-Ḥātamī in ‘Alī Lālā’s Sufi lineage. These were 
copied and reproduced during Jāmī’s time.74 These motivations may have found their 
way into Jāmī’s entry on al-Baghdādī as Sufi groups who viewed their traditions as 
indebted to Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn through Lālā may have attempted to diminish the importance 
of the Kubrāwiyya. 
 
In order to examine the hagiographical tensions further discuss al-Baghdādī’s death 
must be discussed in more detail. The peculiar account of al-Baghdādī’s death in Jāmī’s 
work in the context of competing hagiographical claims allows us to dismiss this 
supposed rift between al-Baghdādī and Kubrā. However, while it is likely that these 
stories indicate rivalries that were projected back into Kubrawī history in a context of 
competing Sufi orders, it would be incorrect to assume a perfect harmony amongst the 
first generation of Kubrawīs. In light of the evidence of al-Baghdādī and his students’ 
antipathy towards Sa‘d al-Dīn and his son, Ṣadr al-Dīn Ḥamū’ī, both of whom were 
prominent Kubrawīs.75 This goes to the heart of the subject of al-Baghdādī’s death as we 
posit that the execution of al-Baghdādī was due to political tensions which involved 
court officials belonging to the Ḥāmū’ī family, these were the cousins of Sa‘d al-Dīn al-
Ḥāmū’ī. This political tension which dates back to al-Baghdādī’s time also complicates 
the succession of Kubrā’s authority and seems to have had a lasting impact on Kubrawī 
lineage. In positing a break between al-Baghdādī and Kubrā, the hagiography touches 
on a tension in al-Baghdādī’s lifetime, as well as later anxieties over the succession of 
Kubrawī authority. In addition, the story of Kubrā and al-Baghdādī’s estrangement 
serves as an intersection of older rivalries, as well as rivalries current to Jāmī’s time.  	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4 .  Al-Baghdād ī ’s  death 
 
It is obvious that al-Baghdādī was a prominent shaykh whose role as leader of a Sufi 
institution would be greatly influential, and therefore worthy of patronage from the 
political class. Ever since the waning of Abbasid power, new Muslim rulers sought 
legitimation by patronising religious institutions such as the madrasa and khānqa. In 
addition to al-Baghdādī, other Sufis also had influence at court and even at this earlier 
time, before the rise of Sufi orders, competition between Sufis did exist, expecially in 
times of political fragmentation. Al-Baghdādī seems to have been caught up in a 
struggle which involved the Khwarazmshah and the influential Ḥamū’ī family on one 
side and the Queen mother on the other. Towards the beginning of his letter to Lālā, al-
Baghdādī tells us that the accusations intended to tarnish his image had arisen from the 
“sons of Ḥamū’ī.”76 This frames the entire letter as a response to a number of 
accusations levelled against al-Baghdādī by these figures. 
 
This refers to the cousins of the contemporaneous shaykh Sa‘d al-Dīn Ḥamū’ī, another 
one of Kubrā’s students. All four of his uncle’s sons worked for the Khwarazmian state 
at the time.77 This seems to be the origin of the tension within the Kubrawī order which 
emerges in Jāmī’s hagiography, and the reason behind his inclusion of the story of al-
Baghdādī and Kubrā’s estrangement in the Nafaḥāt. This becomes obvious as Jāmī places 
Sa‘d al-Dīn as the mediator between the two who works tirelessly to bring about their 
reconciliation.78 The result is that the hagiography casts Sa’d al-Dīn in a much more 
favourable light, portraying him as a friend of both al-Baghdādī and Kubrā. 
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In truth, Sa‘d al-Dīn was shunned by those disciples who were close to al-Baghdādī. Al-
Simnānī never mentions any of the Ḥamū’īs, including the prominent Ṣadr al-Dīn 
Ḥamū’ī, Sa‘d al-Dīn’s son who presided over the conversion of the Mongol ruler Ghāzān 
during al-Simnānī’s lifetime.79 This is incredibly odd given both al-Simnānī’s prolific 
writings and the fact that he too was well acquainted with the Mongol court, 
mentioning interactions with the Mongol rulers without ever mentioning Ṣadr al-Dīn. 
In addition, Lālā’s disciple Jurfānī refused to see Sa‘d al-Dīn and refused to accept an 
ijāza from him.80 The Ḥamū’īs were subsequently ostracised from the main silsila of the 
Kubrawīs who would later trace their spiritual lineage to Kubrā via al-Baghdādī, 
through al-Simnānī, Isfarā’inī and Lālā. Deweese also mentions that Sa‘d al-Dīn could 
have been an associate the shaykh Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn through ‘Imām ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn ʿUmar b. 
Muḥammad b. Ḥākim Arghiyānī’.81 This is telling since the hagiographies that surround 
Lālā and Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn attempt to displace Kubrā’s and al-Baghdādī’s roles in training Lālā 
in favour of Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn. This indicates that some Sufi groups attempted to associate 
Lālā’s allegiance to Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn and Sa‘d al-Dīn Ḥāmū’ī instead of Kubrā and al-
Baghdādī. 
 
This elucidates the true motive behind the narrative of a rupture between al-Baghdādī 
and Kubrā found in Jāmī’s Nafaḥāt. It can be read as an attempt to reconcile all the 
prominent early figures of the Kubrawī order in light of the ostracisation of Sa‘d al-Dīn 
and his son Ṣadr al-Dīn from the main Kubrawī chain of authority. Or we could posit a 
tradition more hostile to al-Baghdādī which sought to establish Sa‘d al-Dīn as the true 
heir of the Kubrawī spiritual chain of authority. If this were the case, the account could 
have its origins in traditions of other Sufi groups which saw themselves as connected to 
Sa‘d al-Dīn and Lālā. Given the overly negative image of the Ḥamū’ī family (and by 
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implication Sa‘d al-Dīn) which emerges in al-Baghdādī’s own words, in addition to their 
shunning by Lālā’s disciple as well as al-Simnānī, it is difficult not to see this tension 
between the spiritual descendants of al-Baghdādī and Ḥāmū’ī continuing for some 
generations.82 Hence, it can also be seen as a negation of al-Baghdādī’s role within the 
order since Sa‘d al-Dīn emerges as the closest figure to Kubrā in this hagiography. This 
would certainly favour an interpretation of the Ḥamū’īs as the rightful heirs of Kubrā’s 
legacy, displacing the role of al-Baghdādī in Lālā’s training. Such readings of Jāmī’s 
account have not been sufficiently highlighted. 
 
While Elias does acknowledge that tension between al-Baghdādī and Sa‘d al-Dīn existed, 
he seems to accept the version of events presented in Jāmī, stating that Sa‘d al-Dīn did 
intercede with Kubrā on al-Baghdādī’s behalf, and states that his status amongst 
Kubrawīs changed with later Kubrawīs rather than amongst the first generations.83 In 
order to agree with such a reading, we must firstly assume the story of Kubrā and al-
Baghdādī’s estrangement is true, which seems untenable. We must also assume that al-
Baghdādī’s critical view of the the Ḥāmū’īs did not last despite the obvious distress he 
reveals in his letter.  
 
Secondly, the story must be placed at an earlier date in al-Baghdādī’s life in 
contradiction to what appears to be Jāmī’s attempt to show Kubrā’s utterance that al-
Baghdādī should die in a river as a sign of irrevocable clairvoyance, foreseeing al-
Baghdādī’s execution by drowning. Jāmī clearly suggests the estrangement as having 
taken place later in al-Baghdādī’s life as Kubrā’s pronouncement results in al-
Baghdādī’s execution. Furthermore Elias asserts that Sa‘d al-Dīn and al-Baghdādī were 
both commanded by Kubrā to leave Khwarazm in the face of the Mongol onslaught in 
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order to show that Sa‘d al-Dīn was not viewed unfavourably in this early generation.84 
Yet this seems impossible since al-Baghdādī’s death occurs (616/1219) earlier than the 
Mongol invasion of Khwarazm of 618/1220-1221 in which Kubrā was martyred.  
 
Therefore Elias is too swift to overlook the political tension between al-Baghdādī and 
the Ḥamū’ī family and does not question Jāmī’s hagiography and that the two had 
reconciled towards the end of al-Baghdādī’s life is taken as a given. Instead, Elias 
focuses on Sa‘d al-Dīn’s reputation for heterodoxy amongst later Kubrawīs as a reason 
for his ostracisation from the Kubrawī school. However, this does not seem to be an 
adequate explanation. In positing that the ostracisation of the Ḥamū’īs from the 
Kubrawī chain was due to their propensity towards heterodox teachings, Elias 
emphasises ḥurūfī teachings and Shiite piety which opposed the “normative teachings” 
of al-Baghdādī and Lālā.85 However, it remains difficult to substantiate this since no 
early Kubrawī writings seem to specify these elements of Sa‘d al-Dīn’s teachings in 
order to point out heterodoxy. On the contrary, both these potential heterodoxies are 
seen quite clearly within Kubrā and al-Baghdādī’s works. Kubrā’s Fawā’iḥ contains some 
clearly ḥurūfī discussions, along with a number of diagrams reminiscent of astrological 
and geomantic or magical practices, which could be seen as heterodox.86  
 
And as we will see in the chapter regarding the khirqa, al-Baghdādī traces the origins of 
the Sufi cloak and the authority of the Sufi chain to ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib and the Prophet’s 
family, adopting a more Shiite-inclined position while arguing against ‘Umar al-
Suhrawardī’s account of the origin of the khirqa as derived from Umm Salama. Al-
Baghdādī also holds a number of unconventional views in the Tuḥfa, one being that the 
Sufi can hear the clear speech of God through mundane physical sounds, which seems 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Elias, The Sufi Lords, 73. 
85 Elias, The Sufi Lords, 74-75. 
86 Kubrā, Fawa’iḥ, 202; 239. Kubrā claims to have seen verses of the Qur’an written in the stars. The image 
here resembles a geomantic diagram.  
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to approach a type of prophecy. 
 
In contrast, here we suggest that al-Baghdādī’s rivalry with the Ḥamū’ī family be 
treated as one of the main reasons contributing to his death. This is enough to explain 
the reason for the estrangement between subsequent generations of Kubrawīs and 
Ḥamū’īs as a number of prominent Kubrawīs saw themselves as the spiritual heirs of al-
Baghdādī. Hence, the best explanation of Sa‘d al-Dīn estrangement is a political struggle 
between al-Baghdādī and the Ḥamū’ī family, as evinced by al-Baghdādī’s letter to Lālā. 
Elias identifies the “sons of Ḥamū’ī” that al-Baghdādī refers to as Sa‘d al-Dīn’s cousins 
(through his uncle and teacher Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad), as ‘Imād al-Dīn Abu’l Fatḥ 
‘Umar (d. 636/1238-9), Fakhr al-Dīn Yūsuf (d. 647/1250) who worked in bureaucracy, 
and Kamāl al-Dīn Abu’l-‘Abbās Aḥmad (d. 646/1248) and Mu‘īn al-Dīn Abu ‘Alī al-Ḥasan 
(d. 643/1246) who worked in the military.87  
 
In the letter, al-Baghdādī reveals in his complaints to Lālā, two main accusations which 
seem to have arisen from the Ḥāmū’īs. The first is the accusation of illicit relations with 
a princess, to which al-Baghdādī replies that he was in fact secretly married to her. 
Connected to this are a number of accusations which question his character, and we see 
al-Baghdādī defend himself by citing prophetic narrations that writing love poetry, and 
seeking pleasure and amusement with one’s wife are all licit activities. The second 
accusation is only hinted at as al-Baghdādī’s moves on to assure Lālā that the money 
received through endowments should not be improperly used.  
 
It seems that he may have been accused of financial mismanagement since he begins by 
declaring it unlawful to consume the property of a charitable endowment.88 The 
emphasis on al-Baghdādī’s finances is alluded to in some biographical accounts which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Jamal Elias, ‘The Sufi Lords’, 75. 
88 Al-Baghdādī, Khirqa Hazārmikhī, 170-173. 
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assert that there was no richer Sufi lodge in the land, and that al-Baghdādī had one 
thousand dinars worth of property in endowments and spent two hundred thousand 
dinars a year.89 As the shaykh al-shuyūkh, al-Baghdādī would have overseen the running 
of substantial land and property and the revenues which flowed into and out of the 
lodge. With his marriage into the ruling classes, such a position must have accorded 
him great influence.  
 
It is clear that relations between the religious classes and the state had soured under 
‘Alā’ al-Dīn Khwarazmshah. We have also seen that the Shah’s mother had attempted to 
undermine her son and rule independently of him. Al-Baghdādī’s marriage with the 
blessing of Turkan Khatūn seems to indicate his alignment to the Queen mother. In 
addition, his insistence in his letter to Lālā that he wished to leave Nishapur and the 
corruption of the officials there for Khwarazm indicates a desire to return to the 
territory where the Queen mother held sway.  
 
Al-Baghdādī seems desperate to leave Nishapur as he tells Lālā that he wished to leave 
for the pilgrimage that year but the Queen mother refused to grant him permission.90 
Hence, the Queen mother seems to have either been fond of him or found in him a 
useful political ally. Al-Juwaynī reveals that Turkān Khatūn had acted in a similar way 
with another political marriage alliance, claiming that Turkan would not allow Sultan 
‘Uthmān to leave Khwarazm and return to his capital due to the “custom of the 
Turks.”91 Al-Juwaynī says that it was their custom that the newly-wed son in law remain 
with his wife’s family for a year after a marriage.92  
 
Al-Juwaynī states that after ‘Uthmān returned to his capital of Samarqand, he began to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 See al-Riyāhī’s Introduction to al-Rāzī’s Mirṣād, 42. 
90 Al-Baghdādī, Khirqa Hazārmīkhī, 173. 
91 Turkan Khatūn belonged to the Qanglī Turkic tribe. 
92 Al-Juwaynī, The World Conqueror, 394. 
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plot against the Sultan, it is therefore possible that the Queen mother had invoked the 
custom of her tribe for political ends. On another occasion, we see Turkan Khatūn 
advising a relative of hers, Kozlī, who unsuccessfully revolted against the 
Khwarazmshah to adopt Sufi dress and practice and take up residence near Tekish’s 
grave. This however, was not a successful plan as ‘Alā’ al-Dīn had him executed upon his 
return to Khwarazm.93 While al-Juwaynī gives us no direct information on al-Baghdādī’s 
death, the behaviour of the Queen mother is paralleld in al-Baghdādī’s letters, 
indicating his attachment to her. 
 
Therefore, while we may never know exactly why al-Baghdādī was killed, we may posit 
here that he was seen as an ally to the Queen mother who was constantly vying for 
power against her son ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Khwarazmshah. His death fits into a broader trend of 
alienation of religious classes under the rule of ‘Alā’ al-Dīn. This was probably due to 
the disruption and competition over patronage relations which accompanied the 
fractured state of the Shah and political rivalries. And in this context, his execution just 
a year before the Mongol invasions is perhaps an indication of the anxiety and 
desperation of the Khwarazmshah in attempting to assert his control. 
 
From this discussion of al-Baghdādī’s life and death we are given an insight into his 
intellectual and political significance. This analysis is important for understanding the 
context in which the Tuḥfa was written. The information we have gleaned here sheds 
light on al-Baghdādī’s animosity towards rulers which is revealed in various passages of 
the Tuḥfa. Furthermore it is important to attain a sense of al-Baghdādī’s significance 
within the early Kubrawī community in order to better understand the influence he 
would have had on the development of Kubrawī thought and practice. This is not to say 
that al-Baghdādī’s position should be emphasised above that of Kubrā’s, but it is evident 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Al-Juwaynī, The History of the World Conqueror, 339. 
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that some of the most prolific Kubrawīs such as al-Rāzī and al-Simnānī, as well as the 
most active Sufi figures and practitioners such as Lālā, viewed al-Baghdādī as a great 
master. His contribution to the development of Kubrawī thought, institutionalisation, 
and more generally to Sufism as a whole, should not be overlooked.  
 
5 .  The text of the Tuḥ fa  
 
Before advancing in our study, we must discuss the text of al-Baghdādī’s Tuḥfa in more 
detail. This is relevant here as the ten questions put to al-Baghdādī reveal important 
information regarding the concerns surrounding Sufism at the time. Al-Baghdādī states 
in the introduction to the text that he wrote the Tuḥfa after a number of his “devoted 
brothers” had asked him to do so and states that the answers arranged in these ten 
chapters encompass “most of what the student needs to know” regarding the Sufi 
path.94 Some manuscripts of the Tuḥfa which include an introduction by the scribe 
identify the questioner as Aḥmad ‘Alī al-Muhadhib ibn Naṣr al-Khuwārī who is 
described as one of al-Baghdādī’s disciples.95  
 
Not much is known about al-Khuwārī, however he must have been one of al-Baghdādī’s 
more prominent disciples. He is quoted in a manuscript of Farīd al-Dīn ‘Aṭṭār’s Tadhkirat 
al-Awliyā‘, lamenting over al-Baghdādī’s execution.96 In Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī’s (d. 626/1229) 
Mu‘jam al-buldān, two towns named Khuwār are mentioned, one near Rayy and another 
near Nishapur and Bayhaq. However, al-Ḥamawī states that the former was by his time 
mostly ruined. Hence al-Khuwārī most probably hails from the latter. 97   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Al-Baghdādī, Tuḥfat al-barara, 1. 
95 See Tuḥfat al-barara, MS Tehran, Sepahsalar 598 (2) f 97. 
96 Landolt, ‘Sufism and Ismailism’, 10. 
97 Al-Ḥamawī, Mu‘jam al-buldān, vol. 2, 370. 
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Abū Sa‘d al-Sam‘ānī (d. 562/1166) equates Bayhaq with Khuwār and states that this 
town produced a number of prominent scholars. A certain Abū Muḥammad ‘Abd al-
Jabbār ibn Muḥammad al-Khuwārī (d. 534/1139) is described as a great imam of 
Nishapur who was taught by the famous Sufi, al-Qushayrī, as well as the Ash‘arī scholar, 
Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī (d. 458/1080). His brother, Abū ‘Alī ibn ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd ibn 
Muḥammad al-Khuwārī (d. 533-534/1138-1139) also seems to have been a Sufi, as he is 
described as a ḥākim, and was also taught by al-Bayhaqī and al-Qushayrī. Hence, it is 
likely that al-Khuwārī came from a family with historic connections to the intellectual 
traditions of Nishapur.98  
 
Al-Baghdādī also spent some significant time in Nishapur where he faced a number of 
political challenges. Given Nishapur’s tumultuous history during the reign of the 
Khwarazmshahs, the questions put to al-Baghdādī tell us a lot about the history of 
Sufism in a period of political disruption. These ten questions of the Tuḥfa are as 
follows: 
  
1. What is [the shaykh’s] opinion with regard to the etiquette (ādāb) of the Sufis in the 
generality of their conditions and behaviours? 
 
2. Regarding the appearance of the Sufis, their shaving of the head, shortening of their 
clothes and wearing blue. Are these conditions necessary for undertaking the path? Or 
is it possible for the wayfarer not to adhere to this [appearance] and not to adorn 
himself in their style, but remain according to his own appearance [even if a change in 
appearance] is a guard for his [spiritual] condition against confusion and attracting 
people to him? 
 
3. What does [the shaykh] say with regard to the definition of shaykh-hood and its 
reality, and the point at which one qualifies for this position? And what is required of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Al-Sam‘ānī, Kitāb al-ansāb, vol. 5, 215-216. 
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[the shaykh] in the training of his disciples from beginning to end, [with regard to] 
purifying and training them, and his conduct with regard to their conditions, selves, 
and speech? 
 
4. What does [the shaykh] say with regard to the definition of discipleship and its 
reality, and of the requirement for the disciple to be guided by a shaykh, and the rules 
which the disciple is obliged to fulfil from beginning to end, and the rights of the 
shaykh [over him]? And must he obey [the shaykh’s] orders, even if they defy the prima 
facie religious law as well as good judgement, whether it be [regarding] an obligatory or 
forbidden [action].  
 
5. How is the practice of seclusion, solitude, and withdrawal from people performed? 
And what are the appropriate remembrance (dhikr) formulas one should perform? And 
is it necessary for him to fast and forgo [certain] permissible foods and clothes? And 
does it harm him to busy himself with the religious sciences, in reading, writing, and 
reciting the Qur’an?  
 
6. How does one distinguish truth from falsehood regarding what enters one’s chest and 
is impressed upon one’s mind in visions and spiritual conditions? Answering this 
question necessitates analysing thought impressions and distinguishing them from one 
another. As well as analysing visions and distinguishing the imagined, which has no 
benefit, from the truth, which is from the perceptions of the heart and the spirit. 
 
7. Regarding the cloak which the Sufis receive from their shaykhs and from which they 
attain blessings, what is its origin, lineage, and purpose? And is its significance 
overstated [by Sufis]? And when is the disciple qualified to wear it? 
 
8. If [the disciple] reaches the lofty stage, and matures to the highest terminus, and 
achieves visions and the unveiling of the realities, and all the intricacies are made clear 
to him, is it possible for him to [consider himself] pardoned from obligations and 
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austerities? And is it possible for him to ascertain that, after all his spiritual exercises 
and struggles, he attains a condition wherein he is [free from being ordered] and 
reproached? 
 
9. If [the disciple] experiences the likes of [what was described in the 8th question], time 
and time again, is it permissible for him to disregard his obligations and diverge from 
religious requirements. And if he is commanded [through a vision] to sin, or to forgo a 
religious requirement, should he adhere to the law or perform what he has seen [in the 
vision] and beseech God [for guidance]. 
 
10. Regarding approaching the doors of Sultans and mixing with cursed oppressors, 
does this reduce his [spiritual] standing or is it permissible for the completed and 
mature to become more relaxed and expansive in keeping company with people, both 
the common and elite, without [allowing] the initiate and intermediate [to do so]? And 
what is expected in the completion of his love and vigilance in guiding [the people to 
God], and the triumph of God? And what follows this answer is a section on the origin of 
audition and its nature, and [a response to] those who curse it and diminish it, or [those 
who rely too much] on seeking rewards from the hereafter and the present [through 
it].99 
 
Al-Baghdādī states in the introduction to the text that at first he considered collecting 
his sermons and lectures in a book entitled Zubdat al-‘awālī wa-ḥilyat al-amālī, but that 
this seemed a vanity to him and he decided to structure the book as a series of 
questions and answers put to him by his disciples instead.100 It is important to note that 
given that the Tuḥfa is a response to ten questions put to al-Baghdādī by al-Khuwārī, the 
structure of the text is to a large extent determined by the questioner rather than the 
author.  
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Despite this seemingly arbitrary structure, there are some overarching concerns in the 
ten questions which offer al-Baghdādī the opportunity to craft a more systematic work. 
While each chapter of the Tuḥfa focuses on some aspect of Sufi practice, al-Baghdādī 
intertwines his answers with significant theoretical discussions. Passages which are 
intended to explain the origins of Sufi practices and ideal Sufi behaviour are 
interwoven with psychological expositions. This allows for some degree of structure in 
the text. For example, al-Baghdādī establishes the framework of his psychology in the 
3rd chapter, which allows him to discuss the production of dreams and visions more 
fully in the 6th chapter.  
 
The questions themselves tell us much about Sufism and wider society in this period. 
Clearly, one of the most pertinent questions in the text centres on defining the 
qualifications and etiquttes of shaykh-hood, determining the extent of his authority, as 
almost every chapter in some way touches upon this subject. As will be shown, the 
significance of these discussions is to increasingly centralise the authority of the 
shaykh. Providing a definition of shaykh-hood and developing the notion of the Sufi 
cloak as a marker of this vocation had important consequences for the transition of Sufi 
communities into orders. This reassured the authority of the Sufi community and 
asserted its identity and self-governance. Furthermore, the subject of shaykh-disciple 
etiquette remained an important topic of exposition in the works of later Kubrawī 
thinkers. Isfarā’inī also wrote on this topic and his son produced a copy of the Tuḥfa in 
the year 791/1388. 101 Hence, al-Baghdādī’s thought was clearly relevant within Kubrawī 
circles for a number of subsequent generations.  
 
Another recurring concern regards dispensation from Sufi practice and the religious 
law, discussions of which are seen in chapters three, four, eight and nine. The question 
of dispensation is related to a number of concerns during this period. The most obvious 	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tension here is that the conceptions of spiritual completion in Kubrawī thought 
whereby the shaykh comes to manifest the attributes of God, seems to allow dispensing 
with the religious law and Sufi practice. Hence, these questions require some extensive 
theoretical expositions in al-Baghdādī’s answers. The topic of dispensation is also 
relevant to the rise of antinomian groups in this period of history. Hence, these 
questions attempt to distinguish correct forms of Sufi behaviour. 
 
The questions also highlight the rise of distinct Sufi identities. The title of the Tuḥfa 
seems to reference one of ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī’s works entitled “Answers to the 
questions of some of the religious scholars of Khurasan.” In this work he discusses the 
topic of investiture, the origins of the Sufi cloak, and whether the Sufi may maintain his 
societal obligations such as work and marriage.102 These questions regarding the usage 
of the Sufi cloak and the appropriateness of mixing with the wider populace are 
mirrored in al-Baghdādī’s text and were clearly an area of concern for Sufis at the time. 
 
Al-Baghdādī explicitly disagrees with and responds to al-Suhrawardī’s discussion of 
investiture in his 7th chapter. That similar questions were put to al-Baghdādī indicates 
the need to produce a Kubrawī response to al-Suhrawardī’s systematised Sufism which 
argued for practices and theories that diverged from those espoused by the early 
Kubrawīs. The questions therefore indicate the emergence of a distinct Sufi community 
which needed to clarify its theoretical framework and communal structure in 
opposition to subversive mystical groups and other Sufi communities. 
 
The questions put to al-Baghdādī are evidence of emerging tensions in this period. 
These are not only confined to tensions between Sufi theory and the potential to 
dispense with the law, but also between the exclusivist and elitist notions of Sufism and 
its increasing popularity within Muslim society. Questions regarding dress and marking 	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oneself out from wider society recur in questions two, five, seven and ten. The 10th 
question in particular displays this tension explicitly. Hence, the questioner asks how to 
balance interactions with the “cursed” and the “oppressors” while also calling people to 
God.  
 
Furthermore, the questions also reveal a genuine interest in Sufi theory. Hence, the 6th 
question requires a detailed explanation of Kubrawī oneirology. This indicates the 
increasing complexity of Sufi thought which is important for understanding the 
reception of new ideas and doctrines which were absorbed through al-Ghazālī’s into 
Kubrawī Sufism. That al-Baghdādī attempts to further develop Kubrā’s thought into a 
more coherent system is not simply a coincidence; rather it is one of the aims of writing 
the text as it informs the answers to the ten questions. This attests to the relevance of 
the systematisation of Sufi theory to the institutional changes which were occurring 
within Sufi communities in this period. Having detailed the setting of our investigation, 
we may now turn to analysing al-Baghdādī’s thought. 
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Chapter 2 
Psychology 
 
This chapter sets out to provide an outline and analysis of al-Baghdādī’s psychological 
theory, a necessary step towards addressing the questions and achieving the aims we 
have set in this study. This will account for the basis of al-Baghdādī’s theoretical 
framework and detail how his ideas of knowledge and perception are built upon it. Here 
it will be shown that al-Baghdādī systematises Kubrā’s work, constructing a clearer 
more stratified psychological theory, and offering more detailed discussions of some 
important ideas found in Kubrā’s thought. This will clairfy the theoretical basis of some 
defining features in Kubrā’s work such as his accounts of visions, dreams and coloured 
lights. Hence, the Tuḥfa is evidence of a highly stratified and coherent system of 
thought which was present even in this first generation of Kubrawī thinkers. 
 
We begin by charting al-Baghdādī’s account of the progression of man from a being 
furthest removed from God, to becoming the locus for the manifestation of God’s divine 
attributes. First we will outline al-Baghdādī’s cosmology and his articulation of the 
parallel micro-cosmology of the human body and soul since this provides the 
framework of his psychology. This is the basis from which to move on to detail his 
theory of dreams and visions and perception of the physical world. This is also 
important for revealing the emergence of a coherent, highly systematised dream 
theory (oneirology) in al-Baghdādī’s work which has not been sufficiently explained in 
studies regarding the Kubrawiyya. It will be seen here that al-Baghdādī’s work is worthy 
of study in its own right as it is evidence of the reception and development of 
philosophical and theological concepts found in al-Ghazālī and Avicenna in Kubrawī 
Sufism. We will also highlight the influence of important Sufi figures such as al-
Qushayrī, ‘Ammār al-Bidlīsī and Abū Sa‘īd ibn Abī al-Khayr on al-Baghdādī’s thought. 
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This will chapter will also reveal the extent to which al-Baghdādī’s systematisation of 
Kubrā’s thought influenced later authors and thinkers such as Najm al-Dīn al-Rāzī and 
‘Alā’ al-Dawla al-Simnānī.  
 
This provides the basis for an analysis of the relationship between Kubrawī thought and 
practice which is central for the emergence of Kubrawī Sufism, since these theories are 
inseparable from the communal and institutional structures al-Baghdādī develops in 
the Tuḥfa which provide the community with its distinctive identity. This 
systematisation of Kubrawī psychology determines the shaykh’s authority and the 
centralisation of the community around him. It also governs the practice of investiture 
and affiliation to the Sufi community, as well as the notion of dispensation from 
religious obligations and responses to antinomianism.  
 
1 .  The composition of man 
 
One of the most important features of al-Baghdādī’s psychological theory is its 
dependence on a cosmological framework. This affords a more detailed explanation of 
the relationship between the soul and body, and hence the production of visions and 
dreams than we would otherwise realise by relying on Kubrā’s work alone. Al-
Baghdādī’s cosmology details a hierarchy from the most bodily complex to the simplest 
of existents where the former is furthest removed from perfection while the latter is 
closest to it. This hierarchy of beings is then reflected in man’s own composition and 
his experiences and behaviours are made to correspond to this cosmological 
framework. Man’s baser behaviours stem from his bodily nature which he shares with 
other bodily existents, while his nobler nature is realised after subduing these bodily 
characteristics. This framework is crucial for providing us with al-Baghdādī’s 
understanding of Kubrā’s thought which is less structured by comparison. 
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Kubrā’s Fawā’iḥ is noted for its discussions of visions which the Sufi experiences in his 
progression along the path. It describes fantastic scenes of demons, flights over various 
landscapes, and perceptions of coloured lights. It is autobiographical in parts and does 
not fully explain the mechanisms involved in the production of visions, or the 
framework for interpreting these visions which at times must be inferred. Still, there 
are some prominent features of Kubrā’s understanding of visions which we may grasp 
from his work. For Kubrā, visionary experiences manifest the degree of the soul’s 
spiritual perfection, and they therefore function as diagnostic tools for understanding 
the state of the soul.103 Sometimes this is presented in a rather literal fashion. For 
example Kubrā states in his Fawā’iḥ: 
 
Know that the ego, the devil, and the angel are not things external to you (laysat ashyā’ 
khārijatan ‘anka), but you are them (bal anta humm). Likewise [the celestial] heaven, earth 
and the seat [of God] (al-kursī)... They are but things within you (innamā hiya ashyā’ fīka), 
and if you travel spiritually and become purified, you will see that clearly, God 
willing.104 
 
Yet the precise meaning of such statements is not easily understood given the style of 
the Fawā’iḥ. Underlying such statements is the notion that is dependent upon the 
degree of the soul’s perfection. The idea that the truth of perception and experience is 
only understood in accordance with the rank of the soul permeates Kubrā’s work. In his 
treatise, al-Uṣūl al-‘ashra, Kubrā explains that the experience of punishment in the 
afterlife is due to a person not severing themselves from their attachments to 
materiality in this life. Hence when a separation from materiality is forced upon him it 
is experienced as suffering, whereas the perfected soul which has cultivated this 
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severance before death will perceive it as bliss.105 The perception of this reality is 
dictated by the degree of purity that the soul achieves in its bodily life, as the same 
reality may be experienced and understood in different ways. How this notion relates to 
the experience of spiritual visions, or even physical sensations in this life remains only 
partly explained in Kubrā’s writings and is given fuller exposition in the writings of al-
Baghdādī.  
 
Because of statements such as the above, Kubrā and his students have been described as 
espousing a type of idealism.106 However, it is difficult to substantiate the suitability of 
such a term for describing Kubrawī thought. Al-Baghdādī and Kubrā do not account for 
the nature of the perceptible world, hence there is no attempt by them to put forward a 
theory of idealism. If we are to understand Kubrā’s statements such as those above, 
turning to al-Baghdādī is crucial as he explains that the realities of the cosmos are 
present within the microcosmic composition of the human as a parallel to the 
macrocosm. 
  
Hence if the Sufi receives a vision of a celestial heaven for example, he perceives both 
the external heaven alongside the reality of that heaven which is stored within him. 
These realities (ḥaqā’iq) that are present within man are not the external things 
themselves, but correspond to these external realities. They are revealed to the soul in 
ever-greater degrees of truth and are completely understood upon its perfection. 
Hence, understanding the true nature of a thing depends on understanding the 
corresponding realities which are stored within the human being, something that can 
only be achieved by purifying the soul through Sufi discipline. 
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The nature of the existence of the world is a question that never arises here. Al-
Baghdādī only discusses the ability to perceive truths from what the senses and the 
imagination present to the soul. For al-Baghdādī, one’s ability to know anything is 
predicated on higher plains of cognition which are only achievable with purification of 
the soul from its lower faculties which obscure truth. The truth of one’s understanding 
of his or her perceptions rises and falls in tandem with the perfection and denigration 
of the soul. This purification involves the individual coming to know the realities of the 
cosmos which are stored within him. Hence, there is a correspondence between the 
perception of the world and the human being’s capacity for knowledge. We can come to 
a fuller understanding of Kubrā’s assertions of these perceptions as things “within” 
man by analysing the composition of man in the Tuḥfa. Given its emphasis on 
cosmology and micro-cosmology as the framework for the perfection of the soul, the 
Tuḥfa provides an important exposition of Kubrawī epistemology. 
 
1.i .  Man as a microcosm: Body and soul 
 
The notion of the human being as a reflection of the entire cosmos is not particular to 
al-Baghdādī or the Kubrawiyya. However, during al-Baghdādī’s time, this notion of 
man’s composition seems to have gained greater currency and become much more 
prominent. The conception of man as a microcosm is prevalent in the works of Sufi 
thinkers in this period such Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī  (d. 674/1274) the foremost disciple 
of Ibn ‘Arabī, as well as ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī. It also finds expression in the writings the 
Brethren of Purity (ikhwān al-ṣafā) and those of Afḍal al-Dīn Kashānī, and was associated 
with Arabic Hermeticism.  
 
This concept also appears much earlier, in writings of Muslim thinkers who did not 
necessarily have an attachment to Sufism such as ‘Amr ibn Baḥr al-Jāḥiẓ’s (d. 255/869) 
	   65	  
Kitāb al-ḥaywān. However, in all these cases, the way in which the cosmos was conceived 
of directly affected the way in which the composition of man was articulated. 
Therefore, although there is nothing new about Sufis drawing on this analogy, the way 
in which it is articulated must be understood if we are to capture the role of micro-
cosmology in the development of al-Baghdādī’s specific psychological theory.107 
 
In the 3rd chapter of the Tuḥfa, detailing the rules of shaykh-hood, al-Baghdādī divides 
all created things into either belonging to the hidden (ghayb) or manifest (shahāda) 
worlds. The human being’s composition however consists of all the realities of both 
realms. This is explained as a consequence of man’s composition of a body and soul. Al-
Baghdādī explains this in the following passages: 
 
God almighty created the worlds, and in their multitudes, they are restricted to two 
types, the hidden world and the manifest world. This is why God has said of Himself: 
“He is Allah, there is no divinity but He, knower of the hidden and manifest.” So He 
described (Himself) as knower of the hidden and manifest in order to describe his 
perfect knowledge of all the existents, for there is no thing in creation except that it is 
either from the hidden world or the manifest world… 
 
[He] created the human as constructed from all the realities of the hidden and manifest. 
And God has said: “And I fashioned him and breathed into him from my spirit…” So the 
‘fashioning’ is from the manifest and the ‘breathing in of the spirit’ is from the hidden. 
So there is no thing in the manifest that is not within the human’s manifest-ness. And 
there is no thing in the hidden that is not within the human’s hiddenness.108 
 
Al-Baghdādī establishes from the outset that all the realities of existence are contained 
within the human being’s composition. The sense of the term ‘realities’ here equates to 	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the intelligibles and their forms. He explains this as being a result of the human’s 
material and spiritual composition. Man’s frame is the most complex bodily 
composition in manifest creation which means that it shares its faculties with all other 
bodily existents. Likewise, the soul as the greatest creation in the hidden world, shares 
its nature with all hidden existents. Al-Baghdādī explains that this is because man is 
nearest to God with respect to the soul and furthest from him with respect to the body: 
 
There is no thing in the world of bodies (ajsām) closer to the presence of Godliness than 
the Throne, because it is the place where the rule of mercy is bound. And from it the 
world of bodies arises, [first] the seven celestial spheres, and after them comes the 
ether (al-athīr) and fire, then air, then water, then earth, then the things which are 
composed of these elements which are the species of solids, plants and animals. So if 
you consider all the existents, you find that the furthest from the presence [of 
Godliness] in reality is the world of bodies. And if you consider the world of bodies as 
varieties of constructions from the different elements, of which man’s bodily frame is 
[one such thing], [man’s bodily frame] is the furthest from true correct standing. And so 
[man] is furthest from the true indivisible substances. So the image of the physical form 
of the human is the furthest composition from the presence [of Godliness] and he is in 
truth the lowest of the low.109 
 
Many medieval thinkers shared similar cosmological systems albeit with some 
variations.110 For al-Baghdādī, the emphasis in recounting this process of creation is 
placed on the progression of existents from simplicity to complexity. God’s essence first 
emanates onto the cosmological throne which lies between the hidden and manifest. 
The notion of emanation was introduced by earlier thinkers to account for the way in 
which the multiplicity of God’s attributes arises from his singular essence, without 
compromising his oneness. God then commands the manifest world, or world of bodies, 	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through the throne which lies between the hidden and manifest. Next in bodily 
complexity to the throne are the seven heavenly spheres. Creation on earth arises from 
this chain of events starting with the throne and moving through the heavenly spheres.  
 
On the sphere of earth, the four elements of fire, air, water and earth combine to form 
existents. The natural state of the elements is to remain separate, however they can be 
forced to unite in order to produce more complex bodies. It was an accepted notion in 
philosophy that the soul forces the elements to combine and behave against their 
nature which was to remain seperate. 111  Hence, the increase in compositional 
complexity indicates further removal from the natural state of the elements and their 
“correct standing.” Hence, bodies are composed of a combination of these elements, the 
more complex they are, the further removed they are from their simpler and seperate 
state. In order of increasing complexity these are, inanimate objects, plants, animals 
and finally humans. Man is therefore the most complex existent possessing human, 
animal, vegetative and mineral faculties. Al-Baghdādī concludes that it is for this reason 
that man’s bodily frame was termed the “lowest of the low” in the Qur’an, while the 
soul was described by the holy text as having the highest standing in all creation. The 
body then presents the soul with a number of faculties from which it must be extracted 
in order to actualise its true nature. 
 
This disparity between the soul and body testifies to the influence of philosophy over 
al-Baghdādī’s thought. Al-Baghdādī’s distinction between the body and the soul 
indicates his adherence to a dualistic notion of body and soul, an idea which has its 
origins with Avicenna.112 For Avicenna, the soul is not dependent on the body and is 
capable of subsisting without it, the body is presented as simply the riding animal 
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which the soul mounts and commands.113 In the Avicennan scheme, the vegetative state 
is marked by its functions such as growth and reproduction, this is below the animal 
state which adds animate functions such as movement and perception. Finally the 
human being is considered to be above the animal due to the power of intellection 
which is located in the soul and is independent of the body.114 For al-Baghdādī the soul 
is also that which distinguishes the human from the animal. However, for al-Baghdādī it 
is the soul’s ability to experience realities and access the greater exalted attributes of 
the spirit, as well as the divine attributes of God which confer this greater status upon it 
rather than intellection. 
 
The influence of philosophy over al-Baghdādī’s Sufism can be traced to al-Ghazālī’s 
adoption of Avicennan ideas. Al-Baghdādī’s cosmogony attests to the reception of body-
soul dualism by reserving the soul from taking part in the descent of man which the 
body takes part in. Some scholars have asserted that al-Ghazālī argues against divorcing 
the soul from the body in his Tahāfut and that he should be considered a monist in this 
regard.115 This is because the ability of the soul to subsist without the body favoured, 
but did not definitively lead to the conclusion of a non-bodily afterlife. Hence, in the 
Tahāfut, a largely polemical work, al-Ghazālī attempts to dissociate himself from the 
philosophical tradition and seems to argue against the subsistence of the soul without 
the body. However it has since been shown that al-Ghazālī ultimately adopted the 
Avicennan dualism of body and soul.116 
 
That the dualistic account of body and soul found its way into Kubrawī thought is 
evident in Kubrā’s Uṣūl al-‘ashra. Translated as The Ten Principles, Kubrā here explains 
that each of these principles is intended to help the Sufi undergo a “death before 	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death.”117 As we have discussed, this is in order to detach the soul from bodily concerns 
prior to the actual physical death so that the soul will not experience pain and suffering 
upon its forced detachment from the body.118 The subsistence of the soul without the 
body upon death is an important premise which underpins the entirety of the work. 
 
The notion of an imagined resurrection is also accommodated in other Kubrawī 
sources. Though it is not necessary to conclude from this that the Kubrawiyya denied 
the bodily resurrection, this attests to the influence of philosophy through al-Ghazālī’s 
thought. While al-Ghazālī does not deny the bodily resurrection, he does seem to 
provide various eschatological options which would accommodate the dualistic account 
of body and soul. It has been pointed out that he does not deny the possibility that the 
soul could occupy a different body upon resurrection, or that the resurrection could be 
imaginal whereby the soul imagines bodily pleasures and pain in the afterlife. 
Imagination however requires a body, so al-Ghazālī hints that in this case the celestial 
bodies could serve as the medium for imagination. Al-Ghazālī also holds that abstracted 
intellectual pleasure will only be available for the most perfected souls.119  
 
That these ideas concerning the soul’s existence in the afterlife affected Kubrawī 
thought is seen in the Tafsīr al-nujūm, a Kubrawī exegesis of the Qur’an. The authorship 
of this work is unclear, having probably been co-written by Kubrā and Najm al-Dīn al-
Rāzī, with some minor additions by al-Simnānī, however all three have intimate ties 
with al-Baghdādī’s work.120 At one point it is explained that in heaven the believers have 
wives who represent God’s attributes of beauty and majesty through the imagination.121 
Here we see that the heavenly maidens are presented as part of an imagined world in 
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the afterlife, a metaphor to the reality in which the soul finds itself. The dualism of 
body and soul found its way into Kubrawī thought which seems comfortable in 
divorcing the soul from the body in a number of contexts. For example, in 
accommodating an imagined afterlife, though not necessarily precluding a bodily 
resurrection. 
 
The dualistic account of the body and soul probably offered al-Ghazālī a more suitable 
model for his project of building an ethical system which required a coherent 
eschatological framework.122 Al-Baghdādī’s Tuḥfa is evidence that al-Ghazālī’s thought 
was useful for later Sufis too. It provides al-Baghdādī with important conceptual and 
discursive tools. These are employed in al-Baghdādī’s account of the soul and body, in 
addition to his stratification of Sufi thought and practice. At one point al-Baghdādī 
asserts that souls do not occupy space (ghayr mutaḥayyiz makānī), and that because of 
this the soul of the shaykh and disciple can meet and commune spiritually in dreams 
and visions.123 This also seems to serve as the premise to a specific class of clairvoyant 
visions which depend on the underlying notion that the soul is not temporally bound. 
As such, it may perceive occurrances in the physical world which the body cannot. 
Hence, these ideas allow al-Baghdādī to develop a number of concepts further. 
 
The duality of body and soul is highlighted in the above passages of the Tuḥfa as al-
Baghdādī makes the point that in man God has brought together “the farthest of the 
far” and “the nearest of the near.” Hence the soul is presented as being entrapped in 
the bodily world, and must be extracted from it. Al-Baghdādī’s cosmology draws a sharp 
contrast between man’s body and soul. The soul remains the direct breath of God, while 
the body is created through a drawn out cosmological process. Hence al-Baghdādī 
constructs a framework which describes the descent of man as occurring in the 	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macrocosm, while the ascent and return occurs in the microcosm, as the soul must be 
extracted from the faculties of the body. This provides an explanation to some of 
Kubrā’s statement in the Fawā’iḥ such as the following: 
  
Existence is composed of four elements, all of which are shades of darkness, one 
covering the other… earth, water, fire, and air. You are beneath them all, with no 
chance for separation from them except by giving each its due: This is the rendering of 
the part to the whole, such that earthliness (al-turābiyya) takes the earth, wateriness (al-
mā’iyya) takes the water, fieriness (al-nāriyya) takes the fire, and airiness (al-hawā’iyya) 
takes the air. When each has taken its share, you become separated from these 
burdens.124 
 
Al-Baghdādī’s micro-cosmological account of man’s body elucidates what Kubrā means 
here. The soul must be extracted from the compounds that make up the body and exert 
an influence over the soul, obscuring its true nature. The importance of this parallel 
between man and cosmos is that man contains all the realities of creation within him. 
The complexity of the body means that it contains all the realities present in the 
manifest realm, while the soul contains the realities of the hidden realm. Hence, the 
Tuḥfa elucidates the meanings of such statements made by Kubrā.  
 
1.i i .  The faculties of the soul 
 
Al-Baghdādī’s understanding of man as a microcosm is developed further in order to 
explain the relationship between the body and the soul, which mimics the relationship 
between God and the cosmos. What is meant by the term ‘soul’ in this study is that non-
bodily substance in its entirety which we have described as the counterpart to the 
body. In the Tuḥfa the soul is subdivided into faculties which account for its various 
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functions and ranks. Here al-Baghdādī presents us with four faculties of the human 
soul, which are the ego (nafs), spirit (rūḥ), heart (qalb) and innermost heart (sirr).  
 
The term nafs can be used to refer to the soul or the self in its entirety, as al-Baghdādī 
does on occasion.125 However the more technical usage of nafs refers to what we shall 
translate here as ego. This is because the term in the Tuḥfa refers to a soul which is 
dominated by its desire to seek material gain, pleasure and comfort. In al-Baghdādī’s 
microcosmic scheme, it represents the lowest bodily faculties which may dominate the 
soul and must be tamed and disciplined like a riding animal.126 It is subdivided by al-
Baghdādī into a commanding ego (which commands the person to sin), a blaming ego 
(which regrets its sins) and a pacified ego. The latter state is often described by al-
Baghdādī as the beginning stages of the heart, and indeed the pacified ego is described 
as turning into a heart in the Tuḥfa.127  
 
However this is just one way in which the term heart (qalb) is used in the Tuḥfa. The 
term can also refer to a much more specific function as the spiritual organ which links 
man’s soul and body, causing the body to behave in accordance with the soul. Crucially, 
it is also the locus of perception and knowledge. In this latter sense it is made 
equivalent to the rational soul of the philosophers which is also described as being able 
to grasp truths once man has overcome the lower faculties of the soul. 
 
The spirit is antithetical to the commanding ego, it represents man’s loftier nature. The 
spirit is associated with the term ‘ubūdīyya, or worship. Hence there is a tripartite 
conception of the soul’s three general ranks of ego, heart and spirit in the Tuḥfa.128 For 
al-Baghdādī, the dominance of the spirit over man’s being is often associated with the 	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love of worship, seclusion and visions. The spirit therefore desires things of the hidden 
and immaterial (ghayb) and delights in acts of worship, seclusion and ecstatic states 
brought about by spiritual experiences. In the Tuḥfa, the term also refers to the soul’s 
ability to perceive hidden truths or future events, as a type of spiritual sensory organ 
referencing its independence from the body. At times the term rūḥ, like nafs is also used 
to refer to the soul or self in the Tuḥfa. Therefore, just as with the terms nafs and qalb, 
al-Baghdādī’s usage of rūḥ depends heavily on the context of the passage. When these 
terms are encountered in their more general sense, it will be necessary to translate rūḥ 
as ‘soul’ and nafs as ‘self’. 
 
Finally there is the sirr, or innermost heart. The sirr seems to have always had a 
connection to the heart in Sufism as its innermost part.129 Like al-Baghdādī’s usage of 
the term ‘heart,’ the innermost heart seems to refer to both a spiritual organ with a 
specific function as well as describing a specific rank of the soul. In the latter sense of 
the term, the innermost heart’s rank seems to be placed above that of the spirit as al-
Baghdādī explains that once one has passed the stage of the heart, he enters the “world 
of the spirit” (‘ālam al-rūḥāniyya) which is associated with the spirit whereas in the 
penultimate stage of perfection he enters the enclosure of beauty and majesty which is 
associated with the innermost heart.130 However, the term also refers to man’s essence, 
indicating the indivisibility of the soul. It also fulfills a psycho-spiritual function by 
emanating the soul’s essence onto the heart which then commands the body.  
 
The heart (qalb) and innermost heart (sirr) are important terms which are developed 
further by al-Baghdādī into spiritual organs which command the body. Al-Baghdādī 
expands upon their functions through a cosmological allegory. In explaining the role of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions, 192. 
130 Al-Baghdādī, Tuḥfat al-barara, 3. 
	   74	  
the heart and the innermost heart al-Baghdādī likens the heart to the cosmological 
throne of God (‘arsh) and the innermost heart to the seat (kursī). Al-Baghdādī explains:  
 
Just as God has created… an intermediary between the hidden and manifest, which is 
the throne, so has he created for man [an intermediary] between his body (manifest-
ness) and soul (hiddenness) which is the heart… And just as God created for himself a 
seat above the throne, so too did he create for man a seat above the heart which is the 
innermost heart.131 
 
Al-Baghdādī then explains that the cosmological seat (kursī) is the locus of divinity 
(ulūhiyya) and the cosmological throne is the locus of mercifulness (raḥmāniyya).132 This 
refers to a distinction between essence and attribute which was common in Islamic 
cosmology, occurring for example in al-Ghazālī’s thought.133 Al-Bagdhādī therefore 
identifies the innermost heart as man’s essence which emanates unto the heart. The 
heart then commands the body in accordance with the essence, just as the cosmological 
seat represents the indivisible essence of God which emanates onto the throne, through 
which God commands the physical world. In the microcosm of man, the innermost 
heart’s emanation onto the heart and its subsequent command of the body results in 
the bodily expression of attributes (ṣifāt).  
 
Al-Baghdādī employs this conception of the innermost heart to resolve an outstanding 
ambiguity regarding its position in relation to the spirit. He states that there has been 
some disagreement among Sufis over the relationship between the innermost heart and 
the spirit, and that some have asserted that the spirit is the loftiest faculty while others 
assert that it is the innermost heart. 134  Al-Baghdādī attempts to resolve this 
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disagreement by associating the innermost heart with the essence of man which 
emanates onto the heart. Hence, it can be considered a greater or lesser substance than 
that of the spirit depending on whichever faculty dominates it, as al-Baghdādī states: 
 
And if you consider the dominance of the spirit over the throne of the heart, [the 
innermost heart’s] rank is below the rank of the spirit. And if you consider the 
dominance of God over the throne of the heart then its rank is greater than the rank of 
the spirit.135 
 
Al-Baghdādī attempts to explain why there has been disagreement over the rank of the 
innermost heart and the spirit. When the spirit is the dominant faculty of the soul, the 
spirit defines the essence of man’s soul. However, when God is dominant over the soul 
and determines its essence, the innermost heart achieves a more exalted state, above 
that of the spirit. Hence what determines the state of the innermost heart and the heart 
is whether the ego, the spirit, or God rules over them. The conduct of the individual 
depends on a chain of command with God, or the ego, or the spirit at its head, followed 
by the innermost heart which determines man’s essence, to the heart which is the 
bridge between the soul and the body where the appropriate attribute emerges, and 
this causes the body to behave according to the heart’s command in order to express 
the attribute. The culmination of this process is what al-Baghdādī means by the term 
manifesting attributes (tajallī al-ṣifāt). 
 
This command of the body is understood as analogous to God’s command of the cosmos. 
Starting from the lowest state of existence this means that at first, the ego dominates 
the heart. However, as it is overcome there occurs the dominance of the spirit over the 
heart. The goal of the Sufi does not end here, the spirit too must be transcended so that 
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the heart and innermost heart can become the throne and seat of God, at this point 
man begins to manifest the attributes of God as al-Baghdādī explains: 
 
And if he attains certainty in this state, the manifestation of the attributes of the spirit 
are exchanged for the manifestation of the attributes of [God]… And so the heart 
becomes the throne of [God] and the innermost heart becomes his seat and wayfaring 
ceases.136 
 
This is the ultimate goal of the Sufi, it is the point at which the Sufi reaches intihā’  (the 
end of wayfaring) and is allowed to become a shaykh and train disciples. At this point 
man manifests God’s attributes. According to al-Baghdādī this state of intihā’ opens the 
potential for infinite progression due to the infinity God’s attributes which al-Baghdādī 
often describes as travelling within God rather than travelling to Him.137 Here, the sense 
of intihā’ is not perfection but the idea of reaching the presence of God (ḥaḍrat al-
rubūbiyya), the term bears the sense of an endless process of perfection. As the 
attributes of God are infinite the Sufi can never complete manifesting them.  
 
These passages build upon the notion of wujūd which Kubrā discusses in his Fawā’iḥ. 
While Kubrā sometimes uses the term to refer to existence in a general sense of “being 
there,” he also employs the term to refer to levels of spiritual existence, or psycho-
spiritual states. 138 Here wujūd is not equivalent to existence in the philosophical sense 
of the word, but refers to the degree to which man’s spiritual being is perfected, as 
Kubrā explains: 
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And know that wujūd is not one [station]. For there is not a [station of wujūd] but that 
there is above it another more specific and better one, until it reaches the station of the 
Truth [God]… And the types of wujūd are contained in seven [stations].139 
 
Kubrā does not explain what these seven states are exactly. However, it is very 
tempting to see them in al-Baghdādī’s framework. From what we have discussed we can 
clearly discern seven psycho-spiritual states which al-Baghdādī has used to describe the 
rank of the soul’s perfection in the commanding ego, the blaming ego, the pacified ego, 
the heart, the innermost heart, the spirit and finally God ruling over the heart. This 
correlation will appear to be even more significant when we come to explain how 
visions parallel the state of the soul. For now however, it is important to note that al-
Baghdādī is building heavily upon Kubrā’s thought, providing us with clearer, more 
systematised theories regarding the relationship between body and soul. 
 
1.i i i .  The heart as a mirror 
 
As we have mentioned, the heart is described both as that which commands the body, 
but also the faculty of the soul which perceives realities. Collapsing both functions of 
perception and command of the body in the single metaphor of the heart in al-
Baghdādī’s thought attests to the influence of al-Ghazālī. In addition, characterising the 
heart as the locus of knowledge and the spiritual organ impresses attributes upon the 
body is crucial both for the stratification of Sufi psychology as well as the Sufi 
community since it establishes an intimate link between visions and the rank of the 
soul, as well as psychological theory and practice. 
 
The assertion that the human soul and body manifest God’s attributes requires some 
clarification in order to avoid accusations of ḥulūl, the heresy of God as incarnate in a 	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body. Al-Baghdādī does not devote a full discussion to this issue, but with regard to this 
problem the influence of al-Ghazālī is felt throughout the Tuḥfa. Al-Baghdādī often 
quotes al-Ghazālī’s ‘Iḥyā’ ‘ulūm al-dīn and Mishkāt al-anwār, and was heavily influenced by 
both works. Al-Baghdādī adopts the metaphor of the human heart as a mirror, and 
employs the term “realities” when referring to knowable truths which man is 
composed of and are imprinted onto the heart.140 The conception of the heart as a 
mirror becomes a central feature of al-Baghdādī’s psychology. In the 3rd chapter of the 
Tuḥfa al-Baghdādī explains: 
  
For the polished mirror, if it aligns with a part of the sun, the sun’s light is imprinted on 
it. And the light which is imprinted on it is not the sun itself, even if the effects of its 
power are more intense than the effects of the power of the part of the sun [that it 
reflects]. For the sun itself does not burn cotton and does not ignite it, though the 
reflection of its rays which are imprinted in a mirror may burn and ignite it. And so is 
the light of the attributes or the essence (dhāt) [of God] if it emerges in the mirror of the 
heart, it is neither the same attributes nor essence, nor is it other than them, even if the 
effects of its power [seem] greater. 
 
Here, al-Baghdādī asserts that the attributes which are reflections in this mirror of the 
heart, are neither identical nor different to God’s attributes. This is extremely similar to 
al-Ghazālī’s discussion of the heart which itself relies on ideas found in the work of the 
10th century Sufi Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī’s (d. 386/996) Qūt al-qulūb.141 The term “realities” 
and the heart as a mirror are connected in al-Ghazālī’s thought. Philosophical theories 
of knowledge held that during the act of intellection, the rational soul, the subject of 
intellection (‘āqil), becomes identical to the object of intellection (ma‘qūl). This was 
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recognised as problematic and a number of philosophers, from Avicenna to al-Farābī 
and Ibn Rushd, sought to address it.142  
 
In order to preclude the possibility of the soul becoming identical or united to God or 
his attributes in the act of perception al-Ghazālī introduces the concept of the heart in 
place of the rational soul and characterises it as a mirror which reflects the realities, or 
forms of things rather than the intelligibles themselves.143  This removes any notion of 
unity between the soul and the object of perception by rendering knowledge a 
reflection of the objects of knowledge whose form only is imprinted in the mirror. This 
precludes any sense of a literal unity between the soul and God.  
 
Al-Baghdādī clearly grasps the significance of al-Ghazālī’s ideas as he employs them in 
reference to the reflection of the essence and attributes of God in the mirror of the soul 
in the above passage. Hence, the mirror imagery is not only relevant to the heart’s 
function as the receptor of knowledge but also to its role of commanding the body. The 
various functions of the soul are collapsed into the metaphor of the heart as a mirror 
here which means that for al-Baghdādī, knowledge and behaviour are linked. As we 
have seen the term realities (ḥaqā’iq) is employed extensively by al-Baghdādī when 
referring to knowable things and his assertion that man contains within his 
composition all the knowable realities in creation.144 Therefore while al-Baghdādī relies 
on al-Ghazālī’s ideas, he develops this term further by emphasising that the realities are 
not only found in the external world, but within man himself as well.  
 
He establishes that every perceptible reality external to the human being corresponds 
to a reality within his own composition. This is important for al-Baghdādī’s discussion 
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visions, since the realities of the hidden and manifest worlds are made present within 
man, he is capable of envisioning the truths of these things through his imaginative and 
spiritual faculties, whether these realities are bodily such as animals or celestial bodies, 
or spiritual such as angels and jinn, are present in front of him or not. Hence, al-Ghazālī 
provides a useful set of conceptual tools for al-Baghdādī’s development of psychology. 
 
The degree to which a reality is reflected in the mirror of the heart depends upon the 
degree of perfection that the soul has attained, the extent to which this “mirror” is 
polished. The blemishes on the mirror are removed through Sufi practices which, once 
completion is achieved, allows these realities to be reflected and comprehended in full. 
By shifting the emphasis onto realities within one’s own composition, al-Baghdādī’s Sufi 
is not primarily perceiving realities of the external world through the mirror of his soul 
but realities which are contained within him, but are present in the external world as 
well. Hence, the imagination could represent these realities in an image without the 
need to perceive them with a physical organ and the degree to which they are 
understood depends on the purity of the soul. 
 
This is made clear in al-Baghdādī’s development of al-Ghazālī’s notion of the heart as a 
mirror. This is seen most strikingly in his recourse to a metaphor of a house and a 
mirror within it. This metaphor is introduced by al-Ghazālī in his Mishkāt al-anwār to 
describe a series of lights which represent knowledge and existence, both originating 
with God and appear in the manifest world through a series of reflections. Here al-
Ghazālī presents with the image of the Sun’s light which is reflected by moon, passes 
through an opening in a house, then falls on a mirror which reflects it onto a wall, and 
is then finally refracted by the wall onto the floor. Al-Ghazālī then likens the Sun’s light 
to God’s light and explains that the final refraction of the light which hits the floor is 
understood to have ultimately originated with God’s light. His discussion here 
emphasises the causal aspect of God’s light from which all perceptible things are made 
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apparent, as he explains that these lights do not regress to no end, but have one origin 
in God’s light.145 
 
Al-Baghdādī develops this metaphor further as he presents us with his own metaphor 
of a dark house with an opening through which light may enter, and a mirror placed 
within it. Here he explains that if a mirror is placed within the house but is not 
polished, it will not be possible for anything within the house to be imprinted onto the 
mirror. He then states that if the mirror is polished, but the house remains dark, there 
is again no possibility for the images to be reflected. He then explains that the house 
requires an opening through which light can enter for the things in the house to be 
imprinted onto the mirror. He then explains that the house represents man’s existence, 
while the mirror represents the heart, and the things within the house are of the 
hidden world, and seem to correspond to the realities.146 He explains that: 
 
Whoever has not polished the heart from the imprints of nature, the blemishes of 
desires, and the particularities of the ego, will not have imprinted within him the 
images of the hidden world and will not see a single thing.147 
 
This goes some way in clarifying Kubrā’s statement that when the Sufi perceives 
celestial heavens, the cosmological throne, the devil or angels, he perceives things that 
are not external to himself.148 It explains that man will realise that heaven and the 
throne, the devil and the angel are not external to man but are within him, once he 
becomes purified. Prior to this perfection, the mirror of the heart will not allow the 
realities to be reflected in it completely, and man will not realise that these realities are 
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contained within him until he has freed himself from the bodily, egoistic and spiritual 
faculties which obscure it. 
 
This links knowledge to the progression of the Sufi through spiritual ranks, and to the 
cultivation of more exalted attributes, both of which are the result of the soul’s 
perfection. An inseparable connection between epistemology, spiritual progress and 
behaviour is established here. This connection is further strengthened by placing 
realities which correspond to those found in the cosmos within man, imbuing the term 
“realities” with both an epistemic significance as forms imprinted in the heart, as well 
as an existential one as part of the human’s composition.  
 
It is important to note that unlike in al-Ghazālī, it is the composition of man’s body and 
soul that results in the microcosmic nature of man for al-Baghdādī. Hence, the realities 
for al-Baghdādī are contained with the “house” of existence. Kubrā’s use of the term 
existence (wujūd) predicts al-Baghdādī’s microcosmology. Kubrā describes the lowest 
state of the soul as one which is inundated by the densest material, whereas the highest 
levels are characterised by the most translucent material.149 This is clearly paralleled in 
al-Baghdādī’s cosmological framework. The soul is revealed to have been unblemished 
and perfect in its original state until it became entrapped in the physical form of the 
body. Kubrā had stated in his Fawā’iḥ that the Kubrawī way is the way of alchemy, 
explaining that the goal of the Sufi is to purify the soul from the impurities which have 
obscured its true state: 
 
Existence (al-wujūd) is composed of four elements, each of them is a darkness, one over 
the other: earth, water, fire and air. And you are underneath all of these… And our way 
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is the way of alchemy, for it is necessary to extract the subtle substance (al-laṭīfa) of 
light from these caverns.150 
 
The meaning of Kubrā’s laṭīfa, here can be found in the 4th chapter of the Tuḥfa where al-
Baghdādī explains the need for a spiritual guide in the form of a shaykh in order to 
extract a person’s soul from the bodily complexities which obscure it. Here al-Baghdādī 
explains that some people were created with souls which have more potential than 
others to arrive at perfection. The potential for the soul to be purified here is a criterion 
for being accepted as a disciple to a shaykh. We will focus here on the conception of the 
soul rather than the passage’s intended aim of demonstrating the exclusivity of Sufi 
affiliation: 
 
What is meant by the divine presence (al-ḥaḍra al-ilāhiyya) is the indivisible substance 
(al-jawhar), [meaning] the soul which is the kernel of the human being. And the human 
souls, even though they share in the reality of the substance-ness (jawhariyya) and the 
purity of light and Godly knowledge… However, their states differ in terms of perfection 
and [imperfection] which are like that of the planets that are perceived in the skies of 
this world. For even if they share in true planet-ness and the realities of light, their 
states differ in perfection and imperfection. For, both the sun and the Alcor (al-suhā)151 
are planets, and yet we perceive the perfection of the sun and the inferiority of the 
Alcor. And such is the state of minerals, for among them are gold, silver, copper and 
iron… And if the substance of the soul in its original created [form] is perfect, accepted 
and beloved, then it does not harm it to be smeared in disobedience at the beginning of 
the affair. And if the substance is lacking, dirty, and rejected, then it does not benefit it 
to perform acts of worship.152 
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The intention of this passage in the Tuḥfa is meant to clarify that despite Kubrā’s 
statement that the subtle substance, the laṭīfa or jawhar must be purified from 
materiality, this does not qualify everyone to become a disciple or shaykh. Attaining an 
official position in the Sufi institution becomes a more exclusive condition and some 
people are not capable of it. Despite the intention of the passage, al-Baghdādī’s 
discussion provides more information regarding Kubrā’s laṭifa here. Kubrā also seems to 
refer to this laṭīfa as a rūḥ and a “light from God” in the Fawā’iḥ. Al-Baghdādī identifies 
Kubrā’s laṭīfa with the jawhar in the above passage, and this is in turn defined as the 
state of divinity which was the original, completely purified condition of the soul.153 The 
meaning of the subtle substance here, also described as a rūḥ by al-Baghdādī is not the 
same as the faculty of the soul called the spirit which we have discussed. Rather it is the 
primordial form of man’s soul as the perfect mirror to God. This is apparent as al-
Baghdādī explains that both the spiritual and bodily aspects of man veil the subtle 
substance: 
 
And the completion of wayfaring (al-sulūk) is the emergence from attributes of nature. 
And what I mean by nature here is what He, God most high, fashioned him at the 
beginning of his affair… And just as he placed for each reality from the realities a 
characteristic (khāṣiyya), exclusive to it, so did he place in each part of the parts of the 
human a characteristic. And from the characteristics of the ego are those that emerge 
from the class of darkness, and from the characteristics of the spirit are those that 
emerge from the subtleties and light. And God is seventy thousand veils of light and 
darkness which are these spiritual lights and egoistic bodily darkness. And the disciple 
does not emerge from these veils of light and darkness, for he is still in his wayfaring.154 
 
While the state of the soul when dominated by the spirit is undoubtedly greater than 
one which is ruled by the ego, it is also revealed to be a barrier to completion. This is 	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because even in this state, man’s heart is not the domain of God. Purification entails 
completely subduing the particulars of the soul, both its spiritual and bodily natures in 
order for it to become the “throne of God.” Hence, the attributes of the spirit and ego 
are likened to imperfect reflections of the attributes of God which are veiled to greater 
or lesser degrees. With this in mind, al-Baghdādī reveals his interpretation of a famous 
prophetic tradition: 
 
And if the disciple is connected to the shaykh (murād), and is governed by the bond of 
desiring, and there emerges in him the effects of the behaviour of the shaykh, that 
behaviour removes him from the world of nature to the world of worship which is the 
mirror to Godliness and the secret of God’s statement: I was a hidden treasure and I 
loved to be known.155 
 
Although al-Baghdādī only quotes the first line of the Prophetic narration here, it goes 
on to say that God created the hidden and manifest worlds in order to be known. We 
can assume that al-Baghdādī expected his readers to be aware of the full narration. The 
two worlds here are interpreted as referring to the microcosm in man rather than the 
macrocosm. Here God is known by the perfection of the soul, when it has been freed 
from the workings of the spirit and the ego and is able to act as a mirror to God and 
manifest his attributes through the body, at this point all the realities of man’s 
composition which act as veils are lifted and made known to him, and his being 
straddles both the hidden and manifest worlds. Here al-Baghdādī shifts the emphasis of 
the narration to the internal microcosmic composition of man rather than the 
macrocosm. 
 
Here we witness important developments of Kubrā’s ideas which result in a clearer, 
more stratified system of Sufi psychology. This stratification is part of broader trends in 	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Sufism in this period. We can see parallels here with the thought of Yaḥya al-
Suhrawardī. Al-Baghdādī’s thought also finds parallels in the works of the 
contemporaneous thinker, Afḍal al-Dīn al-Kashānī (d. 611-612/1214) who also stresses a 
microcosmic framework where behaviour and perception are linked, culminating in the 
perfection of the self and knowledge.156 Whether or not al-Baghdādī and Kashānī had 
any contact seems impossible to say, however al-Baghdādī’s disciple Najm al-Dīn al-Rāzī 
does quote one of Kashānī’s verses in his mirṣād al-‘ibād, indicating that his thought and 
writings may have reached Kubrawī circles.157 
 
This can most probably be attributed to the reception and influence of al-Ghazālī’s 
thought in intellectual circles throughout Iran and Khwarazm. Clearly his discussion of 
the role of the heart is indebted to al-Ghazālī and the collapse of a number of the soul’s 
function into the single metaphor of the heart as a mirror is crucial for al-Baghdādī’s 
psychology which unites knowledge and spiritual practice. Gianotti explains al-
Ghazālī’s notion of the heart ruling the body by comparing the language al-Ghazālī 
employs in his discussion of the heart with the language he employs in discussions of 
the cosmological throne.158 While, al-Ghazālī does not explicitly make this parallel, al-
Baghdādī may have identified this himself.  
 
We see that al-Baghdādī not only relies on al-Ghazālī’s ideas in systematising Kubrawī 
thought, but also builds upon them in interesting ways. The reception of al-Ghazālī in 
al-Baghdādī’s thought is incredibly important for his systematisation of Kubrawī 
psychology. From the duality of the soul, the metaphor of the heart as a mirror, the 
concept of realities, Ghazālian ideas provide al-Baghdādī with important vocabulary 
and concepts to draw upon in systematising Kubrā’s thought. We can now turn to 
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analysing al-Baghdādī’s account of dream and visionary experiences based on the 
framework we have outlined here. 
 
2 .  Oneirology: Thought impressions,  dreams and visions 
 
Dreams in medieval Islamic society were considered to be able to convey truths of the 
hidden and manifest world and inform the dreamer of a number of truths, from matters 
of sharī‘a to divinations. Many treatises were written in attempts to unlock the hidden 
meanings of dreams, and writers from as early as the 7th century in the case of Ibn Sirīn 
(d. 110/728), and as late as the 15th century with Kamāl al-Dīn al-Damīrī (d. 808/1405) 
wrote encyclopaedias listing the meaning of specific dream images.159 Dreams as a form 
of divination in medieval Muslim society were an important concern of political rulers 
and feature prominently in Abbasid historiography.160 This is seen in the translation of 
Artemidorus’ Oneirocritica into Arabic at the caliph al-Ma’mūn’s (d. 223/838) request.161 
 
Dreams and visions were incorporated into hagiographies and biographies as devices of 
legitimation and foreshadowing. They feature in accounts of conversion to Sufism and 
asceticism in the lives of prominent Sufi figures, and also fulfil prophetic roles in 
historiographies, foreshadowing a ruler who matures to fulfil a dream or vision.162 
Hagiographies often stressed conversion narratives, and biographies often assert the 
reception of knowledge through visions and dreams. Dreams naturally were an area of 
increasing interest for Sufis, and by the 12th century Sufism seemed to be the most 
authoritative institution in the science of dreams.163 The increased importance of 
dreams and visions in Sufi thought represents an important transition in the history of 	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Sufism. A more coherent dream theory is relevant to the centralisation of Sufi authority 
in the figure of the shaykh and establishing a sense of communal belonging. Prior to 
demonstrating this, we must detail al-Baghdādī’s oneirology. 
 
The early Kubrawīs stand out in the area of dream science even among Sufis for 
developing a more intricate theoretical framework for the interpretation of dreams, as 
well as explanations for their origins, and the mechanisms by which dreams and visions 
were produced. In contrast to earlier writings on dream images, such as Ibn Sirīn’s 
Tafsīr al-aḥlām, which appear as lists ascribing meanings to particular images without 
any clear underlying framework, al-Baghdādī’s work represents a transition to a 
coherent and systematised oneirology. The interpretive framework of al-Baghdādī’s 
dream science relies on the micro-cosmological understanding of man and offers a 
more systematic account of dreaming than Kubrā’s writings. This is important since 
dream experiences were not without controversies. Even God could manifest in a dream 
through the medium of an image, presenting potential theological problems, something 
which al-Ghazālī addresses in his treatise Risāla fī taḥqīq al-ru’ya.164  
 
Kubrawī works dedicate much effort to detailing dream experiences, they also 
emphasise visions to a greater extent than other contemporaneous Sufi writers. One of 
the reasons for this is the diagnostic value of the dream. As we have stated, the dream 
or vision accords with the perfection of the soul. 165  Kubrā describes a scene in the 
Fawā’iḥ where his visions were purified from the black and blue haze to reveal a circle. 
Once the circle was purified, he began to perceive in it his inner guide. When this circle 
was polished it became a mirror and he realised the inner guide was himself.166  
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Similar visionary anecdotes also occur in the works of Rūzbihān al-Baqlī (d. 606/1209), a 
contemporary of both Kubrā and al-Baghdādī, though whether they had ever met one 
another is impossible to say. Rūzbihān reveals in his own autobiography, the Kashf al-
asrār, that his innermost heart was revealed to him in visionary experiences.167 It is 
clear that al-Baghdādī maintains a similar understanding of visions, which also emerges 
in the works of his disciple Najm al-Dīn al-Rāzī who points out that visions have three 
benefits. The first of these is that the perceiver is made aware of the state of his own 
soul.168  
 
However, the theoretical underpinnings of the diagnostic value of the dream require 
further clarification. Hence, it will be important to understand al-Baghdādī’s 
oneirological system in detail here. For al-Baghdādī dreams and visions parallel 
spiritual progression so that one may move from the opaque and dark, to clear visions. 
Al-Baghdādī fills a crucial gap in our understanding of Kubrawī dream theory by 
offering a system behind the descriptive autobiographical accounts we receive from 
other Sufi writers with his psychological and cosmological frameworks. Al-Baghdādī 
provides in the Tuḥfa a theory of visions which is only implied in the work of his 
teacher. This theory is detailed by al-Baghdādī in an attempt to distinguish true 
spiritual visions from unreliable ones in the 6th chapter of the Tuḥfa. 
 
2.i .  Dreams and visions as exteriorisation of the soul 
 
For Kubrā the degree of the soul’s purification is reflected in visions. This is reflected in 
al-Baghdādī’s work. For al-Baghdādī, when the soul is in rank of the ego, visions are 
characterised by darkness, or are muddled and require interpretation. By contrast, a 
higher degree of perfection is characterised by clearer, more vivid dreams and lighter 	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colours.169 Kubrā however never outlines his system of visions explicitly and we are left 
to infer it from his description of visions. The framework of visions becomes much 
more detailed in al-Baghdādī’s Tuḥfa. Hence, al-Baghdādī takes a significant step in 
systematising Kubrā’s thought here.  
 
Al-Baghdādī maps the visionary experiences of the Sufi onto the micro-cosmological 
understanding of man’s composition which we have outlined. In the Tuḥfa, al-Baghdādī 
describes the progression of visions as literally paralleling the progression of the soul in 
its ascent through bodily complexity to simplicity, and towards God. The progression of 
images are described in one passage where al-Baghdādī details the visionary journey of 
the Sufi, saying: 
 
He [the seeker] sees the things which are stored within him, and he passes over them 
and traverses them… And [first] he sees the truths of earthly things in order of animals, 
and then plants then inanimate things when the attributes of animalness and the 
others are revealed to him. Then his wayfaring passes on to the elements until he 
reaches the ether of his inner being which is the culmination of the attributes of the 
ego. And he sees the truths of the attributes of the ego sometimes… In the image of ugly 
sensible things… And at times in the images of enemies, [such as] snakes or scorpions… 
And the wayfarer in this position of travelling is between two perspectives: One looking 
to what is within him, and one looking to what is above him. And if he looks to what is 
within him he sees the truths of earthly things, and if he looks to what is above him he 
sees the celestial and heavenly spheres. And so the perception of the lower things is due 
to the condition of his station (maqām) and the perception of higher things is out of the 
desire for [further] travelling and the removal of contraction from within his inner 
being.170 
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Here, al-Baghdādī presents the visionary ascent of the individual as an inversion of 
cosmic sequence of creation. This microcosmic understanding is emphasised as al-
Baghdādī states that the seeker sees things stored within him. In other words, he 
perceives the realities of the hidden and manifest which are contained within his 
composition. The disciple begins his journey with the most complex bodily existent and 
this is paralleled in his visions. As he progresses along the path of Sufi discipline, these 
images move from material complexity to simplicity until he begins to see the celestial 
bodies which indicate the higher faculties of the soul. At one point in the text al-
Baghdādī equates the celestial bodies with the heart directly as he says, “the seeker 
witnesses the planets of the heart” (yushāhid kawākib al-qalb).171 Since he has not yet 
“passed over” the celestial bodies but perceives them above him, al-Baghdādī’s 
visionary traveller here stops between the states of the pacified ego which is 
symbolised by the ether, and the heart which is symbolised by the celestial spheres.  
 
This is accompanied by the removal of qabḍ, a psychological disposition indicating 
contraction, a sense of dread or being overcome with awe or fear. Contraction is often 
associated with the initial stages of the Sufi path where the initiate must undertake 
austerities and enter a self-effacing mode of conduct in order to tame the ego. The 
removal of contraction and the perception of the celestial spheres indicates the 
emergence of its antithesis, expansion (basṭ), indicating for al-Baghdādī the delight of 
the soul in acts of worship and austerity which is characteristic of the disposition of the 
advanced Sufi rather than the initiate. The association of the terms travelling (sayr) and 
wayfaring (sulūk) with this visionary journey is also crucial for understanding the 
relevance of visions to the stratification of the Sufi path.172 
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For now though we must point to the interdependence of Sufi practice, visions, and the 
manifestation of attributes which emerges in this passage. Hence, the visionary 
progression mirrors the progression of Sufi training from initiate to shaykh. Al-
Baghdādī systematises Kubrā’s work by emphasising the correspondence between 
visions and micro-cosmology. In the above passage for example al-Baghdādī echoes 
Kubrā’s assertion that stage of the pacified ego is characterised by a pure fire.173 
 
The relationship between cosmology and visions is also the framework upon which 
Kubrawī visionary colour theory is built. Al-Baghdādī’s system reveals that the coloured 
lights which are recounted in Kubrā’s Fawā’iḥ and in the work of countless other 
Kubrawī authors, are related to the progression from bodily complexity and 
opaqueness to subtle substances and translucency. Each faculty of man’s composition 
acts as a lens that distorts the pure colourless light of God. Hence, the first colours 
which the disciple beholds reflect the material density of the most complex existents 
which do not allow light to pass through, while the later stages of the path are 
associated with lighter colours indicating the transparency of the more translucent 
elements, eventually ending in a complete lack of colour signifying the pure, 
immaterial, non-bodily substance of the soul. The colours listed begin with dark blue 
and indigo which indicate the psych-spiritual dominance of the ego. The colour of the 
heart is yellow, and when mixed with the blueness of the ego produces green which 
indicates a pacified ego. Al-Baghdādī also mentions red which seems to represent the 
workings of the spirit over the heart. The final colour mentioned is white and indicates 
the perfection of the soul.174  
 
This emphasis on bodily opaqueness and immaterial translucency is startlingly similar 
to the illuminationist mysticism of the contemporaneous Shihāb al-Dīn Yaḥya al-	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Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191), though whether he and any of the Kubrawīs ever met or were 
aware of each other’s thought is not possible to determine. Central to Yaḥya al-
Suhrawardī’s psychology is the need to extract the soul which is pure light from the 
bodily composition of man which obscures light.175 Yaḥya al-Suhrawardī also discusses 
visions and dreams on the basis of this cosmologically informed understanding of 
psychology whereby darkness acts as an obscurant to spiritual realities.176 
  
In Kubrā’s Fawā’iḥ, we are left to infer the role of translucency and opaqueness and its 
relationship to micro-cosmology by analysing the visions Kubrā presents us with. For 
example, in detailing the difference between visions of the ego and the devil Kubrā 
describes the following: 
 
Wujūd is an intense darkness at first, and if it is purified a little it takes the form of a 
black cloud. And if it is the throne of Satan it is red. And if it is corrected and the 
particulars (ḥuẓūẓ) are removed from it, and the truths remain, it is purified and is 
whitened like cirrus. And the ego when it begins [to manifest], its colour is the colour of 
the sky which is blue… And the ego emanates upon existence and fashions it. And if it is 
purified and made good, it emanates onto it goodness, and goodness grows from it. And 
if it emanates onto it evil, then just the same, evil grows from it.177 
 
Here Kubrā uses the term wujūd to refer to the degree of the soul’s perfection rather 
than existence.178 The sense of the term here seems further refined to refer to the soul’s 
command of the body which establishes a correspondence between visions and the 
expression of attributes. Reading these passages through the lens of al-Baghdādī’s 
system we can make sense of Kubrā’s underlying theories better. This link between 
vision and attribute is established in the Tuḥfa by rendering the heart the locus of 	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perception as well as the spiritual organ which commands the body. Because of this, al-
Baghdādī is able to tie the command of the body to perception, linking visions and 
attributes and establishing the diagnostic value of the image.  
 
For al-Baghdādī the purification of the mirror of the heart within the microcosmic 
framework of man determines these images. Here the darkness of visions signifies 
materiality while purity and light indicate ascension to a higher mode of existence. This 
provides the underlying framework of the above passage where Kubrā explains that 
goodness and evil stem from the “emanation” of the darkness or light of soul onto the 
“existence” of the body. Al-Baghdādī’s systemisation is also helpful in explaining many 
other meanings of the visions which Kubrā recounts. For example, Kubrā describes the 
different types of fire a person can witness with the following: 
 
The difference between the fire of remembrance (dhikr) and the fire of Satan is that the 
fires of remembrance are pure and fast-moving and climb high. And the fire of Satan is 
in a state of impurity smoke and darkness, and in addition, it is slow moving.179 
 
This equates to al-Baghdādī’s cosmological framework from which we can infer that the 
smoky, and tumultuous fire of the devil is due to the lustful and consumptive 
characteristics of the ego, representing a soul which is led by its bodily faculties and 
requires “being fed.” On the other hand, the purity of the fire of remembrance, which 
perhaps resembles a gas lit fire, is symbolic of the ether, the most subtle element on the 
sphere of earth, signifying a pacified ego. 
 
2.i i .  Thought impressions and the inner senses 
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In addition to clarifying the significance of Kubrā’s visionary progression by providing a 
cosmological framework, al-Baghdādī also provides us with an account of the 
interaction among the hidden world, the soul, and the bodily organs which produce 
dreams in order to explain the mechanisms through which these visions emerge. For 
this we turn to the 6th chapter of the Tuḥfa where al-Baghdādī explains how to 
distinguish between true and false visions. He begins by discussing khawāṭir, or thought 
impressions.  
 
The earliest discussions of thought impression emerge in kalām theology in the context 
of the debate regarding free will and predestination. Wolfson ascribes the introduction 
of the concept of the khāṭir to the Mu‘tazali theologian Ibrāhīm al-Naẓẓām (d. 230/845) 
who explained that man must have two such sources of thoughts, one that bids 
desisting in an act and another that bids advancing in it.180 Thought impressions were 
related to debates regarding predestination and free will, since the thought is the 
precursor to action and depending on its origins, whether internal to the human being 
or external to him, could favour the argument of either free will or predestination. For 
these reasons they also carried eschatological significance, resulting in punishment and 
reward in the hereafter. 
 
In the Tuḥfa the sense of the term is that it applies to thoughts which emerge in the soul 
without any conscious effort, hence they are impressed upon it. By al-Baghdādī’s time 
thought impressions had begun to be the subject of more intricate and nuanced 
analysis. Moving beyond their eschatological significance, attempts were made to detail 
the various origins of thought impressions and their effects on the soul. Al-Qushayrī 
recounts that Junayd al-Baghdādī detailed thought impressions in the following 
manner:  
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They are speeches that enter the soul. They may be dictated by an angel or by Satan; 
sometimes they are the soul’s own suggestions, at other times they come from God… 
When a thought comes from an angel, its authenticity is affirmed by [religious] 
knowledge… [And the thought impression] from Satan, when it incites to disobedience 
[of God] and you reject it, will encourage you with another disobedience, for all 
disobediences are equal… And it was said that every thought impression from an angel 
may be agreeable or disagreeable, but if it is a thought impression from God, there will 
be no disagreement on the part of the perceiver.181 
 
Here, the source of thought impressions can be internal such as a faculty of the soul, or 
an external spiritual being such as an angel or the devil. These impressions appear in 
Sufi texts as a way to explain the elusive phenomenon of unconscious thoughts. In the 
Tuḥfa what is emphasised is the effects of the thought impressions, their consequences 
for man’s behaviour, knowledge and the perfection of the soul. 
 
In al-Ghazālī’s work, these thought impressions determine man’s behaviour, yet their 
eschatological significance remains paramount for him as he describes the thoughts as 
“the movers of the will” and “the beginnings of actions,” and goes on to say that there 
are two sources of thought, one angelic and one demonic which cause the emergence of 
a thought in the mind.182 Wrongdoing and right-doing ultimately go back to these 
sources of thought impressions. In his Iḥyā’ al-Ghazālī makes clear that these thoughts 
bear eschatological consequences, motivating man to do that which either increases his 
reward or punishment in the hereafter.183 A similar emphasis is placed on the thought 
impression’s relevance to behaviour and eschatology in ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī’s ‘Awārif 
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where thought impressions are restricted to four types which fall into the two 
categories, either leading to reward or punishment in the hereafter.184 
 
In contrast to this emphasis on the eschatological significance of thought impressions, 
al-Baghdādī seems unconcerned with whether or not a thought results in rewards or 
punishments in the afterlife in this particular discussion. He also does not limit the 
sources of thought impressions to the two categories of good and bad, or angelic and 
demonic. Though thought impressions are related to actions and attributes in al-
Baghdādī’s thought, his interest in them here is in their role of impressing visions and 
dreams upon the mind. In al-Baghdādī’s and Kubrā’s work, there is an attempt to move 
beyond a binary conception of good thoughts and evil with regards to thought 
impressions, as ultimately all thoughts are portrayed as veils to God’s divine inspiration 
which the Sufi must tear down through the practice of seclusion and meditation. Kubrā 
explains at one point in the Fawā’iḥ that the thought impressions from the devil can 
actually lead a person closer to God: 
 
The Satanic thought is of many types and the egoistic thought is of just one type. And 
the soul is like a child, and its enemy is Satan who fashions something for it, and so it 
believes him… It may be that [God] makes the worshiper reach a state of closeness 
through the medium of Satan. For Satan can cast in their hearts the love of worship to 
impress people. And they worship Him for the sake of [impressing] people, turning to 
them so that people [will also] turn to them, but [in doing so] their awe [of God] 
increases. And if they figure that out, they submerge themselves in the ocean of 
worship.185 
 
Al-Baghdādī has a similar understanding of the nuances of these thought impressions. 
For example, al-Baghdādī states that if the devil is unable to move the person to 	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breaking the manifest sharī‘a, these thoughts will begin to distort the believer’s mind 
within the bounds of the law through waswasa.186 The term waswasa, a type of satanic 
whisper, recurs throughout the Tuḥfa often accompanied by the term hawājis. The latter 
term is less malevolent than the former as it does not carry the Quranic association 
with the devil, for this reason al-Baghdādī seems to attribute it to the ego rather than 
the devil. Al-Baghdādī explains that devilish thoughts attempt to reinforce the ego 
within the bounds of the sharī‘a. They manifest a sort of obsessive behaviour, or are 
characterised by impressing doubt in the mind. Al-Baghdādī goes on to describe an 
example of this: 
 
As it was said in the hadith: there is for ablution a devil called alwilhān who invites [the 
believer] to waste water. And this is what many initiates are afflicted with in their 
beginnings, like the waswasa in prayer and in cleaning clothes. It was said that Abū 
Sulaymān al-Darānī was afflicted with wiswās at the start of his journey. And he realised 
one day, in the middle of winter, that he was performing the ablution and washing his 
body parts repeatedly, harming himself and saying, “forgive [me], forgive [me].” He 
then heard a voice saying: forgiveness is in [religious] knowledge. So he busied himself 
with knowledge and afterwards had a vision while praying on the waste of sheep which 
said to him: do you pray on what is ritually impure? He replied: this is something which 
is not agreed upon by the scholars.187 
 
Devilish whispers do not always cause the person to sin, but instead may cause 
obsessions and mental imbalances which are not technically in breach of the law. Al-
Baghdādī brings forward examples of devilish whispers causing the disciple to falsely 
interpret Prophetic narrations and Qur’anic verses in order to achieve the aims of his 
own ego. He mentions instances where in a period of seclusion (khalwa), an initiate may 
be tempted to leave his seclusion when presented with certain prophetic traditions or 	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Qur’anic verses. Thought impressions are the basis of behaviour and prior to knowledge 
since the soul will cause one to interpret things in order to justify an egoistic or devilish 
behaviour if the soul is not yet purified. This is one reason why al-Baghdādī considers it 
superfluous to study religious texts during seclusion, since religious knowledge is 
subject to the disposition of the soul which dictates a person’s thoughts and desires, 
and manipulates his reason.  
 
The sources of thought impressions mentioned by al-Baghdādī are the ego, the devil, 
angels, the heart, the spirit, the Sufi shaykh and finally ilhām (divine inspiration). Divine 
inspiration though is not technically a thought impression according to al-Baghdādī. 
The thought impressions originating from the Sufi shaykh are a particularly important 
addition to this list as they are not mentioned in previous sources, and have 
implications for the structure and identity of the Sufi community which we will detail 
later. Meier also notes that the thought impressions of the shaykh are a “new and 
interesting” addition to the list of thought impressions.188 This conception of the 
shaykh as a source of thought impressions is dependent upon the adoption of body-soul 
dualism.  
 
In listing all these impressions al-Baghdadī diverges from al-Qushayrī by asserting the 
ability to receive thoughts from all the faculties of the soul. This is necessary given al-
Baghdādī’s conception of man as containing all the realities of the hidden and manifest 
from which the soul must be purified. This theoretical framework is not present in al-
Qushayrī’s thought and so al-Baghdādī disagrees with him regarding the notion that 
some faculties of the soul can never be known or understood by the individual and 
remain unintelligible to him: 
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And the truth of this matter is that to know, and to be able to discern different thoughts 
from one another depend upon knowing the sources of the thoughts. The seeker, if he 
does not know the truth of his soul will not know the truth of its thoughts, and if he 
does not know the truth of the devil with its wiles and ways within the seeker, he does 
not know the truth of its thoughts. And likewise he who does not know the heart does 
not know its speech or thoughts. And he, who has not witnessed the angel and does not 
know him, does not know his thoughts… and he who does not know the spirit does not 
know its divine inspiration. And this is why al-Qushayrī, in his chapter on interpreting 
the thoughts related the saying of some of the seekers that, ‘your ego is untrustworthy, 
and your heart never lies, and even if you have struggled with all your ability to have 
your spirit speak to you, it will not speak to you.’ But for me, this speaker knew his ego 
and its lies, and knew his heart and its truth. But he did not know the spirit and so 
concluded that it does not communicate to its owner as the heart does.189 
 
Al-Qushayrī, though a towering figure in the history of Sufi thought, is contradicted on 
more than one occasion in al-Baghdādī’s Tuḥfa. In the 12th century there existed 
traditions which attempted to portray al-Qushayrī as a subordinate of his 
contemporary, the Shaykh Abū Sa‘īd ibn Abī al-Khayr (d. 440/1049). The sayings of Abū 
Sa‘īd were compiled in the Asrār al-tawḥīd by his grandson Muḥammad ibn Munawwar 
in the late 12th century which coincides with al-Baghdādī’s lifetime. 190 These works 
contain a number of stories and hagiographical accounts which suggest that Qushayrī 
was jealous of Abū Sa‘īd’s superior access to the divine, as well as stories where Abū 
Sa‘īd rebukes Qushayrī for ill conduct towards his disciples, portraying him as a less 
effective shaykh.191 Al-Baghdādī seems to adopt this narrative of the relationship 
between the two Sufis as he constantly exhibits great reverence for Abū Sa‘īd, referring 
to him often and always as shaykh, while referring to al-Qushayrī with the title 
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ustādh.192Al-Baghdādī tends to refer to al-Qushayrī as an authoritative source but 
maintains the prerogative to explicitly disagree with him.  
 
Breaking with previous tradition in this instance is important for al-Baghdādī since 
thought impressions determine the images one receives in sleep or in states of elevated 
consciousness. The ability of the spirit to communicate through thought impressions 
and the images they produce is crucial for establishing the diagnostic value of visions, 
representing the realities stored within the Sufi which parallel his progress along the 
path, past the stage of the spirit to the actualisation of God’s attributes. Al-Baghdādī 
goes on to explain that as the soul advances in purification, so too does its 
understanding of thought impressions advance: 
 
With the light of belief (īmān) which is found in the heart, [the seeker] comes to know 
the thoughts [impressed upon him] by the angel. If he perfects the light of belief in the 
heart, he begins to see with his heart’s eye. So he witnesses the lights of angelic 
thoughts, the thoughts of the spirit… And [the thought] speaks to its owner with what it 
contains of goodness and [its owner’s] ear hears, and he comes to understand the 
angelic thoughts and the thoughts of the spirit and the thoughts of divine inspiration 
(ilhām). And he is able to distinguish between them (divine inspirations) and the 
thoughts of the spirit.193 
 
Here, al-Baghdādī stratifies knowledge of thought impressions. As the Sufi progresses 
along the path, he begins to understand the faculties of the soul and the external beings 
from which thought impressions arise after passing certain milestones. Al-Baghdādī 
explains what understanding these thoughts entails. Hence, he explains that the 
difference between egoistic and satanic thoughts by explaining that the ego desires a 
particular material satisfaction such as “a carrot dipped in dates” while the satanic 	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thoughts are more insidious and do not focus on one desire. Al-Baghdādī goes on to 
explain how to distinguish between angelic thoughts and divine inspiration saying that 
the angelic thought bids correct behaviour but this creates a tension in the soul since it 
is contested by satanic and egoistic thoughts which “disturb” it, whereas divine 
inspiration is never contested by any thought impression.194  
 
There is a sense in the Tuḥfa that divine inspiration is constantly muddled by thought 
impressions which corroborate with the rank of the soul since al-Baghdādī states that it 
is not a thought impression at all and that it is veiled by thought impressions.195 In the 
Tuḥfa divine inspiration is the absence of thought impressions. In order to receive 
divine inspiration al-Baghdādī prescribes that the Sufi should enter seclusion and 
perform remembrance or dhikr. Al-Baghdādī stresses that in seclusion the disciple 
should negate the reception of thought impressions through dhikr, and specifically 
through repeating the phrase “lā illaha illā Allāh.”  
 
Interpretations of thoughts, visions and dreams should be deferred to the Sufi shaykh 
who, having mastered his soul and actualised the attributes of God understands the 
origins of these thoughts. Al-Baghdādī is keen to stress that his characterisation of the 
nature of the sources of thought impressions is only a general observation and each one 
must be considered according to the specific experiences of the disciple quoting 
Kubrā’s Fawā’iḥ.196  
 
Al-Baghdādī’s assertion that the purpose of remembrance is to negate thought 
impressions reveals that these thought impressions act as the veils of darkness and 
light which reveal some spiritual communication but obscure God and divine 
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inspiration from the human soul as attributes do. When God commands the heart, the 
Sufi comes to know the origins of all his thoughts and is able to distinguish between 
them and divine inspiration. For al-Baghdādī their negation allows divine inspiration to 
be felt as he states in outlining his rules of seclusion: 
 
The 6th [rule] is negating thoughts in their entirety by nurturing the form of 
remembrance and its meanings. And he should not turn to discerning between 
thoughts from each other. Even if some of the thoughts are from the ego, and some are 
from meeting Satan, and some are from meeting the angels and some are from being 
met with divine inspirations. For it harms him to busy himself with discerning between 
thoughts, a true harmfulness. And Satan harms him in this regard with devilish 
whispers and paranoid thoughts. It is his duty to avoid all thoughts and this is not made 
easy except with the nurturing of manifest (ẓāhir) remembrance (dhikr).197 
  
We know from al-Baghdādī’s interpretations of Sharaf al-Dīn Balkhī’s dreams that the 
formula of this manifest remembrance was to repeat the profession of faith.198 And 
though we have little information regarding what the ritual of remembrance entailed 
during al-Baghdādī’s time, if we look to al-Simnānī, we see that the profession of lā 
illāha illā Allah was accompanied by a specific motion of the head along with specific 
breathing patterns.199 The theory is that the performance of remembrance would keep 
the mind free from thoughts. Al-Baghdādī explains that with this negation of thought 
impressions, the Sufi can receive divine inspiration since it is not a thought impression 
at all but is constantly barred from entering the mind due to the presence of other 
thoughts.  
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These thought impressions are bound to the phenomena of dreams and visions. Al-
Baghdādī explains that dreams and visions are produced in conjunction with these 
thought impressions. He states that, just as man has five outer senses, so too does he 
have five inner senses located in the brain (dimāgh). In this passage, he mentions 
Avicenna’s five inner senses. These are the common sense (al-ḥiss al-mushtarak), which 
gathers the sensory data from physical senses, the imaginal store (al-khayāl) which 
stores the sensory data, estimation (al-wahm) which gathers the meanings of sensor 
data, and the store of these meanings is termed al-dhākira. Finally there is the 
imaginative faculty (al-mutakhayyila) which is able to combine and reproduce different 
images and meanings: 
 
As for explaining witnessing [visions] and distinguishing the truth from falsehood in 
[this experience], just as God has created for man the five senses in the manifest world, 
to behold it with the senses of sight, hearing, taste, smell and touch. Likewise did he 
create in man’s brain (dimāgh) a power where all the images of the senses are gathered, 
termed by the doctors and philosophers as the common sense (al-ḥiss al-mushtarak). 
This sense has a store termed the imagination (khayāl), so that if the sensed things are 
absent from the manifest senses, this power produces them in [man’s] inner self, as if 
he is [truly] witnessing and seeing them. This is because the imaginative power keeps 
the images of sensed things and arranges them.200 
 
Al-Baghdādī then explains that during sleep, or in the event that a person is 
overwhelmed (hajamāt) by an impression when the mind is no longer occupied by the 
outer senses, or in a state which he describes as between consciousness and 
unconsciousness (ghayba) induced through remembrance rituals (dhikr), the 
imaginative faculty is “strengthened” and “speaks” of whatever is dominant over the 
person’s inner being (bāṭin) by means of the images of sensible things which have been 
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stored in the mind.201 In other words, whichever faculty dominates the soul impresses 
its thoughts onto it. The inner senses then combine the sense data gathered in waking 
life into a symbolic representation of the thought impression which is then projected 
onto the mental screen of the individual. 
 
This again is dependent on the Avicennan understanding of the function of the inner 
senses. For Avicenna, in the event of physical sensation, the perception is transferred 
via the pneuma to the nerves where an image is created, this is then sent to the 
common sense where it is connected to other sense data and stored. For Avicenna the 
outer senses always function in conjunction with the inner senses. Hence, while the 
outer senses perceive the world, the inner senses are constantly called upon to make 
sense of it so that the intellect may abstract truths from it.202 However, when the outer 
senses cease to function the imaginative faculty is free to combine images and 
meanings and present them to the mind. Al-Baghdādī relies on this conception of the 
inner senses in his account of dreams: 
 
So, if the person sleeps and his manifest senses are suspended from him, or if he is 
subjected to, or impressed upon by the concerns of the hidden (ghayb) such that he is 
turned away from the perceptible world [in awe], the imaginative power strengthens 
and manifests whatever dominates the inner state of that person through the medium 
of what is stored within the imaginal store (khayāl). If the inner being is dominated by 
the thought of the devil or the ego, the imaginative power, with the workings of the 
estimative faculty (al-wahm) clothes each thought [from the devil or ego] with a 
sensible image which has a meaning appropriate to the meaning of that thought 
impression (khāṭir).203 
And: 
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If the disciple exerts effort into his striving and enters the door of seclusion (khalwa) 
and removes himself from creation and perseveres in recollection (dhikr) and works in 
subduing his sense of sight, which is the most powerful and active of the senses, and his 
sense of hearing which is next after [sight in activity and power], by means of sitting in 
a darkened place where he is not required to shut his eyelids. There occurs to him, in 
the state of wakefulness (yaqḍa) or unconsciousness (ghayba), which is the state between 
sleep (nawm) and wakefulness, perception of things just as the sleeper in his sleep 
perceives them. Hereafter the images of the visions of awe (murībāt) differ because they 
are coloured [differently], at times, they are the images of the devilish thoughts or 
those of the ego which are derived from the imaginative power.  At times, they are of 
the same class as incomprehensible dreams, even if they are viewed in a state of 
wakefulness or witnessing (mushāhada). At other times they are the images of the heart 
and the spirit.204 
 
This is a much more comprehensive explanation of the production of dreams and 
visions which explains the interaction between spiritual beings, the soul and the inner 
senses.  Here, we attain a much clearer understanding of visions as manifestations of 
the soul which has been asserted by scholars of the Kubrawiyya.205  This offers system 
behind the dreams and visions by borrowing some philosophical and Ghazālian diction 
and by crafting an interdependence between cosmology, the inner senses, and thought 
impressions in order to arrive at a detailed oneirology.  
 
This system is dependent on the metaphor of the heart as a mirror which al-Baghdādī 
adopts from al-Ghazālī. The inner senses produce images relating to the hidden world 
of spirits, clothing each thing from the unseen with a sensible image appropriate to it 
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once the outer senses are subdued.206 Yet the ability of the inner senses to perfectly 
represent these spiritual truths through images remains nebulous and unclear so long 
as the wasāwis of the devil and the desires of the ego are present. With Sufi practice the 
mirror of the heart is purified and these obtrusive clouds dissipate and a veridical 
dream emerges (ru’ya ṣādiqa). Quoting a prophetic tradition, al-Baghdādī describes this 
as one 46th of prophecy.207 
 
Al-Baghdādī here also draws upon discussions of prophecy in al-Ghazālī and Avicenna’s 
thought. For Avicenna the inner senses are bodily organs and do not convey knowledge 
themselves. They only present the intellect with particulars from which it can derive 
universal truths.208 Still Avicenna does provide an account of the intellect connecting to 
the inner senses and revealing truths through dreams in his explanation of prophecy. 
This is not so different from the above passage, since for al-Baghdādī the inner senses 
play a similar role with respect to the thought impression.209 
 
For Avicenna, when the imagination is free from distractions of the senses, it could 
connect to the intellect to produce a true prophetic vision or ru’ya. Al-Ghazālī recasts 
Avicenna’s ideas by describing the instance of prophecy as a connection between the 
cosmological tablet and the heart. 210 Al-Baghdādī develops a more comprehensive 
understanding of the unconscious human psyche by relating thought impressions to 
the production of dreams within a microcosmic framework. Al-Baghdādī’s oneirology 
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the ego and the devil which are worthless, to divine inspiration. Hence prophetic 
dreams are presented within an overarching system which explains the relationship 
between man’s inner senses, his soul and thought impressions. Here, al-Baghdādī 
systematises Kubrawī oneirology by drawing on theological and philosophical concepts 
such as thought impressions and inner senses.  
 
2.i i i .  Spiritual visions and the imagination 
 
For al-Baghdādī the dream ru’ya given its dependence on the imaginative faculty, is a 
type of vision which is less clear and vivid than the clairvoyant vision directly 
perceived by the spirit. Al-Baghdādī explains that when thought impressions and the 
physical senses are subdued, and if one has tamed his ego so that it may not interfere in 
the production of visions, the spirit produces images to the eye directly rather than 
through the imaginative faculty. Hence, it is as if the vision is perceived with the eye. 
He describes this as the peel or outer shell (qishr) of divine inspiration. This is explained 
by al-Baghdādī in the following: 
 
The spirit benefits from the outer senses, a power with which it apprehends the images 
of the sensed things, without the use of the sensory organ. It may be that the seeker 
perceives a vision in his sleep, unconsciousness (ghayba), or wakefulness when his eyes 
are shut. He witnesses that thing with his eye, but there is no doubt that the sight is not 
related to the eye in any way because it was closed. So, it must be from the perceptions 
of the spirit through the power which it had extracted from the [outer] senses.211 
 
Al-Baghdādī explains here that the image is presented to the eye even if it is not 
physically present in front of it. For al-Baghdādī this class of visions are true, as 
opposed to the symbolic images of a dream which require interpretation. Hence, they 
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may present the Sufi with an instance of divination, beholding a future event, seeing 
things which are occurring elsewhere, or perceiving spiritual beings such as angels. 
This is a more direct and certain vision than a dream. While al-Baghdādī states that the 
vision is not beheld due to the workings of the physical organ, he also indicates that the 
vision is predicated on the ability to see since it is a power which is in some way 
dependent on the sensory organ (quwwa mustafāda min al-‘ayn). The literal nature of 
these images is emphasised as he continues to describe an instance where the prophet 
and his companions perceive Gabriel in the form of a man: 
 
For the prophet and his companions saw Gabriel in the image of a bedouin. And there 
was no doubt that the image was not from the workings of the imaginative power. For 
[the workings of the imaginative power] differs according to the natures of people and 
are never of the same type, and they differ markedly… But when the sight was agreed 
upon by the companions on one image and opinion, and there were no differences in 
between their conditions [of apprehension], we know that such an image is not from 
the class of images that are created by the imagination but are due to the angel taking 
on a bodily shape. And this is the fulfilment of the station of the spirit (martabat al-
rūḥāniyya).212 
 
Al-Baghdādī argues here that these experiences are verifiable as truths because they 
appear in the same form to everybody, they are not symbolic and no longer subjective, 
they are universal images and are collectively shared among all people, just as everyone 
agreed on the image of Gabriel. Therefore when one is rid of the ego and Satan which 
produced opaque, confused and contaminated images, true visions begin to emerge. 
Progress along the path of purifying the soul is accompanied by a higher capacity for 
these true visions which are no longer in need of interpretation.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 Al-Baghdādī, Tuḥfat al-barara, 28. 
	   110	  
Al-Baghdādī’s assertion that it is not the eye or the imagination which perceives this 
spiritual truth, but “the spirit which is strengthened by the power of the eye”, leaves us 
with little information regarding how these visions are perceived and by what organ. 
This becomes even more problematic as al-Baghdādī later seems to suggest that the 
spirit can produce an image in conjunction with the imaginal store. Neither mode of 
perception is fully explained though we know that the image is not a result of the 
imaginative faculty mutakhayyila which takes an active role in producing images, but 
the imaginal store which is the treasury of images. Al-Baghdādī seems to suggest that 
the spirit can either access the imaginal store to represent these perceptions, or 
produce the perception directly to the mind. 
 
Unfortunately, the exact mechanism by which the spirit perceives these things is not 
explained by al-Baghdādī though there seems to be a sense that the spirit engages the 
physical eye directly. There is also a sense that this is predicated on the notion of body-
soul dualism, allowing the spirit to perceive events in the world which are not in front 
of the eye. The explanation for this is missing in al-Baghdādī’s work, however if we turn 
to ‘Ammār al-Bidlīsī, one of Kubrā’s teachers, he explains that upon the purification of 
the soul, the Sufi is able to focus the physical eye on the form of a vision. In this case, 
physical sight gains the capacity for spiritual sight (ittaṣafa al-baṣar bi-ṣifat al-baṣīra).213  
 
We will discuss this more fully when we come to al-Baghdādī’s account of physical 
sensation where al-Baghdādī discusses the need to close the distance between the 
hidden and manifest aspects of man’s composition. For now, we must content ourselves 
with the notion that there is a sense in which these visions are predicated on the ability 
to see. It also may indicate the duality of the body and soul, as the spirit which is not 
temporally bound is able to perceive events in other places or in the hidden world and 
present them to the mind as if they are perceived with the physical eye. Regardless, al-	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Baghdādī explains that if the spirit does draw on the imaginal store, the reality of the 
image remains the same even if the particularities of the image differ from person to 
person: 
 
And it may be that the image is in the workings of the imagination by the will of God 
most high, just as you perceive the angels in the image of eunuchs, in which you are 
graced with two appropriate meanings. One is the absence of the instrument of desire 
in the angel and his independence from [it], and the other is due to their closeness to 
the presence [of God’s throne]. And [the imagination’s] function is as an intermediary 
between The Creator and creation… And if it is not an instance of perceiving souls, and 
was instead an image in the hidden world like heaven or hell, it may be that the 
perception of the spirit is free from the workings of the power of the imagination, and 
it may be that the perceptions of the spirit is mixed with the workings of the 
imagination. And that is why the wayfarers perceive the truth of heaven and hell in 
different images.214 
 
In this example of angels appearing as eunuchs al-Baghdādī explains that a eunuch is 
the closest servant to the king and lacks sexual desires. Hence, the image of a eunuch 
should be interpreted as representing an angel since they are the closest servants of 
God and lack bodily desires. In this case, the particular image of a eunuch, heaven or 
hell may differ from person to person, but the meaning of the image remains the same. 
Here the inner senses clothe a truth from the hidden world with a sensible image. 
Despite the variance from person to person in perceiving the image of heaven or hell, 
they are nevertheless true apprehensions of a hidden reality which changes only in 
form. At the very end of this chapter, al-Baghdādī describes how the relationship 
between the image, the imagination and the state of the soul progresses, mapping this 
progression onto his psychological framework which we have outlined: 
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And the fact of the matter is that the power of the imagination (khayālīyya) which is 
stored and placed in the world of humanness, is an instrument which most people 
command with their will. And if the governance of the ego or Satan dominate it, it is 
used [by them] it in corroboration with their natures, and the visions which are 
induced through it are of [the same class] as fanciful dreams (aḍghāth) which are not 
comprehensible. And if the governance of the spirit, the vicegerent of God on His earth, 
dominates it, then he may use it according to his desire, and [the spirit] informs the 
wayfarer through [the imagination] about the hidden world. And if the governance of 
God dominates it… then He, The Real, praise be to him, makes it an intermediary 
between the hidden and the manifest, and the servant perceives with [the imagination] 
the truths of hidden things. And as long as it is in the workings of the spirit, the disciple 
requires the shaykh to know the realities of visions. And if the governance of The Real 
takes possession, he no longer requires anything but Him, so just as He shows him a 
vision, He inspires him with its reality [and meaning].215 
 
Al-Baghdādī here presents the full progression of visions in symbiosis with the spiritual 
progression of the individual. In each stage the imagination is aligned with the soul and 
the visions become clearer and more comprehensible as one ascends, culminating in 
the reception of clear direct truths which are immediately understood once the soul 
becomes the throne of God. Moreover, al-Baghdādī’s assertion that the imagination is 
an intermediary between the divine and creation asserts its theophanic and prophetic 
role, manifesting spiritual truths at various levels of perfection depending on the 
degree to which the soul reflects God’s essence and attributes. To go back to the earlier 
metaphor of the heart as a mirror, the realities are represented to the mind by the 
imagination after being reflected in the mirror of the heart. The forms vary in clarity 
depending on the soul’s purification, when it is purified they become literal 
representations either through the medium of the imagination or directly from the 
spirit.  	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This scheme is repeated in a much more abbreviated form by al-Baghdādī’s disciple, 
Najm al-Dīn al-Rāzī, in his Mirṣād al-‘ibād. Here we are given examples of dreams at the 
various stages which al-Baghdādī outlines. These examples are taken from the Qur’an as 
al-Rāzī explains that the unclear dream is likened to that perceived by the king who 
imprisoned Joseph, the dream in the state of the spirit is that which Joseph himself 
experienced when beholding the stars, and the true literal vision is equated with 
Abraham’s dream where he is told to sacrifice his son, explaining that it had no need of 
explanation and interpretation.216 In fact al-Rāzī’s entire chapter on visions in the 
Mirṣād is heavily indebted to al-Baghdādī’s Tuḥfa. Clear parallels with al-Baghdādī’s 
cosmology are seen in his detailing of visions, and much of al-Baghdādī’s discussion is 
repeated here.217  
 
In comparison to the Mirṣād, al-Baghdādī’s Tuḥfa has not received much attention for its 
systematisation of oneirology. We have shown here that the Tuḥfa is an invaluable 
source for understanding Kubrawī dream theory and works like the Mirṣād. Al-
Baghdādī’s psychology is incredibly important for understanding not just the Mirṣād but 
the works of other Kubrawī authors and later Sufi works which drew on the works of 
Kubrawīs who were influenced by the Tuḥfa. Our analysis of al-Baghdādī’s oneiric 
theory is therefore an important step towards understanding the development of Sufi 
thought in this regard. 
 
2.iv.  The vision of colourless light 
 
One of the defining characteristics of Kubrawī thought is its focus on detailing the 
visions of coloured lights, a topic which also features in al-Baghdādī’s Tuḥfa though only 	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briefly. For al-Baghdādī, the coloured lights also adhere to this framework of dreams 
and visions as well as his micro-cosmology. They are also described by al-Baghdādī as 
God’s lights of beauty and majesty. They progress from dark opaque colours to lighter, 
more translucent colours ending in a colourless white light.  
 
White is significant here for a number of reasons. Throughout our analysis it has been 
shown that al-Baghdādī describes of visions as veils (ḥijāb). The term indicates that 
though the visions represent God to some extent, the very presence of an image is 
ultimately a barrier to the goal of the Sufi since God cannot be contained in an image. 
Hence, every vision of light is in some way an imperfect theophany of God. God’s pure 
colourless light is refracted off of the “prism” of the soul so that it produces a colour 
based on the extent to which the soul has been perfected. 
 
A vision of God is surely the ultimate vision, yet an image itself is an obstruction. 
Symbolic images of God fall short of representing him by their very presence which 
restricts God to a specific form, indicating influence of the ego or spirit over the soul 
which bar God’s dominance over it. Al-Baghdādī frequently makes use of the tradition 
that God has seventy thousand veils of light and darkness, stressing that both the light 
of the spirit and the darkness of the ego are veils for God.218 Here, these veils are 
represented in colours whereas colourless light represents completion. 
 
While cultivating these images helps the Sufi progress due to their transformative 
effects on the soul, ultimately they must be transcended to actualise the attributes of 
God. In the beginning and intermediary stages of the journey images are necessary in 
order for the Sufi to dislocate himself from his ego and conceive of it as a separate 
entity. As long as the lights maintain some colour, the Sufi is perceiving an altered 
vision of God, obstructed by either the ego or spirit. The goal of the Sufi is to move 	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beyond these coloured lights to the absence of coloured light. Hence, the duality 
represented by a vision, which was useful in the initial stages of transcending the ego, is 
a hindrance to completion. Al-Baghdādī describes the Sufi’s visionary progression in 
seven stages in his 5th chapter on dhikr and seclusion which will be paraphrased here: 
 
1- Experiencing the intelligibles of the intellect (al-ma‘ānī al-‘aqlīyya). 
2- Delight in the truths of the attributes of the heart.  
3- Absorption in the visions of the innermost heart. 
4- The manifestation of the lights of beauty (jamāl).  
5- Loss of consciousness (walha) due to the proximity of the divine.  
6- The erasure of experiencing the manifestations of the lights of beauty.  
7- Annihilation (fanā’) [due to the awe] of what is impressed upon him by the attributes 
of majesty (jalāl).219 
 
Here the penultimate step to annihilation and completion is described by al-Baghdādī 
as the erasure of the coloured lights. In Kubrā’s work this penultimate stage is described 
as the “forgetting of duality.” Duality (ithnayniyya) here is equated to the manifestation 
of the lights of beauty, while forgetting duality and passing into unity is equivalent to 
al-Baghdādī’s final stage of annihilation. Kubrā’s work, expresses this in four stages 
rather than seven: 
 
1- Seeking the beloved. 
2- The soul’s devotion to the beloved. 
3- Forgetting duality (nisyān al-ithnayniya). 
4- Passing away into unity (al-fanā’ fī al waḥdāniyya).220 
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Hence while the notion of duality which accompanies the perception of the lights is a 
step towards completion for the initiate and advanced, it must be overcome as the 
ultimate goal of the Sufi, to manifest the attributes of God should be characterised by a 
completely pure soul, lacking any colour. Thus, what Kubrā terms here as forgetting 
duality involves the “erasure of the lights of the attributes of beauty” for al-Baghdādī. 
Kubrā also details two levels of annihilation which are relevant to the stratification of 
the faculties of the soul found in the Tuḥfa. Kubrā states in his Fawā’iḥ that: 
 
Annihilation is of two types, one from the attributes [of man] and into the attributes of God, and 
that is the annihilation in singularity (fardāniyya). And the other is the annihilation from [man’s] 
attributes into [God’s essence], and that is the annihiliation of unity. And if the essence 
manifests, so does awe… and it is as if [the wayfarer] nears death.221 
 
This description of annihiliation is relevant to al-Baghdādī’s discussion of the heart and 
innermost heart. The innermost heart is equated with the essence while the heart is 
equated with the attributes in the Tuḥfa. The two tiers of annihilation are 
representative of the distinction between these faculties of the soul which gain the 
distinct roles of determining man’s essence (found in the innermost heart) and 
attributes (found in the heart) in the Tuḥfa and determine the experience and erasure 
of the coloured lights. Najm al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Mirṣād can also add to our understanding of 
the stage of erasure here, Hamid Algar translates the passage from the Mirṣād as 
follows: 
 
As for the attributes of splendor, when they manifest in the station of the effacement of 
the effacement, the imperiousness of the awe of divinity and the severity of the majesty 
of eternity, a black light is witnessed that dispenses man from all need of other than 
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God, causes him to abide in God, and gives life and death. For with the appearance of 
this light the supreme talisman is broken and all vague images are dispersed.222 
 
The phrase to “abide in God” which al-Rāzī uses here is paralleled by al-Baghdādī’s 
notion of “travelling within God” which is seen throughout the Tuḥfa. It is equated with 
his definition of intihā’, which signifies attaining the final stages of the path. Here the 
term is directly related to manifesting the attributes of God. Travelling “within” God 
occurs in the Tuḥfa as an expression which accompanies the manifestation of God’s 
attributes. Al-Rāzī clearly adopts this notion from al-Baghdādī, as the erasure of colour 
for him also represents the penultimate step to completion. 
 
The use of black light here is somewhat unexpected since for al-Baghdādī it is white not 
black which indicates the erasure of vision.223 Yet both lights can be described as an 
absence of colour and are in keeping with the progression of visionary colours. The 
reasoning of al-Rāzī’s passage is the same as al-Baghdādī’s in that to achieve the 
manifestation of the attributes of God, one’s visions must move beyond the coloured 
lights. The Tuḥfa is replete with examples of people who were misled or trapped in a 
lower state of the spirit and barred from reaching the Presence of Godliness due to their 
love of such experiences and their desire to experience these spiritual lights and 
visions. Examples that show that the progression of spiritual lights parallels Sufi 
practice and the manifestation of the attributes of God and that remaining within the 
lights and veils of the spirit is a trap are also common in the text.224  
 
Visions therefore correlate with the progression of the individual from base animalistic 
attributes to the attributes of God. These manifestations of God’s attributes were 
described by al-Baghdādī as being imprinted in a mirror. He also described man’s soul 	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as a mirror to God’s essence and attributes which are not the same nor different to 
God’s essence and attributes, just as the reflection of sunlight in a mirror is not the sun 
itself.225 In this analogy the mirror which is the heart manifests the attributes to 
different levels of perfection depending on the degree of polish it has attained. The 
coloured lights are therefore dependent upon this conception of the heart. Hence, the 
experience of coloured lights adheres to the same theoretical framework which we 
have outlined.   
 
Oddly enough, we receive the clearest indication of the need to transcend these 
visionary colours from one of the earliest and shortest chapters of the Tuḥfa which 
prescribes the clothing practices of the Sufi community. Here al-Baghdādī explains that 
the disciple should wear dark blue and the Sufi shaykhs had chosen this colour for three 
reasons, because it can bare dirt well and will not distract the person from his duties, 
because it indicates a state of mourning over past sins and wasted time, and finally 
because “it is of the habit of the seeker to wear clothes which are coloured with the 
colours of the lights he witnesses.”226  
 
He goes on to explain that dark blue is the most unclear colour, as it is tainted with the 
darkness of the ego and compares it to smoke, evoking the image Kubrā described of a 
consumptive fire. He describes these colours as veils, and as the disciple rises in his 
spiritual growth these colours change, green being the final colour of the veils of the 
ego. But it is not only the ego that acts as the veil, the heart and spirit are also veils and 
also produce their own coloured lights. Al-Baghdādī goes on to assert that there are 
many other colours, listing indigo, yellow and red, unfortunately he does not detail 
which states they represent and asserts to the reader that his aim here is not to detail 
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each and every colour. 227 He explains that all of these colours represent degrees of 
perfection, explaining: 
 
One of the shaykhs228 has said that green is the veil with no veil behind it. And this 
means that there is no veil of the ego behind it, for the veils are not [solely] 
characterised by darkness, for God has seventy thousand veils of light and darkness… 
And that is because just as the darkness of the ego is a veil, so too are the lights of the 
heart, secret, and spirit. And just as the colours of the soul differ, depending on its 
condition, becoming at times blue, and at times green, so too do the conditions of the 
lights of the heart differ depending on its degree of completion and the descent of the 
spirit onto it. So at times it becomes white and at times it becomes yellow, or it becomes 
red… And it has been the custom of those shaykhs, who have excelled in the path, to 
wear garments which are coloured with the colours of their stations and visions... and 
the shaykhs choose white (for themselves), and agree between them that the wearing of 
white is of a greater station than blue. And they do not allow for those who are not 
shaykhs to wear the white fineries. And that is because white has no colour, and so it is 
not permissible… for those who have not attained annihilation (fanā’) of [their] 
humanity and perfected their servitude. And for the disciple, a changing of their image 
and form has been prescribed [by the shaykhs].229 
 
Here the colours of visions parallel the dominion of the ego, spirit or God over the heart 
which determines the actualisation of attributes. This results in a stratification of the 
Sufi path from initiate to shaykh with detailed states inbetween. The use of the term 
annihilation here shows the accordance between white light and al-Baghdādī’s 
description of the erasure of the visionary lights, reinforcing the hierarchical 
conception of visionary progression. When the human begins to actualise the attributes 
of God, the need for this visionary intermediary ceases as God comes to be the only 	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faculty commanding the human heart and body. This is stated explicitly in the 9th 
chapter of the Tuḥfa where al-Baghdādī describes completion with respect to attributes 
in the following:  
 
And God extracts him… from the opaqueness of the ego and the lights of the spirit, and 
there is found within him neither light nor darkness from any of the attributes of 
humanness. And he is not heavenly or earthly, for he stands with God.230 
 
Hence, the visionary theophany of God’s beatific light (tajallī anwār al-jamāl) in al-
Baghdādī’s thought indicates the persistence of duality or ithnayniyya, as Kubrā put it. 
Visionless-ness indicates union since it is the absence of theophany, representing the 
soul’s return it to its primordial condition as a perfect mirror to the divine. If 
understood from the perspective of al-Baghdādī’s micro-cosmological scheme, 
theophany is always a representative of imperfection as it presupposes the persistence 
of some obscurant manifest bodily faculty or hidden spiritual faculty which holds sway 
over the soul. The lights represent micro-cosmology, as the densest and most opaque 
colours are found at the bottom of the hierarchy while complete translucency is found 
at the top, indicating the soul as a perfect mirror to God.  
 
3 .  Physical and spiritual sensations  
 
From what we have presented so far, it may seem as though al-Baghdādī maintains a 
dualistic notion of the world by upholding its division into the hidden and manifest. His 
psychology relies on this distinction between the hidden and manifest in order to 
describe the human being’s composition as an exception to this which partakes of both 
worlds. Though it may seem so at first glance, the conception of the world, or at least 
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the soul’s perception of it, is complicated by al-Baghdādī’s discussion of physical and 
spiritual sensation. Here we see that al-Baghdādī renders the manifest world a 
representation of the hidden world through his discussion of the manifest and spiritual 
senses.  
 
The dualistic character of al-Baghdādī’s cosmology is shown to be only a matter of 
perception, as the distinction between the hidden and manifest is revealed to be a 
consequence of the inability of the perceiver to overcome what al-Baghdādī terms, the 
“distance” (bayān) between his own hiddenness and manifest-ness. Meaning that if the 
soul remains under the influence of the ego, its perceptions will stop at the manifest 
bodily senses, oblivious to the spiritual truth represented by the physical world.  
 
Unfortunately, al-Baghdādī does not provide much in the way of explaining what the 
spiritual senses are, or how they are heard simultaneously with physical sounds. 
Towards the end of his discussion on spiritual sounds al-Baghdādī explains that one can 
understand bird song, the ringing of bells and the creaking doors and translate this into 
comprehensible human speech. However, he himself indicates that he does not intend 
to explain this stating that “those who have not freed themselves from their human-
ness will find this assertion abhorrent, and he who has not experienced [this] does not 
know.”231 Al-Baghdādī then does not necessarily intend to provide an explanation for 
this. Though these notions only partially explained, this study will attempt to account 
for the relationship between the physical and spiritual senses through an analysis of 
the text. This study must also discuss al-Baghdadī’s conception of beauty here since it 
details the transformative effects of visions and music which are relevant to the 
stratification of the Sufi path.  
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In Sufism, the divine attributes had been traditionally divided into those pertaining to 
God’s beauty and those pertaining to His majesty.232 Kubrā embellished the meanings of 
these terms, using them to describe the coloured visions and dream images he 
experienced as representations of the beauty and majesty of God. The title of Kubrā’s 
magnum opus, the Fawā’iḥ al-jamāl wa-fawātiḥ al-jalāl testifies to the central role that the 
concepts of beauty (jamāl) and majesty (jalāl) play in Kubrawī Sufism. We have seen that 
al-Baghdādī continues to emphasise the two terms by referring to the manifestation of 
the lights of God’s beauty and the passing away into visionless-ness through majesty. A 
contemporary of al-Baghdādī, Rūzbihān al-Baqlī also emphasised beauty in some of his 
work, and like Kubrā offers visionary autobiographical accounts which emphasise 
beauty in visionary scenes, often poetically described. Rūzbihān for example, bears 
some similarities to the Kubrawīs in his descriptions of visionary theophanies, both of 
the majestic and beautiful attributes of God as his “clothing” (libās), and we have seen 
similar ideas in al-Baghdādī’s work, for example employing the term libās in reference 
to the imagination which clothes spiritual truths or attributes of God with symbolic 
imagery.233 
 
Unlike Kubrā, al-Baghdādī’s discussion of beauty seems to focus on physical sensations 
rather than spiritual visions and dreams. We turn mainly to the phenomenon of sound 
in order to investigate the role of beauty in al-Baghdādī’s work. In his discussion of 
audition (samā‘), the practice of listening to music in order to induce spiritual 
experiences, al-Baghdādī allocates for beauty a central role for the spiritual progression 
of initiates and accords physical sensation a role in conveying spiritual truths and God’s 
speech to the advanced Sufi. Despite this focus on physical sensations, al-Baghdādī’s 
framework here is the same as that which underpin his understanding of visions and 
dreams.  	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Al-Baghdādī conceives of physical sensation as having a similar role to that of the 
imagination, as a medium which represents spiritual realities through particulars. 
Outlining al-Baghdādī’s psychological framework reveals that perceiving the truth of a 
spiritual vision depends upon the degree to which the soul is purified. This theory 
applies to physical sensation as well. The notion that the perception of the truths of 
physical sensation is dependent on the purification of the soul also reveals the point at 
which the Tuḥfa overcomes a seemingly dualistic account of the world. As such the 
truth of physical sensation also parallels the progression of attributes and visions. 
 
3.i .  Perceiving sounds 
 
Audition is a practice which dates back to a much earlier period in the history of 
Sufism, and by al-Baghdādī’s time it was a well-established Sufi ritual. However, it 
seems to have always courted controversy, with some religious scholars denouncing 
the practice as a sin and forbidding it. Prior to al-Baghdādī, al-Ghazālī had mounted a 
formidable defence of the permissibility of audition in his Iḥyā’.234 Al-Baghdādī is clearly 
well versed in this section of the Iḥyā’, as he summarises its main argument for the 
permissibility of audition in the Tuḥfa by explaining that al-Ghazālī reduces the 
opposition to audition to the claim that the practice is a disagreeable frivolity, and 
summarises al-Ghazālī’s response as showing that such a statement cannot apply to 
audition.235  
 
Al-Baghdādī’s rather brief summary reveals that he is not heavily invested in justifying 
the permissibility of the practice from a legal point of view and is happy to refer the 
reader to al-Ghazālī instead. His primary aim then is to discuss the theoretical 	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underpinnings of the practice. Turning to the final chapter of the Tuḥfa, we see that the 
same framework which characterised dreams and visions is extended to physical 
sensation. Al-Baghdādī states here that it is possible for man, when his heart is 
governed by God to perceive the true meanings of physical sensations. The bodily world 
manifests a spiritual truth, but the ability to perceive this is only possible when the soul 
is purified. 
 
After a brief discussion of the permissibility of keeping company with rulers, al-
Baghdādī focuses the remainder of his 10th chapter on the topic of audition. He begins 
by expanding upon a concept which was not unknown to Sufis, specifically that the Sufi 
had two sets of each sensory organ, one set for perceiving the manifest world, while the 
other perceived the hidden. 236  Al-Baghdādī begins his discussion of audition by 
developing this notion: 
 
Just as God created for man a bodily frame (qālib) and spirit, so did he create for his five 
senses, which are sound, sight, taste, smell and touch, a form and spirit. And their form 
is what clings to [man’s] frame, and their spirit is what clings to his heart. And when the 
form (qālib) shares [its rank] with animals and beasts, the images [man] receives from 
the senses are those which are shared between man and animal. And for the form of 
man, there are shared [senses which he shares with other beings]. And for the heart, 
which is specific to man, is the spirit of the senses which is also specific to man. He who 
does not have from the world of mankind anything apart from characteristics of the 
manifest senses, and forbids the truth of the spirit of the manifest senses, which are the 
realities of the hidden senses, is like the animals and beasts.237 
 
Here man is either capable of perceiving the manifest with his manifest being alone, in 
which case he is like any other animal, or he is capable of perceiving it with his spiritual 	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senses which are particular to human beings and raise him above the animal state. 
These spiritual senses are also described by al-Baghdādī as the reality of the senses 
(ḥaqīqat al-ḥiss). The physical and spiritual senses are in some way linked but al-
Baghdādī does not provide us with much detail regarding the details of this connection 
which we must infer from his discussion. Al-Baghdādī continues to describe the relation 
between these manifest and spiritual senses in the following passage:  
 
And with [man’s] manifest senses he understands the precious things [of the manifest 
world] and with the true senses, he apprehends the realities of the hidden. God has said 
of the characteristics of the unbelievers: You see them looking at you but they do not 
perceive. Meaning, and God knowing, that they used to look at the image of the 
Prophet, peace be upon him, with their outer senses but they did not perceive the 
image of prophecy with the true spiritual senses. And God said that, “they are removed 
from hearing.” And there is no doubt that they were not removed from their outer 
sense of hearing, but that they were removed from the true, spiritual sense of hearing 
which is the spirit of the outer sense of hearing. So they used to hear the Qur’an as a 
combination of sounds that was particular and specific. And so it was heard by the 
outer sense and they understood from it the words of the ancients, and they did not 
perceive with real hearing which is the spirit of manifest hearing, for they were 
removed from it, so they [could not] apprehend the word of God, praise be to him, in 
order to believe in him.238 
 
Here al-Baghdādī draws heavily from the Qur’an in order to justify his interpretation of 
a distinct spiritual hearing, which is dependent on the presence of a physical stimulus, 
providing the hearer with spiritual truths that the physical event represents through 
particulars. The hearer must move beyond the particulars and sense the truth of the 
sounds in order to realise the truth of the sensation. Hence, while the perception of the 
physical particulars and the spiritual meanings seem distinct, perceiving the spiritual 	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sound is dependent on the presence of the manifest sound. The physical event becomes 
a particular form or image which manifests a spiritual truth. The ability to perceive the 
spiritual truth is in turn dependent on the rank of the soul and the degree of its purity. 
 
A similar notion is found in al-Ghazālī’s work, though this refers to the imagination 
rather than physical sensation, the parallel is nonetheless appropriate since both 
sensations depend upon the body. In his discussion of prophecy al-Ghazālī argues that 
prophets have no choice but to speak to people through images which if considered for 
their literal form alone will be found to be false, but whose interpretation is true. Al-
Ghazālī then reveals that these images are the same type as those which the 
imagination produces in dreams, because the majority of people are “asleep” and this is 
the only way the prophets can communicate truths to them.239  
 
This reasoning accords with al-Baghdādī’s notion of the physical senses, as the physical 
form is not considered true in itself but is a symbolic representation of truth, and can 
move the soul to arrive at a spiritual sensations of truth. Al-Baghdādī’s Qur’anic 
example, describing those who do not believe as unable to understand the meaning 
behind their physical sensation of God’s word, echoes al-Ghazālī who refers to the 
images which God sends through the prophets. For al-Ghazālī, the meanings of these 
symbols will only be revealed to most people in the afterlife. Al-Ghazālī’s thought might 
also be the origin of al-Baghdādī’s peculiar usage of the term “the spirit of the sense” 
(rūḥ al-ḥiss), as al-Ghazālī describes the meaning behind the imaginative images which 
prophets convey through scripture as the spirit (ruḥ) of the image.240 Al-Baghdādī also 
equates the spiritual senses with the term realities and identifies the heart as their 
receptor, revealing the importance of the reception of Ghazālian thought here. This 
indicates that the spiritual sounds which are sensed by the heart are equivalent to the 	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intelligibles which are perceived by the rational soul. This equivalence between 
realities and spiritual senses is made clearer with al-Baghdādī’s assertion that spiritual 
sound is independent of the bodily particulars which represent it: 
 
And in the beginning of the emergence of this [spiritual] sound, the workings of the 
[bodily senses] dominate him, for it is the [spiritual sense’s] outer shell and its bodily 
form…  And if he attains completion and matures to the point of finality, [the spiritual 
sense] pervades at all times. For its true source is above the world of time and place. 
And if the seeker turns to the cosmos he hears the glorification of [God by the created] 
things clearly, for there is no thing that does not glorify and praise Him. And if [the 
seeker] is abducted by God from the cosmos, he hears the speech of God, praise be to 
him, and his days are spent absorbed in audition (samā‘). 
 
Hence it seems that what al-Baghdādī intends by the term spiritual senses is that they 
are the meanings behind the symbolic representations of the physical senses. They are 
spiritual realities which are sensed and experienced rather than intellected. These 
realities are presented to the soul through a spiritual sensory organ which has a 
connection to a corresponding physical organ. They derive meanings from the physical 
world in accordance with the perfection of the soul. The concept is not fully explained 
as al-Baghdādī maintains that these spiritual meanings are sensed as sounds. It remains 
somewhat difficult to understand how two sounds could be heard at the same time, 
however we will attempt to provide an explanation for this as best as we can in the 
coming discussions when we come to discuss al-Baghdādī’s assertion that completion is 
found in perceiving both the physical and spiritual sounds. First we must turn to the 
role of beauty in the Tuḥfa to grasp the nature of these spiritual sensations more fully. 
 
3. i i .  Beauty, music and the assent of the soul 
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Despite the influence of al-Ghazālī’s thought here, there are important discussions in al-
Baghdādī’s text which al-Ghazālī avoids discussing in depth. Although al-Ghazālī 
provides an extensive discussion of audition, he does not seem to discuss the role of 
beauty in music and poetry, declaring that this pleasure is one of God’s mysteries which 
cannot be explained.241 In contrast to this, beauty plays a central role in moving the soul 
to a state where it is receptive to spiritual senses and truths for al-Baghdādī.  
 
However, given the ambiguity surrounding al-Baghdādī’s notion of spiritual senses, we 
will need to find parallels between al-Baghdādī’s thought and other theories regarding 
the role of the senses and beauty. Al-Baghdādī’s discussion offers a description of the 
psychological effects of perceiving beauty and provides hints as to where we may look 
for parallels. Al-Baghdādī turns to the aesthetics of music, granting physical beauty an 
important ability to suspend the conscious mind from directing the senses, allowing the 
spiritual senses to be perceived, and facilitating the transformation of the soul to a 
greater condition.  
 
We may find some clues in discussions of beauty in the context of poetry. This had been 
an area of investigation by previous thinkers, and al-Baghdādī’s discussion bears some 
parallels to these older discussions. Furthermore, part of the audition ceremony would 
undoubtedly have featured the recitation of poetry even though al-Baghdādī seems to 
focus on music in his discussion. There are countless examples of audition ceremonies 
featuring lyrics which are mentioned and recorded in a vast number of Sufi works, and 
we can safely assume that this would have been a feature of any audition ceremony of 
the time.242  
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Avicenna described poetry as imaginative speech and argued for its usefulness in 
conveying truths through the imagination, despite the inability of the imagination to 
arrive at truths on its own. For Avicenna poetry conveyed knowledge through 
syllogisms, a weaker form of reasoning than demonstrative proofs. However, Avicenna 
afforded the beauty involved in imagination a role in the reception of knowledge, 
explaining that although the truths of poetry are not demonstrated, the soul assents 
and yields to them as a result of feeling wonder and pleasure.243 Avicenna justifies 
poetry for the sake of it by assigning an important role for pleasure, wonder, and awe, 
which accompany the experience of listening to poetry. The role of the imagination and 
physical sensations here, though important, is only as a means to knowledge and not 
knowledge itself. Wonder and pleasure here take the place of demonstrative proofs in 
forcing the soul to assent to a truth.244 
 
Al-Ghazālī had a similar approach to Avicenna when it came to poetics, though unlike 
Avicenna, al-Ghazālī discussed the topic in the context of religion, and emphasised the 
need for syllogistic truths while not affording much of a role to pleasure.245 Despite al-
Baghdādī’s reliance on al-Ghazālī and the frequency with which he quotes from the 
Iḥyā’ in this 10th chapter, he nevertheless parallels Avicenna more strongly by 
emphasising the role of beauty and pleasure in causing the soul to assent to higher 
truths. This is seen in the following passage which details the heart’s assent to spiritual 
truths through the medium of physical sounds: 
 
We have said that bodily sensed sound is attached to the heart and the distance 
between [the heart and this sound] is closer than the distance between manifest bodily 
sight and true spiritual sight. For this reason, the effects of outer sound on the heart are 
produced faster… Do we not see that one is perhaps taken from consciousness if he 	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hears some voices which are pleasant and harmoniously tuned, whether he is a person 
of the heart or not, and this condition of being taken away from consciousness is not 
achieved by looking at beautiful things with the bodily sensation of sight. This is true 
hearing, for it may be that the servant of God takes pleasure in it and does not feel that 
pleasure but instead listens to things with his heart and no longer hears directly from 
that thing with the bodily [senses], for the heart becomes that which hears, 
experiencing the realities of his hearing.246 
 
Like Avicenna’s discussion of beauty in poetry causing the soul to assent to a truth 
beyond the combination of particular images which emerge in the imagination, al-
Baghdādī asserts that the beauty of music causes the soul to experience a spiritual truth 
which is greater than the mere combination of physical sounds in music. This parallel is 
evinced by the relationship between the heart and the realities, which are equivalent to 
the rational soul and intelligibles. For Avicenna the information is in the 
communication of intelligible truths through poetic syllogisms which were not literally 
true in themselves but made sense when taking the meaning of the poem into account. 
For al-Baghdādī, the combination of beautiful harmoniously tuned sounds (al-aṣwāṭ al-
ṭayyiba mutanāsibat al-awzān) induces a state which allows the listener to experience 
spiritual sensations. Al-Baghdādī emphasises the physical beauty of sound by referring 
to the tuning and harmony of the music rather than imaginative speech. Yet the role of 
beauty here is remains similar to that of syllogism in language. While Avicenna focuses 
on beauty in language, and its ability to inspire shock, awe or pleasure, al-Baghdādī 
focuses on the physical sensation, emphasising that one’s consciousness is taken by 
listening to these pleasant, melodic and complimentary sounds. 
 
Al-Baghdādī expands upon this notion of beauty then by according it an important role 
in inducing a liminal state and suspending the consciousness of the mind and the outer 
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senses. This allows the soul an opportunity to rise above its bodily concerns. Beauty 
causes the soul to enter a state which is similar to the state induced through 
remembrance rituals in seclusion. This was related to the production of visions, by 
suspending thought impressions as well as the bodily faculties of the soul. The 
experience of beauty here is considered powerful enough, to move even the non-Sufi to 
this spiritual perception. Hence, al-Baghdādī states that even if one has not progressed 
spiritually and is not a Sufi or, as he puts it a “person of the heart,” they may still be 
affected by the experience, so that they hear with their “true” spiritual senses.247  
 
However, physical beauty remains useful only in as much as it causes the soul to assent 
to higher spiritual states and truths, it is not truth in itself since as we shall see, all 
physical sensations bear a spiritual truth which the Sufi must learn to perceive without 
the aid of this experience of physical beauty. It is important to note that al-Baghdādī 
defends and speaks very highly of audition insofar as it is useful for the beginner. The 
advanced Sufi however is not in need of the practice and perceives the spiritual 
sensation at all times.  
 
For Avicenna, the universal truths of the intellect can be grasped by the soul without 
the use of the imagination or the bodily senses. However, if the soul is dominated by its 
lower faculties, it can return to the imagination which provides a starting point of 
particulars from which the soul can abstract universal truths. For Avicenna, the 
imagination is a starting point for achieving the higher truth, preparing it for the 
reception of intelligibles. Once this is achieved, the soul does not require returning to 
the imagination unless it regresses and is diverted from its higher functions.248 The role 
of the imagination here is similar to the role of the physical senses and beauty in the 
Tuḥfa. Physical sensations provide the initiate with a useful starting point, but spiritual 	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sensations are not necessarily bound to these particulars and can be sensed 
independently from them. 
 
With this in mind, al-Baghdādī attempts to craft a hierarchy of experiences of beauty. 
Al-Baghdādī states that hearing is for the initiate and vision is for the advanced.249 The 
completed Sufi is in not in need of these experiences however. He is able to experience 
truths directly without the aid of the imaginative faculty or the outer senses. Al-
Baghdādī refers to his prophetology in order to argue this case. Al-Baghdādī explains 
that Moses only received the speech of God and was denied a vision of him when he 
asked for it [Qur’an 7: 143]. On the other hand, the prophet Muhammad is associated 
with visions, presumably referring to his ascension through the heavens. Al-Baghdādī 
explains that Moses is destined to follow Muhammad to achieve completion. This 
explains his statement that the path begins with hearing and completion (intihā’) is 
attained with sight. In this way al-Baghdādī ranks the transformative effects of visions 
above sounds.250  
 
For al-Baghdādī, physical sight is an experience which does not affect the human heart 
as easily as sound and is not likely to cause the soul to assent to a higher state. Physical 
sound is described as being “closer” to the heart in comparison to what al-Baghdādī 
describes as the “distance” of sight. Towards the end of the Tuḥfa, al-Baghdādī quotes 
al-Hujwīrī’s Kashf, repeating a Sufi tradition where the shaykh al-Hamadānī arranges an 
audition session for al-Jallābī, informing him at the end that eventually there will be no 
difference between audition and the sound of a crow for him. Al-Baghdādī then goes on 
to explain that this is because the power of audition to affect the soul remains strong as 
long as one does not experience visions (mushāhada) and that one should not become 
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dependent on audition so that it becomes a barrier to completion.251 Hence, there is a 
sense that in completion beautiful stimuli, whether imagined, physical, or spiritual, are 
no longer required for spiritual progression. 
 
This hierarchical arrangement reflects the stratification of Kubrawī thought in al-
Baghdādī’s work. Beauty induces in the Sufi a condition whereby he is more receptive 
to spiritual truths. These experiences affect a change in the Sufi, resulting in the 
attainment of a higher spiritual rank. Najm al-Dīn al-Rāzī also points to the need for 
spiritual experiences to transcend certain stations, stating that this is one of the three 
benefits of spiritual visions.252 This begins with audible experiences, is advanced with 
visionary experiences and ends in the irrelevance of physical and mental images as a 
transformative tool along the path, since after achieving perfection the realities which 
physical and visionary beauty reveal are experienced directly at all times. This accords 
with the significance of the colourless white light of God seen in completion, which 
represents the absence of images and the complete purification of the soul. 
 
There is an important underlying reason to this hierarchical relationship between 
seeing and hearing which points to the stratification and emerging self-consciousness 
of the Kubrawī community. The increasing attention to visions in this period in Sufism 
reflects the transition of Sufism from communities to orders. Given the emphasis of the 
Kubrawiyya on understanding and detailing visions, this may also serve to assert the 
value of Kubrawī Sufism over other forms of Sufi practice which would have shared 
similar traditions of audition but whose visionary practices are less detailed. This 
emphasis of visions as a necessary experience towards completion seems to grant the 
Kubrawiyya an advantage in theoretical exposition as well as practice. 
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3.iii .  Transcending the spirit and returning to physical sensation  
 
That the spiritual senses allow the perceiver to apprehend realities, and are 
independent of the physical senses is made clear by al-Baghdādī as he describes them as 
“above time and place.”253 Despite this independence however, al-Baghdādī is not 
willing to render the bodily sounds completely unnecessary. Though it may seem at 
times as if the body is simply a hindrance and something which ought to be 
transcended, it is necessary for al-Baghdādī’s definition of completion which depends 
on the proper command of the bodily faculties. Regarding sensation, al-Baghdādī terms 
this “removing the distance” between man’s spiritual and bodily faculties. Here he 
reveals more about the relationship between physical and spiritual sensation:  
 
And [listening with the heart alone and not in conjunction with the outer senses] is due 
to the distance between the manifest and the hidden [within themselves], and this 
distance is not lifted at all, except with struggling and discipline. So if the person hears 
a sound, whether it be harmonious or not, he receives from that sound the 
apprehension [of the particulars] of sensation. And if he also has with him the spiritual 
sense of hearing, meaning true hearing, he receives from it two lots. The first lot is 
related to the perception of the sense-able [bodily] hearing, while the second lot is the 
perception of true hearing. And true hearing does not stop at what strengthens it from 
the manifest sound, for it has in its own world, apprehensions which are without limit. 
And that is why one of the shaykhs254 has said: in my heart there is a singer (qawwāl) 
who sings to me.255 
 
Here, al-Baghdādī complicates the notion of spiritual sensation by subdividing the 
spiritual sound into that which is related to the outer senses and that which is above 
time and space. Hence, those who experience unconsciousness due to the physical 	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sound through beauty and listen with their heart alone have not realised the full 
potential of spiritual hearing because they do not comprehend the truth of the physical 
sound. Part of the significance of the spiritual sound itself remains dependent on the 
presence of a physical sensation.  
 
What al-Baghdādī means by “removing the distance” between the hidden and manifest 
aspects of man is directly related to Sufi training and progressing along the path in the 
above passage. Completion results in the greater hidden faculties of the soul 
commanding the body, thus bridging the distance entails the most noble aspect of 
man’s soul, as a reflection of God, commanding the human body. This is directly related 
to the capacity for knowledge, since completion entailed coming to know all the 
microcosmic realities of man’s composition which explains how the truths represented 
by the particulars of physical sounds are understood. Hence, we may venture an 
explanation of this notion by positing that for al-Baghdādī upon perfection, the 
microcosmic realities which correspond to the external realities are perfectly 
imprinted onto the mirror of the soul and this allows the Sufi to grasp the full truths of 
his physical experiences.  
 
Al-Baghdādī grants physical hearing a connection to spiritual hearing by describing it 
as the outer layer of spiritual hearing. The physical sound has a meaning and a truth 
which is inaudible to those who have not advanced the soul’s rank. Just as God’s 
attributes are manifested by the perfected human soul through the body, so is God’s 
speech, and the truths of the hidden world made apparent in the manifest world where 
they are represented by sensible manifestations. So al-Baghdādī returns our focus to 
the physical, and argues for its necessity as he continues to explain that when the 
distance between the manifest and hidden faculties of man is bridged, unintelligible 
sounds become translatable into human speech: 
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And if the seeker hears a voice and his ear is prepared to receive his lot, and true 
hearing is his right, and if the distance between the manifest and hidden is lifted with 
striving and other acts [of worship], it is possible for the hearer to describe what he 
hears from his true sense of hearing from the various sounds like the slamming of 
doors, the voices of birds, the creaking of a well, with comprehensible and 
understandable speech (kalāman mafhūman ma‘lūm).256 
 
Here al-Baghdādī shows that knowledge acquired from physical experiences are 
dependent on the purification of the soul just as dreams and visions are. We had seen 
previously that a dream image symbolically represented the divine due to the presence 
of bodily and egoistic faculties which obscured the literal truths, while the more 
perfected soul sees a clear and direct literal truth in his vision due to the absence of 
bodily faculties. Here we see that the physical senses are intertwined with the soul in 
the same way, as the spiritual senses only grasp knowledge from the bodily world in 
accordance with the soul’s purity. Physical sound manifests God’s speech to degrees of 
truth depending on the state of the soul just as the theophanic visions manifested God 
in different colours according to the soul’s purification. Al-Baghdādī makes this clear as 
he explains:  
 
And this sound, by which I mean the true spiritual sound, follows undoubtedly the 
reality of the heart, yet it is in the abode of the sense of the bodily form (qālib). And just 
as the person hears speech or a voice through the medium of his senses from whoever 
is present with him or is addressing him, so does the heart hear speech according to 
what is with it. For if [the heart] is with God it hears from God, and if it is with other 
than God then it hears from that other. And if the servant hears [a bodily] speech or 
voice and the heart is with God, the manifest sense of hearing hears that speech or 
voice from the one who speaks or remains silent, while the heart hears from that 
[bodily sound] the speech or command of God… And for that reason it may be that he 	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hears something and understands from it something else, so that he hears superficial 
speech and understands from that superficiality profundities.257 
 
This provides an explanation to some common tropes in Sufi thought. The reference to 
hearing something profane and understanding a spiritual truth from it, echoes the 
writings of Rūzbihān for example who describes hearing a poetic verse about 
drunkenness and hangovers, yet understanding from it “ecstasies, kindness and 
speeches from the station of expansiveness” (basṭ).258 Ernst explains in reference to this 
episode that for Rūzbihān even the most profane poetry could become a manifestation 
of a divine quality.259 
 
For al-Baghdādī, perceiving the spiritual sensation with both its bodily and spiritual 
significance is a necessity for completion. This reasserts the significance of the bodily 
world and has important consequences for discussions of antinomianism and ecstatic 
states. The inability to comprehend the physical sound experienced represents a flawed 
and imperfect altered state which the Sufi should attempt to progress from. In these 
cases the Sufi may think that he has attained finality but is in fact simply unable to 
understand his experiences because he is too engrossed or overwhelmed by his 
spiritual sensations. This is apparent as al-Baghdādī continues: 
 
And if the distance [between manifest and hidden] is not lifted, it is not possible for [the 
seeker] to describe [that unintelligible sound] with any comprehensible [speech]. And it 
may be that he does not feel his own sense of hearing even if he hears it and if that 
[sound] changes his condition (ḥālatihi) in the manifest. And this is the condition of 
many of those who experience ecstatic states (al-mawājīd) who have found in their 
inner [being] audible messages which have been sent to their hearts and changed the 	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attributes of their hearts. And that change led to a change in the manifest, yet they did 
not understand from that anything, nor did he apprehend any speech.  
 
Al-Baghdādī characterises those who only perceive the spiritual sensation as 
incomplete due to their inability to apprehend the physical and spiritual sensation in 
tandem. Though their souls assent to a higher truth and they undergo a change in their 
attributes, they do not understand what it is they have experienced. The crucial point 
here is in marking out completion from the station of the spirit, since the Sufi should be 
master of both his physical and spiritual existence. As we shall see, this is related to the 
definition of shaykh-hood as it establishes that the shaykh must fulfil a prophetic role 
as an intermediary between God and his community, having his heart with God while 
attending to worldly affairs.  
 
This notion does have precedent in the works of earlier Sufis. We can look to a similar 
idea found in ‘Ammār al-Bidlīsī’s Bahjat al-ṭā’ifa. Al-Bidlīsī was one of Kubrā’s teachers 
and is mentioned by Kubrā in the genealogy of his cloak of blessing.260 His influence 
over the development of the Kubrawiyya has not been well documented, however it 
seems that some of his discussions are echoed in Kubrā’s and al-Baghdādī’s work. Al-
Bidlīsī also dedicates significant discussions to Sufi psychology including visions and 
thought impressions. Although it is beyond the scope of this study, it is important to 
note that this points to some important parallels between al-Baghdādī and al-Bidlīsī’s 
work, which could be significant for those who wish to understand the development of 
Kubrawī thought.  
 
Al-Bidlīsī’s discussion of visions in his Bahjat al-ṭā’ifa parallels al-Baghdādī’s discussion 
of audition. Here al-Bidlīsī explains the need to comprehend the form of the vision as 
well as its immaterial origins. His discussion seems to drawa on al-Ghazālī’s ideas, as al-	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Bidlīsī relies on the notion of “power” (qadar) in this discussion. Al-Ghazālī employs 
these term as equivalents to the terms to the actor (fā‘il), action (fi‘il) and object which is 
acted upon (maf‘ūl).261 Al-Bidlīsī asserts that every vision has a qādir, which refers to the 
cause, or the one who has power, namely God. Every vision is also produced through a 
qudra, which is the creative power of God. While the vision itself is referred to as the 
maqdūr, which is the object which power is acted upon.  
 
Al-Bidlīsī explains that these three steps which are involved in the creation of a thing 
can be perceived or comprehended by the Sufi. God, or the qādir as well as his creative 
power are perceived with the heart, while the maqdūr is perceived by what he describes 
as the physical eye because it is a part of the created world, or dunyā. He explains in this 
passage that those who perceive only the holder of power and the creative power are 
incomplete, and only the truly perfected perceives all three at once and attain complete 
knowledge in the perception of the vision.262  
 
Al-Bidlīsī describes the incomplete Sufi in the same way that al-Baghdādī describes 
those who are unaware of the physical experience of hearing when experiencing 
ecstasy. Here Bidlīsī describes them as children who see but do not understand.263 He 
goes on to explain that the incomplete Sufi’s heart is overwhelmed by the vision so that 
it comes to “dominate” him (ghalabat al-shuhūd ‘alā al-qalb), only perceiving the qādir and 
qudra, but ignoring the maqdūr. On the other hand the Sufi who has attained completion 
has a “stable” heart and is able to focus the physical eye “of his head” on the form of 
the vision. In this case, physical sight becomes characterised with the attribute of 
spiritual sight (ittaṣafa al-baṣar bi-ṣifat al-baṣīra).264  
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This offers an explanation of the connection between bodily and spiritual sensation 
which is missing in al-Baghdādī’s text. Al-Bidlīsī explains that the physical sensory 
organ acquires the ability to perceive spiritual sensations through purification of the 
soul. This is remarkably similar to al-Baghdādī’s discussion of physical and spiritual 
sound. It also reveals that there is a connection between physical and spiritual sounds 
by explaining that the physical eye comes to acquire the characteristics of spiritual 
sight. Hence, though the physical and spiritual sensations are distinct, the ability to 
perceive the spiritual vision or sound is predicated on the ability to see and hear. 
 
In this passage, physical sight is necessary for ensuring that the Sufis are not 
overwhelmed by their spiritual senses. For both thinkers, maintaining focus on the 
physical sensation represents a more complete state by grounding the Sufi and barring 
him from being overcome by ecstasy. Only by maintaining one’s focus on the bodily 
sensation can one understand the spiritual meaning which it represents. This crafts a 
hierarchy of spiritual experience by characterising the intermediary condition as a 
detachment from the bodily world. It is above the perception of bodily particulars alone 
which is due to the domination of the ego over the soul, but below completion.  
 
Hence al-Baghdādī’s definition of completion requires the perception of the spiritual 
sound which is attached to physical sound, and not the non-bodily spiritual sound on 
its own. Though the truths which are derived from the spiritual senses, like the 
intelligibles “are beyond time and space,” he nevertheless argues that completion is 
predicated on perceiving the physical sensation. Al-Baghdādī is therefore tentative 
about completely divorcing the spiritual sensation from the bodily sensation.  
 
Landolt finds a similar idea in Najm al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s work but concludes that the 
“positive valuation of the world in al-Rāzī’s case appears to involve a certain turning 
away from the strongly spiritualist trend of Kubrā’s and more towards Ibn ‘Arabī’s view 
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that vision of God is impossible without vision of the world.”265 From this analysis of the 
Tuḥfa, we see that this assertion cannot be upheld. Al-Rāzī clearly owes his 
understanding of physical sensation to al-Baghdādī who developed Kubrā’s thought 
further in reference to the physical senses. This is not a divergence from Kubrā and a 
move towards Ibn ‘Arabī as Landolt claims, but is a development of Kubrā’s thought 
through al-Baghdādī. This is an important point since the emphasis on theophany in al-
Rāzī’s thought has often been portrayed as being due to his diverging from Kubrawī 
thought and adopting ideas particular to Ibn ‘Arabī. Landolt also neglects to highlight 
that al-Baghdādī’s discussions of theophany both with regard to sound and visionary 
lights clearly predicts al-Simnānī’s four-fold theophanic system which is understood in 
opposition to Ibn ‘Arabī’s thought. 266 Al-Baghdādī’s influence over al-Rāzī and al-
Simnānī is clear in this regard. 
 
Furthermore, this conception of the world is important for differentiating between 
correct practice and behaviour and antinomianism. Al-Baghdādī links his discussion 
here with the well-known tradition stressing the need for the Sufi to have his “heart 
with God” while also being able to maintain himself in the physical world and within 
society. This is an important conception which gains currency the 11th and 12th 
centuries as Sufism became increasingly institutionalised and antinomian groups 
became increasingly visible. It is seen for example in the sayings of Abū Sa’īd which al-
Baghdādī was certainly influenced by.267  
 
This called for a definition of spiritual perfection which envisaged the Sufi’s return to 
societal norms, having been engrossed in asceticism and spiritual experiences in the 
intermediary stage of the spirit. There had always been a sense that ecstatic states 
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brought about by spiritual visions or music could unhinge the mind and lead the Sufi to 
insanity.268 Hence, ecstatic states needed to be defined within a framework which could 
control and temper their expression. In this instance, al-Baghdādī clearly shows that 
completion is not found in ecstasy but in stability which requires a return to the 
physical world in order to transcend the station of the spirit.  
 
Our discussion here reveals that this was expressed through a theoretical 
understanding of the physical senses. By rendering the manifest world a representation 
of the hidden world, and indeed God himself, al-Baghdādī stresses that it must be 
sensed in order for the theophany to be understood by the Sufi, imbuing the manifest 
with renewed importance. In doing so he overcomes the dualistic understanding of the 
world as divided into hidden and manifest, which is revealed to be an illusion after 
bridging the distance between the microcosmic hidden and manifest of the human 
being’s composition. When this is achieved, the Sufi hears the speech of God from “the 
particular letters of the Qur’an” or from any other sound.269 
 
By according a greater role for the physical perceptions, al-Baghdādī diminishes the 
role of ecstatic states, or wajd, which are regarded as transient states and a means to 
completion, but not the ultimate goal of the Sufi during audition. While ecstatic states 
had always been a feature of the audition ceremony, discussed by earlier writers such as 
Sarrāj and Sulamī, earlier discussions did not necessarily attempt to arrange such a 
detailed relationship between physical and spiritual senses and craft a hierarchy of 
experiences.270 The discussion of physical senses in al-Baghdādī’s text therefore shows 
that the further development of these ideas which were also intended to address the 
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practical concerns of the day, stratifying the ranks within the Sufi institution and 
restricting antinomianism while also advancing an account of psychology.  
 
Conclusion 
 
It has been demonstrated here that al-Baghdādī systematises and develops Kubrā’s 
thought towards some very significant conclusions with implications for Sufi thought 
and practice. Al-Baghdādī furnishes Kubrawī theory with the understanding of the 
microcosmic significance of the human being. This allows him to discuss the 
relationship between the soul and the inner sense as well as the outer senses in more 
depth in comparison to Kubrā. His explanations regarding the sources of dreams and 
visions which are mapped onto this cosmological framework offers us a more 
developed oneirology and a better understanding of the theoretical framework of 
dreams and visions in Kubrawī thought. This exposes the oneiric system which informs 
not only Kubrā’s work, but the works of other Kubrawī authors such as Najm al-Dīn al-
Rāzī. This is a significant finding since dream analysis had previously seemed to ascribe 
meanings to images in a more arbitrary fashion without a coherent system. 
 
This study has demonstrated that al-Baghdādī draws upon a number of concepts found 
in the works of previous thinkers in order to further develop Kubrawī theory. The 
microcosmic account of the human proves to be a rather versatile idea as al-Baghdādī 
draws upon it in almost every psychological discussion in the Tuḥfa. But its significance 
is only fully realised in its dependence upon important concepts which were adopted 
from al-Ghazālī. This is especially important in the metaphor of the heart as a mirror to 
the realities which are present within man’s composition, as well as the heart’s role as a 
microcosmic throne which explains the soul’s command of the body. This allows al-
Baghdādī to develop the important symbiosis between perception and the expression of 
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attributes and testifies to the centrality of al-Ghazālī’s thought for the systematisation 
of Kubrawī psychology.  
 
In al-Baghdādī’s psychology it is apparent that all mental and physical perceptions 
parallel the microcosmic progression of man from the dense, opaque and unclear bodily 
faculties which obscure the soul, to the more exalted, transparent, purified immaterial 
soul. This occurs quite literally in some parts of the Tuḥfa, in the progression of 
visionary images, yet at other times there is a more allegorical relationship between the 
microcosm and visions, in the case of perceptions of different fires, or coloured lights 
for example. In the case of physical sensation, this was presented as a progression from 
physical sounds to the spiritual sound which the physical represents as a type of 
theophany. The correspondence between the microcosmic and macrocosmic realities 
which are imprinted onto the soul was central in this case, bridging the apparent 
dualism of al-Baghdādī’s cosmology upon perfection. 
 
It has also been shown that al-Baghdādī’s theoretical framework heavily influenced al-
Rāzī’s Mirṣād. Hence, al-Bagdhādī’s systematisation of Kubrā’s ideas spread to the wider 
Islamic world through the popular works of Najm al-Dīn al-Rāzī in the 13th century. Al-
Baghdādī’s theoretical framework is also clearly discernable in Isfarā’inī’s work where a 
number of ideas found in the Tuḥfa are adhered to including the dualistic conception of 
man’s body and soul, as well as the microcosmic conception of man’s being and its 
relationship to the experience of coloured lights.271 Later, the Kubrawī thinker al-
Simnānī echoes al-Baghdādī’s development of Kubrā’s thought here as he puts forward 
a similar cosmological framework to that found in al-Baghdādī’s Tuḥfa and develops 
further al-Baghdādī’s characterisation of man as a mirror to the divine.272 Later we will 
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also demonstrate that the basis of al-Simnānī’s prophetology is also traceable to the 
Tuḥfa. 
 
Crucially, we have also highlighted a number of areas where theory and practice 
intersect and inform one another. These theories of the microcosmic composition of 
man and its relationship to oneirology as well as sense perception are not simply 
abstract theoretical concerns. Rather, they inform Sufi practice which translates these 
theories into a lived experience, shared among the Sufi community. Almost every 
aspect of the theoretical framework which we have outlined here will be shown to 
directly inform al-Baghdādī’s ideas regarding the structure of the Sufi community, the 
centralisation of the authority of the shaykh, the response to the tensions surrounding 
antinomianism, the rules governing affiliations of the Sufi institution with wider 
society, and the development of increasingly distinct self-conscious Sufi identities. All 
this will point us to the conclusion that al-Baghdādī’s work reveals the emergence of a 
distinctive proto-Kubrawī community, enlightening us with regard to this gradual 
transition of Sufism from loosely structured communities to orders.  
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Chapter 3 
Master and Disciple 
 
Having detailed the psychological theory that informs the entirety of the Tuḥfa, we 
have now grasped the framework upon which most of al-Baghdādī’s arguments are 
built. As we have previously discussed, despite al-Baghdādī’s extensive passages on 
psychology, the Tuḥfa’s main concern is not to outline a psychological theory. Though 
we have pieced it together here from various chapters of the Tuḥfa, none of the ten 
questions answered by al-Baghdādī is specifically intended to deal with the topic of 
psychology or epistemology apart from the 5th chapter, distinguishing true visions and 
dreams from false ones.  
 
However, al-Baghdādī’s answers to the ten questions all draw upon his psychological 
framework to such an extent that the framework itself is revealed in discussions of 
behaviour and practice. We must then ask ourselves why it is that al-Baghdādī’s 
psychological theory seems inseparable from questions regarding behaviour, practice, 
antinomianism and politics. In this chapter it will be shown that for al-Baghdādī, theory 
and practice are interdependent as they inform one another. The adoption of 
philosophical concepts through al-Ghazālī in order to systematise Kubrawī thought will 
be shown to be indispensible for al-Baghdādī’s attempts to centralise and formalise the 
relationships within the Sufi community. These concepts will provide a number of 
discursive tools for the stratification of Sufism. 
 
To account for these developments in thought and practice, we must understand the 
context of al-Baghdādī’s work. This period in the history of Sufism marks the point at 
which Sufis were consolidating theoretical and practical developments that would 
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eventually form the basis for later Sufi orders, or tarīqa Sufism.273 Like his contemporary 
‘Umar al-Suhrawardī, al-Baghdādī’s work consolidates trends leading the Sufi 
community towards its transition into an order.274 His work highlights some key 
theoretical developments which were aimed at centralising and formalising the Sufi 
community, setting the foundations upon which Sufism would later transform into 
orders.  
 
The germination of many characteristics which we would more commonly associate 
with the later period of Sufi tarīqas are not often traced back to this period of early 
Kubrawī thought. It will be shown in this chapter that al-Baghdādī develops many 
characteristics which become much more prominent in the case of later Sufi orders. 
The claims to exclusivity, the sense of belonging to a particular genealogy, and the 
competition amongst Sufis in the later period is more pronounced when compared to 
earlier Sufism.275 Yet we can witness these developments, albeit more subtly, and 
perhaps due to their nascence, in al-Baghdādī’s work.  
 
Al-Baghdādī attempts to establish a sense of belonging to a specifically Kubrawī Sufi 
community, and in doing so anticipates the exclusivist claims of later Sufi orders. He 
achieves this through development of praxis in accordance with his systematised 
psychological and oneiric theories. This will be seen in his development of dhikr rituals 
which attempt to conjure visions of the shaykh, as well as his rules which govern the 
behaviour of shaykhs and disciples. He also attempts to centralise the authority of the 
community in the figure of the shaykh in his development of the terms ‘the shaykh of 
birth-right’ (shaykh al-wilāda) as opposed to ‘the shaykh of training’ (shaykh al-tarbiyya) 
distinguishes a shaykh from whom one can claim a spiritual lineage in the former, from 
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one who only trains the disciple in the latter. Al-Baghdādī also formalises positions 
such as companionship (suḥba) in order to maintain this centralisation.  
 
To understand why this form of Sufism took shape in in the 12th century, we must look 
to the history of Sufism up to this point. With the decline of the Abbasids, new state 
structures based on new political ideas emerged.276 Roy Mottahedeh has shown that 
with the collapse of Abbasid authority, the legitimacy of subsequent political rulers 
stood on shaky grounds. This threw Muslim society “back on its own resources” where 
it was able to “generate self-renewing patterns of loyalty and of leadership.”277 The 
increasing stratification of Sufism which takes shape after the collapse of Abbasid 
power and the emergence of patronage systems between rulers and Sufis in this period 
can be viewed as an example of society attempting to govern itself. It established 
relationships of obligations and duties with minimal input from government.278 
 
With the ever more fractious and violent nature of the empire of the Khwarazmshahs, 
the need for such alternative networks of loyalty and leadership to be maintained and 
strengthened is likely to have increased. Hence, the stratification of Sufi theory and 
practice and the resultant centralisation of Sufi authority which is evident in al-
Baghdādī’s work should be seen in this context of the self governance of Muslim society 
which had to adapt to changing social and political realities.  
 
In this context, Kubrawī Sufism required further formalisation of its affiliations and 
offices and further centralisation, as increased competition amongst the patrician 
classes could promote instability within, as well as competition between institutions of 
learning. This is seen in the examples of Sufis, preachers and legal scholars who were 
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executed or exiled in this period. In al-Baghdādī’s case, this formalisation and 
centralisation in the face of political disruption is achieved through the stratification of 
Sufi psychology, oneirology and visionary theory. Hence specific markers of proto-
Kubrawī Sufism emerged in part out of a need to adapt to the realities of the day. 
 
This ability of Sufism to adapt to social and political realities has been noted by a 
number of scholars. Knysh has argued that Sufism should be viewed as a process of 
creative reinterpretation of Islam which is determined by a number of social, political 
and personal factors, and that Sufism did not exist outside its reinterpretation and 
adaptation to the realities of its day by a Sufi leader and his followers.279 Anjum 
however, has noted that limiting Sufism to a reinterpretation which does not exist 
beyond its manifestation in the realities of the day does not account for why a certain 
group may identify themselves as Sufis in relation to a shared genealogy or past and 
requires further explanation. He posits that Sufism should be seen as a discursive 
tradition which is able to adapt itself by drawing on a shared tradition, vocabulary, 
narratives and texts.280  
 
Anjum’s formulation comes closer in describing what we are arguing here in al-
Baghdādī’s case, however, it does not go quite far enough. For al-Baghdādī, the 
adaptation of Sufism to socio-political realities through institutionalisation is not a 
simple case of utilising what was already present in the Sufi tradition. The stratification 
of Sufi psychology and oneirology in the Tuḥfa is dependent on the adoption of 
important philosophical concepts which enter Sufism through al-Ghazālī and are 
further developed. The dualism of body and soul, the microcosmic conception of man, 
as well as collapsing a number of functions of the soul such as perception and command 
of the body into the metaphor of the heart as a mirror, are central to achieving this 	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adaptation in al-Baghdādī’s case. The Kubrawīs were not unwittingly drawing on a set 
of narratives and traditions but were actively developing and shaping these narratives. 
Hence, through theories which imparted structure onto their communities and wider 
society, Sufis arrived at new conceptions of identity and group belonging. In our 
discussion of the institutionalisation of Sufism under al-Baghdādī, the interdependence 
of practice and theory serves to make Kubrawī psychology and cosmology a lived 
experience.  
 
Al-Baghdādī does not present the stratification of Sufism as an arbitrary set of rules for 
the structure of the Sufi community, but as behaviours which emerge organically in 
consistency with his theoretical framework. While thinking of Sufism as an adaptation 
to the realities of the day through shared traditions, narratives and texts is a good 
starting point, we must also acknowledge that the process of adaptation involved the 
introduction of important doctrines regarding the nature of man which determined the 
relation of the Sufi to the wider world, through practice and institutional structures. 
The structure of the Sufi community and the emergence of its collective identity are 
intertwined with the stratification of Sufi psychological theory. 
 
Al-Baghdādī’s work is important here because it reveals the extent to which the 
formalisation and institutionalisation of Sufism was furthered in this period and the 
significance of the adoption of philosophical concepts and Ghazālian theories to the 
stratification of Sufi communities and its impact on medieval Islamic societies. Al-
Baghdādī’s work is not only important for its systematisation of Kubrawī cosmology, 
dream theory and psychology. It is also important for attempting to implement these 
ideas in order to cultivate a sense of belonging to the shaykh, establishing a proper 
etiquette for each stage of the Sufi path, developing a sense of Sufi elitism, and defining 
proper behaviour in opposition to antinomianism. All of these developments help 
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establish the Sufi community’s ability to govern itself and survive political and social 
upheavals.281  
 
The Khwarazmshah ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Muḥammad’s empire during al-Baghdādī’s time was 
characterised by instability. The Khawarzmshah  “established a reputation for violence 
and extortion” and his empire was plagued by disaffection among the populace who 
faced much hardship. Furthermore, the Khwarazmshah’s anti-caliphal policy was sure 
to lessen his legitimacy amongst the Sunni population. 282  The Khwarazmshahs’ 
“orthodox” credentials were further undermined as associations were drawn between 
them and magical and occult traditions, and by their alliances with former Ismailis. 
Given their reputation for concealment, the extent to which people believed in the 
sincerity of these reformed Ismailis’ conversion is questionable.283  
 
Given this state of affairs, that Sufis would attempt to establish stronger ties which 
would reassure their communities in the face of hardships seems natural. Hence, the 
institutionalisation of Sufism is likely to have been catalysed in order to mitigate this 
breakdown of government and its legitimacy, in addition to the extortion and violence 
which accompanied this in the Iran and Khwarazm. Examples of religious authorities 
superseding governmental authority in the period can be seen for instance by the 
increasing political authority which was deferred to the ‘ulamā’ of Bukhara who 
collected taxes on behalf of the state despite the presence of the secular Karakhānid 
rulers in the region.284 
 
The stratification of Sufism, along with its increasing social responsibilities results in 
the appearance of more exclusivist tendencies in al-Baghdādī’s case. This can also 	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partly be understood in the context of the Khwarazmshahs’ attempts to rapidly 
centralise power.285 Such a policy, accompanied with the infighting amongst the ruling 
classes is likely to have disrupted patterns of patronage in this period. The 
hagiographical works which spread and gained popularity in the 12th and 13th centuries 
stress the need to return to the older “golden age” of patronage under the great Saljuq 
Vizier Niẓām al-Mulk. The prevalence of episodes involving Nizām al-Mulk who acts as 
a patron of Abū Sa‘īd Ibn Abī al-Khayr in Ibn Munawwar’s Asrār al-tawḥīd attests to this 
anxiety over patronage relations.286 The hagiographies surrounding Abū Sa‘īd are also 
characterised by elitist notions, for example in the attempts to emphasise Abū Sa‘īd’s 
authority over al-Qushayrī’s. This is important to bear in mind as al-Baghdādī heavily 
relies on sayings and anecdotes from Abū Sa‘īd’s life in his discussions of the behaviour 
of the shaykh and disciple and in the relationship between Sufis and rulers which 
emphasise an elitist conception of the Sufi shaykh.  
 
Furthermore, evidence of increasing competition among Sufis can be found in the Tuḥfa 
as it argues for an exclusivist conception of the Sufi community against ‘Umar al-
Suhrawardī’s populist approach regarding discipleship and investiture. It seems that 
the sense of exclusivity which accompanied elitism is indicative of competition 
between Sufi communities in these uncertain times of political fragmentation, and was 
a symptom of the need to fortify the Sufi community against competing interests.  
  
Bearing this in mind, here we will establish the structure of the Sufi community 
according to the Tuḥfa. This study then must ascertain how al-Baghdādī embellishes the 
hierarchy between shaykh and disciple, and show how this is grounded in his 
psychological framework. This is essential before moving on to consider how al-
Baghdādī attempts to resolve some of the tensions between Sufi thought and Islamic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
285 Sevim and Bosworth, ‘The Seljuqs’, 181. 
286 Safi, The Politics, 138-140. 
	   153	  
norms and conventions and comparing his community with other emerging Sufi groups 
in the later chapters of this thesis, since this formalisation and centralisation will itself 
be shown to function as a restriction of antinomianism. This will answer questions 
pertaining to the development of Sufism in this period through our analysis of al-
Baghdādī’s strategies of centralisation and stratification and the pertinence of his 
oneirology in this regard. All this gives rise to a nascent, specifically Kubrawī form of 
Sufism.  
 
1 .  The formalisation of the shaykh-disciple relationship 
 
Before we begin our analysis of the text, it will be necessary to discuss the history of 
existing scholarship regarding the relationship between shaykh and disciple and al-
Baghdādī’s position within this context. The formalisation of the relationship between 
shaykh and disciple determines the heart of the Sufi institution, the means by which it 
gains legitimacy and authority, and by which it survives and propagates itself. In early 
Sufism, the relationship between master and disciple was less structured compared to 
the time when al-Baghdādī was writing. The Sufi author ‘Abbād al-Rundī (d. 792/1390) 
had projected into the history of Sufism, a progression of the shaykh-disciple 
relationship from an emphasis on “instruction” (ta‘līm) to one of “training” (tarbiyya).287 
The former was conceived of as a shaykh who simply gave lectures to his followers 
while the latter had a much more comprehensive command of every aspect of the 
disciple’s behaviour. 
 
This characterisation of the role of the shaykh by al-Rundī attempts to explain a shift 
which was obvious to later medieval Sufis, from a less formalised method of Sufi 
learning where local communities would form around a particular teacher and would 
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not survive beyond a few generations, to the establishment of Sufism as an institution 
which based its legitimacy on a chain of spiritual authority (silsila) stretching back to 
the prophet.288 This also inevitably paralleled a shift in emphasis on the preferred 
lifestyle of the Sufi community, for example from travel to a more sedentary life 
centred in a lodge around the Sufi shaykh who had come to be expected to fulfil 
important social and political roles.289  
 
The relationship between shaykh and disciple is therefore indicative of wider trends in 
Sufism. A more structured, comprehensive involvement of the shaykh in the disciple’s 
life, along with attachments of belonging to particular shaykhs rather than many at a 
time indicates a greater degree of formalisation and the increasing importance of the 
Sufi lodge in society. In this chapter al-Baghdādī’s contributions to the growing 
discussion regarding the proper conduct of the Sufi shaykh and his students in this 
period will be realised.  
 
The question of the conduct of the shaykh and disciple for al-Baghdādī is also an 
attempt to address potential theological, legal and spiritual difficulties which were 
associated with Sufism. One of al-Baghdādī’s primary concerns is to detail the nature of 
completion in order to ensure that adhering to Islamic law and Sufi practices remained 
necessary for the Sufi at all times against those groups who claimed otherwise.290  
 
This is seen for example in his prioritisation of the psycho-spiritual needs of the 
disciple, and the need to guard him from the potential hazards which face him along 
the Sufi path. These are presented as the underlying reasons to the formalisation of the 
relationship between the shaykh and disciple. This need for an interpreter of visions, 
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and a guide who can lead the Sufi past psychological barriers and deceptions is 
paramount for al-Baghdādī and is one of the main reasons why the shaykh is necessary 
for the progression of the student. This relationship between the shaykh and disciple 
also acts as a legitimising factor which qualifies the student to become a shaykh in his 
own right after having undergone training. In this respect, potential antinomianism, 
the appearance of unaffiliated Sufis, and the requirement of the disciple to have a 
shaykh are intimately linked in al-Baghdādī’s thought. 
 
Antinomianism is problematic in theory, given the obligation to follow the sharī‘a. 
However, it also presents a problem for the centralisation of the shaykh’s authority. 
The existence of people who were recognised as having spiritual insight without 
belonging to a Sufi institution and without adhering to an established form of mystical 
praxis could undermine the authority of fledgling Sufi institutions. Many of al-
Baghdādī’s discussions in the Tuḥfa are clearly responses to these potential problems. 
The 4th chapter of the Tuḥfa for example, attempts to explain whether a disciple should 
obey the shaykh if the latter orders him to break the religious law (shar‘).291  
 
Al-Baghdādī’s rules of shaykh and disciple conduct show us that the theoretical and 
practical are intimately linked in the Tuḥfa. Theory clearly informs practice while 
practice embodies theory. The theoretical becomes a lived experience in the example of 
oneirology and hierarchical dress codes for example. Al-Baghdādī’s work is therefore a 
crucial source for understanding the development of Sufism at the time. In addition, 
Najm al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s influential Mirṣād al-‘ibād, which became a popular work 
throughout the Islamic world is heavily indebted to al-Baghdādī’s Tuḥfa with respect to 
its characterisation of the shaykh-disciple relationship. Thus, al-Baghdādī’s ideas were 
disseminated throughout Iraq and Anatolia via his student, and his ideas for the 
structure of the Sufi institution were made known far beyond Iran and Khwarazm.  	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As we have noted, late-medieval Sufis themselves came to realise the change in the 
relationship between the early Sufi shaykhs and their disciples and how this differed 
from their own time. Al-Rundī’s distinction between the shaykh of training and the 
shaykh of teaching in the 14th century attempts to understand this as a shift in the 
methods of learning, yet this does not adequately explain this change. If we wish to 
truly grasp the reasons behind the formalisation of Sufism, we must first sketch the 
development of the shaykh-disciple relationship prior to al-Baghdādī’s lifetime. 
 
In comparing the transition from early Sufism to the Sufism of al-Baghdādī’s time, a 
change in the nature of the relationship between the shaykh and disciple is clearly 
discernable. However, modern scholars had previously accepted al-Rundī’s explanation 
that the earlier shaykhs were “teachers” who simply gave lectures to their followers 
and companions, while later shaykhs were “trainers” who had more comprehensive, 
authoritarian control over their disciple’s behaviour.292 This distinction does not seem 
to accurately describe the nature of this transition, and has since been questioned by 
scholars such as Silvers-Alario, who has pointed out that early Sufis did not distinguish 
teaching from training. 
 
Silvers-Alario comes to the conclusion that the early Sufi community was a widespread 
network of shaykhs and their companions (ṣāḥib) rather than disciples (murīd). These 
companions would learn from many different shaykhs, often travelling to or with them, 
and there did not seem to be any claims to uniqueness focused on one particular shaykh 
and his spiritual lineage.293 By contrast, later, more formalised forms of Sufism in al-
Baghdādī’s time are characterised by stronger attachments to shaykhs and a sedentary 
lifestyle, all of which was associated with the transition of Sufism from a loosely 	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structured community to one centred around lodges and institutions. Hence, it is not 
necessarily the methods of teaching which distinguishes later Sufis from earlier ones. 
 
While there was never a conceptual distinction between instruction and teaching in 
early Sufism, there is undoubtedly a difference between the fluid relationships of early 
Sufism and the formalised relationships between shaykhs and disciple which develop 
throughout the 11th and 12th centuries. It is evident that although the shaykh’s role as a 
teacher and instructor in the habits and behaviours of his followers was always a 
feature of Sufism, there was an increasing attempt to define the relationship between 
shaykh and disciple through rules and regulations which appear to become more 
stringent.  
 
This institutionalisation is developed even further in al-Baghdādī’s work and is 
therefore important for our understanding of the development of Sufism in this period. 
Al-Baghdādī’s contribution is not an arbitrary set of rules. For him, the shaykh-disciple 
relationship was based on certain theoretical positions which are consistent with his 
psychological framework. While al-Baghdādī was not the first thinker to develop rules 
to govern the disciple’s and shaykh’s conduct, he injects specifically “Kubrawī” ideas 
into his discussions. 
 
It will be shown here that for al-Baghdādī, a shaykh is someone who has transcended 
the veils of the ego and spirit so that they actualise the attributes of God. The 
legitimacy of the shaykh is therefore expressed in the context of the psychological 
framework as it is formulated within the Tuḥfa. While al-Baghdādī does not deny the 
authenticity of spiritual progress for those who have not gone through proper training, 
they are nevertheless barred from participating in the institutionalised form of Sufism 
and propagating a spiritual lineage. Ultimately, Kubrawī psychology becomes that 
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which justifies the entirety of the shaykh-disciple relationship and the only way for a 
Sufi to claim shaykh-hood in an authoritative form. 
 
In comparison to the Tuḥfa, the discussions of the 10th century thinkers al-Hujwīrī and 
al-Qushayrī regarding the conduct and proper interaction of shaykhs and disciples are 
relatively brief. It is not until the 11th century that we see more intricate discussions of 
the shaykh’s relationship with his disciples. The Sufi shaykh Abū Sa‘īd Ibn Abī al-Khayr 
(d. 440/1049) is sometimes credited as the first to attempt the codification of life in a 
Sufi lodge (khānqa).294 However, many lodges were in operation during Abū Sa‘īd’s time 
and he is perhaps reflective of a wider trend in Sufism rather than having begun 
initiated this himself.295 Abū Sa‘īd’s teachings are mainly preserved in the works of his 
biographers and hagiographers, Ibn al-Munawwar (who wrote and compiled the life 
and sayings of Abū Sa‘īd in his Asrār al-Tawḥīd) and Jamāl al-Dīn Faḍl-Allah.  He does not 
seem to have written a treatise on the subject of codified life himself, and therefore the 
recorded sayings appear somewhat detached from a framework of thought that informs 
the code of behaviour as it does in al-Baghdādī’s thought.  
 
It has been argued that Abū Sa‘īd marks a pivotal moment in the development of the 
Sufi lodge, namely its expansion from a centre for mysticism and asceticism to the 
service of wider society, adopting some of the functions of the ribāṭ (military outpost) 
and chivalrous groups (futuwwa) institutions.296 This established the place of service to 
society as a primary function of the Sufi institution at the time, as Abū Sa‘īd encouraged 
Sufi lodges to accept all members of society, waiting upon the poor and needy and 
social outcasts. This was an extension of the notion of service to society as a form of 
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worship which had gained credence as a form of asceticism among Sufis and chivalrous 
groups.297 
 
During Abū Sa‘īd’s time, Sufi lodges became centres which cut across class distinctions, 
receiving the patronage of rulers and influential figures as well. Ibn al-Munawwar’s 
biographical work establishes that the famous Vizier Niẓām al-Mulk was a patron and 
supporter of Abū Sa‘īd for example.298 Omid Safi shows that many of the narratives in 
Ibn al-Munawwar’s Asrār serve to articulate the ideal relationship between Sufis and 
rulers.299 The king is expected to pay homage to the shaykh in order to for his rule to be 
sanctioned by him. To some extent, the relationship between the patron and the 
shaykh is intended to mirror the relationship between humanity and the divine, God 
bestows blessings and grace while man’s responsibility is to show gratitude and 
obedience.300 
 
This notion is consistent with emerging ideas about the way in which disciples should 
interact with the shaykh. It will be shown that al-Baghdādī treats the shaykh as an 
intermediary or substitute for God in respect to the disciple and explicitly refers to him 
as the inheritor of the prophetic knowledge. Here, the disciple should first attempt to 
defer his own will in exchange for the shaykh’s commands as preparation for 
annihilating his will completely and substituting it with God’s.  
 
Claiming to emulate the teaching methods of the Prophet was not specific to Sufis. 
Early hadith scholars consciously modelled their methods of teaching after the Prophet 
and his companions.301  Yet for al-Baghdādī the Sufi shaykh is not just a representative 
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of God and the Prophet to his students but is also expected to behave as such amongst 
wider society. At this time, the Sufi shaykh’s status as a walī (a saint or friend of God) 
was beginning to be conceived as a representative of the Prophet and therefore of God 
in wider society as well, and Sufis began to develop more elaborate theories to support 
this, above simply emulating the prophet’s behaviour. 
 
There is precedent for the ideas we find in al-Baghdādī’s work in the biographical and 
hagiographical works dedicated to Abū Sa‘īd ibn Abī al-Khayr. Both of Abū Sa‘īd’s 
biographers, Ibn al-Munawwar’s and Jamāl al-Dīn Faḍlallah were contemporaries of al-
Baghdādī. The influence of their work is clearly seen throughout the Tuḥfa, as al-
Baghdādī frequently quotes from the al-Munawwar’s Asrār in the Tuḥfa.  Al-Baghdādī 
was therefore very much involved in the hagiographical construction of the figure of 
Abū Sa’īd. By rendering Abū Sa‘īd’s rules for discipleship and shaykh-hood into Arabic, 
al-Baghdādī also disseminated the teachings of Abū Sa‘īd beyond the Persian speaking 
world.302 The construction of Abū Sa‘īd is therefore indicative of a wider discussion 
regarding the institutionalisation of Sufism which was occuring throughout the Islamic 
world. 303 
 
In the Tuḥfa Abū Sa‘īd’s name appears in almost every discussion of the rights of 
shaykhs and disciples and it is evident that al-Baghdādī views Abū Sa‘īd as authoritative 
in this regard. Of course, rules regulating relationships between teachers and students 
were common across all areas of Islamic learning, there was a prevalent culture of 
etiquette or Adāb throughout the Islamic world at the time, in almost every 
profession.304 Yet, al-Baghdādī does not merely repeat Abū Sa‘īd’s rules and regulations, 
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but invests them with a renewed significance informed by their incorporation into a 
coherent psychological framework. 
 
Al-Baghdādī was not alone in attempting to root ideal notions of behaviour in a firm 
theoretical basis. ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī was also heavily invested in developing the rules 
of Sufi behaviour. This is seen in his regarding of the Sufi shaykh as a muntahī (someone 
who has completed the Sufi path) who after having ascended through the ranks of 
discipleship attains a high degree of freedom and authority.305 Like al-Baghdādī, ‘Umar 
al-Suhrawardī also constructs the hierarchy of the Sufi institution as a reflection of the 
levels of psycho-spiritual progression. That al-Baghdādī was interacting with al-
Suhrawardī’s work is clear as he responds to al-Suhrawardī’s ‘Awārif in the 7th chapter of 
the Tuḥfa.306 The Tuḥfa covers many of the same topics which al-Suhrawardī discusses, 
ranging from interactions with Sultans, to the basis and origins of the khirqa (Sufi 
cloak).307 Hence, al-Baghdādī should be seen as contributing to a wider transformation 
in Sufi circles across the medieval Muslim world. 
 
The type of institution ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī was cultivating differed markedly from al-
Baghdādī’s. Al-Suhrawardī characterises some aspects of his ribāṭ-based Sufism, as 
praiseworthy innovations (istiḥsān), something al-Baghdādī takes issue with and 
responds to.308 Al-Baghdādī’s incorporation of the sayings of figures such as Abū Sa‘īd 
and earlier Sufi practitioners into his programme of centralising and structuring the 
Sufi community by imbuing these ideas with a markedly Kubrawī psychological 
framework and providing a theoretical basis for Sufi etiquette, is therefore in some 
sense a response to the ideas espoused by al-Suhrawardī. Hence, it is al-Baghdādī’s 
intention to engage with wider discussions regarding the development of Sufi 	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communities, indicating a vibrant exchange of ideas between Sufis across the Muslim 
world. 
 
Al-Baghdādī builds upon the ideals represented by Abū Sa‘īd in expanding the Sufi’s 
role in serving wider society while attempting to maintain the exclusivity, integrity and 
intimacy of his Sufi fraternity. This results in what seems like a paradox of both an 
expansion and a restriction of the Sufi community. We will come to show how this 
tension is resolved in detail when we come to our comparison of al-Suhrawardī and al-
Baghdādī. Before we can move on to such a discussion however we need to understand 
how al-Baghdādī’s thought establishes communal structures and modes of collective 
belonging. 
 
2.  Defining shaykh-hood 
 
In order to fortify itself against outside influences in a period of social disruption and 
violence, the Sufi institution required a formalisation of its offices. In the earlier period, 
teaching positions in institutions of learning were largely determined by the collective 
will of their patricians, despite the development of certifications of learning (ijāzāt) 
since teaching was not really a vocation and there was no employer.309 Teaching 
relationships were often fluid and did not necessarily require an institutional 
connection.  
 
Unlike the Sufi institution, the madrasa was not always able to arrive at a defined 
certification of teaching positions. This was partially responsible for the volatility that 
we see in 12th and 13th centuries in the case of the madrasa in the Levant, where 
increased competition between patricians meant that a teacher was unlikely to 	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maintain their position for more than a few years.310 Al-Baghdādī’s definition of what 
qualifies one to become a shaykh is therefore an important step in fortifying the Sufi 
institution against such influences. The development of Sufi psychological theory is 
central to achieving this definition of shaykh-hood which confers and centralises 
authority in the figure of the shaykh and protects the institution against outside 
political interests which was an ever more pressing concern at the time. 
 
Before we delve into his definition of what it means to be a shaykh, it is important to 
note that al-Baghdādī opens the chapter by immediately mentioning the ten qualities 
that a shaykh should have according to Abū Sa‘īd, translating the shaykh’s ten points 
into Arabic with the following:  
 
1- That he attains the state of a shaykh (murād) so that he may train a disciple (murīd). 
2- That he be a wayfarer on the path (ṭarīq) so that he is able to guide others [upon it]. 
3- That he be [an effective] discipliner and trainer so that he may discipline and train 
the disciple.  
4- That he be generous and self-sacrificing, not desiring of the world, so that he may 
affect his disciple [in this way]. 
5- That he does not become attached to the disciple’s money so that he is not obliged to 
spend it according to what is correct. 
6- If possible, he should preach with allusions (ishāra) rather than explanations (‘ibāra). 
7- If it is possible for him to discipline the disciple gently, he should not discipline him 
harshly and angrily. 
8- In whatever he orders the disciple to do, he should consult the disciple before 
ordering him to do it. 
9- If he orders [the disciple] to abstain from something, [the shaykh] should also abstain 
from it. 
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10- If he accepts a seeker of God, he is not to reject him [and turn him back] to anyone 
else.311 
 
Al-Baghdādī then assures the reader, again on Abū Sa’īd’s authority, that if the shaykh 
possesses these qualities and mannerisms, his disciples will become a true wayfarers. 
This is because, according to al-Baghdādī, every attribute which emerges in the disciple 
is from the attributes of the shaykh.312 Therefore in addition to a general etiquette of 
conduct, al-Baghdādī emphasises the effect of the shaykh on the disciple. This adds a 
theoretical underpinning to Abū Sa’īd’s rules of conduct, which link Abū Sa’īd’s sayings 
to Kubrawī theory. It is crucial to point out that just after this list, al-Baghdādī outlines 
his psychological theory, which we have already discussed in depth and will not repeat 
here. That the psychological theory is introduced here is telling since it makes evident 
that shaykh-hood is defined by the manifestation of the attributes of God as articulated 
by al-Baghdādī. 
 
The psycho-spiritual justification behind the shaykh-disciple relationship underpins al-
Baghdādī’s view of Abū Sa‘īd’s rules. The disciple mirrors the shaykh’s characteristics as 
the Shaykh mirrors the attributes of God. The imagery here references the conception 
of the heart as a mirror, again showing the relevance of the adoption and development 
of al-Ghazālī’s notion of the soul to institutionalisation of Kubrawī Sufism. Here, the 
shaykh is rendered an intermediary between the disciple and God. The shaykh pre-
empts God’s command of the disciple’s being by regulating the disicple’s behaviour in 
accordance with his superior knowledge which itself is due to God’s command over the 
shaykh’s soul. The surrender of the will to the shaykh as a precursor to the surrender of 
the will to God is also implied in Kubrā’s Fawā’iḥ as he states that the initiate should 
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“annihilate” his decisions in that of the shaykh’s (tark al-ikhtiyār wa-ifnā’ahu fī ikhtiyār al-
shaykh).313  
 
This theoretical underpinning is important in developing the first two of Abū Sa‘īd’s 
listed qualities, namely the need for the shaykh to have gone through a process of 
discipleship, and that he should belong to a Sufi genealogy in order to qualify as an 
instructor to others, something Kubrā also stressed.314 This idea is expanded upon by al-
Baghdādī when he begins explaining exactly why it is necessary for a shaykh to have 
undergone Sufi training. Here it is implicit, that for a shaykh to actualise the attributes 
of God, he must at some point have been trained by a shaykh. This is because if one is 
naturally attracted by God they will have had no experience of traversing the 
microcosm of man through spiritual discipline. They will be transported to the spirit 
without overcoming the ego, hence they will not have the knowledge to guide a 
disciple. The disciple actualising the attributes of the shaykh as a precursor for 
actualising the attributes of God is therefore not only one method of achieving shaykh-
hood, it is made a necessary precondition for achieving it. True spiritual completion can 
never be reached without the guidance of a shaykh. 
 
This asserts the shaykh-disciple bond as an exclusive path to spiritual completion 
which can only be realised through adherence to the Sufi path (ṭarīqa). This is an oft-
repeated point by al-Baghdādī, those who are naturally attracted to God (majdhūb) so 
that they may bypass Sufi training, cannot become shaykhs to disciples since they have 
not encountered the same psychological barriers that an ordinary person has. This is an 
important development since the term majdhūb was used to describe a “passive” Sufi 
who did not undertake a spiritual path, was naturally attracted to God and seemed to 
have no goal other than asserting his state of inner contentment, all of which were 	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features shared by subversive mystical groups.315 For al-Baghdādī then, the shaykh-
disciple bond legitimises and allows for the propagation of Sufism as an institution of 
spiritual training and delegitimises subversive institutions. 
 
Of course such reasoning is circular since the qualification for becoming a shaykh relies 
on having been a disciple. However this is justified by asserting a lineage of successive 
shaykh-disciple relationships which stretch back to the Prophet. This silsila to the 
Prophet establishes a sense of shared authority and genealogy and legitimises the 
shaykh’s authority. Al-Baghdādī is aware of this and immediately after presenting these 
sayings of Abū Sa’īd states that “Shaykh-hood (al-shaykhiyya) is the viceregency (khilāfa) 
of Prophethood, as the Prophet peace be upon him has said: the shaykh in his 
community is like the Prophet in among his people (ummatihi).” He then goes on to 
state that the learned are the inheritors of the prophets, and the prophets did not leave 
any inheritance save knowledge.316 Al-Baghdādī will later develop the idea of the chain 
of spiritual authority further in his discussion of the Sufi cloak (khirqa), in addition to 
devising a theory of prophetology, all of which will strengthen the force of these 
arguments. For now we need only point out that the shaykh is able to claim to 
represent the authority of the Prophet, and that attachment to a silsila is necessary in 
legitimating the bond between shaykhs and disciples. 
 
Quoting Abū Sa’īd’s work in this context then, allows al-Baghdādī to marry institutional 
principles to important theoretical positions. It is no coincidence that al-Baghdādī 
outlines the progress of psycho-spiritual states in this chapter, mapping the 
psychological journey from a state furthest removed from God to one whereby man 
actualises the attributes of God here provides a guide for the entire Sufi path from 
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initiation to perfection. Here, al-Baghdādī introduces the psycho-spiritual progression 
we have previously discussed stating:  
 
Concerning when a wayfarer deserves the position [of a shaykh], and how he may 
become one of the learned and an inheritor of the Prophet, and when authority (imāma) 
is conferred to him, and how he may act properly with his fellow man, and call (people) 
to God… Only after knowing the reality of the way and the Sufi path.317 
 
Al-Baghdādī then immediately begins to detail his psychology and the microcosmic 
nature of man, and describes the process by which one may attain the manifestation of 
God’s attributes. Hence, the institutional and societal roles of the shaykh are 
intertwined with his understanding of Sufi psychology. That this is explicitly stated in 
the Tuḥfa is a clear indication that al-Baghdādī’s psychology is not meant to remain 
abstract but informs the structure of the Sufi order and necessitates the engagement of 
the shaykh with wider society as well. 
After this theoretical interlude, Al-Baghdādī explains that when the wayfarer has 
sufficiently advanced, his travel, meaning his wayfaring (sulūk) and spiritual journeying 
are exchanged for effortless attraction to God (jadhba).318 The disciple therefore ceases 
to progress on the Sufi path through his own exertions (mu‘āmala), and begins to be 
effortlessly attracted to God. Here, al-Baghdādī tells us that the assumption that the 
Sufi had any agency to begin with is an illusion. At this point the Sufi begins to 
understand that his self-awareness in coming closer to God had always really been God 
coming closer to the Sufi. Al-Baghdādī explains that this realisation takes place after 
the person’s heart has become the throne of God and his innermost heart has become 
God’s seat: 
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Wayfaring is broken and travelling (sayr) is annihilated. Indeed, travelling is exchanged 
for attraction, and the kernel of attraction is freed from the peel (qishr) of travelling so 
that it is made certain for the [wayfarer] that all his austerities in struggle and 
beseeching in the beginning were due to the… attractions of God. However, he was not 
capable of perceiving and comprehending the truth of attraction from behind the peels 
of acts. So if he has gotten rid of the world of humanity and has realised the truths of 
manifestation (tajjalī) [the attributes of God] and reaching the ḥaḍra (presence of God) 
he becomes certain that there is no God but God. As God has said to his Prophet, “and 
know that there is no God but God and repent for your sins,” meaning repent for self-
awareness of the actions of worship. And that is why the Prophet, peace be upon him, 
has said, “Your actions will not save any of you.”319 
 
This notion of God’s agency and the distinction between attraction and actions is 
perhaps a development and extrapolation from some important tenets of Ash’arī 
thought. Traditional Ash‘arite doctrine held that every event is directly brought about 
by God. Al-Baghdādī here applies this notion to man’s actions and poses that he should 
properly conceive of himself as an instrument for God’s actions rather than as an 
autonomous agent.320 Implicitly adopting this Ash‘arī concept, and applying it to human 
behaviour renders shaykh-hood a matter of realisation. The shaykh understands this 
while the disciple conceives of himself as the agent who moves closer to God through 
his own efforts and worship. 
 
In accordance with al-Baghdādī’s psychology, the initiate on the path is required to 
perform acts of worship and austerities in order to progress through the veils of the ego 
and the spirit. However, once God is in command of the human soul, the actions 
themselves are revealed to be part of the obstruction along the path due to the 
assumption of agency which accompanies performing acts of worship. Hence, even 	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though a person may overcome the ego and align his being with the spirit, true 
completion is not reached until one has understood that the spirit too must be negated 
for all action to be attributed to God. Towards the end of this discussion, al-Baghdādī 
uses the phrase “no God but God,” lā ilāha illā Allāh, to imply that attributing progress to 
one’s own efforts is similar to worshipping a false divinity. This realisation comes to 
define shaykh-hood and accord the shaykh a freedom and authority in his office above 
the disciple. For the shaykh, no longer requires acts of worship for progression.  
 
In this discussion, al-Baghdādī also states that not everyone may become a shaykh and 
teacher to a disciple and a vicegerent of the prophets. Al-Baghdādī begins by explaining 
that although traversing one’s own humanity (bashariyya) is necessary for everyone, 
upon completion all will differ at maturity. He goes on to state that just as God has 
decreed that at maturity, some people will reproduce and others will remain barren or 
infertile, so too do those who have attained the attributes of God differ in their ability 
to create and raise spiritual children.321 He then relates this to Abū Sa‘īd’s rules of 
shaykh-hood:  
 
Just as the Prophet, peace be upon him, when he attained this state, was instructed by 
the Real, praise be to him, with proselytising and the message, so too is the walī (friend 
of God), when he attains this state, instructed… with proselytising and the message. And 
the most important of his qualities are the ten attributes which were mentioned by the 
shaykh Abū Sa’īd… So the term ‘disciple’ (murīd) is given to him as long as his travels are 
in the realm of humanity. And if travel in the realm of humanness ends, and providence 
has attracted him to the enclosures of honour, loving is exchanged for beloved-ness and 
desiring is exchanged for desired-ness. And if the wayfarer has matured to the end [of 
wayfaring] (al-muntahā), and knows the truths of the hardships, dangers, crossings, 
[psycho-spiritual] conditions, states, pitfalls, strife, devilish whispers, and perturbing 
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suggestions (hawājis), only then is he capable of acting as a guide to others and a 
cautioner to the disciple in traversing the distances and dangers [of the path].322 
 
Here, al-Baghdādī once again links Abū Sa‘īd’s ten principles, with his systematisation 
of Kubrawī psychology in order to define what constitutes a legitimate spiritual lineage. 
Here those completed Sufis who are naturally attracted to God are disqualified from 
training disciples because they are not acquainted with the psycho-spiritual barriers 
which ordinary disciples face. Spiritual completion becomes the determining factor in 
qualifying a shaykh to propagate a lineage only through traversing the entire 
microcosm starting with the ego and ending with the expression of God’s attributes. 
Hence shaykh-hood is only capable of being reproduced by the journey of another 
disciple to the station of shaykh-hood through path of microcosmology that al-
Baghdādī outlined.  
 
Another important notion which is elaborately developed in the Tuḥfa is that the 
disciple undergoes a spiritual birth upon entering into a training relationship with a 
shaykh. Prior to the 12th century there does not seem to be any reference to the idea of 
spiritual birth, yet in the 12th century the idea of rebirth and in the context of the 
shaykh-disciple relationship becomes ever more prevalent, appearing in both al-
Baghdādī and ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī’s writings.323 Al-Baghdādī develops the notion of 
lineage and belonging through this metaphor of birth where the shaykh acts as a 
husband and the disciple acts as a wife, in order to fertilise an egg (janīn) of spiritual 
development within the disciple. Al-Baghdādī utilises this notion to argue that the 
disciple ought not to have more than one shaykh at any given time, stating: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322 Al-Baghdādī, Tuḥfat al-barara, 8. 
323 Salamah-Qudsi, ‘Institutionalised’, 391-392. 
	   171	  
Birth (wilāda) and training (tarbiyya) are bound in reality to the parents, however the 
state of childbirth and [the state of] training differ markedly. The bond of birth to the 
parents cannot be shared between the parents and any other… And in the bond of 
training, another is able to share with [the parents]… And such is the state of the 
embryo of servitude in the womb of discipleship. Its emergence and attachment is 
dependent upon the decree of the Truth praise be to him, [who ascribes to it] to a 
specific shaykh, in which no one else will share until the death of [that] shaykh. And if 
the embryo has been born, [meaning] the true seeker, training becomes appropriate, 
and he is able to suckle from another shaykh like a wet-nurse who stands in the 
position of a mother.324  
 
Al-Baghdādī argues here that a successful “pregnancy” and spiritual awakening 
requires that the disciple only be attached to one shaykh and goes on to say that if a 
disciple is trained by another shaykh during this period of pregnancy, there will occur a 
miscarriage of the spiritual foetus. After the birth however, the disciple is allowed to 
seek instruction from other shaykhs. These gendered metaphors of the shaykh-disciple 
relationship reflect a shift to more exclusive claims over the spiritual lineage of the 
disciple. While in early Sufism a student could have many shaykhs at a time, al-
Baghdādī here establishes the exclusive claim to spiritual lineage as the right of the first 
shaykh. Subsequent shaykhs may teach the disciple but they function as “wet nurses” 
nurturing the disciple rather than instigating his initial spiritual awakening, and 
consequently unable to assert a relationship of belonging.  
 
A clear hierarchy develops whereby the shaykh who initially trained the disciple is 
given the primacy of a parent while any shaykh afterwards is considered a surrogate. 
This exclusivity predicts the rise of later Sufi orders, al-Baghdādī’s attempts to assert a 
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difference between lineage and training sheds light on this transitional period in Sufism 
in the 12th/13th centuries. This also enlightens us regarding the usage of the word 
(tarbiyya) prior to al-Rundī’s time. Al-Baghdādī has no notion of a distinction between 
teaching shaykhs and shaykhs of instruction, rather his concern is in identifying the 
belonging of the disciple to a particular Sufi shaykh. 
 
Salamah-Qudsi draws attention to this passage of the Tuḥfa, pointing out that al-
Baghdādī’s treatment of the spiritual birth differs markedly from that of ‘Umar al-
Suhrawardī’s, stating that it is much more detailed and elaborate. She also rightly 
highlights that the emphasis on the notion of spiritual birth barred the disciple from 
being trained by multiple shaykhs during the period of his spiritual awakening as this 
would result in a “miscarriage.” 325 However, this alone does not encompass the extent 
of al-Baghdādī’s discussion which aims to define a shaykh of belonging and distinguish 
this role from the shaykh of education. This is a much starker attempt to assert the 
authority of a particular shaykh’s lineage above that of others who the Sufi may study 
under throughout his career. This notion of birth and belonging is crucial for al-
Baghdādī as it is also closely connected to the ritualisation of visions of the shaykh. 
 
Moreover, qualifying to enter into this lineage bears a social responsibility as the walī is 
instructed to proselytise and spread God’s message. While the Sufi community 
internally functions as an intimate and exclusivist organisation, al-Baghdādī maintains 
a sense of duty towards wider society. Here it may be useful to remind ourselves that al-
Baghdādī was given the title of shaykh al-shuyūkh, and Lewisohn has asserted that the 
person who held this office had a number of societal obligations. These were to give 
counsel to non-initiates, delivery of public homilies, general proselytising and presiding 
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over samā‘ sessions.326 Hence the shaykh had a prominent public role among the wider 
populace. 
 
The disciple on the other hand, lives a secluded life, breaking with his social 
connections, adopting rules of dress and appearance which mark him out from wider 
society, observing forty day retreats as well as prolonged periods of silence. The 
disciple is completely governed by the shaykh and practices austerities and asceticism 
according to what the shaykh deems appropriate. By contrast the shaykh may engage 
in a number of activities which may seem more lavish, such as holding banquets and 
concerts, or conducting business transactions. Such a prominent role is reserved for the 
shaykh in al-Baghdādī’s own writings as he explains that the shaykh should function 
like a prophet: 
 
If the servant attains this rank and abode [of actualising the attributes of God], he is 
between God and his servants, and the abode of the heart is between the manifest and 
hidden, his outer being (ẓāhirahu) is with creation and his inner being (bāṭinahu) is with 
God, “men who are not distracted from remembering God by trade or selling.”327 
 
The interpretation of the Qur’anic verse [24:37] here is that even though one may 
engage in worldly affairs, the shaykh’s inner state should not be affected by it. The 
verse is then interpreted not as an order to refrain from worldly affairs, but to be able 
to engage in them without compromising one’s spiritual state. This verse is also 
emphasised in Abū Sa‘īd’s sayings with the same aim in mind. Here, al-Baghdādī 
reinforces ideas found in the sayings of Abū Sa‘īd with psychological and hermeneutical 
evidence, defining the ideal state of the Sufi as one who conducts business with people 
and lives among them without ever becoming neglectful of God.328 For al-Baghdādī this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326 Leonard Lewisohn, ‘Iranian Islam’, 13. 
327 Al-Baghdādī, Tuḥfat al-barara, 8. 
328 Safi, The politics, 127. 
	   174	  
is a form of asceticism and austerity for the shaykh whereby he must put up with the 
difficulties he faces in daily life and exhibit patience when amongst the wider populace, 
referring to the saying of the Prophet “that to mix with people and patiently bear the 
pain they inflict is better than not to mix with them at all.”329 This reintroduction into, 
and service of wider society is therefore redefined as an act of asceticism.  
 
3 .  The role of oneirology in establishing a Sufi  community  
 
The development of elaborate Sufi dream theories in the 13th and 14th centuries is not 
commonly considered in light of its influence on the structure or identity of the Sufi 
community or as an indicator of wider social changes. Deweese posits that the early 
Kubrawīs’ interest in dream theory meant that figures like Kubrā and al-Baghdādī may 
have been reclusive in nature and disinterested in social and political involvement, and 
that this tendency within Kubrawī thought ultimately led to the decline of the 
Kubrawiyya.330 Here, we will show that this assertion cannot be maintained. An analysis 
of the theoretical and practical implications of al-Baghdādī’s oneirology will show quite 
the opposite. A more elaborate science of dreaming is not a purely personal and private 
venture, but is also important for the development of Sufism as an institution. Hence, 
dream theory and socio-political concerns should not be seen as mutually exclusive 
interests. 
 
Dreams in medieval Muslim societies are not purely private experiences. The very act of 
dreaming and narrating a dream is not a solely mental or personal event. Dreams and 
visions occur in a cultural context which largely determines what is worth seeing and 
relating.331 Moreover, as a means of communication with the unseen, dreams served 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329 Al-Baghdādī, Tuḥfat al-barara, 40. 
330 Deweese, ‘The Eclipse’, 79-80. 
331 Bashir, ‘Narrating Sight’, 235. 
	   175	  
very public roles. By rendering the spiritual sensible, dreams reflected and shaped the 
medieval Muslim’s understandings of the world as well as himself. Dreams and visions 
could highlight the blessings and charisma of the dreamer for example. 332 They also 
allowed a person to meet with a deceased figure of authority who could convey a 
criticism or praise of certain individuals, and in doing so, denounce or legitimate 
institutions.333 In addition, dreams and visions were crucial devices in the construction 
of narratives, featuring prominently in hagiographical, historiographical and 
biographical works.  
 
The increase in visionary autobiographies written in the 12th and 13th centuries attest to 
the changing social and institutional realities of Sufism. Earlier Sufi autobiographies 
such as al-Tirmidhī’s and al-Ghazālī’s accord a marginal role for the writer’s own 
visionary experiences, while in the autobiographical writings of 12th and 13th century 
Sufis such as Rūzbihān and Kubrā, visionary experiences are central. As we have 
discussed in detailing al-Baghdādī’s psychology, for Kubrawīs the dream is in a sense a 
representation of the soul at various stages of perfection and therefore reflects the Sufi 
path to completion. Salamah-Qudsi’s analysis of visionary autobiographies points out 
that this reflects a turning point in Sufism which saw the widespread adoption of the 
doctrine of the human soul’s divine essence. The adoption of body-soul dualism allowed 
the assertion of the soul’s divine origins and its attachment to the body in al-Baghdādī’s 
thought. This was an important premise for the construction of a coherent oneiric 
system in the Tuḥfa based on microcosmology. Accompanied with the increasing 
importance of the shaykh and increasing hierarchical nature of the Sufi community, 
meant that visionary autobiographies functioned as guides for disciples and a means of 
training.334 Evidence that visions began to mark out stages of the Sufi path are abundant 
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in the Tuḥfa as both the visions of coloured lights and dream experiences are mapped 
onto a micro-cosmological understanding of man which represents the extent to which 
the divine essence of the soul is obscured by spiritual and bodily faculties. 
 
The development of dream theory in al-Baghdādī’s work is important for the 
centralisation of the community and its stratification, as well as crafting a sense of 
group belonging and identity which binds members to the shaykh. Al-Baghdādī 
strengthens the relationship between dreams and visions and communal concerns 
through a ritualisation of the disciple’s visions of the shaykh. Furthermore, the 
concordance between al-Baghdādī’s oneirology, psychology and cosmology, renders is 
an important source of communal identity as it renders the theoretical a lived 
experience through dream interpretation. The development of visionary-dream theory 
serves as a means of determining the theoretical and social context of the dreamer. 
Hence, dream interpretation also reinforces communal identity and belonging by 
constructing personal narratives for members of the Sufi community, which are 
nevertheless shared by virtue of being built within a defined theoretical framework.  
 
This elaboration of dreaming as a complex science also compliments the elitist notions 
which continue to develop regarding the Sufi shaykh as the greatest religious authority 
in Muslim society. Throughout the Tuḥfa al-Baghdādī argues that the Sufis are the true 
heirs of the prophets and that the authority of the Sufi institution should be placed 
above all others. As Ohlander states, “dreams were made to serve as a marker of claims 
to status and authority, in particular in relation to the assertion that among all the self 
identified tawā’if (groups) comprising the Muslim body politic it is the Sufis who fulfil 
the function of post-prophetic heirship for the umma itself.”335 Hence, the development 
of dream theory into a highly systematised science in al-Baghdādī’s work reveals a 
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growing self-conception of the Sufi institution as a socially and politically important 
community. 
 
Here we will also detail the implication of dream theory for the structure of the Sufi 
network. A more elaborate and detailed dream theory serves a number of purposes. It 
enables disciples to contact inaccessible living masters who may guide them in times of 
difficulty, reaffirming the bond between them. At the same time it allows for a wider 
and more disparate network of disciples. They also serve to connect living Sufis with 
those who have passed away, allowing the Sufi to claim a lineage to previous masters 
and legitimate his learning and authority, allowing the institution to continue beyond 
time and space. 
 
The Tuḥfa also draws on the importance of being able to interpret dreams and visions in 
the relationship between master and disciple. Al-Baghdādī’s discussion of dreams serve 
as a means to assure us of the necessity of the formalised relationship between the 
shaykh and disciple as the latter is considered ill-equipped to interpret his visionary 
experiences which may lead him astray. Al-Baghdādī’s science of dreaming which we 
outlined previously, where the incomplete Sufi would receive muddled visions which 
required interpretation due to the workings of the ego or spirit while the shaykh 
receives direct messages from God, also easily lends itself to the hierarchical 
arrangement of the Sufi order.  
 
3.i .  Visions and the Sufi hierarchy  
 
We will begin here by analysing how al-Baghdādī discusses dreams and visions in order 
to justify the formalised relationship of master and disciple. In the above passages one 
who has not overcome the pitfalls faced by a disciple in his Sufi training cannot qualify 
as a teacher, and this includes the experience of dreams and visions. The ability to 
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interpret these experiences becomes synonymous with shaykh-hood. This is seen 
clearly in al-Baghdādī’s psychology where the disciple is discouraged from interpreting 
his dreams, and must defer all interpretation to his shaykh until he attains completion. 
 
However, al-Baghdādī goes even further than this and on a number of occasions 
emphasises that the disciple can also receive a psycho-spiritual experience from the 
shaykh. As we have seen, al-Baghdādī includes the shaykh as a source of thought 
impressions when detailing the mechanism of dreaming, acting as a “peel” (qishr) of 
divine inspiration (ilhām). 336 Hence the shaykh is incorporated into al-Baghdādī’s list of 
thought impressions and appears in the visionary life of his disciples alongside angels, 
Satan, jinn and God. 
 
The connection of the shaykh to the visionary experiences of his disciples is discussed 
in the 4th chapter of the Tuḥfa when al-Baghdādī turns to explaining why the shaykh is 
required as a guide to traversing the Sufi path. Here al-Baghdādī builds upon the notion 
of the disciple mirroring the shaykh’s attributes, explaining that the shaykh is like a 
mirror of God while the disciple is like a mirror of the shaykh. Al-Baghdādī then 
explains that while this may result in the beginner understanding some realities and 
truths of his inner being (bāṭin) with the “light of the shaykh” and assume that the 
source of this light was his own rather than reflection of God’s light off the mirror of 
the shaykh’s heart. With this hubris, the disciple may leave the shaykh thinking he is 
capable of journeying to God on his own and only succeeds in returning to his previous 
state of ignorance.337  
 
Ascribing the progress made to one’s self rather than to God is one of the main pitfalls 
encountered by the Sufi. The shaykh therefore acts as a reminder, an intelligible symbol 	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and authority to whom all the progress the aspirant makes is ascribed to, predicting the 
disciple’s realisation that this progress should be ascribed to God’s attraction rather 
than himself upon completion. Here, this progress is experienced visually as a shining 
light emerging from the darkness of the ego. Al-Baghdādī cautions that the experience 
may be so novel and exciting that it misleads the disciple into ascribing the emergence 
of the light to his own efforts rather than the shaykh, or mistakenly believe that he has 
achieved completion. Therefore, the shaykh’s role in dream and vision interpretation 
functions as an antidote to hubris. It also reveals the consistency with which al-
Baghdādī applies his notion of completion to the spiritual-mental experiences of the 
Sufi. The misleading nature of these visionary experiences assert the necessity of the 
shaykh, this is emphasised in the oneiric scheme of the Tuḥfa as completion and the 
attainment of shaykh-hood is only realised when the colourless light is beheld, 
indicating the erasure of visions. 
 
Earlier Sufis had stressed the need of a shaykh, explaining that disciples required 
shaykhs just as the companions required the Prophet.338 Moreover, it was commonly 
held that the shaykh would need to act as a guide and interpreter the disciple’s visions, 
however al-Baghdādī clearly embellishes these notions with his own understanding of 
dreams and visions. There is a close connection here between potential pitfalls and the 
visionary life of the Sufi. Here the shaykh becomes part of the Sufi’s spiritual and 
mental life and is represented as a light in the disciple’s visionary experience. 
 
A few passages later, al-Baghdādī provides us with more information regarding the 
shaykh’s role in guiding the intermediate disciple. Al-Baghdādī discusses two mistakes 
which a disciple may fall into, building upon some older discussions in Sufism with his 
markedly Kubrawī theories. First he details the following scenario, likening a disciple’s 
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someone who has observed water erupting from the ground and assumes that there is 
nothing beyond it, or a digger who assumes that his success in excavating water wells is 
due to his own efforts, stating: 
 
This is like the attracted (majdhūb) who has received from God light in his heart, so that 
he is overcome by it and assumes that it is perfection… And he does not know that the 
blessings [bestowed] upon the servants in the presence of God are infinite, and that the 
travel within God is never broken, not in the present or in the hereafter. And if the 
arrogant, attracted one who is pleased with his [supposed] completion, is in the service 
of a shaykh… The shaykh makes known to him his shortcomings… and he (the disciple) 
comprehends his attraction with Sufi practice/wayfaring (sulūk) until he is free of this 
complication.339 
 
The second potential danger in which the disciple may find himself is in the event of a 
theophanic vision of God: 
 
 And the second [danger] is that the wayfarer, if he is surprised by the Truth  
(God) in his sleep, or a state of unconsciousness (ghaybatihi), and He manifests Himself 
to his Heart and innermost heart, and he [the disciple] is still under the influence of the 
imagination, the imaginative faculty will clothe the perceptions of the heart which are 
received from the state [of Godliness] with a suitable image. And so the wayfarer will 
assume that the Truth, praise be to him, has an image which is temporally bound 
(mutaḥayyiz makānī), and so he becomes an apostate. And if he is in the care of a 
perceptive shaykh, he [the shaykh] will save him from the heresy of tashbīh… And will 
distinguish for him between the workings of the imaginative faculty, the apprehensions 
of the intellect, the visions of the heart and the perceptions of the spirit.340 
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Sarrāj recounts a similar incident which had occurred to one of Tustarī’s students for 
example.341 However, al-Baghdādī then goes to explain how such experiences, if not 
interpreted and scrutinised, lead to heretical doctrines of incarnation (ḥulūl) and false 
understandings in moments of ecstasy such as the famous Hallajian phrase “I am the 
Truth” (anā al-ḥaqq). The disciple does not yet comprehend that the human being is a 
mirror to God and that the reflection of God’s essence and attributes in this human 
mirror is not God himself, yet at the same time is not other than God, utilising al-
Ghazālī’s analogy of the heart as a mirror.342  
 
Al-Baghdādī builds upon these older discussions by incorporating them in the 
framework of a more developed Sufi theory. In doing so he furnishes the understanding 
of these experiences with a markedly Kubrawī conception of dreams which explains 
that the disciple is experiencing a theophany of God, muddled by the projections of the 
soul onto his mental screen. These phenomena are therefore informed by his 
understanding of dreams and visions as manifestations in accordance with the state of 
the seer’s soul.343 Thus, not only is the mistake of identifying an image with God due to 
the disciple’s lack of spiritual progression, but the appearance of God in an image is 
itself a mark of incompletion.  
 
This more elaborate theory of visions contextualises the visionary and dream 
experiences of the disciple in a hierarchical order so that an image of God or coloured 
lights is considered a distortion compared to the experience of the colourless white 
light of God who cannot be contained in an image. The disciple is told not to attempt to 
interpret his dreams at all and must defer the interpretation to his shaykh, so that until 
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the final white light is experienced, the hierarchy of shaykh and disciple is maintained 
even in the psycho-spiritual experiences of the disciple. 
 
The intertwining of the personal visionary experiences of the Sufis and the 
formalisation of the communal and hierarchical bonds between shaykh and disciple are 
even more striking in al-Baghdādī’s discussion of clothing. That the Sufis should wear 
the colours they experience in their visions and according to their spiritual stations, 
details a hierarchy of colours from blue for the initiate to white for the shaykh.344 Here 
the systematised theory of dreams and visions which al-Baghdādī outlines is not 
relegated to pure theorisation but becomes a lived experience, mirrored in the material 
culture of the Sufi community as it establishes a clear communal hierarchy. 
 
3 . i i .  Dreams, visions and communal identity 
 
In addition to his reliance on dream theory to formalise and detail hierarchies within 
the Sufi community, al-Baghdādī also takes recourse to dreams and visions in order to 
provide the Sufi community with tools to survive and adapt to the political and social 
changes and disruptions of his day. Perhaps one of the most striking examples of this is 
the presence of the shaykh in the spiritual, visionary and imaginative world of his 
disciple. 
 
In an anecdote about Abū Sa‘īd’s friend, the shaykh Abū al-Ḥasan al-Kharaqānī (d. 
452/1033), al-Baghdādī describes that a group of Sufis who are about to set out on a 
journey ask al-Kharaqānī for a dhikr formula which would protect them. The shaykh 
tells them to repeat his name in an event of danger. Some of them mock this advice, 
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preferring to invoke the name of God, while others adhere to it, and in the end those 
who mocked the advice perish in their journey while the remainder arrive safely. The 
shaykh then explains that although the name of God is certainly greater, those who 
perished had performed dhikr of a name they did not understand.345  
 
Al-Baghdādī then turns to discussing the practice of communing with the shaykh 
through the remembrance ritual (dhikr). In the 5th chapter of the Tuḥfa, which focuses 
on detailing the theories and methods which inform the practice of seclusion (khalwa), 
al-Baghdādī repeats Junayd al-Baghdādī’s rules of seclusion, elaborating heavily on 
each. When discussing the 7th rule of “binding the heart of the disciple to the shaykh,” 
al-Baghdādī explains that the shaykh may communicate to the disciple through dreams 
and visions, explaining: 
 
 For the shaykh in his community is like the Prophet among his people, and just as it 
is impossible for devil to appear in the image of the Prophet peace be upon him, on the 
authority of what was said by the Prophet peace be upon him: “Whoever has seen me in 
their sleep has [truly] seen me, so the devil cannot impersonate (yatamaththal) me.” So 
for that reason, it is impossible for him to appear in the image of the shaykh. And the 
shaykh does not occupy space  (ghayr mutaḥḥayyiz)… All places are equal to him, and so 
for any situation in which the disciple finds himself, the shaykh’s spirituality does not 
abandon him… And if the disciple performs remembrance (yatadhakkar) of the shaykh in 
his heart, the shaykh comes closer and is bound to his heart and he [the disciple] 
benefits from him.346 
 
As we have detailed in our discussion of al-Baghdādī’s psychology, the notion that the 
soul does not occupy space refers to the dualism of body and soul and the independence 
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of the soul from the body. This enters Sufi thought through al-Ghazālī’s adoption of 
Avicennan ideas regarding the relationship of the soul and the body. Here is a clear 
example of how the incorporation of philosophical notions into Sufism through al-
Ghazālī offered later Sufis with the conceptual tools to stratify not only Sufi thought 
but also their institutions. Since the soul can subsist without the body and is not bound 
to it, it makes sense that a disciple and a shaykh could commune spiritually.  
This also draws on the oneirology and visionary theory which we have discussed in the 
previous chapter. We have seen that the remembrance (dhikr) ritual was intended to 
bar thought impressions from entering the mind apart from the intended object of 
vision. Hence, the remembrance, through the negation of thoughts and sense 
perception, with God as the intended object of vision could produce theophanic images 
or coloured lights via the imagination or the spiritual sensation. Here al-Baghdādī 
reveals that the remembrance ritual can be directed towards the soul of the shaykh as 
well.  
The reference to the prophet, in the above passage is also important since it guarantees 
that the image of the shaykh is true just as the prophet’s image cannot be a deception. 
This reveals an important practical consequence for al-Baghdādī’s prophetology which 
we will sketch in the coming chapter which likens the shaykh to the prophet. Hence, 
the development of oneirology, prophetology, as well as the adoption of Avicennan 
body-soul dualism combine here to produce a ritual practice which reinforces 
communal identity and further centralises authority in the shaykh. 
Al-Baghdādī details three instances where the disciple may benefit from calling on the 
spirituality of the shaykh: In the instance of a vision or experience he cannot 
comprehend, in the event of being frightened by a satanic experience, and lastly when 
the disciple is preparing to witness the lights of the hidden world (anwār al-ghayb) 
which threaten to overwhelm him (this refers to the coloured lights detailed in Kubrā’s 
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Fawā’iḥ which have discussed previously). In the first two instances remembrance of the 
shaykh helps disperse the threatening visions, while in the latter example it fortifies 
the disciple to allow him to receive the visions of the lights of beauty and majesty 
which threaten to overwhelm him. 347 
Although instances of perceiving one’s shaykh in a dream or vision were reported in 
earlier Sufi works, al-Baghdādī’s here shows that the experience had become ritualised 
and became part of the Sufi’s repertoire of practices. A vision of the shaykh is induced 
here rather than appearing at random. The bond between shaykh and disciple is not 
confined to the world of the shahāda here, and the training of the disicple allows a 
psycho-spiritual connection to exist between both parties regardless of their location in 
the “world of bodies.” This spiritual connection seems to have become even more 
important amongst later Sufis, however al-Baghdādī presents us with an early source 
which details a ritualised method for this. This ritual was in fact put into practice in the 
14th century. Al-Simnānī who was barred from meeting his shaykh Isfarā’inī in Baghdad 
by the Ilkhanid rulers of his time resorted to communicating with him spiritually. Al-
Simnānī himself stipulated that one’s guide ought to be living even if he is not in the 
same location as the student, indicating that even an inaccessible guide could be 
considered sufficient for one to qualify as a disciple and legitimise an institutional 
bond.348  
This psychic connection between masters and disciples becomes an important feature 
of Naqshabandī Sufism by the 16th century. In these later periods, some Sufi 
communities would practice visualising and imagining the shaykh in a practice known 
as tawajjuh, and Bashir has stated that this went hand in hand with the dhikr formula of 
lā ilāha illā Allah.349 Later Kubrawī sources also treat the shaykh as a protective spirit 
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which can be called upon to aid the disciple in his time of need.350 Al-Baghdādī’s text 
shows that this idea had been germinating much earlier in the 12th and 13th centuries.  
The possibility of psycho-spiritual guidance without necessarily being near one’s 
shaykh serves a number of practical purposes. Al-Baghdādī mentions that it encourages 
the disciple to remain in seclusion so that he will not be required to break it to ask the 
shaykh to interpret his visions and experiences for him. This was certainly an 
important reason for al-Simnānī’s view of the spiritual communication with the 
shaykh.351 The ritualisation of this spiritual relationship between the shaykh and 
disciple may also serve further purposes. It allowed al-Simnānī and Isfarā‘inī to form a 
formalised teaching bond without a prolonged interaction between teacher and 
student. Hence it allowed the relationship to continue despite the political ruler’s 
insistence that al-Simnānī be barred from reaching his shaykh in Baghdad.  
It also accommodates the structure of a widespread Sufi community and mitigates the 
potential setbacks of emphasising a much more sedentary lifestyle. An increasing 
emphasis on “stability” and a sedentary life among Sufis in the 11th and 12th centuries 
contributed to a negative view of travel (siyāḥa/safar) which had been seen previously 
as an honourable and virtuous lifestyle. In addition, these more established Sufi 
communities began to develop rules that increasingly restricted and regulated travel.352 
Al-Baghdādī, in his Persian treatise Risāla fī al-safar argues that the Prophetic 
instruction to travel and improve one’s health must refer to a spiritual journey, since 
physical travelling only deteriorates one’s health if they are not accustomed to the 
climate to which they travel to. 353  
Such a change in attitude towards travel indicates the increased association of 
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sedentary. The increased regulations surrounding travel for Sufi members, for example 
requiring the permission of the shaykh to do so, also reasserts the centralisation of the 
Sufi community. There were of course legitimate reasons to travel and Sufis did find 
themselves having to travel to proselytise, to learn from a shaykh, to perform 
pilgrimage, and to escape violence. In these situations the elaboration of oneirology and 
visionary theory, as well as the ritualisation of visionary experiences reduces the 
tension between centralisation and the spread of the Sufi community, allowing 
relationships to continue beyond time and space. 
This could also add a sense of continuity and stability to a community experiencing 
dislocation caused by violence and political disputes which were rife during al-
Baghdādī and Kubrā’s time. We know of a number of Sufis who fled Iran and Khwarazm 
for Anatolia in the 12th and 13 centuries, the most prominent cases being that of Jalāl al-
Dīn Rūmī’s father, Bahā’ al-Dīn Walad, as well as Najm al-Dīn al-Rāzī. These cases have 
led some scholars to posit that the Khwarazmshah’s court was particularly hostile to 
Sufis.354 It was probably not a specifically anti-Sufi agenda, but competing political 
interests that caused these emigrations, and undoubtedly affected those within the Sufi 
community.  
This ritualisation of visions of the shaykh then maintained a sense of belonging to a 
specific community. This is made clear in the Tuḥfa as al-Baghdādī seamlessly 
transitions from discussing the dhikr of the shaykh to explaining the difference between 
a shaykh to whom one belongs to and a shaykh of training, tarbiya. Here al-Baghdādī 
associates the ritualised vision of the shaykh with the shaykh of belonging. He explains 
that the dhikr of the shaykh helps the disciple in the three instances we have outlined 
above before moving on to detail the exclusive right of a disciple’s shaykh of birthing: 
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And in these two instances, if [the disciple] remembers the shaykh and beseeches him 
like a child beseeches his parents when seeing something which he is afraid of, or 
speaks [the shaykh’s] name, then he perceives the dispersion of the image of Satan 
upon remembering [the shaykh’s] name, or the removal of fear and horror from his 
heart and the negation of [the satanic thought impressions]… And it is not possible for 
someone to say: “We have seen that the shaykhs benefitted from more than one 
shaykh, such as Abī ‘Uthmān al-Ḥīrī, for he gripped the rope of discipleship of Yaḥyā 
ibn Mu‘ādh al-Rāzī, and after that he aspired to the companionship of al-Shāh al-
Kirmānī and he followed his steps until he was accepted, and then according to what 
has been said, [he then followed] al-Shāh al-Nīshābūrī. And he [then] saw Abū Ḥafṣ al-
Ḥaddād and [was taken] into his mesh. And he deliberated until Abū Ḥafṣ was 
established instead of al-Shāh… And you [al-Baghdādī] have been excessively stern in 
asserting that discipleship is attached to only one shaykh.” To this we say: Birth and 
training are attributed to the parents...355 
The text switches rapidly form detailing the benefits of performing the dhikr of the 
shaykh, to the issue of belonging to one shaykh while being taught by multiple shaykhs. 
Here al-Baghdādī attempts to differentiate between a shaykh of “belonging” by 
equating him with a biological parent and a shaykh of “training” or “nurturing” as a 
wetnurse. The two discussions do not seem connected unless we assume that al-
Baghdādī implicitly accords a greater psycho-spiritual role for the shaykh of belonging, 
which seems to be the case since he posits the question of why it is not possible to 
benefit from many shaykhs in the context of the ritualised visionary remembrance. 
This would also explain why a discussion of birthright and training are found in a 
chapter on remembrance and seclusion, which would otherwise seem out of place. The 
ritual of the dhikr of the shaykh therefore is revealed to have a further symbolic 
meaning, asserting a belonging to a specific shaykh by according him a prominent role 
in the psycho-spiritual experiences of the disciple. 
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The use of the term tarbiya, nurturing or training in opposition to wilāda, or birthing 
also highlights that the term shaykh al-tarbiya might have had a number of connotations 
in this period. Since, as we have previously discussed, there has been some attention 
given to the evolution of this term and whether it signified a change in the nature of 
Sufism, we may highlight here that the term appears in a different context to that of a 
purely methodological concern. For al-Baghdādī, tarbiya is not a term concerned with 
the shaykh’s approach to training, it is concerned with the belonging of the disciple. 
Hence, the training relationship is made subordinate to the “birthing” relationship in 
order to centralise the authority of the Sufi community.  
Moreover it seems that al-Baghdādī’s attempts to centralise the community were met 
with resistance. Hence, he predicts an objection citing the example of ‘Uthmān al-Ḥīrī. 
This indicates that the notion of belonging to one shaykh above all others may have 
been a departure from the looser networks of belonging which had characterised Sufi 
communities up to this point. Here, the psycho-spiritual function of the shaykh and the 
practice of the dhikr of the shaykh augment the special relationship of the shaykh of 
birth, allowing the disciple to continually believe in his presence and guidance even if 
he must enter into the service of another shaykh.  
This concept not only centralises the authority of the shaykh of birth but also forms a 
spiritual and visionary connection between him and his disciples, this links the shaykh 
to every individual’s psycho-spiritual experience within his community. This 
establishes an identity of belonging to the shaykh which is able to survive in a number 
of contexts where shaykhs and disciples were unable to reassert their bonds in person. 
This was predicated on the adoption of specific conceptions of the soul, the 
stratification of oneirology, and the development of prophetology which lay the 
foundation for the ritualisation of visionary experiences. Ultimately then, it becomes 
impossible to disentangle the development of the oneiric theory that we find in Kubrā 
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and al-Baghdādī’s work from the structure of the Sufi community, its identity, and its 
responses to social and political challenges. 
 
3 . i i i .  Dream Interpretation and the construction of narratives 
 
In addition to the existence of the shaykh’s soul beyond time and space, the 
formalisation of dream interpretation is another important “ritual” which we have seen 
al-Baghdādī emphasise. The psychological theory al-Baghdādī detailed accorded dreams 
and visions a diagnostic value. Yet, they could also present information that is not 
merely subjective, conveying the truths of both manifest and hidden existents.356 
However the disciple is not allowed to interpret these experiences himself, or reach 
conclusions on his own. The interpretation is the remit of the shaykh, and the 
experiences of the disciple are constructed into a narrative through the shaykh. 
 
As we have highlighted, dreams were important devices in biographical works that 
helped construct narratives. Hence, dream interpretation helped construct personal 
narratives in accordance with the Kubrawī theoretical framework, connecting 
individual experiences to shared, communal experiences. This meant that dream 
interpretation became an ever more important device, linking individual dream 
experiences to a collective sense of identity by providing the dreamer with 
interpretations that reinforced the theoretical underpinnings and institutional 
structures of the Kubrawī community. 
 
We attain a glimpse of how this functioned practically in the letters exchanged between 
al-Baghdādī and Sharaf al-Dīn al-Balkhī, where al-Baghdādī interprets the latter’s 
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dreams. In one of these dreams Balkhī perceives a “demon” shaykh who informs him 
that the dhikr formula of lā illāhā illa Allāh is inappropriate and that one should only 
repeat Allāh. In his interpretation of the dream, al-Baghdādī treats the demon shaykh’s 
argument seriously. Here al-Baghdādī admits that the former dhikr is not yet a reality 
for the disciple until he has attained completion yet, still he argues that initiates should 
repeat the formula “no God but God” as they are still in need of negating the ego, which 
is the false divinity. This disagreement over the correct formula for dhikr is relevant to 
al-Baghdādī’s distinction between a majdhūb and a disciple who must adhere to certain 
behaviours to overcome the initial stages of the path. The formula of “no god but God” 
indicates the need to traverse the ego and spirit which al-Baghdādī is keen to maintain 
as a necessity for achieving completion. 
 
Al-Baghdādī then tells al-Balkhī to avoid taking instruction from jinn, as they will not 
be familiar with the veils that humans face due to the bodily existence of human 
beings.357 The demon shaykh is given the same status as a majdhūb or non-affiliated, 
passive Sufi here, described in the same manner as one who has not been trained by a 
Sufi shaykh and did not have to overcome the psycho-spiritual barriers of his ego 
through Sufi practice, and is therefore not fit to instruct and teach disciples. In this 
way, al-Baghdādī reasserts the arguments he makes in the Tuḥfa in his interpretations 
of al-Balkhī’s dreams. The process of dream interpretation is therefore an event which 
may be used to reassert the Kubrawī theoretical framework, definitions of shaykh-hood, 
as well as notions of hierarchy and belonging.358  
 
In another more fantastical dream, al-Balkhī tells al-Baghdādī that he had witnessed a 
desert, empty apart from a single well. At first animals emerge from the well and they 	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begin transforming back and forth between animals and humans. Then a giant serpent 
(or dragon) emerges from the well and swallows all the animals but after a while 
regurgitates them back out again. Al-Baghdādī interprets the symbols of this dream 
according to his psychological framework. We are told that the desert is existence while 
the well is the connection to the unseen. The animals represent the attributes of the 
ego, while the serpent represents al-Balkhī’s spiritual progress. The serpent attempts to 
subdue the attributes of the ego but is tired and must release them, indicating a 
spiritual fatigue.359 In this case al-Baghdādī maps the symbols of the dream onto his 
psychological and microcosmological framework which we have previously outlined, 
again reinforcing the theoretical underpinnings of his Sufi community through dream 
interpretation. 
 
All this also reinforces the authority of the shaykh. Al-Baghdādī links the disciples 
attempt to understand his own dreams to the potential for dreams and visions to 
mislead the Sufi. It is the institution of the shaykh-disciple bond which regulates the 
potential heresy of believing that one has seen the image of God for example. Moreover, 
it is the interpretation in the context of Kubrawī psychology, which seeks to 
understand these images in reference to the state of the Sufi’s soul which tempers 
misleading visionary experiences. The potential dangers of dreaming therefore act as 
an argument for the necessity of the disciple to have a shaykh. The potential to be 
misled by these experiences is nullified in the event of dream interpretation. But the 
shaykh does not only guard against these dangers, he is heavily involved in shaping the 
narrative of the dream and diagnosing the psycho-spiritual condition of the individual. 
Hence dream interpretation grants the shaykh the authority to shape these narratives. 
 
Throughout this discussion we see that there is overwhelming evidence for the link 
between the development of a more structured dream theory and the centralisation 	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and formalisation of the relationships within the Sufi community. We have seen that 
the ritualisation of dreams and visions, along with the practice of interpretation 
reasserts notions of belonging and connection among members of the Sufi community, 
as well as reinforcing the psychological and cosmological theories upon which these 
relationships are based. All this points to the centrality of oneirology in the emergence 
of a proto-Kubrawī communal identity. 
 
4 .  The role of the disciple  
 
Some studies describe the relationship between the shaykh and disciple as one of 
complete domination and subordination. At a glance it seems that al-Baghdādī places 
the disciple in a state of complete submission in the structure of this community, 
however a closer examination presents a more complex picture which suggests that 
disciples were given authority in some cases, and could even run their own lodges while 
still maintaining a relationship of discipleship towards their shaykhs. However, in order 
to grasp the structure of multiple teachers with one central shaykh of birth-right, al-
Baghdādī’s notion of discipleship and its various stages must be detailed. Al-Baghdādī 
defines the various stages of discipleship Just as he did with shaykh-hood, with 
reference to his psychological system. 
 
From what we have discussed so far, it is evident that alongside the authority and 
freedom which was granted to the shaykh, his jurisdiction over the disciple was so 
great that it required complete surrender of the disciple’s will to the will of the shaykh. 
Al-Baghdādī detailed an extremely intimate relationship between the two where “the 
shaykh’s authority encompasses all the affairs of the disciple, and all he experiences in 
private and in public.”360 Al-Baghdādī often discusses the relationship between shaykh 
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and disciple in gendered language, as one between a husband and wife, two lovers, or a 
hen and her eggs. 
 
In Gender and Spiritual Self-Fashioning, Margaret Malamud explores medieval Muslim 
conceptions of gender and marriage through the imagery employed by Sufis in 
describing the shaykh-disciple relationship. Malamud argues that this is in accordance 
with the idea of the shaykh as an intermediary between God and the disciple and 
indicates that the shaykh-disciple bond was conceived of as a parallel to the ideal 
human relationship with God, where the human is in a state of complete passivity and 
receptivity towards God. Here it is argued that in likening the shaykh-disciple 
relationship to that of man (shaykh) and wife (disciple), medieval Sufis expressed the 
ideal role of a woman in a marriage as a passive and submissive partner compared to 
the active role of the husband, signifying hierarchical relationships of power and 
subordination.361 She also highlights a number of passages from the work of al-
Baghdādī’s disciple, al-Rāzī’s Mirṣād al-‘ibād, describing the shaykh as a mother who 
suckles her child or a hen which cares for her eggs.362 In fact many of these images of 
the shaykh have their origins in the Tuḥfa which predates the Mirṣād and which al-Rāzī 
is clearly quoting here.363  
 
Al-Baghdādī shaykh and disciple as husband and wife, however in these passages his 
main aim is to illustrate, as we have previously discussed, that some marriages result in 
offspring (a shaykh capable of carrying on a lineage) while others are infertile.364 The 
focus al-Baghdādī places in these metaphors is not on the submissive role of the 
disciple, but on the procreative potential of the shaykh-disciple bond which calls into 
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question the shaykh’s suitability as much as it does the disciple’s. His point in this 
instance is that some Sufis do not qualify to be followed by disciples and cannot 
produce a lineage, and that those shaykhs who are unqualified but gain a following, will 
never be able to “impregnate” their disciples. Al-Baghdādī’s main concern is spiritual 
lineage and the survival of the chain of authority, as well as the centralisation of the 
Sufi community around a shaykh of belonging. This also hints at al-Baghdādī’s 
exclusivist approach to accepting disciples, choosing only those who can attain shaykh-
hood. 
 
For al-Baghdādī, the relationship is not one of complete domination and subordination 
as the disciple comes to acquire some scope for authority with respect to those disciples 
who are less advanced than him. This is an important development since it allows the 
spread of the community without compromising its centralised and exclusivist 
character. The very existence of shaykh-hood is dependent on the presence of disciples, 
and the more disciples a shaykh had, the more prestige he would command.365 This 
offers a means to that prestige without seeming to relax the rules of discipleship.  
 
The shaykh is tasked with carefully considering the individual within his authority, 
taking into account his individual experiences and not simply treating each disciple in 
the same manner except in a general sense. There is also an attempt to reign in the 
jurisdiction of the shaykh and bar the abuse of his position. The situation then was in 
some ways reciprocal, and the disciple did acquire the possibility of some authority and 
influence within the institution prior to becoming a shaykh in his own right.  
 
At the beginning of the 4th chapter of the Tuḥfa al-Baghdādī turns to discussing the 
nature of discipleship (irāda) more explicitly, explaining why a disciple requires a 
shaykh, what is incumbent upon the disciple, and whether or not he is required to obey 	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the shaykh’s instructions even if they violate the outer aspect (ẓāhir) of the sharī‘a and 
common sense. Al-Baghdādī again immediately translates from Abū Sa’īd here, listing 
the ten qualities which a disciple needs in order to undertake the Sufi path: 
 
1- That he be clever and understanding, in order to understanding the ishārāt of the 
shaykh. 
2- That he be obedient to [the shaykh] so that he may perform the duties ordered by 
the shaykh. 
3- That he be perceptive in his hearing to understand the speech of the shaykh. 
4- That he be enlightened in his heart to perceive the greatness of the shaykh. 
5- That he be trusting in the words (of the shaykh) so that he trust what he (the 
shaykh) says about his psychological dispositions. 
6- That he has trust in the authority [of the shaykh] so that he is sincere in his 
responsibilities. 
7- That he be generous and self-sacrificing so that it is possible for him to abandon 
what he possesses. 
8- That he is able to keep secrets, so that he becomes a confidante of the shaykh. 
9- That he be enthusiastic and loving of advice, to accept the advice of the shaykh. 
10- That he be a wayfarer so that he may sacrifice, with his spirit, along the Sufi path.366 
 
Al-Baghdādī goes on to state that only those who have these ten characteristics may 
become students to a shaykh. He then moves on to say that some people are not 
qualified to undertake the Sufi path, explaining that, although all humans had the same 
primordial origins, they differ in the extent to which their souls can be purified.367 He 
then describes how some people who simultaneously desire the present and the 
hereafter do not qualify as disciples.368  
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So in addition to these ten requirements al-Baghdādī demands a further assessment of 
the disciple’s spirituality. It seems that for al-Baghdādī, the general populace is not fit 
for this task as he often describes them as lacking in spirituality.369 Discipleship for al-
Baghdādī is an exclusive privilege and unlike the Sufism of his contemporary ‘Umar al-
Suhrawardī who relaxed affiliations to the Sufi institution, al-Baghdādī maintains an 
exclusivity when it comes to the heart of the Sufi community as the shaykh in theory 
should not accept a disciple who falls short of these conditions. 
 
The intimate relationship between shaykh and disciple in the Tuḥfa seems to contrast 
with the more formal arrangement crafted by ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī. Many of al-
Suhrawardī’s rules are in accord with the ten qualities which Abū Sa‘īd and al-Baghdādī 
list.370 However there seems to be a more intimate tone in the shaykh’s interaction with 
his disciples in al-Baghdādī’s Tuḥfa when compared to al-Suhrawardī’s ‘Awārif. This is 
seen more explicitly as al-Baghdādī states: 
 
For every individual from among the people there is, according to their particularities, 
a particular way (ṭarīq khāṣṣ)… For every disciple has experiences which concern [only] 
him, as well as experiences which he shares with all other disciples. So the shaykh has a 
particular path, and the disciples, also have according to their particularities, paths and 
specific experiences, which are not within the path of the shaykh.371 
 
Furthermore, although the disciple is required to submit to the will of the shaykh and 
obey his command, he could still exercise some authority within the structure of the 
Sufi community according to al-Baghdādī. Even while the student is still a disciple, al-
Baghdādī allows him to train students who are less advanced. Thus the shaykh may 
train an intermediate while the intermediate trains a beginner as al-Baghdādī explains: 	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We have clarified previously the station which when reached by the wayfarer, makes it 
possible for him to guide and train disciples, and from whom shaykh-hood is 
acceptable… And it is the traversing of the Attributes of humanness and reaching the 
presence of God. And we have clarified that although this is the end of travelling, it is 
the beginning of the emergence of attraction. And the travel of attraction within God is 
endless. And the station in which the wayfarer is qualified to become a shaykh is shared 
between prophets and shaykhs… And the difference between the station of the 
prophets in their levels, and the station of the shaykhs in their grades appears after 
establishment in the shared station which is the point of arrival and maturity [shedding 
the attributes of humanness and reaching the state of Godliness]. And so the wayfarer is 
complete with respect to those below him regarding discipleship (irāda), lacking [in 
completion] with respect to those above him regarding shaykh-hood. And so he 
benefits from his shaykh and benefits the disciple.372 
 
Here, al-Baghdādī details a system whereby a Sufi, though not yet qualified to depart 
from the training of his own shaykh, may train disciples who are not as advanced as 
him. Here, there appears to be scope for disciples to acquire some authority before 
completing their training within the Sufi institution and becoming shaykhs to initiates. 
Hence like other Sufi communities, al-Baghdādī manages to incorporate intermediate 
teaching positions while detailing a more intimate and hierarchical arrangement.373 
 
This is dependent on al-Baghdādī’s definition of attraction. Since the attributes of God 
are infinite, it remains impossible to attain a finite state of perfection. This highlights 
the extent to which the development of theory is relevant for the development of the 
structure of the Sufi community. Al-Baghdādī introduces new hierarchies into the 
structure of the Sufi community, allowing disciples to simultaneously occupy the 
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position of a student and an instructor. This allows for the potential of the Sufi 
institution to expand while maintaining a centralised notion of authority.  
 
This may also help explain historical reality of the loosely structured Kubrawī 
community at a time where Kubrā and al-Baghdādī operated within the same network, 
yet seemingly ran their own separate lodges. We may remind ourselves here that ‘Alī 
Lālā seems to have received training from both Kubrā and al-Baghdādī. And as we have 
shown earlier, al-Baghdādī’s role in Lālā’s Sufi training does seem more prominent than 
Kubrā’s, while al-Rāzī who was also trained by both shaykhs, mentions al-Baghdādī 
frequently does not mention Kubrā at all in his work. Al-Baghdādī’s assertion therefore 
could be an attempt to make sense of this reality and establish a centralised conception 
of the Sufi community with scope to incorporate independent Sufi shaykhs functioning 
at the same time within it. This attempt to centralise the authority of the community in 
one shaykh is stressed as al-Baghdādī discusses the point at which the disciple becomes 
a companion to his shaykh:  
 
And it is a wonder that sometimes the power of the disciple becomes greater than the 
power of the shaykh, so that his saintliness is greater than that of his shaykh’s. Yet even 
so, in reality he is not free from the requirement of adhering to his shaykh… And the 
etiquettes of companionship (ṣuḥba) are in accordance with adhering to the rights of 
the shaykh in his presence and in his absence, and there is no need to explain this, for 
the true [companion] does not need to be taught these etiquettes.374 
 
Here, once a disciple attains an equal or greater spiritual rank in comparison to his 
shaykh, he is termed a companion (ṣāḥib) rather than a murīd. The relationship between 
a companion and a shaykh remains a formalised one, with the companion still behaving 
as a disciple. This term, which in early Sufism was used loosely in order to describe a 	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shaykh’s followers, is employed here to refer more specifically to his spiritual equals. 
This formalises what has historically been a more informal relationship. Thus, the 
centralised authoritative structure of the community is maintained despite the 
existence of multiple qualified shaykhs within one community. This formalisation 
hinges on al-Baghdādī’s definition of intihā’, which we may translate as completion, 
though bearing in mind that the term is better understood as attaining or reaching the 
end of Sufi training. Al-Baghdādī tells us that intihā’ is in fact the beginning of 
manifesting God’s attributes. This process of manifesting attributes is endless, just as 
the names of God are infinite. The following chapter will provide a fuller account of this 
concept along with the concept of attraction. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Throughout this chapter we have seen that the theoretical and practical are 
inseparable in al-Baghdādī’s attempts to centralise and formalise the structures of the 
Sufi community. We have seen that his psychological theory was employed to redefine 
and develop a number of positions within the Sufi community and define the 
qualifications for positions of shaykh-hood and discipleship. The terms birth (wilāda), 
training (tarbiyya), and companionship (ṣuḥba) were all employed to further centralise 
the authority of the shaykh. This is not only important for our understanding of al-
Baghdādī’s thought, but for the development of these key terms throughout the history 
of Sufism. 
 
We have seen that psychological theory was essential in the development of theories of 
dreams and visions which not only established belonging and a sense of cohesion, but 
also informed the material culture of his Sufi community, in the cases of dress and 
visionary experiences. In addition, we have shown that al-Baghdādī also attempts to 
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reshape the Sufi community and centralise it through visionary remembrance rituals. 
All this highlights the ways in which the development of psychological theory was 
relevant to the social and political changes of the day, and the importance of al-
Baghdādī’s work for understanding the changes undergoing within the Sufism of this 
period.  
 
If we are to understand the transition of Kubrawī Sufism in this period better, al-
Baghdādī’s text is invaluable. It also provides us with a comparative example to the 
work of ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī, who in contrast to the early Kubrawīs, has received far 
more scholarly attention in this regard. Here we have presented a number of 
arguments which raise some important questions regarding the relationship between 
early Kubrawīs and ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī with regard to exclusivity and populism. We 
will attempt to answer these questions through a comparative study of their respective 
approaches to investiture practices later in this thesis. Through this comparison we will 
show the versatility of al-Baghdādī’s approach, as the paradigm of theory and practice 
that he crafts serves to navigate questions of antinomianism as well as questions 
surrounding affiliation and competition with other Sufi communities.  
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Chapter 4 
Subversion of Islamic law and social  norms 
 
By presenting al-Baghdādī’s discussions of dispensations from the law, we can come to a 
better understanding of early Kubrawī thought and answer some important questions 
regarding the development of Sufism in relation to the rise of subversive mystical 
groups in this period. This chapter will show that al-Baghdādī relies on Kubrawī 
psychology and its formalisation into institutional structures in order to distinguish 
between normative and heterodox behaviour. These discussions in the Tuḥfa have 
important implications for the Sufi community’s place within society.  
 
Much of the Tuḥfa attempts to address tensions between Sufism and Islamic law and 
practice. The extent to which the Sufi is bound to abide by the sharī‘a is dealt with 
directly in the 3rd, 4th, 8th and 9th chapters of the Tuḥfa. In addition, the 5th chapter on 
seclusion discusses whether or not it is permissible for a disciple to study religious 
sciences and scripture during seclusion. Clearly this issue is of prime importance for al-
Baghdādī as it is one of the Tuḥfa’s main concerns. This calls for further clarification 
since al-Baghdādī does not seem all together consistent in his rules regarding 
dispensation from the law at first glance. His insistence on complete adherence to the 
law at times sists uncomfortably with his tolerance of dispensation from it in the case of 
the perfected Sufi shaykh.  
 
For example, in the 10th chapter of the Tuḥfa, when discussing whether it is permissible 
for Sufis to keep company with rulers, al-Baghdādī expresses ideas which if taken at 
face value seem to allow for the Sufi to break the religious law. This is justified with 
reference to the psychological theory we have outlined. In completion, the Sufi is able 
to perceive realities through his spiritual senses and capacity for visions, allowing him 
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to make judgements which are impossible for others to assess. Al-Baghdādī explains 
this in the following passage: 
 
And the elders and seniors of the shaykhs are those who stand steadfastly with God… 
And if they take anything, it is not for anyone to object to their taking [of it]. Because 
the insight of others is in the perceptible form of things, and their insight is from the 
realities of things.375 
 
At the end of the chapter al-Baghdādī seems to suggest that the notions of legal 
permissibility (ḥalāl) and impermissibility (ḥarām) are relative, depending on a person’s 
spiritual rank, stating: 
 
The purpose of the initiate is to preserve the outer aspect of the law… Until God grants 
him, with perfection, the station of the matured men and so permissibility for him is 
that which he does with the will of God, and what is forbidden to him is that which he 
does with [the command of his] ego, heart or spirit.376 
 
If taken in isolation such statements seem to provide scope for transgressing the law. A 
theoretical tension seems to exist here between divine inspiration and the obligation to 
adhere to the law. However, it would be a mistake to interpret al-Baghdādī as allowing 
even a perfected Sufi to explicitly break the law. A closer reading reveals that al-
Baghdādī relies on his psychological theory to argue against the possibility of 
transgressing the religious law. However, al-Baghdādī’s main use of psychology in these 
discussions is not to systematically rule out dispensation from the law, rather he limits 
the potential to subvert the law through the formalisation of Sufi hierarchies. This 
indicates a more nuanced attitude towards antinomian behaviour than we might 
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otherwise expect, disturbing notions of a clear opposition between subversive and 
“normative” Sufism.  
 
This reading of the Tuḥfa has important implications for our understanding of medieval 
Muslim society. Dispensation is for Sufis to cling to in order to justify the elitism of the 
Sufi institution and to argue for its precedence over legal schools and perhaps even 
rival Sufi institutions. In the case of Iran and Khwarazm, al-Baghdādī’s assertion of the 
elitist notion of the Sufi shaykh’s rights to dispense with the law coincides with the 
collapse of political authority, increasing violence and dislocation, and the competing 
patterns of patronage which ensued. The effect of this on the Sufi community 
necessitated the restriction and delegitimisation of subversive expressions unless they 
came from the shaykh. In this context, the rise of antinomian groups is best understood 
as a reaction to the increasing institutionalisation, elitism and political nature of Sufism 
which limited antinomian expressions within the Sufi community.  
 
1 .  Defining Antinomianism 
 
To understand how al-Baghdādī’s psychological theory is employed to restrict 
antinomianism requires an attempt to define the parameters of normative Islamic 
behaviour and deviance in this period. Discussing the relationship between Sufism and 
antinomianism in the context of medieval Islam requires us to recognise a multiplicity 
in the ways in which Sufi or “mystical” piety was expressed. From the earliest days of 
those mystical groups and figures who came to be known as Sufis, conforming to 
Islamic and social norms could be held alongside practices such as seclusion, celibacy, 
and various forms of asceticism which seemed strange to wider society. 377 
Antinomianism therefore had a number of manifestations, from holding and expressing 
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seemingly heretical beliefs, to strange or disrespectful behaviours, and even 
performatively breaking the sharī‘a. There was no standardised criteria for identifying 
an antinomian. Furthermore, subversive behaviour was not always synonymous with 
heresy.  
 
Our attempts to understand the relationship between Sufism and antinomianism have 
also been complicated by scholarship in the recent past. Medieval Sufis have been 
categorised as either adhering to social and religious conventions or subverting them in 
modern scholarship. This is perhaps partly due to the problematic distinction between 
the so-called “drunk” and “sober” schools of Sufism which have informed earlier 
scholarly works. In reality, the terms sukr (drunkenness) and ṣaḥw (sobriety) when they 
appear in the works of al-Hujwīrī, al-Qushayrī and others before them, were technical 
terms, often an interdependent pair, intended to describe certain spiritual conditions 
and did not define distinct Sufi groups.378  
 
The question of social and religious conservativism and subversion is more complex as 
the very same Sufi thinker may hold antinomian beliefs alongside more conventional 
ones, or engage in strange practices in some instances, while adhering to conventional 
behaviour in others. The Tuḥfa is particularly enlightening in this regard for its 
attempts to respond and restrict religiously subversive behaviour while maintaining 
the theoretical possibility, and permissibility of the shaykh to dispense with the 
religious law. 
 
The first documented, and unsuccessful charge against the Sufis for heretical beliefs 
and behaviours emerges in Baghdad in 264/877. This was an incident where the 
“traditionalist” preacher Ghulām Khalīl accused about seventy Sufis, along with Abū al-
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Ḥusayn al-Nūrī (d. 295/907), of zandaqa or heresy.379 It is not clear what the central 
charges were exactly, however the questions which were said to have been put to Nūrī 
cover a range of practices, from attitudes to prayer and ritual purity, to the claim that 
the Sufis had said they no longer feared God but loved him.380 
 
The fluidity of Sufi belief and practice at this time means that it is not possible to 
identify one clear defining belief or set of behaviours and practices which distinguished 
between antinomian and “orthodox” Sufis. The 9th and early 10th centuries certainly 
were turbulent times for Sufis. Ḥallāj, who was executed in 309/922 represented for 
generations after him, the most provocative expression of Sufi doctrines by blurring 
the distinction between creator and created with his statement “I am the truth.” 
Subsequent Sufi authors however did not emphasise speculation on the nature of God 
and instead focused their attention on Sufism as a pietist movement and on detailing 
the inward experiences of the Sufi. The famous Sufi Junayd al-Baghdādī, a 
contemporary of al-Ḥallāj, introduced a distinct terminology for Sufism which 
attempted to express Sufi thought in a less provocative manner.381  
 
This development of a distinctive lexicon marks an early attempt at institutionalisation 
in response to accusations which associate Sufism with antinomianism. Junayd, by 
defining and crafting comprehensive ways of speaking about mystical experiences, 
begins to mark out a “scholarly” Sufism from a fluid landscape of mystical beliefs, 
practices and expressions. And, as Melchert has argued, these developments were 
reactions to the increasing repression of the time. 382  Hence tendencies towards 
institutionalisation, even in the early days of Sufism, can be understood as reactions to 
antinomianism and political repression. 	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Despite these developments, the subversive potential of Sufism remained. Sufism by al-
Baghdādī’s time had also absorbed facets of other groups which could potentially be 
socially subversive or strange. For example the formation of a community around a 
lodge was something adapted from the Karrāmiyya, an earlier ascetic religious 
movement.383 By appropriating and formalising some of the beliefs and practices of 
other socially subversive mystical groups, Sufism managed to subdue modes of religious 
behaviour which were viewed as strange or problematic.  
 
However Sufis themselves were not completely free from accusations of heresy and 
while they may have subdued socially deviant movements by supplanting them, they 
nevertheless achieved that by adopting some of their practices. In addition to the 
creation of Sufi lodges, other aspects of loosely structured mystical movements were 
incorporated into Sufism resulting in a range of ascetic practices, dress codes and 
hairstyles which marked Sufis from non-Sufis. Furthermore the practice of samā‘ and 
the association of Sufism with musical concerts was always a source of tension between 
its proponents and detractors.  
 
One of the ideas most commonly associated with antinomianism originated with the 
Malāmatiyya or “the people of blame.” Beginning in Nishapur in the 9th century, this 
loosely structured group of devotees saw expressions of outward piety as a trap for the 
ego and attempted to outwardly blend into wider society. For them concealing their 
piety was of prime importance, they maintained conformity with society around them 
while their “hearts” were with God. Yet they also considered it better to incur blame 
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(malām) than to express outward forms of piety.384 This movement no longer existed in 
al-Baghdādī’s time, however Sufism absorbed some aspects of its thought.385  
 
The early 13th century saw the emergence of antinomian dervish groups such as the 
Qalandariyya under the leadership of Jamāl al-Dīn Sāvī (d. 630/1232-33) beginning in 
Egypt but quickly spreading throughout the Muslim world. The Qalandarīs were 
antinomian in almost every way, rejecting family life, vocations, shaving all their hair, 
wearing minimal clothing with equally minimal respect for the religious law.386 
Qalandarīs initially did not rely on the notion of blame in order to justify their 
behaviour, instead it seems that they based their ambivalence to social norms and 
Islamic law on their spiritual contentment.387 Blame became an important concept for 
the Qalandariyya in later periods. There is a sense that for later Qalandariīs, it was not 
enough to blend in with wider society but to actively transgress social and religious 
norms in order to incur blame and abase their egos.388 The notion of blame was 
therefore not antinomian in itself but could be used in order to justify antinomian 
behaviour. Yet this was shared between lodge based Sufis as well as emerging 
antinomian groups in the 13th century. 
 
Even those Sufis who are considered “normative” maintained that intentionally 
incurring the blame of society could be a virtuous thing. For example al-Hujwirī 
endorses blame which is intentionally incurred in order to break one’s attachment to 
society or to reduce the fame they may have attracted for their piety. However, al-
Hujwīrī rules out the permissibility of breaking the law in doing so.389 There was 
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therefore, in some cases, a sympathetic attitude to the Malāmatī movement from very 
early on, so long as the law was adhered to.390  
 
By the time al-Baghdādī was writing, controversies over Sufi notions of unity between 
man and God which came to the fore with figures such as al-Ḥallāj seem to have 
subsided. Between al-Ḥallāj’s and al-Baghdādī time, Sufi writers such as Sarrāj, Sulāmī, 
al-Hujwīrī, al-Qushayrī and al-Ghazālī had consistently clarified aspects of Sufi thought, 
argued for the agreement between it and Islamic scripture, and diminished the idea of a 
literal union between man and God. Al-Ghazālī in particular had mounted an extensive 
defence of Sufism in his Iḥyā’. Al-Baghdādī himself does not formulate his exposition of 
Sufi thought and practice in the Tuḥfa in a defensive manner, and does not attempt to 
justify Sufism’s accordance with Islamic doctrines and scripture. On occasions when the 
question of legal permissibility arises, al-Baghdādī is content to refer the reader to the 
Iḥyā’, for example in his argument for the permissibility of samā‘.391 It is clear, that for 
him Sufism’s accordance with Islamic scripture requires no justification. Al-Baghdādī is 
instead more concerned with clarifying correct modes of behaviours in relation to Sufi 
theory. 
 
2 .  Antinomianism in the Tuḥ fa  
 
Al-Baghdādī’s treatment of antinomianism differs in its scope from these previous Sufi 
discussions of antinomianism. Both al-Ghazālī and al-Hujwīrī for example denounced 
those who flout the religious law. These earlier writers tend to consider the idea of 
breaking the law in light of the notion of malāmma (blame) and maintain that it may be 
permissible to perform a blameworthy act that does not break the law.392 This was 
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clearly related to the performative context of incurring blame, which depended on 
outside observers.  
 
Instead al-Baghdādī frames antinomianism as a question tied to psycho-spiritual 
completion (intihā’). This emphasis on completion signals the emergence of mystics 
whose framework for subversion seemed not to be primarly attached to blame, but to 
spiritual contentment which meant that observing the religious law was no longer 
required for them. The problem for al-Baghdādī regards the extent to which one is 
justified in breaking with the law in accordance with spiritual completion. He is not 
concerned with the heresy of incarnation or transgressions of those motivated by 
blame, offering no mention of blame and only a very brief paragraph regarding 
incarnation.  
 
This shift in framing the discussions of subversion is an important indicator of societal 
change. It is directly relevant to the increasing authority of the Sufi shaykh above that 
of legalists and other religious authorities. In this context, subversive behaviour had to 
be delegitimised while institutional Sufi authority had to be maintained. Moreover, the 
notion of being able to dispense with Sufi practices also bears implications for the 
acceptance of new affiliates and the incorporation of secular rulers into the Sufi 
community. Relaxation of rules regarding dispensation allowed ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī to 
formally invest rulers with the Sufi cloak for example. 393  Hence the notion of 
dispensation was closely associated to the question of whether or not to accept lay 
affiliates into the Sufi community. Discussions of dispensation are therefore not limited 
to antinomianism in every instance. This results in a tension within the text of the 
Tuḥfa between permissible and impermissible exemptions from the law which does not 
seem to be systematically resolved. 
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Al-Baghdādī himself was accused of defying the sharī‘a and social custom in his 
relationship with a princess that he secretly married. In addition the imagery 
associated with the Qalandarī in Persian poetry was ascribed to al-Baghdādī in al-‘Irāqī’s 
poem which mentions the youthful al-Baghdādī playing chess with Kubrā.394 Hence al-
Baghdādī was associated with antinomianism at certain points in his life and after his 
death. For him, questions regarding antinomianism were relevant to his position as the 
shaykh al-shuyūkh as he was accused of misconduct by rival parties with rival political 
interests. These questions then bear very real consequences for the circumstances of al-
Baghdādī’s life. Allowing the shaykh some freedom with regard to dispensing with the 
law and social norms was most probably a pertinent issue for him. 
 
Al-Baghdādī died just before the Qalandarīs and the Ḥaydarīs emerged as distinct 
movements. He does not mention any such groups, and nor do his contemporaries 
denounce them as heretics or charlatans. There is no indication here that al-Baghdādī’s 
discussions of antinomianism and dispensations are directed at a defined group of 
mystics. In fact, the formalisation of Sufism which was taking place in the 12th century 
seems to rise in tandem with antinomian brotherhoods. Even the Qalandarīs who 
attracted harsh rebukes from Sufis and other thinkers in the later 13th century, were 
not criticised so heavily by Sufis in the late 12th and early 13th century. Earlier Sufi 
criticism was of a subtler nature, for example ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī, describes them as 
sincere believers, governed by the tranquillity of their hearts “to the point of 
destroying social customs.”395 They are not necessarily considered charlatans, and their 
spiritual accomplishments, though incomplete and misguided, are not considered 
disingenuous.  
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A similar attitude towards subversive mysticism exists in al-Baghdādī’s thought, where 
it is delegitimised and discouraged but tolerated to some extent. Hence, we should not 
assume that the wider Muslim community was hostile to such groups from their 
inception. Al-Baghdādī’s student, Najm al-Dīn al-Rāzī, who fled to Anatolia just before 
the Mongol invasions of Iran, testifies to the prevalence of “charlatans” and “tricksters” 
posing as learned men and gaining esteem.396 But this seems to refer to the spread of 
people posing as Sufis while not possessing the correct qualifications. His concerns 
regarding tricksters then is directed at misplaced patronage rather than rejectors of 
social custom.  
 
Al-Rāzī also mentions the “qalandar” in a poem in his Mirṣād with positive 
connotations.397 Moreover, al-Baghdādī lists in his work some practices to which 
initiates should adhere but which were common to Qalandarīs as well, albeit in a more 
extreme manner. For example he tells us that his disciples should shave their head, 
something which the Qalandarīs took to the extreme by also shaving their facial hair 
and eyebrows in order to distinguish themselves from society.398 Hence, the premises 
on which the Qalandarīs based many of their practices could sometimes be shared by 
institutionalised, lodge based Sufis. Clearly then, when al-Baghdādī does refer to Sufis 
and mystics who subvert the law, he does not have the idea of a qalandar in mind. 
 
Al-Baghdādī’s assertion of dispensations for the Sufi shaykh then is not primarily 
concerned with the rise of particular antinomian groups. Rather, the increased political 
and societal importance of Sufism in a fractious political environment led to the need 
for a justification of the shaykh’s right to dispensations. This in turn led al-Baghdādī to 
curtail and undermine more radical expressions of spirituality, as well as denying them 
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institutional legitimacy.399 Hence, the antinomianism which spread in distinct forms 
from the 13th century onwards can be seen as a response to the institutionalisation of 
Sufism advanced by thinkers like al-Baghdādī and ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī. 
 
In this study therefore, it will be necessary to understand the term antinomianism not 
as a reference to a defined group of people such as the Qalandarīs. Rather, what is 
meant by the term ‘antinomianism’ in this study is a trend of potentially subversive 
behaviours and beliefs which was gaining currency at the time. Al-Baghdādī’s own 
definition of the term can be deduced from the Tuḥfa itself. The heading of chapter 8 of 
the Tuḥfa is explicitly formulated in order to address the issue of whether or not the 
Sufi is required to maintain legal obligations upon completion. The heading of chapter 9 
also mentions the notion of completion but specifies whether the Sufi should obey a 
vision or experience which orders him to transgress the law. In chapter 4, al-Baghdādī 
answers whether or not the disciple is obliged to follow the commands of the shaykh in 
the event that they seem to contradict the law prima facie.400  
 
Al-Baghdādī’s definition of antinomianism can be formulated in the following manner: 
adherence to the notion that the Sufi is no longer required to observe legal and 
religious obligations, either due to his state of completion in which performative acts of 
worship are made irrelevant for him, or due to spiritual insight and mystical 
experiences which command him to forego such obligations. This formulation is 
indicative of an emerging phenomenon of mystics who would forego observance of 
religious obligations and may not have been affiliated to a Sufi institution with an 
established spiritual chain of transmission. There is no indication that al-Baghdādī 
identifies any particular group here rather than what seems to have been a growing 
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trend. Indeed, there is no evidence that these groups existed as well defined categories 
in this period. 
 
His response to this issue which emerges in a number of separate discussions within the 
Tuḥfa is also telling. Central to all these responses however is an attempt to redefine the 
notion of completion as an infinite journey of travelling within God as opposed to the 
finite journey of travelling to him so that the Sufi may never cease observing religious 
obligations and the requirements of the Sufi community. This may also account for the 
curious absence of the term baqā’, with its connotations of abiding and the cessation of 
movement, in the Tuḥfa’s descriptions of completion. Hence, his response is meant to 
define the notion of completion (intihā’) in order to circumvent an interpretation of the 
term which would allow for dispensation from religious obligations and Sufi practice. 
Yet defining the term intihā’ has important implications for the structure of the Sufi 
institution as well as antinomianism. 
 
Hence, al-Baghdādī’s response to these questions is multifaceted and intends to address 
more than what he perceives as an emerging trend of antinomianism. With these 
restrictions, al-Baghdādī intends for the authority of the Sufi shaykh to exceed that of 
the jurists when it comes to legal matters. He is keen to allow some degree of freedom 
with regard to the law in the case of the shaykh. Yet, this operates within the 
framework of existing legal opinions and is therefore relatively restricted. He also 
attempts to restrict the access of lay affiliates to official affiliation to the Sufi 
community by restricting dispensations from the law and Sufi customs for initiates. 
Hence, defining completion and restricting dispensations point to the wider concerns 
of the Sufi institution as well. The significance of emerging antinomian groups should 
therefore not be over-emphasised since these discussions act as avenues to address a 
number of issues which were pertinent to the Sufi community. 
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3. Prophetology 
 
One way in which al-Baghdādī deals with the notion of antinomianism is through 
detailing a prophetology. This is evident in his lengthy passage on the actualisation of 
the attributes of God which in addition to defining completion, constructs a 
prophetology that corresponds to the ranks of the soul and positions the Prophet 
Muhammad as the ideal “completed” person whose example must be followed in order 
to achieve perfection. The development of prophetology here is significant for 
understanding the development of Sufism in the 12th century and onwards. 
Prophetology became incredibly prominent in al-Simnānī’s articulation of Kubrawī 
psychology for example, positing that the individual contains an inner prophet which 
corresponds to his spiritual station.401  
 
These ideas spread and grew in complexity over the centuries, influencing thinkers 
during the Timurid period like Jāmī.402 It has been claimed that the first examples of this 
type of prophetology are found in ‘Aṭṭār’s writings,403 however al-Baghdādī provides an 
extremely early and detailed theory of prophetology based on his psychology. While it 
is difficult to determine when prophetology began to become a feature of Sufi thought, 
the similarity between his and ‘Aṭṭār’s prophetology strengthens the case of a 
connection between the two figures, and al-Baghdādī should be seen as the most likely 
origin of ‘Aṭṭār’s ideas.  
 
Given the growing significance of prophetology in Sufism in this period and afterwards, 
it is important to highlight here the extent to which it is indebted to al-Baghdādī’s 
articulation. Its emergence in the context of al-Baghdādī’s discussion aimed at 	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restricting antinomianism, and his grounding it in premises particular to Kubrawī 
psychology reveal that the impetus behind this way of speaking about the Prophet 
serves both theoretical and practical purposes. This relationship between the theory 
and practice can be explored in an analysis of the 9th chapter of the Tuḥfa. Here, al-
Baghdādī answers the question of whether one may break the religious law or is 
exempted from ritual obligation upon completion of the Sufi path.  
 
In his answer al-Baghdādī introduces a more detailed discussion of attributes, and 
although the purpose of this passage is to lead into an argument for the need to follow 
the Prophet’s example in order to manifest the attributes of God, al-Baghdādī briefly 
digresses and provides justification for manifesting attributes which may seem 
blameworthy but are in fact praiseworthy. He begins here by expounding upon the 
notion of man being composed of all the realities of the created worlds: 
 
And it is necessary for you to know, along with what you have learnt, that God has 
created the human and placed in him all the specificities of the two worlds, the hidden 
and manifest. And upon reflection, [man’s composition is divided] into four aspects. 
And of them, [there are] two, one which he shares with the lower bodies [earthly] and 
one which he shares with the higher [celestial bodies]. And [from these four sides there 
are another] two aspects, one which he shares with the hidden things, and one which 
he shares with the created things in the manifest world.404 
 
Al-Baghdādī starts here by elaborating upon the microcosmic notion we have already 
presented in detailing his psychology. Here al-Baghdādī divides creation into four 
categories, here he adds lower bodies such as those on earth, and celestial bodies such 
as the planets to the two categories we have previously discussed which are the hidden 
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and manifest. He then moves on to explain how each of these aspects relates to the 
manifestation of attributes: 
 
And for every aspect of these aspects, there are specificities and attributes. And the 
aspect which he shares with the lower bodies is the ego in the convention of the 
learned (muḥaqaqī) Sufis, for they have said, it is the nurturer of the blameworthy 
attributes. And it is not meant here that they are blameworthy in an absolute sense, but 
they are blameworthy additions [to the ego.] For the praiseworthy, good attributes 
which are from the specificities of [this aspect of the ego], are of the blameworthy 
attributes if they are considered additions to the attributes of the spirit. For the truth of 
the blameworthy attributes are the dark/oppressive attributes which have become a 
veil for the attributes of the spirit. And they are the attributes that arise from this 
[lower bodily] aspect, whether they are [considered] good attributes such as animal 
generosity and bravery, or blameworthy and ugly like anger. For the lion is brave and 
the rooster is generous, and the animal generosity in man is egoistic and blameworthy, 
and animal bravery in him is egoistic and ugly.405  
 
Locating the desires and instincts such as anger in man’s animal soul follows the 
Aristotelian scheme which Avicenna and al-Ghazālī also adhere to. Motion, desire and 
perception were considered the function of the animal soul. Al-Baghdādī here is 
referenccing al-Ghazālī’s Iḥyā’ which asserts that man can harness the potentially 
blameworthy characteristics of the lower soul in accordance with his higher nature.406 
Hence, al-Baghdādī characterizes the attributes of the ego and spirit as “additions” or 
“relational” (iḍāfa) which explains that the attributes are blameworthy when they 
belong to the ego, but praiseworthy when they belong to the spirit.  
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By positing that man shares some aspect with the celestial bodies, we may reasonably 
speculate that this is a reference to the heart, the equivalent of the rational soul, which 
was commonly associated with the celestial spheres and planets.407 In this case we 
would not necessarily need to posit a different framework from that of al-Ghazālī’s 
regarding the attributes since most thinkers would place reason outside the remit of 
the animal soul and human ego and associate it with the heavenly spheres, the “higher 
bodies” al-Baghdādī mentions here. In al-Ghazālī’s thought this is equivalent to the 
rational soul which is immaterial, non-bodily and specific to man.408 
 
That al-Ghazālī’s influence is pervasive throughout this passage is obvious, and seen 
more strikingly as al-Baghdādī continues his discussion. He goes on to criticise the same 
theories of attributes which are criticised in al-Ghazālī’s book of anger in the Iḥyā’. Here 
al-Baghdādī claims that certain “philosophers” have misunderstood the nature of 
attributes: 
 
And from this you learn of the shortcomings in the reasoning of the philosophers in 
apprehending the realities, since they set forth in their speech on purification and 
adornment that, he who does not purify himself from the blameworthy attributes, is 
not inculcated with the praiseworthy attributes, because it has two sources, and those 
[attributes] which spring forth from the attributes of animals, plants and inanimate 
objects which are present within man are blameworthy and those that spring forth 
from the source of the attributes of the spirit are good. And they did not know that 
from the blameworthy characteristics in the manifest, are not blameworthy in reality 
like anger. 
 
For if the servant rids himself of the ego and its attributes and is inculcated with the 
light of the spirit and its beauty, and nearness to God has overcome him, and “he does 	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not cease to draw nearer to Him with supererogatory worship, until He loves him.” And 
if the love of the True emerges, He becomes for him his hearing, sight and hand, in 
accordance with the famous ḥadīth. And so he is angered with God’s anger and content 
with His contentedness.409 
 
Al-Ghazālī, in his book on anger, explains that God has placed anger in man as a “fire” 
in the heart which functions as an impetus to overcome harm and danger. Al-Ghazālī 
describes it as stemming from an animal “desire” or shahwa, which is necessary for 
man’s survival, for example making him search for food. Al-Ghazālī goes on to explain 
that not being able to be angry at all is a deficiency, as the person will have no 
motivation for self sacrifice (ḥammiyya), and that those who have posited that one is 
capable of being rid of anger completely, and those who have said that it is impossible 
to be rid of it, stand on weak foundations. Instead, with the realisation that all things 
are obedient to the command of God, man realises the futility of being angered by 
worldly things. Al-Ghazālī explains that due to the realisation of God’s unity, and with 
the heart being occupied with more important desires, the influence of anger will 
weaken and his anger will be “for God.”410 
 
Al-Baghdādī draws on this discussion of anger in al-Ghazalī’s Iḥyā’ here but his 
conclusion stresses the unity of man and God in terms of attributes much more than al-
Ghazālī. Unlike al-Baghdādī, al-Ghazālī’s Iḥyā’ does not describe the Sufi being angry 
with God’s anger.  Rather, man’s attributes begin to align with the will of God. Al-
Baghdādī’s discussion of attributes describes the manifestation of God’s attributes 
through man as reflections which are neither the same nor different to the attributes 
themselves.411 This accords with al-Baghdādī’s framework of God’s attributes being 
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manifested by the human body due to God’s dominion over the soul which commands 
the body. 
 
The importance of this development is to craft three distinct general ranks in which the 
soul may find itself, that of the ego, the spirit and God. Each rank results in certain 
attributes and behaviours and can therefore be used to describe certain spiritual and 
religious attitudes which can be applied to institutions or groups. Al-Ghazālī’s theories 
become important here since he opposes the notion that certain attributes must be 
negated entirely. That supposedly base attributes like anger can become the noble 
attributes of God for al-Baghdādī means that there can be a progression from the 
ascetic, detached states of the spirit, which bring the Sufi back to worldly affairs upon 
completion once the person’s innate animal attributes are commanded by God. 
 
The attributes of the spirit for al-Baghdādī function as a trap along the path. They cause 
the Sufi to become arrogant and assume that he has attained the final stages of the 
path. This is crucial in al-Baghdādī’s understanding of antinomian behaviour, this 
incomplete stage causes confusion and is responsible for causing the person to believe 
that they can dispense with ritual obligations. Hence, he draws on al-Ghazālī here for 
the very specific purpose of characterising the correct usage of the base attributes as 
the most perfected state, while anyone believing in the ability to negate them 
completely is characterised as being misguided. This is seen more clearly as al-Baghdādī 
continues: 
 
And it is made certain that some anger is praiseworthy and some generosity is 
blameworthy. For the attributes of the ego in their entirety are veils to the spirit... And 
if the seeker takes to removing the love of the world from his ego and to remove desires 
from it with austerities, then according to the extent of which austerities remove the 
covering of the path from the perceiving eye, he achieves unveiling (yukāshaf) with the 
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apprehensions of the spirit and the realities of the spiritual world until the unveiling of 
the curtain. And the secret of this station is not specific to the original religion [of 
Islam] (ḥanafiyya), or Christianity, or Judaism or Zoroastrianism. For anyone who strives 
a true striving and is committed to cutting the link to these blameworthy attributes and 
halted their substance, has matured to this high station. And it is because of this secret 
that many of the Christian monks (rahābīn) have achieved unveiling, despite their 
apostasy and misguidedness, in greater numbers than the arrogant leaders of the 
Muslims. Those who have been [deceived] by the terms of “belief” and “Islam” and have 
became absorbed in the love of fame and wealth.412  
 
Al-Baghdādī’s seems to approach a rather ecumenical conclusion regarding mystical 
experience here, asserting that non-Muslims can attain a high station of spiritual 
unveiling. Though it may seem to be a rather pluralistic position, this is in fact an 
attempt characterise the status of the spirit as incomplete. Al-Baghdādī argues that this 
is not completion at all and that completion may only be attained by following the 
example of the Prophet, and his example or sunna. Hence, this acknowledgement of the 
universality of the science of unveiling pre-empts any argument for the irrelevance of 
Islamic law for the perfected person. This becomes clearer as al-Baghdādī continues: 
 
For if the wayfarer reaches the attributes of the spirit by removing the love of the world 
from their hearts and breaking the desires from the ego, and some of the attributes of 
the spirit manifest to him and the realities of events in the hidden are revealed to him, 
and future events [are also revealed to him], at this point the wayfaring Muslim is 
distinguished from the [Christian] monk. And the monk remains in his station since his 
religion was abrogated by the law (sharī‘at) of the master of the first and last of [the 
prophets].413 
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The mention of other religions here also references common themes in Sufi poetry and 
rhetoric. Christian monks, along with Zoroastrians and members of other faiths are 
often characterised as being superior to “externalist” Muslims, or those who have not 
grasped the truth of God. Such glorifications are pervasive in ‘Aṭṭār’s poetry for 
example.414 These images were also associated with other themes of profane activities 
such as wine drinking, monasteries and idol worship which suggested that the infidelity 
of these groups only pertained to a literalist conception. Hence they could be used to 
extol the virtues of the “inner” aspects of religion which Sufis wished to emphasise in 
their poems. 415 Here al-Baghdādī maintains a less provocative position as the non-
Muslim mystic is made greater than the literalist, but incomplete when compared to 
the Muslim Sufi. Here, al-Baghdādī attempts to mitigate the potential subversive 
symbolism of the non-Muslim to undermine the religious law by incorporating it into 
his discussion of attributes. This also highlights the relevance of prophetology for 
distinguishing between the levels of a literalist, a spiritualist and the perfected, as 
prophets such as Jesus and Moses come to symbolise Christianity and Judaism. Judaism 
is equated with literalism, while Christianty is equated with “spiritualism.” 
 
Al-Baghdādī then goes on to explain that the incomplete wayfarer who remains 
dominated by the spirit will be of the “losers” in the hereafter though they believe that 
they are on the path of truth due to their spiritual unveilings and “perceiving what 
most have not perceived.” He describes this as the state of “most Muslims” and says 
that this is one of God’s traps. He describes them as perceiving some of the realities 
stored within them, but never unveiling themselves to The Real, or God (al-ḥaqq). And 
ultimately such a state leads to suffering in the hereafter due to the denial of 
completion and the inability to “unveil” God fully, which he describes as the 
punishment for those who have attained the state of the spirit. He argues that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
414 Lewisohn, ‘Sufi Symbolism’, 260-261. 
415 Ernst, Words, 75. 
	   223	  
ultimately it is only with the alignment to the Prophet that one may manifest the 
attributes of God.416 
 
Towards the end of the chapter al-Baghdādī reminds the reader that in Islamic 
tradition, both Jesus and Moses asked God to render them followers of the prophet 
Muḥammad. For Moses this is because of his inability to move beyond the ego, and for 
Jesus this is explained as an inability to achieve perfection due to the overwhelming 
“lights” of the spirit, as al-Baghdādī explains:  
 
And likewise Jesus peace be upon him, was dominated by the attributes of the spirit. For 
he did not take pleasure in the bodily things and was not tested by the desires of the 
ego and so God raised him to the station of the spirituals… However, just as the 
attributes of the ego are dark veils, so are the attributes of the spirit, and of light, veils, 
for God most high is seventy thousand veils of light and darkness. So Jesus traversed, in 
his wayfaring, the dark egoistic attributes and remained in the spiritual enlightened 
attributes. And that is because it is possible to emerge from the darkened egoistic 
attributes with the power of the light of the spirit, and it is not possible to emerge from 
the light of the spirit except by the attraction of The Real praise be to him, which is 
attached to belovedness. And it is impossible for The Real, praise be to him, to 
bestow/designate (yattaṣif) anyone with the perfection of beloved-ness unless they 
follow (mutāba‘at) the Prophet (al-muṣṭafā).417   
  
Here al-Baghdādī clarifies his earlier pluralistic statement by asserting that both Moses 
and Jesus, the two prophets and messengers symbolising Judaism and Christianity, were 
incomplete. This results in an argument for the exclusivity of Islam, and the need to 
follow the Prophet in order to achieve salvation. It also stratifies the Sufi path as Moses 
is equated to an initiate while Jesus represents an intermediary. While this discussion 	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may seem to be specifically directed at non-Muslims, the scope of the question al-
Baghdādī aims to answer is very much attached to tensions within Sufism regarding the 
law. 
 
The thrust of al-Baghdādī’s argument in this passage links spiritual completion to 
adherence to the prophetic custom and by extension, Islamic law. Here, he draws on a 
number of concepts which were important for establishing the formalised relationship 
of shaykh and disciple. Jesus here represents the intermediate Sufi who is barred from 
completion due to the blinding light of the spiritual veils while Moses is barred from 
completion by the darkness of the ego. Here the Prophet acts as a shaykh to the 
incomplete Moses and Jesus. Hence, this discussion is made relevant to the 
institutionalisation of Sufism.  
 
Here, adherence to the law and the institutional conception of the shaykh and disciple 
are intimately linked by al-Baghdādī’s theoretical framework. The attributes of the ego 
and spirit need to be transcended in order for the Sufi to manifest the attributes of God 
and this can only be achieved by following the tradition of the Prophet, as the disciple 
follows the shaykh who represents the prophet. Eventually the chapter culminates in a 
description of perfection which emphasises that it is impossible to become complete 
without adherence to the law and the way of the Prophet as he states: 
 
And if the honest Muslim wayfarer attains the station of the spirituals, he is welcomed 
by the benevolences	   of the Real, and experiences the breezes of [God’s] benevolence 
from the winds of providence. And so he is between two things, spiritual flight and 
Godly abduction. And with this is a lofty state and high station. And the image/form of 
perfection is that it remains in him after the opaqueness of the attributes of the ego 
[are removed?]. And if it is extremely subdued, and God manifests to him with the 
attribute of majesty which does not allow for anything to remain or to be left, and 
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destroys that opaqueness which remains of the attributes of the ego. But the 
manifestations of the lights of the spirit are flashes for the initiate in the darkness of 
the ego. For it does not remain for a [prolonged] time. And if the traces of wayfaring 
[re]-emerge, the attributes of the spirit and the opaqueness of the ego return as they 
were before the manifestation, and he does not cease [oscillating between] becoming 
and unbecoming… Until eternal provedence transfers him to worshipfulness, and its 
image is adherence [to the prophet] (mutāba‘a). And God extracts him with 
worshipfulness and adherence, from the opaqueness of the ego and the lights of the 
spirit, and there is found within him neither light nor darkness from any of the 
attributes of humanness. And he is not heavenly or earthly, for he stands with God.418 
 
This equation of completion with a state beyond the veils of the spirit and ego is 
described here as only being possible by adherence to the Prophet. Here is perhaps the 
most explicit expression of the interdependence between Sufi theory and 
institutionalised behaviour expressed through prophetology. The entirety of the 
passage reads as a description of the psychological progression of the Sufi, yet it is 
anchored in the notion of the need for a guide who represents the Prophet. Finally al-
Baghdādī finishes this discussion in the 9th chapter with the following: 
 
[And the Shaykh Abū Yazīd] has said, “I ascended to the presence, and so I crossed the 
created things and I reached the enclosures and was veiled by the greatest veil I have 
ever witnessed. So I said, my God what is this veil? And He said, it is the veil of the ego. 
So I said, how is it gotten rid of? He said, by following the beloved.” This is what clung 
to my mind from a long story. And know that it is from the signs of acceptance that fear 
and dread increase. And everyone who has come to a higher position, and a loftier 
stage, and a more completed nearness, increases in dread…  
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And he who does not believe in God’s plan (makr Allah) and fears doubt, cannot dispense 
from having a guide to beseech to, and to cling to his rope and hold fast to his rein. And 
the guide of guides, and the master of the first and last is Muhammad.419 
 
Here al-Baghdādī introduces a further argument against antinomianism, marking out 
the proper psychological response to nearness to God with fear, dread and humility. 
This defines the proper response to an increase in psycho-spiritual rank as one which 
would adhere to the law due to fear. By the end, al-Baghdādī returns to discussing the 
need for a guide and again emphasises that in order to overcome spiritual barriers and 
attain completion, the Sufi must follow the Prophet. This is also a way in which al-
Baghdādī can stress the disciple’s need for a Sufi shaykh since he acts as an 
intermediary for the Prophet. Ultimately, completion is defined as total adherence to 
the Prophet and the religion of Islam since Muhammad is the only Prophet who 
overcame the spirit and ego and manifested the attributes of God.  
 
This conception of the Prophet obviously captured the imagination of Sufi thinkers at 
the time. ‘Aṭṭār for example repeats in his work, many aspects of this discussion of 
prophetology as Qamar ul-Hudā has highlighted that ‘Aṭṭār’s meditation on the written 
form of the name Muhammad in his Muṣībat nāma attributed one mīm to the manifest 
world (‘ālam) and the other to the hidden world. The encompassing of both worlds 
represented the uniqueness of Muhammad as a Prophet.420 This is strikingly similar to 
al-Baghdādī’s theory of attributes and its relationship to prophetology. Therefore, 
Hudā’s assertion that these are the first allusions to this concept of prophetology seems 
untenable with what we have presented here. Al-Baghdādī reveals a highly systematic 
and theoretically coherent prophetology that is much more developed than ‘Aṭṭār’s, 
and it may be that al-Baghdādī was his primary influence in this respect. 
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4 .  Religious learning and Sufism 
 
Though this discussion of attributes firmly places Islam and the Prophet at the core of 
the notion of perfection, al-Baghdādī’s more polemical statement that many non-
Muslims have ascended to greater degrees than Muslim scholars exposes a tension 
between the Sufi system of learning and the Islamic sciences. Those statements clearly 
assumed the priority of psycho-spiritual training in relation to scriptural knowledge. 
This affords Sufism a claim to knowledge which is independent of the religious sciences. 
Despite this, al-Baghdādī attempts to ground Sufi knowledge within the framework of 
the legal tradition, but never fully resolves the potential for the two to contradict one 
another.  
 
Hence the need to follow (mutāba‘at) the Prophet in attaining completion, though it 
stresses the importance adherence to Islam, does not necessarily equate to an 
adherence to the law as articulated by legal scholars. The concept is far greater than 
that as he saw Sufi shaykhs as representatives of the prophet by virtue of having 
attained a similar spiritual rank to him. Psycho-spiritual rank is certainly prioritised 
over the religious science and is evident throughout al-Baghdādī’s Tuḥfa. In the 5th 
chapter of the Tuḥfa regarding seclusion, al-Baghdādī answers the question of whether 
or not one should engage in studying the Qur’an, Hadith and the sharī’a during periods 
of seclusion. Here we are confronted with a seemingly negative view of the study of the 
religious sciences. 
 
Al-Baghdādī argues that the initiate is not capable of properly understanding the 
scripture, or using it according to his spiritual needs. The only example al-Baghdādī 
provides where the disciple is required to read the Qur’an in seclusion is in the case of 
one who has already memorised it and is at risk of forgetting what he has learnt, 
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because according to him, forgetting what one has memorised of the Qur’an is a sin.421  
By the end of his discussion al-Baghdādī concludes: 
 
 For you today, know the Qur’an before knowing belief (īmān). And know that if the  
disciple who has not memorised from the Quran [anything] apart from the opening [al-
fātiḥa] of the book and the chapter of ikhlāṣ, and does not read them apart from when he 
is in prayer and is then distanced from the abode of arrogance and comes to the abode 
of joyousness, and has devoted himself to God in worship… Until he attains certainty is 
from those who have won [bliss]… And the person who memorises and completes [the 
reading of] the Quran every day and night, but whose his heart is full of love for the 
world and polluted with malice, envy and blameworthy characteristics is among the 
lost.422 
 
Al-Baghdādī clearly asserts that the psycho-spiritual rank of the disciple is the primary 
cause of his praiseworthy or blameworthy nature. The study of the Islamic sciences is 
irrelevant to this and could even prove harmful as al-Baghdādī explains that scripture 
could be misinterpreted as instructions to act in a manner which is pleasing to the ego 
if the ego is dominant over the person’s soul. Hence, scholastic religious learning does 
not necessarily affect the spiritual rank of the individual positively. Sufi training is the 
most important form of training since it affects the person’s insight in every other area 
of learning.  
 
Such a position however was not necessarily a controversial one. Turning away from 
scriptural learning at the beginning of the Sufi path is common in the biographies of 
many famous Sufis during this time. Abū Sa‘īd was reported to have abandoned the 
religious sciences, and al-Ghazālī famously gave up his intellectual pursuits and instead 
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practiced Sufism, abandoning his post at the Niẓāmiyya school in Baghdad.423 In addition, 
Kubrā abandoned his scholastic religious training in favour of the Sufi path and was 
rebuked for returning to his classes on religious sciences after turning to Sufism. This 
did not mean that the two modes of learning were at odds, rather there seems to be an 
attempt to establish hierarchy of learning here where the Sufi path is prior. 
Furthermore, Alexandrin has pointed out that in Kubrā’s case, the two modes of 
learning are reconcilable. 424 
 
This hierarchical relationship between Sufism and scholasticism is clear in al-
Baghdādī’s work. For him, this was not a rejection of scholastic learning, but an 
adherence to the notion that the disciplining of the soul is prior to scholasticism. Al-
Baghdādī tells us that the state of the soul informs interpretations scripture for 
example. Al-Baghdādī only stipulates that the Sufi should avoid the religious sciences in 
seclusion as the goal of seclusion was to control thought impressions (khawāṭir) and 
elevate the soul to a greater rank. However, one could engage with scholasticism after 
undergoing the proper Sufi training. Proper scholastic understanding is dependent on a 
more sublime soul which ensures that scholastic training will not be influenced by the 
negative thought impressions which enter the mind. Kubrā himself only produced 
scholastic works such as his tafsīr after having completed his Sufi training.425  
 
Although al-Baghdādī is keen to bar the Sufi from breaking laws on which there is 
widespread consensus, in theory he maintains that the Sufi shaykh by virtue of divine 
inspiration, and access to knowledge through visions, is free to break what he terms the 
prima facie law (ẓāhir al-shar‘) while adhering to its reality. The significance of this 
distinction however is not felt until the final chapters of the Tuḥfa. Al-Baghdādī seems 
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to carefully craft this discussion throughout the text which progresses slowly from a 
rather conservative position in the first chapter to an explicit acknowledgement of 
tension in the 10th chapter.  
 
At the very beginning of the Tuḥfa, in answering a query regarding which legal school 
the Sufis should follow, al-Baghdādī attempts to diminish the need to adhere to any one 
particular legal schools by asserting that the Sufi should adhere to the most stringent 
rulings which deny the desires of his ego in order to tame it. Al-Baghdādī argues that 
the Sufi can choose from any of the accepted legal schools in order to achieve this. 
 
Although al-Baghdādī states this very generally in the first chapter of the Tuḥfa, 
namely, that “our path” chooses the most stringent of rulings, this does not seem to be 
consistent with the arguments and examples in later chapters.426 The notion that the 
Sufi chooses a ruling from among existing accepted rulings runs throughout the Tuḥfa 
in the later chapters, when it comes to the decisions of the shaykh, al-Baghdādī allows a 
great degree of freedom in deciding which rulings to follow. The earlier assertion that 
the most stringent ruling should be chosen seems to be specific to the initiate who has 
not subdued his ego. This is hinted at when he clarifies his statement saying, “the 
etiquettes which are attached to the states and stations differ according to the [varying] 
states and stations of the wayfarer.”427 By the time we have read on to the later chapters 
of the Tuḥfa a much more problematic tone emerges. Here, al-Baghdādī departs from 
his initial argument and frames the debate as a distinction between the exoteric and 
esoteric characteristics of the law: 
 
The orders of the law are divided into two. The first is that which has attained a 
consensus among the umma and the scholars (‘ulamā’ ) and it is not for anyone to claim 	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that he has received a sign [from God] and order to contradict it. For that is a 
disobedience, and there is no authority for the disobedient. The second is that upon 
which there has been disagreement in the opinion of the legal scholars (mujtahidīn). 
And the Prophet peace be upon him has said: “disagreement between my umma is a 
mercy.” And it may be that the shaykh orders [the disciple], based on his insight, to do 
something that defies what was said by one of the legal scholars, in accordance with the 
saying of a different legal scholar… For the ruling of a mujtahid is based on the dictates 
of reasoned reflection (ẓann) and the ruling of the shaykh is based on signs from the 
Truth, or a sign from the Prophet, peace be upon him, or the ruling of the heart during 
a state [in which he beholds] an image of the sign of the Truth.428 
 
A clear hierarchy is seen here with Sufi modes of knowledge given precedence over 
legal reasoning. The scholar of law can never attain the same degree of certainty as the 
Sufi does through experiential knowledge. However, al-Baghdādī points out that the 
Sufis should only operate within the framework of the law, the Sufi shaykh is free to 
decide what to do, but it appears here to be in accordance with an existing opinion held 
by some legal scholar.  This however is not possible in a case in which a consensus has 
been reached, and the Sufi is not allowed to break with it.  
 
Given that there are a great number of issues on which various opinions could have 
been obtained, this does provide the Sufi with a degree of freedom within the legal 
framework. However if we turn to the 10th chapter of the Tuḥfa a much more forceful 
tone emerges. This chapter deals with the issue of keeping company with sultans, 
oppressors and the misguided as well as the samā‘. Here, al-Baghdādī details a story 
where the shaykh Abū Sa‘īd orders his khādim (superintendent of the khānqa) to go to 
the chief of police asking for a donation. The policeman mockingly tells the khādim that 
he had forcibly taken twenty dirhams from a boy earlier that day which he offers, and 
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the khādim accepts “trusting in the spiritual insight of the shaykh.” Later, a boy enters 
the khanqa and offers his dirhams to the shaykh and apologises explaining that the 
policeman had taken the remainder of the money from him by force. Abū Sa‘īd replies 
that the dirhams have already reached him.429  Commenting on this, al-Bagdhādī 
explains: 
 
And regarding the great and advanced ones from among the shaykhs, for they stand 
firmly with God, the ones who have transferred their matters to God, and have removed 
themselves from the workings of the spirits and hearts, which are greater than the 
egos. And their rising is with God, and their sitting is with God, and their action is with 
God, and their resting is with God… and their taking is with God, and their abstention is 
with God… If they abstain from something then it is not for anyone to object to their 
abstention. And if they take anything, it is not for anyone to object to their taking [of 
it]. Because the insight of others is in the perceptible form of things, and their insight is 
in the realities of things.430 
 
Al-Baghdādī then explains: 
 
Whoever looks to the acceptance of the money which was forcibly taken, based on what 
is perceptible, must blame him [Abū Sa’īd]. However, he was knowledgeable in the 
reality of his command and the chief of police’s state and the shortcomings of the boy… 
And these are authoritative signs from the Truth. And of those who have received 
mercy from God and who have been taught divine knowledge by him, if their 
disposition is such that it accords with defying the law in its perceptible form, then it is 
by sanction of God’s command and according to his law (sharī‘atahu) in reality [that they 
do], just as Khidr was with Moses… And this is not allowed to any of the initiates, and 
that is why Abū Sa’īd, may God have mercy on him, said “whoever saw me in my 
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beginning became righteous (ṣiddīqan), and whoever saw me in my completion became 
a heretic (zindīqan).” For the task of the initiate is to obey the perceptible law.431 
 
These two passages appear at first to be completely at odds with the passages we have 
quoted earlier where al-Baghdādī was keen to ensure the reader that the Sufi had to at 
least choose from among the diversity of legal opinion between the legal scholars. Yet, 
the acceptance of the money by the shaykh in this anecdote seems to contradict this. 
Here it is argued that the shaykh is free to break the law from the point of view of an 
outside observer. 
 
The reference to a story from Abū Sa‘īd’s biography is significant here. Abū Sa‘īd stands 
out as intricately linked to the Saljuq state, receiving patronage from the famous vizier 
Niẓām al-Mulk and establishing connections with a number of courtly figures. As we 
have noted earlier, the biographies of Abū Sa‘īd were written at around the same time 
when al-Baghdādī was writing the Tuḥfa. Sufis capitalised on the biographical and 
hagiographical accounts of Abū Sa’īd in constructing the ideal relationship between 
their communities and political rulers in the 12th century. Many of the anecdotes in the 
Kashf asrār al-tawḥīd attempt to construct an ideal relationship between Sufis and rulers 
by stressing the need for rulers to patronise Sufis and receive their blessings in 
exchange for legitimation.432  
 
It is no surprise then that this passage is found within the 10th chapter of the Tuḥfa, 
discussing the permissibility of the Sufi keeping relations with the ruling classes. The 
aim of this chapter is not to discuss whether it is acceptable to transgress the law but to 
explain the shaykh’s interactions with the ruling classes. Al-Baghdādī here provides us 
with an ambiguous example of “breaking” the law. We are told that the money was 
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intended for the Sufi lodge, and the shaykh simply accepted money which was meant to 
reach his lodge anyway. In this way, “the knowledge of the things stored in the hidden” 
which al-Baghdādī mentions at the end of the passage, in Abū Sa’īd’s case, is described 
as a type of clairvoyance. 
 
Al-Baghdādī states quite clearly that only the shaykh has the privilege of breaking the 
perceptible form of the law based on divine insight, while on the other hand he may 
only order the disciple to break with one interpretation of the law in favour of another. 
However, al-Baghdādī is keen to point out that the insight of the Sufi adheres to the 
reality of the sharī‘a and is therefore not licence to completely disregard its statutes. For 
him it is not a question of ever being able to break the law, but rather an ability to 
perceive the reality of a given situation and arrive at the best judgement. The shaykh’s 
opinion is still subject to the law, but it is not understood by those who have not 
achieved a similar rank.  
 
Yet, although the example provided is ambiguous, in theory the tension between 
knowledge through divine insight and knowledge through scholastic training is not 
decisively resolved by al-Baghdādī. While divine insight bends to the confines of 
scholasticism in some cases, the reverse also seems possible. The example of Abū Sa’īd 
accepting forcibly confiscated money, which was intended for the Sufi shaykh in the 
first place, is a far more ambiguous action than dispensing with obligatory prayers for 
example, which is something al-Baghdādī outrightly rejects. Here, the intention to gift 
the money to the shaykh acts as a loophole which allows Abū Sa‘īd to break the 
manifest law. In this example the definition of the hidden law is simply a more 
complete understanding of the events which had taken place through clairvoyance. It 
therefore does not describe the hidden law as anything other than a complete 
knowledge of the facts of the case. 
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Al-Baghdādī certainly does not approve of transgressing the law explicitly, however the 
ambiguity between divine insight and the law is not fully resolved here. Ultimately, al-
Baghdādī seems to accept that the Sufi will inevitably have false accusations levelled 
against him in his quoting of Abū Sa‘īd’s statement that whoever saw him during his 
shaykh-hood viewed him as a heretic. Al-Baghdādī seems to say that there will always 
be critics who will suspect the Sufis of antinomianism. Hence, dispensation from the 
manifest law is allowed to exist in the framework of the Sufi institution which limits its 
expression to the authority of the shaykh. This discussion, should not be interpreted as 
al-Baghdādī giving licence for breaking the law in any meaningful way. Rather, given 
the context of the discussion, in a chapter regarding the relationship between Sufis and 
rulers, it would be more appropriate to understand this passage as an expression of the 
elitist conception of the Sufi shaykh who is given authority to make judgements which 
may contradict that of a legal scholars. This elitism is paralleled by increasingly 
hierarchical structures within the Sufi institution itself. 433  Hence what may initially 
seem to be a discussion of antinomianism is in fact an argument for the elite status of 
the completed Sufi. This goes some way towards explaining why al-Baghdādī does not 
definitively resolve the tension between law and divine inspiration since it is necessary 
to maintain the shaykh’s right to dispense with legal rulings and lay claim to greater 
political authority.  
 
As Muslim society was increasingly reliant on the madrasa, khānqa and futuwwa 
organisations for political stability and continuity in this period, it became important to 
belong to a certain group or organisation which could provide routes to political 
engagement. While the rulers sought to gain legitimacy through patronage of such 
institutions, the poor could also protect their interests by attaching themselves to such 
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an institution. For example, having their property constitute an endowment (waqf) to 
come under the protection of a Sufi school.434 
 
However, attachment to a Sufi group often had wider implications during this period. 
Competing patrician interests caused warring and violence between Shafi‘ī and Ḥanafī 
factions in the 10th and 11th centuries. These institutions were the main vehicles 
through which the authority and influence of one group could be established. Yet these 
attacks did not focus on the variance in legal methods, rather Ḥanafīs resorted to 
denouncing the theological positions of Ash‘arism which was associated with Shafi‘ism 
at the time. Shifting the accusations to the theology of the Shafi‘īs allowed for criticism 
of the school since its reputation as a legitimate legal institution was not 
questionable.435 Sufism in the 10th and 11th centuries, in most cases was aligned to Shafi‘ī 
institutions too, and offered the prospect of an attachment to a broader network of 
institutions.  
 
That belonging to a Sufi group was increasingly beneficial is seen in discussions of the 
problem of tashabbuh (behaving as, or pretending to be like a Sufi) is discussed by many 
prominent Sufi writers of the 11th and 12th centuries including Abū al-Najīb al-
Suhrawardī.436 ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī formalised the affiliation of these “imitators” and 
propagated a more widespread and populist Sufi community. 437  In addition to 
discussions regarding imitators, the usage of the terms ‘āmma (the common people) and 
khāṣṣa (the elite) by Sufi authors also indicates the increasing hierarchical notions 
present in Sufism in the 12th and 13th century. Muslim scholars had always distinguished 
themselves from the commoners as the “elite.” Yet in the 10th century, Sufis began to 
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refer to themselves as the “elite of the elite” around Junayd al-Baghdādī’s time.438 Al-
Ghazālī also employs this tripartite distinction of society in a letter to a Saljuq vizier 
distinguishing between the masses, the devout, and the Sufis.439 
 
Jonathon Brown contrasts Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī’s derogatory usage of the term ‘āmma 
when referring to the general populace with the more technical usage, referring to the 
stations Sufis may achieve in order to mark hierarchies within the community in the 
writings of the later Kubrawī Shaykh Nūr al-Dīn Isfarā’inī (d. 639/1242) as well as Ibn 
‘Arabī. Brown argues that the maturity of the term indicates a more accommodating 
form of Sufism which spread among the masses. Yet it also indicates an increasing 
emphasis on the internal structure of the order, distinguishing elite Sufis from 
“common” Sufis, highlighting the increased attachment to Sufi orders among the 
general populace, as well as its transition from a marginal movement to the 
mainstream. 440 
 
However, while a trend of increasing institutionalisation and popularisation of Sufism is 
clearly discernable in the 12th and 13th centuries, we should not assume that this was 
due to the acceptance of a once unacceptable religious movement. Furthermore, as we 
have argued here, not all Sufi thinkers necessarily embraced a relaxed attitude towards 
affiliation despite the spread and popularity of Sufism. For example that al-Baghdādī 
maintains an exclusivist notion of discipleship while also according the shaykh a 
prominent public role and allowing the community to spread.  
 
In light of this, Brown’s assertion that Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī’s adoption of Sufism 
incorporated a previously heterodox movement into Islamic Orthodoxy seems 
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problematic.441 Sufism throughout the 11th century, though not as widespread as it 
seems to have become later on, had been very much tied to the development of the 
Islamic legal traditions, particularly the Shafi‘ī school of law, al-Qushayrī for example 
equates Sufism with the Shafi‘ī school.442 Margaret Malamud has also shown that the 
madrasa functioned as a space where students could study Sufism, and that Sufis were 
often members of the ‘ulāmā’ in the 11th century, well before al-Ghazālī’s conversion to 
Sufism.443 Yet, even Malamud’s arguments are couched in the premise that Sufism, prior 
to its attachment to Shafi‘ism had been outside the mainstream, an assertion which 
Melchert has shown to be problematic in light of evidence that even before its 
identification with Sufism, Malāmatism had been central to the religious 
establishment.444  
 
Hence, the development of an elitist self-conception among Sufis does not indicate a 
movement from the unorthodox to the mainstream. There was continuity between 
previous mystical trends and the rise of Sufism and there was always a connection 
between mysticism and legal institutions, which only became more distinct in later 
centuries. The increasing institutionalisation of Sufism can be seen to coincide with 
similar developments in other branches of Islamic learning such as the madrasa well 
before al-Ghazālī’s defence of Sufism. There is also a potential contradiction in asserting 
that al-Ghazālī popularised Sufism and yet maintained that the masses should not be 
permitted to partake in it. Moreover, Brown’s claim that later Sufis did not project 
notions of elitism into the lives of earlier Sufis is simply not accurate.445 For example 
‘Aṭṭār reflects a distinction between commoners, religious scholars and Sufis in his 
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accounts of Dhū al-Nūn where the Sufi is certainly ranked above the scholar.446 This 
attests to the fact that such notions had currency even in the 13th century.  
 
Sufism, even when exclusivist in its tone, and more selective in who to officially allow 
into its ranks was always intertwined with the religious establishment of medieval 
Islamic society, could still prove to be popular, and could still fulfil important public 
roles. In analysing al-Baghdādī’s discussion of shaykh and disciple, a school could have a 
rather insular internal structure while still emphasising service to the general 
populace. Thus, even when Sufis such as al-Ghazālī espoused a hardened attitude 
towards the general populace, we cannot assume that they shunned them and barred 
them from participating in the activities of the Sufi lodge. Elitism played an important 
political role in asserting the primacy of the Sufi institution. Discussion of 
antinomianism and unorthodoxy therefore ought to be considered for their relevance 
to elitism and society, and not limited to concerns over emerging antinomian mystical 
brotherhoods. 
 
While al-Ghazālī’s elitist notions regarding the general populace were not necessarily 
reproduced by prominent mystics such as Ibn al-‘Arabī in the early 13th century, there is 
clear evidence that such notions persisted, as evinced in the Tuḥfa where society is 
arranged within a four-part hierarchy with Sufis at the top. Elements of these divisions 
are also found in al-Rāzī’s Mirṣād.447 Al-Baghdādī, when addressing the question of 
whether a Sufi should interact with the general population or sultans and rulers, often 
refers to the saying of the prophet that to mix with people and patiently bear the pain 
they inflict is better than not to mix with them at all.448 Al-Baghdādī often portrays 
engagement with wider society as a test or struggle that the Sufi should bear when 
necessary.  	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This undoubtedly indicates a negative view of the ruling classes and wider society, we 
should read al-Baghdādī as arguing for the engagement of Sufis with society precisely 
because it is a test they must face. Furthermore, reintegrating into society is a 
necessary step in transcending the spirit and reaching the presence of God and 
completion.449 Sufis could then insist on engagement with wider society, despite elitism 
and negative notions of the general populace. We should therefore not assume that 
harsh statements regarding commoners and the political class resulted in an 
isolationist Sufi community.  
 
Brown’s reading limits Sufism to one trajectory, moving from a marginal place in 
society to the mainstream, accompanied by a move from elitism to populism. Such a 
reading neglects to understand the multiple ways in which Sufism developed at the 
time. In al-Baghdādī’s case elitism serves to assert a Kubrawī Sufi identity in the wake of 
the Suhrawardiyya who espoused a more populist message. In addition, it also fortifies 
the Sufi community against political interests in a time of uncertainty. Al-Ghazālī was 
also concerned with fortifying the Sufi institution against political influences which to a 
large extent explains his elitist attitude.450 
 
Elitism in al-Baghdādī’s case reveals that by his time there was an increasingly stark 
self-conscious distinction between Sufi institutions and legal institutions which had 
previously been closely intertwined. This is evident in his diminishment of the 
connection of Sufism to Shafi‘ī law, stating that a ruling is chosen based on the insight 
of the shaykh or in order to defy the ego in the case of the initiate. This is a marked 
contrast to the close association between Sufism and Shafi‘ism which is found in al-
Qushayrī’s work. Hence, al-Baghdādī’s flexibility when it comes to the law is evidence of 	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the emergence of more confidently distinct institution. In this context, maintaining the 
ability to dispense with legal rulings in the form of divine insight is important. Hence 
the development of a hierarchy regarding dispensations regulates subversive 
expressions of religion while offering the Sufi shaykh some important freedoms. 
 
5.  Mystical  experience and the case for normative behaviour 
 
This tension between mystical experience and the religious law is revealed in other 
chapters of the Tuḥfa. In the 8th chapter of the book al-Baghdādī discusses the possibility 
of receiving a divine message or vision from God, ordering the Sufi to break the law. Al-
Baghdādī does not deny the authenticity of such a message but characterises the 
phenomenon as a test stating: 
 
If there appears (sanaḥat) in the heart of the disciple a sign from God, praise be to him, 
to abandon a specific, obligatory act of worship, and the ego agrees with it, then that is 
a test and strife, and it is necessary for him to take refuge in God from God. The Prophet 
has said: “I take refuge in your bounty from your anger and I take refuge in your 
forgiveness from your punishment and I take refuge in you from you.” I heard our 
shaykh Abu al-Jannāb al-Ḥāfiẓ [Najm al-Dīn Kubrā] say: “I heard Rūzbihān al-Miṣrī say, 
[I heard a voice] say to me once to abandon prayer, “for you have no need of it.” And so 
I said, my Lord I can not endure that, order me to do something else.” This is the nature 
of the protected ones. For the arrogant natured one, and those who have not been 
trained by a true shaykh, if he comes across something like this, he abandons his 
worship and God deceives him without him knowing.451 
 
Here al-Baghdādī acknowledges that an order to abandon worship from God could 
occur in the Sufi’s visionary experiences. However he does not seem to consider such 	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an experience to be a genuine message from God. Such a vision is described as occuring 
due to the incompletion of the perceiver. Yet the possibility of such an occurrence is 
central to his argument for the need for institutionalisation. This threat of God’s divine 
machinations, or makr, which al-Baghdādī refers to at various points in the text allows 
him to argue for the need of a shaykh who can guide the Sufi. 
 
Again, the arrogant Sufi is characterised as one who has not been taught by a shaykh 
and has not cultivated the correct disposition to respond to the event as Rūzbihān al-
Miṣrī had done. For the moment however, the questions that arise from the possibility 
of two opposing commands from God, one from scripture and another from spiritual 
vision or insight, is not theoretically resolved here. This again puts mystical experience 
in contention with Islamic law, and al-Baghdādī instead turns to the bond between 
shaykh and disciple to assure adherence to the law. 
 
Stressing the need for a shaykh however does not systematically rule out dispensation 
from the law in theory, rather it is simply a strategy to temper antinomian behaviour. 
The closest al-Baghdādī comes to resolving these tensions between divine insight and 
the law in favour of normative behaviour and practice through a systematised 
discussion of psychology, is seen in his discussions of prayer and audition. Here al-
Baghdādī draws on his psychological theories of the body manifesting the nature of the 
soul, and of physical perception as a medium for a spiritual truth. Regarding the 
obligatory prayers al-Baghdādī states: 
 
And I have seen the ignorant Sufis abandon obligatory prayer without a sign [from 
God]. And it is said that the wayfarer is required to be consistent with his prayer, and 
the unfortunate one did not know that prayer has a physical form (qālib) and a spirit 
(rūḥan). And its physical form is its image which is composed of the rules, Prophetic 
traditions and parts, and its spirit is presence (ḥuḍūr) and witnessing… and the physical 
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form of prayer is like the physical form of man, and its spirit is like his spirit. And just as 
the spirit of man is not man [in his entirety] but is part of man, so too is the spirit of 
prayer not prayer itself but part of prayer. For as long as [man’s] life remains, and the 
spirit remains attached to the frame [of the body], it is necessary for the [bodily frame] 
to adorn itself with the physical form of prayer, and the spirit with its spirit… And God 
has said to His Prophet… “And worship your Lord until you attain certainty,” and the 
Qur’an commentators (mufassirūn) have agreed that what is meant by certainty here is 
death.452 
 
Here we see that al-Baghdādī emphatically rejects that the completed Sufis could 
justifiably abandon the obligatory prayer for as long as they live. Having adopted a 
dualistic account of body and soul, al-Baghdādī reassures the reader that as long as the 
soul is attached to the body, the body must perform the actions of prayer. Al-Baghdādī’s 
statement that one can dispense with prayer upon attaining certainty in death echoes 
Kubrā’s writings. In the Fawā’iḥ Kubrā states that bodily existence represented by the 
elements will not be gotten rid of completely until the actual death, but the voluntary 
death of the Sufi which involves purification of the soul will remove some of these 
aspects.453   
 
As we have discussed, Kubrā’s treatise al-Uṣūl al-‘ashra, develops the concept of 
voluntary death and posits that in order to avoid experiencing suffering in the 
hereafter one must become acquainted with death, and overcome bodily existence in 
this life, that way the soul will not suffer when it is forced to abandon the body.454 This 
argument informs each of Kubrā’s ten principles to which the Sufi must adhere. Al-
Baghdādī develops Kubrā’s ideas here in order to stress the importance of religious 
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practices and obligations. In Kubrā’s treatise, only the physical death allows the 
attainment of complete knowledge and encountering one’s lord.455  
 
Al-Baghdādī’s argument here is formulated as a response to the hypothetical claim that 
one can adhere to the spirit of prayer but not its physical form which is interesting in 
itself since the imagined claim seems to take body-soul dualism as a given. This 
indicates that al-Baghdādī attempts to preclude potential problematic conclusions in 
the adoption of body-soul dualism. Here al-Baghdādī’s further systematised psychology 
builds upon Kubrā’s ideas in order to argue against abandoning prayer. Firstly, despite 
the adoption of body-soul dualism, al-Baghdādī ensures that as long as the soul and 
body are attached, the body must perform the physical form of prayer. Secondly, the 
nature of the body, as the vehicle which expresses the soul, necessitates that prayer 
must manifest through the medium of the body. 
 
Al-Baghdādī renders the physical world a manifestation of spiritual truths, in order to 
argue that there can be no adherence to the spirit of the law without also adhering to 
its bodily form. His statement that the spiritual aspect of prayer is not prayer in its 
entirety, just as man’s soul is not fully man without the body, stresses the importance 
of the bodily world. The body must conform to the physical form of worship as long as 
it exists. This discussion parallels al-Ghazālī’s Mishkāt where he explains that the 
manifest world parallels and represents the hidden world. Here al-Ghazālī states that 
the Prophetic narration that the angels do not visit one’s house if a dog is present there 
is true both with regard to its hidden meaning (sirr) and apparent image (ẓāhir). He then 
explains that the intended meaning is that the house of the heart should be free from 
the dog of anger because it obstructs knowledge which is an angelic light. Nevertheless 
since the image represents the hidden meaning, it is important for the Muslim to 
conform to this narration in both its hidden and apparent meanings. He then explains 	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that some Sufis have made a grave mistake by abandoning their obligatory prayers 
while maintaining that they remain praying in their innermost hearts. He also 
mentions that he who abstracts the hidden from the apparent is a bāṭinī, meaning an 
Ismaili.456 Hence, in his most systematic attempt to resolve the theoretical tension 
between completion and the law, al-Baghdādī builds upon both al-Ghazālī and Kubrā’s 
thought.  
 
This is not the only instance where al-Baghdādī stresses the importance of bodily 
existence to argue against antinomian behaviour. In his discussion of audition, al-
Baghdādī asserted the need to sense the bodily sensation along with the spiritual 
sensation in order to comprehend the truths presented by the outer senses completely. 
Hence the physical senses has a spirit (rūḥ) which was independent of bodily particulars 
and above time and space, but did not represent the entirety of the experience.457 The 
terminology employed in the discussion of prayer closely mirrors the discussion of 
music and physical sensation in al-Baghdādī’s 10th chapter with regard to the bodily and 
spiritual aspects of sound. Moreover, in our analysis of audition in the Tuḥfa, we saw 
that true perfection of the senses required one to overcome the state of perceiving the 
spiritual sound while neglecting the physical. Hence, completion always involves a 
bodily manifestation for al-Baghdādī. 
 
His discussion of the role of the senses in audition is highly relevant here. Wajd is an 
ecstatic state closely associated with ecstatic expressions (shaṭḥ) in Sufi thought.458 Wajd 
was also commonly associated with the practice of audition as we have numerous 
descriptions of Sufis entering this state while listening to music and poetry. Sarrāj 
explained these often seemingly heretical utterances as the overflowing of a powerful 
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experience of the divine, but which he considered more common amongst initiates and 
novices. These utterances were considered dangerous for the masses to hear but 
worthy of analysis and interpretation for the learned scholars. Despite this, some Sufis 
such as al-Ghazālī seem to have supported the execution of a Sufi who publicly 
expresses such utterances.459 
 
One of the primary concerns of al-Baghdādī’s discussion of samā‘ is its relationship to 
antinomian behaviour. Though this is not stated explicitly, al-Baghdādī’s intention is 
clear as he defines the antinomian behaviours associated with audition as an 
incomplete state of listening.460 Here, he characterises the incomplete Sufi as removed 
from their physical senses due to the force of the spiritual senses, whereas the 
completed Sufi would not be overwhelmed, and because of this he would hear God’s 
speech through the unintelligible sounds of birdsong, ringing bells and creaking wells.  
 
Emphasising the bodily world as a representation of the hidden world, or even God’s 
speech, functions as an attempt to restrict subversive behaviour. Theophany is often 
considered for its potential heresy and is cited as one of the main sources of tension 
between Sufis and those who insist on maintaining God’s transcendence. In al-
Baghdādī’s thought the relationship between the manifest and hidden world which 
parallel each other is a powerful argument which reinforces normative behaviour.  
 
6 .  Wayfaring and spiritual f l ight  
 
In al-Baghdādī’s thought, conceptions of antinomianism are closely related to the way 
in which the Sufi path is envisaged. When a Sufi author identifies behaviours and 
experiences as either belonging to the state of beginners, intermediates or perfected 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
459 Ernst, Words, 12-14. 
460 See Chapter 2. 
	   247	  
Sufis, we learn a great deal about the author’s attitude to antinomianism. These stages 
in al-Baghdādī’s work are often identifiable with the various terms used to describe the 
path. Here al-Baghdādī’s develops these terms with regard to their relationship to 
notions of obligation (taklīf). Notions of attraction and reaching the end point are 
central to al-Baghdādī’s discussion of religious obligations, and whether the completed 
Sufi is able to dispense with them. It will therefore be necessary to analyse the terms al-
Baghdādī employs in describing the Sufi journey in order to grasp how attraction to 
God is related to the requirement to fulfill obligations. 
 
In the 8th and 9th chapters of the Tuḥfa, the possibility of breaking the law or neglecting 
acts of worship in any significant way is muted by the formalisation of the Sufi 
institution. Al-Baghdādī sees subversive beliefs and practices as problematic when they 
exist outside the Sufi institution, however to some extent heterodox beliefs and 
behaviours could be expressed within the institution where they were controlled by 
hierarchies. If heterodoxy occurred outside the bounds of the Sufi institution however, 
it may still have been tolerated and even considered a genuine spiritual experience, but 
an unaffiliated mystic was not allowed to claim spiritual authority, or to propagate a 
legitimate lineage. 
 
Al-Baghdādī’s codification of the shaykh-disciple relationship was therefore aimed to 
deal with the problematic social and theoretical elements of Sufism. Yet, it was 
necessary for al-Baghdādī to tread a fine line between maintaining the elitist notion of 
Sufi authority while also restricting antinomian behaviour. Hence, formalisation of Sufi 
behaviour attempts to refine what it means to be “complete.” It also meant that 
dispensations from the law had to be institutionally sanctioned, diminishing the 
potential to subvert social and religious norms.  
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This is evident in al-Baghdādī’s definition of attaining the end point, (intihā’) and 
attraction, (jadhb) which accompanies it. The term attraction had signified moments of 
rapture in early Sufism, however it came to be associated with unconventional rapture 
and eccentric behaviour in around the 11th century.461 For al-Baghdādī and ‘Umar al-
Suhrawardī, the term begins to acquire a more definite meaning. As mentioned, al-
Baghdādī describes the Sufi who had attained intihā’ as one who is no longer conscious 
of his own actions as God commands the Sufi’s heart and body. This accompanied an 
exchange of acts of worship for effortless attraction in nearing the divine. At this point 
it is revealed to the Sufi that his acts of worship were not bringing him any closer to the 
divine, rather it was out of God’s grace that one attained these states. Furthermore 
being conscious of one’s own worship was a veil to God which indicated the rule of the 
spirit over the heart rather than God. This state of shaykh-hood is described by al-
Baghdādī as attraction. In the Tuḥfa, attraction signifies a permanent state in which 
there is the possibility of infinite progression.  
 
For al-Baghdādī, the term attraction is best understood as a counterpart to wayfaring, 
sulūk, as well as sayr. These terms describe different ways in which the Sufi progresses 
on his path to God. Wayfaring came to refer to a behavioural etiquette, while the terms 
sayr, or voyaging and ṭayr, or spiritual flight, became increasingly connected to 
visionary or meditative disciplines. Lewisohn for example has described the latter as a 
visionary voyage.462 In any case, we can be certain that by the time the prolific Kubrawī 
writer ‘Azīz al-Dīn al-Nasafī came to formulate his ideas, these terms had acquired 
distinct meanings which described particular disciplines within Sufism.463 
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However, that these terms were beginning to acquire distinct meanings much earlier, 
in Kubrā and al-Baghdādī’s time has not been significantly highlighted. Al-Baghdādī 
employs the term “spiritual flight” as referring to a state just below being “abducted” 
by God. The Sufi who nears completion is described as oscillating between these two 
states.464 Spiritual flight is therefore placed above wayfaring which is an exoteric code 
of conduct, but below abduction which is synonymous with attraction. 
 
Understanding the term “flight” in the Tuḥfa however is complicated by al-Baghdādī’s 
metaphorical usage of the term. For example, al-Baghdādī refers to the disciple as an 
egg that must be tended to by a mother bird so that the chick can emerge from its shell 
and becomes receptive to “flight.”465 These descriptions remain rather general and do 
not provide us with a concrete characterisation. If we look to Kubrā, the term “flight” is 
overwhelmingly connected to visionary experiences.466 
 
This connotation of flight with spiritual visions and ecstatic states are also reproduced 
in al-Baghdādī’s work. This is not simply a hierarchical arrangement, there are certain 
psycho-spiritual goals in practising wayfaring and spiritual flight. In his 10th chapter, on 
audition, al-Baghdād argues that audition is essential for the removal of contraction 
(qabḍ) from the soul and imbuing it with feelings of expansion (basṭ). In this discussion 
he associates these terms with wayfaring and spiritual flight respectively stating: 
 
For the disciples, and the companions of striving and discipline, and the practitioners of 
seclusion and isolation are of varying ranks and conditions, they may taste the delicacy 
of expansion with which [God] awakens their hearts. And He removes from them the 
effects of discipline and the fatigue of striving. And it may be that he places them in 
contraction which, if allowed to persist, results in depression and discontentment, 	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which we fear may grieve the disciple in seclusion and open his inner being to 
receptivity to Satan and the ego. And in both instances, the shaykh trains him 
according to his critical examination. For if he is in a state of expansion, wanting 
through audition, to make him feel longing and desire, and he beseeches through it, 
with the supplication of his protected heart, so that he is not tested by the frustrated 
prolongment of his heart and his spirit in [a state of] contraction. And with that, he 
exchanges his wayfaring with spiritual flight.467 
 
Here al-Baghdādī associates asceticism and austerities with wayfaring, while 
expansiveness is associated with spiritual flight. Hence, wayfaring takes as its main 
concern the exoteric etiquette of behaviour, while flight is related to the psycho-
spiritual experiences of the Sufi. Al-Baghdādī is not as clear on the distinction between 
the two terms as later writers, but we can certainly see an attempt to define these two 
terms in the Tuḥfa and can therefore posit that al-Baghdādī and Kubrā influenced the 
connotations that these terms were to acquire.  
 
Al-Baghdādī’s own student, Najm al-Dīn al-Rāzī, using the same imagery as his master, 
places flight above wayfaring, describing the novice who cannot “fly” as an “egg that 
has not reached bird-hood.” Yet al-Rāzī also makes clear that “flight” is only possible 
with the guidance of a shaykh, and that, under the guidance of a shaykh “who 
resembles a bird,” the disciple is able to cover “vast distances” more quickly. 468  He then 
relates a conversation with a Sufi named Shaykh Abū Bakr who, was drawn to God 
without a shaykh, and says that although he had passed “mighty obstacles” by virtue of 
“rapturous states,” it took him 45 years to arrive at a particular station. al-Rāzī then 
states that he related this conversation to al-Baghdādī who comments: 
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None ever recognises the true value of the shaykh, nor is able to repay the debt that he 
owes him. We have disciples who in two years fulfil all the requirements of wayfaring, 
from the beginning of the path to the end of Truth. And when they reach that station of 
which you speak, we cause them to pass beyond it in one or two days. Yet that 
venerable one, after forty five years of struggle and being drawn nigh to God, tarries 
there for two whole years and suffers so much pain.469 
 
In this exchange between al-Rāzī and al-Baghdādī, flight as a more structured discipline 
with institutional significances. This is the essential point of the bird-egg metaphors 
employed by both al-Rāzī and al-Baghdādī. The contrast here between a naturally 
attracted non-affiliated Sufi and one who is trained by a shaykh is stark. While the non-
affiliated Sufi came closer to God through rapture he was unable to progress from these 
spiritual experiences which overwhelmed him. This also indicates that al-Bagdhādī’s 
more structured theory of visions and spiritual experiences was intended to guide the 
disciple through such obstacles. 
 
The development of ‘spiritual flight’ as a distinct notion associated with the guidance of 
a shaykh through visionary and ecstatic experiences also devalues spontaneous ecstatic 
experiences, encapsulating what we have previously detailed as one of the main 
arguments of the Tuḥfa, namely that those who are naturally attracted to God do not 
qualify as shaykhs since they do not understand how to guide a person for whom such 
natural attraction is not experienced. Flight serves as a counterpart to this spontaneous 
series of mystical experiences, suggesting a more structured approach in dealing with 
visions and ecstatic states. One of the main aspects of flight then, is its effectiveness in 
moving the Sufi to completion more efficiently. This also highlights the relevance of al-
Baghdādī’s systematised oneirology for the stratification of the Sufi path. 
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7. Attraction and reaching the final stages of the path 
 
Given what we have presented here, it is important to note that al-Baghdādī’s notion of 
attraction, as the end point of the Sufi journey is a significant development of the term 
from spontaneous attraction experienced by the un-affiliated Sufi. It does seem strange 
that al-Baghdādī chooses the word attraction, or jadhb to define the completed state of 
the Sufi. However, al-Baghdādī’s descriptions of attraction differ markedly from earlier 
definitions of the term, since for al-Baghdādī, attraction and reaching the final point 
(intihā’) are intimately connected. 
 
For his contemporary in Iraq, ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī, jadhb retains more of its older 
meaning in that it is ideally a temporary state. Both al-Suhrawardī and al-Baghdādī 
develop the notion that the muntahī has before him limitless potential for progression. 
However, unlike al-Baghdādī who characterises completion as an infinite progression of 
travelling “within” God, for al-Suhrawardī the Sufi experiences jadhb and is meant to 
follow this with further acts of devotion (mu‘āmala). This results in the attainment of a 
greater state which is then followed by a higher jadhb and again spurs the Sufi on to a 
higher act of devotion. Al-Suhrawardī therefore establishes an infinite series of jadhb 
and mu‘āmala which results in a symbiotic relationship between the two which means 
that the Sufi is never able to completely abandon practice. For al-Suhrawardī, attaining 
a permanent state of jadhb is a trap which the Sufi should avoid falling into. Instead the 
Sufi ought to continually experience moments of attraction and overcome them 
through acts of devotion.470 
 
By contrast al-Baghdādī’s psychological progression is not characterised as a symbiotic 
relationship between experiencing attractions and performing acts of devotion, as the 
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natural state of the shaykh comes to be defined as a constant state of attraction in 
which he desires to perform acts of worship. For al-Suhrawardī, this symbiotic 
relationship maintains the importance of ritual and worship. Since this framework is 
not available to al-Baghdādī, he sets forth a number of other arguments which stress 
the need for adherence to Islamic law and acts of devotion after intihā’ has been 
reached. These arguments depend on al-Baghdādī redefining the meaning of obligation 
(taklīf) within a state of attraction. 
 
Al-Baghdādī introduces the term attraction very early on in the text, in the first 
chapter of the Tuḥfa. Here, the term is contrasted to the wayfaring of the ego and the 
sailing of the heart which is described as a sea voyage in contrast to the land voyage of 
the beginner, as al-Baghdādī explains in a passage embellished with geographical 
imagery: 
 
And if he crosses the caverns of the ego and reaches the shores of the oceans of the 
heart, and at that point his etiquettes are exchanged and differ like the condition of he 
who travels in a perilous wilderness and the condition of he who crosses oceans and 
swims in the waters. For the etiquettes of swimming and knowledge of the details of 
sailing and ships oppose the etiquettes of crossing valleys (thaghar)… And just as there 
are for land mounts [horses and camels] stations and abodes which support the 
caravan… So does the wayfarer, in the caverns of the ego, have abodes and stations.471  
 
And: 
 
There are no stations and abodes for seafaring vessels and ships, apart from when 
disaster and hurricanes take hold. And that is because [ships] do not require any 
nourishment or replenishing, but their nourishment is in the appropriate wind which 
strengthens it.  Likewise is the state of the heart which does not have any stations or 	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abodes because it does not require bodily, animal food… But its nourishments are the 
breezes of the subtle attractions of The Real.472 
 
He then explains that once the Sufi has accomplished the proper etiquette in this state, 
meaning the state of reaching the heart and beyond the ego, he is “transported by the 
divine attractions to the world of the innermost heart.” Here, he is to adhere to a 
different set of behaviours which al-Baghdādī explains are intended to “turn him 
towards facing the presence of God (ḥaḍrat al-rubūbiyya) and the conditions incumbent 
upon the Sufi in this state are those of presence (ḥuḍūr) and witnessing [visions].”473  
 
Finally al-Baghdādī reveals that these three modes of travel which each require certain 
behaviours correspond to the well-known hierarchical division of faith, islām, īmān, and 
iḥsān. Al-Baghdādī states that travelling through the wilderness of the ego requires the 
etiquettes of islām, while crossing the ocean of the heart requires īmān. Finally, being 
transported to the world spirits firstly, and secondly into the enclosure of the 
innermost heart and the presence of God’s beauty and majesty, pertains to the 
etiquettes of iḥsān.474  
 
Al-Baghdādī’s aim here is the development of a distinct hierarchy regarding the stages 
of the path. Each station is connected to a particular method of behaviour and 
therefore attraction appears here not as a substitute for acts of worship, but a state 
which requires a new set of behaviours. This already positions al-Baghdādī to argue 
that the behavioural stipulations are necessary even at the end of the path. 
Furthermore the introduction of etiquettes or ādāb into the stationless progressions 
beyond the ego serves as an attempt to introduce etiquette into the higher levels of the 
path. 	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The meaning of attraction develops further throughout the text. In the 3rd chapter 
when al-Baghdādī begins to detail the psychological theory which informs the Tuḥfa, he 
equates attraction with the manifestation of the divine attributes. Here he makes a 
direct parallel between “exchanging the attributes of the spirit for the attributes of 
God” with the “negation of sayr”, which is related to “flight,” and the exchange of sayr 
with attraction. At this point, “the kernel of attraction is freed from the shell of sayr.”475 
He then goes on to describe the journey of attraction as infinite, stating: 
 
If sayr is exchanged for attraction, travelling occurs in the world of God’s attributes, and 
[this travelling] has no end point.476 
 
He also describes it as follows: 
 
If sayr in the world of humanness ends, and providence attracts him to the enclosures of 
honour, loving is exchanged for being loved.477 
And: 
 
And in reaching the presence of God, we have made clear that, although it is the end of 
sayr, it is the beginning of the emergence of attraction. And travelling with attraction 
within God is without end.478 
 
It is important to note the significance of these descriptions of attraction for wider Sufi 
thought. The peculiar phrase travelling inside God for example which is repeated in the 
Tuḥfa, is also prevalent in the works of the poet ‘Aṭṭār and lends credence to the latter’s 
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connections with Kubrawīs.479 In addition, the description of attraction in terms of 
transitioning from being the lover to being beloved draws on Kubrā’s descriptions of 
finality which we presented in our discussion of psychology.480 Here, al-Baghdādī’s 
definition of intihā’ is in fact not accurately rendered completion, but moving beyond 
wayfaring and flight and indicates reaching the point of travelling within God and 
actualising His attributes. This is the beginning for the possibility of infinite 
progression: 
 
And travelling in God is without end, neither in this world nor in the next. And if the 
arrogant attracted one is pleased with his completion, and is in the service of a shaykh, 
then without a doubt the shaykh makes known to him his shortcomings and reveals to 
him his limitations, and he perceives his attractions with wayfaring until he solves his 
problem.481 
 
This was important for the institutionalisation and centralisation of the shaykh’s 
authority, since it defines shaykh-hood and keeps the highly advanced Sufi in need of a 
shaykh. Here, the advanced Sufi may remain in need of a shaykh despite actualising the 
attributes of God since it is an infinite process. Al-Baghdādī’s notion of attraction is not 
free from the potential pitfalls of arrogance which accompany advanced states. Hence, 
the structure of the shaykh-disciple relationship remains firmly in place, etiquette 
continues to be observed, and the shaykh remains the primary authority of the 
community. 
 
The argument which runs alongside this notion of completion is that the proper 
disposition of the perfected person would result in the seeker wanting to perform more 
acts of worship not less. In most of these discussions al-Baghdādī’s answer to whether 	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one is required to maintain taklīf, obligatory acts of worship, is to redefine obligatory 
acts in the context of the advanced Sufi as no longer being viewed as obligations. The 
term taklīf, connotes a strenuousness and difficulty in the performance of an action. 
Here al-Baghdādī claims that there is no taklīf in the advanced state. This does not mean 
that the Sufi is able to dispense from his obligations, but that the Sufi no longer 
perceives his obligations as obligations. This argument is very much dependent on the 
notion of completion and attraction which al-Baghdādī outlined for us. 
 
In the 9th chapter of the Tuḥfa, al-Baghdādī discusses whether one is at liberty to 
dispense with obligations and worship once they have reached completion. Here, al-
Baghdādī likens the ideal Sufi to a young man in love with a beautiful woman, arguing 
that for such a lover, austerities are not felt to be austerities at all as he would gladly 
endure hardships for the object of his love.482 Here God is rendered the feminine while 
the Sufi takes on the role of a courter. Al-Baghdādī attempts to reinterpret the meaning 
of obligations (taklīf) so that it no longer connotes a burden, but something which one 
desires to perform. Hence, the proper muntahī should want to perform more acts of 
devotion not less. This was a matter of realisation attached to completion. Therefore 
worship and obligations are the same at all stages, but it is only that the initiate and 
intermediate do not perceive attraction behind their efforts to achieve completion: 
 
The reality of the attractions (jadhbāt) is that they are the pains of worship. If the 
person who is instructed to perform [an act] or abstain [from it], and is one of those 
who have realised that this life is but amusement and play… And when they are 
instructed with an order and have been blessed with an act of worship they are 
contented [with it]. 483 
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For al-Baghdādī then, attraction and completion are processes of realising the true 
nature of worship, by which acts of devotion come to be viewed by the Sufi as 
expressions of love and longing rather than obligations. Al-Baghdādī also sets 
attraction up as the counterpart to wayfaring in the description of completion which 
we presented in the previous chapter. 484 Al-Baghdādī also explains the different goals of 
the initiate: 
 
For the true protected wayfarer, as his standing with God increases, and as He brings 
him nearer to His presence, increases in his enthusiasm in acts of worship and his 
fondness for them. And this is one of the signs of acceptance, for the striving of the 
initiate is in cutting the connection to the ego and creation, and negating all thought 
impressions... And the striving of the muntahī is, when there comes a time where there 
is no scope for an angel to come near [and appear to him], nor a prophet [to appear in a 
vision], and he strains his efforts in acquiring the delight [in] the arrival [to God], and 
his spirit is absorbed in witnessing The [lights of] Beauty and Majesty, he is removed 
from monitoring time in accordance with this state and no creation distracts him… This 
is [the station of] the Prophet, peace be upon him, when this station commands his 
inner being and the dominion of Beauty manifests and [the Prophet] left creation… And 
he was absorbed in completion. It was said that Muḥammad desired his Lord and was 
made to love seclusion and devotion until God weaned him off suckling from His care 
and rejected him (fashalahu) by [ordering him to] mix with creation and call them to the 
Truth. And if you ascertain that cutting the human relationship with creation is a 
burden on the seeker, then how [do you consider] cutting the relationship of intimacy 
with the presence of God? 485 
 
Al-Baghdādī, after appealing to the example of the Prophet in arguing that one must 
view the return to society as the true tribulation, presents the reader with the example 
of Kubrā’s shaykh, Rūzbihān al-Miṣrī rejecting a command which ordered him to leave 	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prayer which we have discussed above. Here, as in the previous passage, al-Baghdādī 
cleverly redefines the word obligation or taklīf as al-Miṣrī is made to say “oblige me 
with a different command” (kallifnī bi-shay’ ākhar).486 Indicating that the real obligation 
on al-Miṣrī was abandoning prayer. All this serves to redefine the meaning of asceticism 
for the muntahī who is no longer in need of ascetic practices. The disciple perceives 
obligations as hardships while the shaykh sees them as pleasurable. Therefore when 
one becomes a shaykh, performing acts of devotion is no longer defined as asceticism. 
This ensures the continuation of devotion, worship, adhering to the law and societal 
obligations upon completion.  
 
The real taklīf for the advanced Sufi then is not in performing acts of worship but in 
abandoning seclusion and the presence of the divine and returning to wider society. 
This again attempts to redefine taklīf so that the true hardship becomes having to 
abandon austerities and worship. In this way al-Baghdādī diminishes the importance of 
the question as it is reduced to an issue of semantics and a notion that what is 
considered a hardship is relative. Technically, the idea that the Sufi is no longer 
required to perform austerities is not explicitly rejected, but it seems inconceivable 
that this could be interpreted as abandoning obligatory worship since al-Baghdādī had 
absolutely rejected abandoning prayer.  
 
The effect of al-Baghdādī’s argument is effective in limiting the scope of another form 
of antinomianism. The tendency for the advanced Sufis to begin to love and desire 
seclusion and spiritual experiences may also lead to subversive behaviour. By rendering 
the obligation of the completed shaykh as a return to society and service to community, 
the subversive behaviour of abandoning society is regulated and rendered a liminal 
state. We see the importance the shaykh-disciple bond here. Clearly, the institution is 
conceived of as a safeguard to antinomianism by holding the Sufi to a set of correct 	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etiquettes depending on psycho-spiritual rank, regulated by the shaykh’s authority. 
While antinomian elements such as detachment from society and ecstatic behaviour 
remain a possibility, they are significantly restricted by al-Baghdādī’s formalisation of 
the shaykh-disciple bond as well as his psychological theory.  
 
The only instance where al-Baghdādī allows for a complete cessation of legal and ritual 
observance is in the case of insanity in the 8th chapter of the Tuḥfa, after asserting the 
need to adhere to the physical form of prayer. Here, al-Baghdādī very briefly gives us 
some insight into his views on holy fools (‘uqalā’ al-majānīn). Insanity was a complex 
idea in medieval Islamic society and it was not the case that the insane was always 
treated as a sort of saint, there were some conditions which the madman was required 
to fulfil.  
 
As a general rule all insane people were exempted from ritual obligations.487 Al-
Baghdādī in this passage on madness discusses the case of Luqmān al-Dasanjardī after 
explaining that the Sufi must pass through a stage where he begins to love seclusion 
and monitoring his soul. Al-Baghdādī explains that at this point the Sufi experiences a 
weakening of his efforts in physical acts of worship due to his joy in the psycho-
spiritual experiences of seclusion. Luqmān allowed himself to be overcome by this 
weakness and asked God to set him “free” from worship (‘ubūdīyya). Al-Baghdādī then 
tells us: 
 
And so his reason was taken from him, which is a prerequisite for [maintaining] 
obligations, and since then he became one of the holy fools (‘uqalā’ al-majānīn). And this 
is not one of the levels of completion but is of the protection (muḥāfaẓat) of God. The 
teacher al-Qushayrī has said in the Risāla that one of the dervishes would be absorbed in 
his intense love, an absorption that would busy him from creation and distract him 	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from feeling [his condition]. And if the time of prayer came, he would return to 
normality and pray, [afterwards] he would then return to his absorption. And this is the 
completion of protection and the effect of providence… And in my experience, as the 
effects of acceptance of the wayfarer increases, so do his obligations.488 
 
Al-Baghdādī uses the word ‘protection’ here to indicate a cessation in spiritual progress 
as opposed to progression. Hence the madman is one who was granted license to 
dispense with the law due to his insanity but is trapped in his incomplete condition.  
Mentioning that al-Dasanjardī would return to normality during prayer indicates an 
insanity which was not like a medical form of insanity. In some legal traditions for 
example, an insane man could not be divorced by his wife if his madness would cease 
during the hours of prayer. This seems to have qualified the madman for a type of holy 
insanity.489 Al-Baghdādī therefore once again provides us with an example of being free 
to dispense with the law without actually breaking it.  
 
Attitudes of reverence towards the insane, or holy fool are found in much earlier Sufi 
works. Al-Hujwīrī’s for example argues against the notion that the only type of 
knowledge was intellectual since the insane and children were considered be capable of 
gnosis.490 Al-Baghdādī’s accommodation of insanity is therefore nothing new. However, 
his characterisation of the insane here attempts to clarify the relationship between this 
type of mystical experience and the Sufi institution. Barring the insane from progress 
and releasing them from legal requirements also disqualifies them from a place within 
the Sufi institution.  
 
The holy fool is the antithesis of completion which is endless travel since he is trapped 
in a certain station. Al-Baghdādī stresses that the completed Sufi cannot cease 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
488 Al-Baghdādī, Tuḥfat al-barara, 35. 
489 Dols, Majnūn, 444. 
490 Al-Hujwīrī, Kashf al-Maḥjūb, 268. 
	   262	  
journeying and that attraction has no stops and stations. In order to continue on the 
infinite journey the Sufi is always required to adhere to certain behaviours and 
etiquettes. Hence, the one example where someone may legitimately become free from 
legal requirements and Sufi practice is held up against the ideal state of endless travel 
and adherence to the Sufi path.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Throughout this chapter we have attempted to disentangle the complex relationship 
between Sufism and antinomianism in al-Baghdādī’s text. Antinomianism in this period 
is multifaceted, it is not easily definable as a distinct group of people or set of beliefs, 
and as previously stated, al-Baghdādī is keen to maintain some dispensations from the 
law in a limited form in order to bolster the elitist conception of the Sufi institution and 
limit the involvement of lay affiliates within it. This results in a tension whereby al-
Baghdādī attempts to restrict dispensations from the law while granting the Sufi 
shaykh greater freedom with respect to the law in accordance to his understanding of 
the hidden law. 
 
For al-Baghdādī, restricting antinomianism is intimately bound to the notion 
institutionalised Sufism. The necessity of the institution is stressed in al-Baghdādī’s 
psychological theory and his prophetology which underpins notions of behaviour. Only 
by adherence to a shaykh is the Sufi able to transcend the ego and spirit and attain 
completion. This completion injects new meaning into the physical world as a 
manifestation of spiritual truths. In this way, even the more potentially radical 
elements of Kubrawī thought are employed by al-Baghdādī in service of a conservative 
attitude towards ritual obligations, stressing the need to adhere to the law while the 
soul remains attached to the body for instance. 
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These arguments, along with the tripartite division of the Sufi path establish a 
hierarchical institution. All of this depends very much on al-Baghdādī’s conception of 
psychology. The antinomian for al-Baghdādī becomes synonymous with a lack of 
completion, the inability to manifest the attributes of God. And this lack of completion 
is presented as a consequence of being devoid of the guidance of a shaykh with a 
spiritual lineage. From what we have presented then, it seems that the assertions that 
the early Kubrawīs could not resolve the tension between their engagement in political 
affairs and their asceticism seems untenable.491 The very same psychological theory al-
Baghdādī systematises in order to discuss dreams, visions, and spiritual sensation is also 
employed to codify Sufi behaviour. 
 
The result of al-Baghdādī’s arguments is that the non-affiliated, untrained Sufi’s 
authority is delegitimised. Yet the spiritual experiences of those rogue Sufis are not 
necessarily seen as disingenuous, intentionally misleading or the work of charlatans. In 
fact when al-Baghdādī describes Sufis who abandoned the obligatory prayer, something 
he absolutely disagrees with, he refers to them as “ignorant Sufis,” which suggests that 
al-Baghdādī is not concerned with completely ejecting them from the fold of Sufism. 
Hence, there is no attempt here to identify a particular antinomian identity such as a 
Qalandar. 
 
This attitude of tolerating some forms of subversion is indicative of a tension in al-
Baghdādī’s thought. Namely, that Sufism must retain some sense of authority above the 
law prima facie in order to maintain its social and political standing while also 
denouncing explicit transgressions of the law. This elitism is indicative of wider trends 
in Sufism in this period during which increasingly hierarchical structures were 
developed within Sufi communities. This accompanied ever closer ties to the political 	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classes which made Sufis more susceptible to accusations that they had corrupted true 
piety.492 In light of this, the emerging image of the Qalandarī was elevated to that of a 
genuine mystic who was clearly not part of the political and religious establishment.493 
 
The rise of antinomianism can be seen as a response to the increasing 
institutionalisation of Sufism as evinced by figures such as ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī and al-
Baghdādī. Hence, the Tuḥfa reveals an attempt to concentrate authority in the 
institutionalisaed Sufi community, which is likely to have contributed to the spread of 
antinomianism rather than its diminishment. Anitnomians now had to find expression 
outside the Sufi institution. Another challenge to Sufism which emerged after this 
period of increasing institutionalisation came from those who took issue with Sufism’s 
claim to esoteric knowledge beyond the law. Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim 
represented an attempt to divest Sufism from its claims to esoteric knowledge.494  
 
In doing so the hierarchies of Sufism and the very basis of the institution, the authority 
of the shaykh is denied, and a far more egalitarian alternative to authority is posited in 
its place by focusing on the sharī‘a and rendering it accessible to all.495 Both reactions 
are consistent with what we have detailed of al-Baghdādī’s discussion of 
antinomianism. The restriction of dispensations to institutionally sanctioned divine 
insight, along with the elitist conception of the Sufi institution fits well with the 
objections both of legalists who were uncomfortable with Sufism’s claims to hidden 
knowledge, as well as subversive mystical groups who were increasingly dissociated 
from Sufi institutions.  
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Chapter 5 
Investiture and Clothing 
 
An analysis of the discussion of dispensation and antinomianism found in the Tuḥfa 
would not be complete without turning our attention to the Sufi cloak  (khirqa) and the 
practices of investiture which developed around it. In al-Baghdādī’s discussion of the 
Sufi cloak, questions regarding the structure of the community and antinomianism 
intersect. Although al-Baghdādī’s writings do not explicitly state it, investiture is 
closely related to the issue of dispensations (rukhṣa). ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī allowed the 
investiture of lay-affiliates who could eschew Sufi practices and rituals, formalising 
their attachment to the Sufi institution without stipulating any obligations.  
 
Discussions of dispensations then were not only relevant to the potential 
antinomianism which accompanied claims of completion, but also for amassing 
disciples and the spread of the institution, since joining the Sufi institutions without 
any obligations would allow it to attract affiliates more easily. The discussions 
concerning the cloak of investiture serve to distinguish betwen al-Baghdādī’s Sufi 
community from other Sufi communities as he argues in opposition to notions and 
practices of investiture espoused by ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī. 
 
This chapter will first detail al-Baghdādī’s conception of the Sufi cloak, examining its 
significance within the theoretical framework we have outlined, as well as in the 
account of its origins provided in the Tuḥfa. We will then turn to a comparison between 
al-Baghdādī and ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī in order to highlight the emergence of self-
consciously distinct Sufi communities in this period and the relevance of theoretical 
stratification to emergence of this distinct identity. 
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This will highlight an important point in this transitional period in the history of 
Sufism. The discussion of investiture in the Tuḥfa points to the emergence of self-
consciously distinct Sufi communities, a significant indicator of the establishment of 
Sufi orders. This self-consciousness has not commonly been traced back to al-Baghdādī 
or the first generation of Kubrawīs. Hence, evidence of a communal identity in the text 
will oblige us to reassess the point when Sufis came to think of themselves as belonging 
to distinct Sufi communities in 12th and 13th centuries. This will allow us to posit the 
existence of a proto-Kubrawī community. 
 
Like Sufi authors before him, al-Baghdādī attempts to explain the origins and 
significance of Sufi clothing practices. Al-Sulamī, al-Qushayrī and al-Hujwīrī had earlier 
sought to explain the origin, and the meaning of particular Sufi modes of dress, as well 
as traditions of investiture. In these earlier texts, the discussions surrounding dress are 
characterised by practical concerns. Al-Baghdādī’s treatment of the topic differs 
markedly in its emphasis on the psycho-spiritual significance of clothing and its 
relationship to visionary theory and psycho-spiritual completion. The relationship 
between clothing and the visions of coloured lights reveals that clothing practices are 
tied to al-Baghdādī’s systematisation of Kubrā’s thought. 
 
Much of this discussion is contained in the 7th chapter of the Tuḥfa which is dedicated to 
discussing the khirqa (the Sufi cloak or habit). In his own words, al-Baghdādī attempts to 
address in this chapter the questions of the origins of the khirqa and its transmission 
(isnād), its purpose, whether its significance has been exaggerated by Sufis, and when it 
should be bestowed upon the disciple.496 The bulk of al-Baghdādī’s discussion however 
is primarily concerned with the structure of the Sufi community. The topic of clothing 
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is also discussed in the first few chapters of the Tuḥfa which detail the Sufi’s appearance 
and its relation to visionary progress.497 
 
Al-Baghdādī’s discussion of “exaggeration” is also an attempt to reconcile the tension 
between Sufi thought and the emphasis on the material culture of institutionalised 
Sufism. This is a necessary point to tackle for al-Baghdādī’s since it will be essential to 
defend and bolster the significance of the cloak to achieve his aims of structuring the 
affiliations of the Sufi community, by linking the institutional hierarchy with the 
theoretical basis of investiture. Hence, al-Baghdādī argues for the appropriateness of a 
greater emphasis on the material culture of Sufi dress which is essential for the 
formalisation of ranks and affiliations within the community. He achieves this by 
incorporating Sufi dress and investiture into his psychological framework. 
 
Al-Baghdādī’s views on the practical uses of clothing in Sufism are anchored in the 
same psychological framework which permeates the entirety of the Tuḥfa. The clothing 
practices al-Baghdādī expounds are not arbitrarily decided upon, rather they are 
portrayed as arising from the basis of psycho-spiritual concepts. By discussing 
investiture in the framework of his psychology, al-Baghdādī represents an important 
development in the institutionalisation of Sufism.  
 
Through psychological theory, al-Baghdādī also attempts to maintain an exclusivist 
method of investiture in contrast to ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī. This attempt to distiniguish 
the proto-Kubrawiyya from al-Suhrawardī’s community is the clearest evidence of the 
emergence of a self-conscious identity in al-Bagdhādī’s text. Hence, the chapter will 
conclude with a comparison of al-Baghdādī’s and al-Suhrawardī’s account of the cloak. 
Here, al-Baghdādī’s important rebuttle of al-Suhrawardī’s account of the origin of 
investiture will be analysed. 	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1. Investiture among Kubraw īs 
 
The sources that discuss investiture practices among early Kubrawīs during al-
Baghdādī’s time present us with a number of problems. Often it seems that Kubrawī 
shaykhs diverged from one another, differing in their practices and methods from 
investiture to seclusion and audition. Meier notes a large degree of flexibility in 
practice regarding clothing and other etiquettes among Kubrā’s disciples. Al-Rāzī for 
example allows the use of the reed flute in audition ceremonies in violation of Kubrā’s 
supposed disapproval of wind instruments.498 It is therefore difficult to assert the extent 
to which al-Baghdādī was influenced by writings attributed to Kubrā regarding 
etiquette. 
 
Kubrā mentions two different lineages for two types of cloaks in his letter to Lālā. The 
first is for a cloak of instruction, which bears the same chain of authority that al-
Baghdādī mentions in the Tuḥfa. The second lineage mentioned by Kubrā is for a cloak 
of blessing which is derived from ‘Ammār al-Bidlīsī and includes a number of 
prominent figures including Abū Najīb al-Suhrawardī, Aḥmad al-Ghazālī, and Junayd al-
Baghdādī.499 Al-Baghdādī’s certification (ijāza) to ‘Alī Lālā shows that he invested Lālā 
with a cloak of instruction upon completion.500 The cloak of blessing and its chain of 
transmission are notably absent from the Tuḥfa. It will be shown that al-Baghdādī’s 
silence on this lineage is intended to distinguish his community from that of ‘Umar al-
Suhrawardī’s who shares this same lineage.  
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If we turn to the Ādāb al-murīdīn, a work attributed to Kubrā regarding Sufi etiquette 
and behaviour, we see an extremely detailed explanation of the symbolic meaning 
behind a number of Sufi garments. Whether this is in fact one of Kubrā’s works however 
is uncertain. Meier states that Kubrā’s chapter on dress emphasises the symbolic 
meaning of certain garments while paying little to no attention to their practical 
uses.501 This would mark a dramatic shift from earlier Sufi discussions of clothing and 
investiture. In his analysis, Elias notes that despite the emphasis Kubrā placed on items 
of clothing in this work, the writings of Kubrā’s disciples do not mention receiving any 
such intricate garments.502 This suggests that Kubrā did not adhere to the rigid, 
hierarchical practice of investiture outlined in the Ādāb where each garment acts as a 
badge of progress for overcoming a very specific psycho-spiritual barrier on the path to 
God.  
 
Furthermore, Elias has pointed out that one manuscript of the text identifies the author 
of the Ādāb as Khwaja ‘Abd Allah Anṣārī, and posits that Kubrā’s work is likely to have 
been added to, or that it was joined onto an Anṣārī work. 503 Both Elias and Meier have 
remarked that the section in the Adāb regarding clothing is disproportionately long in 
comparison to the other three sections of the work.504 Unlike Elias, Meier argues that 
this was one of Kubrā’s less thought-out, earlier works. However, given the highly 
intricate system of clothing in the Ādāb which is more likely to be a feature of later Sufi 
orders, and the fact that there is no evidence of its implementation among the earlier 
generation of Kubrawīs, this seems unlikely. If we accept Elias’ theory of a treatise of 
Kubrā’s joined onto one of Anṣārī’s, it becomes difficult to say to what extent the ideas 
found in this text may have influenced al-Baghdādī. Yet there is enough evidence to 
posit that the Tuḥfa is likely to have preceded the Ādāb. 	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There are similarities between the Ādāb al-murīdīn and the Tuḥfa. And it is likely that the 
Ādāb was influenced by the Tuḥfa. For example, the idea that the Sufi should wear the 
colours which reflect the rank of the soul is present here, though it does not seem 
related to visions and its progression of colours differs from the visionary progression 
of colours found in the Tuḥfa and Kubrā’s Fawā’iḥ. Al-Baghdādī’s discussion of clothing, 
is much more consistent with Kubrā’s discussion of colours in the Fawā’iḥ than the 
scheme presented in the Ādāb. This strengthens the case for Elias’ argument that the 
section on clothing in Ādāb al-Murīdīn portrays a later amendment of Kubrā’s work. If 
we accept this account of the Ādāb, it seems likely that the idea of clothing as a 
representation of the Sufi’s psycho-spiritual state and the visions he experiences would 
have its origins with al-Baghdādī’s articulation in the Tuḥfa. Al-Baghdādī’s work may 
very well be the earliest source we have which correlates the Sufi’s psycho-spiritual 
rank and the colour of his clothing. In order to answer this question regarding the 
chronological placement of the Ādāb more fully, the cloak’s relation to psychological 
theory and coloured visions in the Tuḥfa must be understood. From this it will be 
possible to argue that the Ādāb should be considered a later work which was probably 
influenced by the Tuḥfa. 
 
2 .  Clothing as exteriorisation of psycho-spiritual states and 
visions  
 
Al-Baghdādī conceives of the cloak and Sufi dress as expressive of the rank of the soul 
according to his Kubrawī psychological theory. Al-Baghdādī’s explanation of the origins 
of the cloak also rests on arguments from prophetic tradition. Yet tellingly, his 
systematised theoretical framework of psychology informs his interpretation of these 
prophetic examples. Early on in the chapter, al-Baghdādī equates the cloak with 
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attributes, placing it within his theoretical framework as a physical manifestation of the 
condition of the soul:  
 
And when He [God] accorded him [the Prophet] with the perfection of cultivating this 
lofty state505 in the hereafter and in this world, He invested (khala‘a) him, upon his 
perfection with a clothing specific to his physical frame, and a clothing specific to his 
reality (ḥaqīqa). And for that reason, He has invested each of his parts with a clothing. 
For the clothing of his humanity is the sharī‘a, and the clothing of his heart is the ṭarīqa, 
and the clothing of his innermost heart is reality (ḥaqīqa), and the clothing of his spirit 
is worship (‘ubūdiyya), and the clothing of his reality is beloved-ness (maḥbūbiyya), and 
the clothing of his form is the Sufi cloak. And just as the reality of the law is [composed 
of] the permissible and forbidden, which originate from [the prophet’s] lofty state, 
likewise [there is] for human behaviours and natural etiquette, a reality which is the 
Sufi cloak, which has been chosen [and sanctified] by God.506 
 
Here al-Baghdādī employs the term clothing not only to refer to the physical textile 
which one drapes around their person, but in reference to a much more significant 
concept of a bodily image which represents the spiritual reality of the soul. Al-
Baghdādī’s usage of the term clothing (libās) here in reference to the actualisation of 
the true nature of the faculties of the human soul renders the cloak synonymous with 
attributes (ṣifāt) which emerge in the soul and are manifested by the body. Thus, the 
attribute resulting from the perfection of each faculty of the soul is described as a libās. 
As previously discussed, the term libās also referred to the imagination which clothes 
God or spiritual truths in symbolic images.507 Al-Baghdādī confirms that the cloak is a 
result of the spiritual completion in the following: 
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507 See chapter 2. 
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And when the effects of the Real’s (God) providence in the reality of the Prophet peace 
be upon him begins from the inner being, and then gradates to the manifest[…]. And the 
emergence of the light of prophecy into his manifest being (occurred) after forty 
years… first in servitude which is the clothing of his spirit, then in reality which is the 
clothing of his innermost heart, then in the path which is the clothing of his heart, then 
in law which is the clothing of his humanity… until the matter was done for him and he 
said: Today I have completed for you your religion.508 
 
The cloak here reflects the soul’s progress to perfection and is worn at the end of the 
process of perfection. This will be a significant notion since there was disagreement 
over whether the disciple should be invested with a cloak before completing his 
training. Furthermore, the microcosmic understanding of man is seen in al-Baghdādī’s 
usage of the term “gradation” (tadrīj), which echoes the cosmogony of creation. Being 
invested with a cloak depends on the perfection of the soul which command the body, 
just as the materiality arises in the cosmos through a process of emanation of the divine 
essence onto the throne which sets into motion the process of creation. The cloak is 
rendered as a sense-able image of spiritual perfection, synthesising investiture with 
psycho-spiritual theories.  
 
Turning to al-Baghdādī’s discussion of clothing in the second chapter of the Tuḥfa 
which we have discussed regarding the progression of colours with this notion of libās 
in mind, we see that Sufi dress mirrors visionary colours and the progression of 
attributes. Here we see al-Baghdādī explains: 
 
It has been the custom of the seekers to wear clothes [coloured] with the colours of the 
lights of the visions which they see. And for each faculty of the faculties of the human 
being, if it has been sweetened with the sweetness of worship, has a light specific to it. 
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So, for the ego, there are lights according to its stations in worship, and the first of its 
lights is blue in colour, and that is because while the ego is still wilfully transgressive, 
[it is] a darkness […]. And the blue [light] is created from the mixture of the light of 
remembrance… with the darkness of the ego, for blue is born from mixing black with 
white […]. And if the ego is illuminated with the light of the heart… it becomes green.509 
 
Al-Baghdādī then goes on to describe the causes of experiencing the various other 
colours of visionary experience in accordance with Kubrā’s thought, though adding 
clarifications to what Kubrā had stated in his Fawā’iḥ in some instances, for example in 
his explanation that green is only the final veil of the ego and not the ultimate veil.510 
Eventually al-Baghdādī concludes his discussion of clothing with what we have detailed 
before, that the shaykhs wear white due to the vision of annihilation which is 
colourless, while disciples wear dark blue symbolising the visions in the station of the 
ego.511 
 
Here, clothing reflects the stages of psycho-spiritual development that we have 
outlined in previous chapters in this study. As we have argued previously, al-Baghdādī’s 
notion of attributes and visions were linked through the collapse of the perceptive and 
commanding functions of the soul into the heart. This is significant here since it allows 
a symbiosis between spiritual progress, visions and clothing. The initiates begin in a 
state where the ego is dominant, producing opaque starting with blue, in accordance 
with Kubrā’s Fawā’iḥ.512 The Tuḥfa is coherent with Kubrā’s Fawā’iḥ in this regard, as it is 
informed by Kubrā’s writings which also assert a symbiosis between visions and 
attributes.513 
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Al-Baghdādī more or less repeats Kubrā’s visionary progression here but adds his own 
discussion of certain colours the most important of which being white. As we have 
stated earlier, white is associated with completion whereby God commands the human 
body through the heart, and the seeker overcomes the duality of perception. Hence, al-
Baghdādī develops Kubrā’s teachings on colours further and uses this as the basis for 
his coloured hierarchy within the Sufi community.  
 
In this scheme clothing attains more institutional significance under as visible 
representation of a Sufi’s inner state, placing them in a ranked hierarchy. Hence, 
psychology in al-Baghdādī’s text is not confined to the theoretical, imagined and 
visionary realms, but also informs the structure of the Sufi community. This hierarchy 
could very well have been put into practice, since al-Baghdādī allowed a incomplete 
Sufi aspirant to train those less advanced than him despite not having attained shaykh-
hood.514 If authority and teaching duty could be delegated to a shaykh’s more advanced 
pupils, it seems likely that clearer markers institutional positions would be needed to 
maintain the central authority of the shaykh which may be marked out by the 
increased significance of green in al-Baghdādī’s colour scheme. 
 
This would also result in a clearer distinction of al-Baghdādī’s Sufi community from 
others, as a specifically Kubrawī institution, with its own specific markers of 
identification and its own internal structure. As in other chapters of the Tuḥfa, al-
Baghdādī attempts to maintain a consistency between Kubrawī theory and Sufi practice 
and it seems likely that the coloured hierarchies would be identifiable markers of 
Kubrawī Sufis since they may not necessarily be shared by other Sufis. 
 
This analysis offers a new understanding of the Ādāb al-murīdīn. The Tuḥfa offers a much 
more detailed account of clothing than what we find in Kubrā’s Fawāi’ḥ where the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
514 Al-Baghdādī, Tuḥfat al-barara, 15. 
	   275	  
reasons for wearing the cloak are limited to making Sufis known in society so that they 
may be held to account and avoid laxity in their practices. This was a well known 
argument for wearing the cloak which features in al-Hujwīrī’s Kashf much earlier.515 
However, it is also far less detailed than the Ādāb.  
 
The difference between the Fawā’iḥ and the Ādāb could not be starker. The Ādāb 
provides us with an extremely intricate and detailed discussion of the meanings behind 
various colours as well as many Sufi items of clothing which are never mentioned in 
12th and 13th century texts. Strangely, it neglects to couch the colour coding within the 
psychological framework al-Baghdādī adheres to, and also does not make a direct 
connection between colour and visions. Meier paraphrases the Ādāb’s chapter on the 
colours of the khirqa in the following: 
 
If one has overcome the concupiscent soul (nafs), killed it… and now sits mourning the 
soul’s demise, then one should wear black or dark blue. If one has repented of offering 
resistance to God… and cleared the page of one’s heart of the inscription of foreign 
elements and the lust of the concupiscent soul, then one should wear white. If… one has 
traversed the sublunar world and entered the translunar realm… then one should wear 
(light) blue. If one has attained a share in all the mystical stations… then one should 
wear something multi-coloured. 516 
 
The text then goes on to discuss additional garments such as added trimmings, a hem 
or a collar, among others. The clothing system found in the Adāb, clearly is not exactly 
the same as al-Baghdādī’s system of wearing what one perceives in their visions. Thus 
the reasoning behind wearing blue is restricted to that of mourning, while white does 
not appear to be associated with the concept of fanā’ at all, and it seems that the multi-
coloured cloak reflects the highest position here instead. Here garments signify 	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spiritual progression, but they are not representations of the soul as it is revealed in 
visions. The underlying theories in this section of the Adāb are either unknown to us or 
less reliant on a coherent theoretical framework than the system in the Tuḥfa. 
 
Al-Baghdādī’s reasoning accords better with Kubrā’s work as well as previous Sufi 
sources. For example, the concept of inconstancy is literally termed ‘colouring’ (talwīn), 
and is commonly discussed in opposition to constancy (tamkīn). These terms are found 
in earlier Sufism as markers of completion and incompletion. They distinguish the 
incomplete Sufi, whose journey is characterised by change and advancement along the 
path, from the advanced Sufi whose psycho-spiritual rank is stable.  Al-Qushayrī 
describes the difference between the two terms in his Risāla:  
 
As long as a man travels along the path, he experiences inconstancy, because he 
continues to rise and fall from one state to another and move from one condition to 
another; he leaves one place for another, but once he has arrived [at the presence of 
God], he becomes stable so that he does fall back into the conditions of the ego, for he is 
constant in his condition… And he who attains eradication… if he no longer takes 
account of his self, soul and senses… there is no constancy or inconstancy for him, and 
no station and no condition.517   
 
Al-Baghdādī’s according of a change of attire for the disciples, starting with blue, while 
reserving white clothing for the shaykhs draws on these well known descriptions of 
incompletion, constancy and annihilation. If we recall that for Kubrā and al-Baghdādī, 
the Sufi’s coloured visions are essentially manifestations of God which are distorted by 
the soul, we see that al-Baghdādī’s discussion of white clothing ties this Kubrawī 
concept with al-Qushayrī’s statement that the sign of completion is that the Sufi no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
517 Al-Qushayrī, al-Risālah, 80. 
	   277	  
longer takes account of his self. 518   Hence white signifies the absence of self-
consciousness due to the absence of colour.    
 
Therefore, if the section on clothing in the Adāb is to be placed after the Tuḥfa as we 
argue here, it seems that it must have drawn on al-Baghdādī’s work or others which 
were influenced by him by associating different coloured garments with different 
spiritual ranks. Given that al-Baghdādī’s discussion is far less extensive, and that 
neither Kubrā, al-Baghdādī, or any of the existing letters or works in the Khirqa 
hazārimīkhī make any mention of the items found in the Adāb, such as collars and hems, 
it seems more sensible to date this section of the Adāb at a later time when the Kubrawī 
community had developed into a more significant order with more detailed hierarchies 
where reference to such items would make sense. 
 
Moving on from the Ādāb, we can learn more about what al-Baghdādī’s work tells us 
regarding Sufism in this period. In the second chapter of the Tuḥfa al-Baghdādī lists two 
additional reasons for prescribing blue garments for the initiate. The first is that the 
initiate should wear blue garments to hide the effects of physical work which he is 
charged with during his training, so that the initiates will not be concerned with their 
appearance. The second is that blue was the colour of mourning and initiates should 
mourn over their sins.519  
 
The notion of mourning over one’s life before turning to Sufism which is presented in 
the Adāb and the Tuḥfa, was also common amongst earlier Sufis. Both of these reasons 
can be found discussed at some length in al-Hujwīrī’s Kashf al-Maḥjūb.520 The implication 
of listing these arguments alongside al-Baghdādī’s own Kubrawī theory of colours here 
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is that it renders Kubrawī Sufism as consistent with the older traditions of Sufi theory 
and highlights that the conclusions of al-Baghdādī’s psychology do not deviate from the 
existing corpus of Sufi practice, despite being based on a specific theory of colours.  
 
Despite this accord in practice, al-Baghdādī has significantly built upon and diverged 
from earlier Sufi authors such as al-Hujwīrī and al-Qushayrī. Neither makes an attempt 
at crafting a hierarchy in their discussions of clothing, nor do they attempt to craft a 
symbiosis between it and psycho-spiritual states to the extent that al-Baghdādī does. 
Their explanations betray a Sufism which is less formalised than that of al-Baghdādī’s. 
Al-Hujwīrī reasons for wearing blue is in order to bear dirt, not because of the work that 
the Sufi initiates performs in service to the lodge or the shaykh, but because of the 
amount of travelling they undertake. 
 
This shift in reasoning is telling as it points to a more sedentary and communal life in 
contrast to earlier practices of wandering Sufis. This increasing emphasis on stability 
among Sufis in the 11th and 12th centuries was accompanied by less emphasis on travel, 
and a more established Sufi community with an increase in rules that restricted and 
regulated travel.521 If we briefly turn to al-Baghdādī’s short treatise, the Risāla fī al-safar, 
a meditation on the prophetic saying, “travel and improve your health” which is 
interpreted with the following:  
 
Physical journeying does not lead to bodily health, because when the nature and 
temperament get accustomed to a certain climate, changing the climate leads to 
illness… If you take a Turk to a hot climate, it will lead to his illness and death. The same 
is true of Indians who are taken to Turkistan. It is therefore clear that the saying… 
refers to the journey which is hoped to lead [those described in the Qur’an as] “there is 
a sickness in their hearts” to the health of intimate knowledge… Good health is the 	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domain of the heart, and profit in the domain of Lordship and the realm of [divine] 
absorption. 522 
 
This internalised notion of travel was in fact an important development in al-
Baghdādī’s work as it stratified the Sufi path into more distinct phases. This became a 
prominent theme in Sufism, finding expression in a number of works from Kubrā’s 
Fawā’iḥ to ‘Aṭṭār’s poetry.523 The shift to sedentary life is evident in the absence of al-
Hujwīrī’s argument here. Therefore, while al-Baghdādī does draw on the authoritative 
canon of previous Sufi works, his Sufism bears a different character. The incorporation 
of these earlier discussions legitimates his argument showing adherence to the Sufi 
canon while at the same time constructing a very different form of Sufism. 
 
3 .  The cloak  as a miracle 
 
During his discussion of his chain of authority, al-Baghdādī pursues another line of 
argument which accords the cloak a status similar to that of miracles. This notion of the 
Sufi cloak and the blessings derived from it bears similarities to older Sufi discourses. 
Garments are discussed by a number of authors in the context of an older Sufi 
controversy. This was the practice of tearing one’s clothes in moments of ecstasy (wajd) 
during the audition ceremony (samā‘). This is discussed in al-Hujwīrī’s Kashf al-maḥjūb 
where it is explained that the pieces of cloth torn in this way are distributed to the 
attendees, conferring blessings upon them.524 Here, the spiritual power of the torn 
garments to bless those who it is given to is presumed. Al-Baghdādī discusses this 
transformative effect of the cloak in the context of investiture. 
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Just before detailing his chain of spiritual authority (silsila) from which the cloak 
descends, al-Baghdādī briefly explains the nature of miraculous events: 
 
And from the perspective of reality, because it is the tradition of God that nothing of 
the hidden things emerges in the manifest world without the medium of a perceptible 
(‘ayniyya) form, out of His bounty towards his stewards (awliyā’)525 
 
Al-Baghdādī then details a story whereby the Prophet miraculously milks a non-
lactating goat, explaining that the Prophet extracted the milk through the medium of 
the goat even though God is able to create the milk without the need of an intermediary 
form or image.526 Having established this, al-Baghdādī then goes on to describe the 
miraculous nature of Abū Hurayra’s ability to memorise a vast number of Prophetic 
narrations as a result of the Prophet feeding him dates. Finally al-Baghdādī makes a 
comparison between Abū Hurayra and ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, asking that if the former 
attained such a vast amount of knowledge in this way, how much greater would the 
knowledge of ‘Alī be, since he was honoured with the khirqa.527 
 
Al-Baghdādī’s epistemology the consciousness which accompanies spiritual purity is 
prior to knowledge. If we recall our discussion of audition as it is presented in the Tuḥfa, 
we see that physical events may also represent spiritual realities. Thus, one could hear 
physical sounds with his ear and hear the speech of God with his spiritual sense of 
hearing. It seems that the khirqa functions in a similar manner to other physical 
experiences, as everything perceived by the physical senses functions as a medium for a 
spiritual reality in al-Baghdādī’s thought.  
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Al-Baghdādī maintains that the physical aspect of the miracle is only the medium by 
which the miracle takes place. The physical form of the khirqa here becomes almost 
accidental, a form or image for an immaterial event. Thus, likening the cloak to a 
miracle does not mean that the cloak itself confers the blessing or knowledge onto a 
disciple but only represents it in a physical form. Here the cloak becomes a 
representation for the transferal of knowledge and the purification of the soul. This 
occurs in another instances according to al-Baghdādī. In addition to the prophet 
feeding Abū Hurayra dates, al-Baghdādī explains that it also occurred through covering 
his family with his cloak, as he explains: 
 
  See how the divine custom [that no hidden thing emerges in the manifest without a  
bodily intermediary] is attached to the removal of sins from [the prophet’s family] and 
their purification, by the Prophet [peace be upon him] taking them under his cloak. And 
this is the reality of the cloak… God has made it a purifier for those who wear it and are 
honoured by it.528 
 
The cloak for al-Baghdādī comes to embody this famous intensely intimate tradition of 
the purification of the Prophet’s family. This tradition is not seen as the origin of the 
Sufi cloak by his contemporary ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī. There is good reason for this, as it 
emphasises the exclusivity of investiture, restricting it to the most intimate people in 
the Prophet’s life. Through his discussion, al-Baghdādī also crucially links his 
theoretical framework to this prophetic tradition. The notion of the cloak as an 
exteriorisation of the soul, as well as its intimate, exclusive origins, indicates a greater 
stress on the exclusivity of the cloak. Hence, these theoretical developments have 
important consequences for Sufism’s societal and political role. 
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4. The Sufi  cloak and kingship  
 
That clothing and investiture practices carried a social significance in Islamic society is 
reflected in al-Baghdādī’s introduction to the 7th chapter of the Tuḥfa. Here he explains: 
 
For [God] has brought together in [man] all the particulars of this world and the 
hereafter, and the realities of the worlds of the hidden and manifest. And so people are 
(divided) into four levels. One level has acquired all the fortunes of this world and the 
realities of the hereafter, one level which has lost both this world and the next, one 
level which has reached the good blessings of the hereafter and have denied themselves 
the pleasures of this world, and another [level] which has done the opposite, enjoying 
the pleasures of this world and forbidding for themselves the happiness of the 
hereafter. And there is no doubt that the most perfect of these [groups] is the first.529 
 
The highest group here is equated with the perfected Sufis who represent the prophet 
Muhammad in society. Hence, al-Baghdādī moves on from this to discuss the notion of 
kingship through prophetology by comparing Muhammad and Solomon, the latter of 
which has been portrayed in Islamic tradition as the greatest manifestation kingship, 
commanding both the hidden and manifest worlds. Here al-Baghdādī establishes that 
the prophet Muhammad is the greater manifestation of kingship despite the more 
obviously pronounced image of kingship which is traditionally ascribed to Solomon.530 
Al-Baghdādī’s discussion of the khirqa therefore is clearly related to notions of society 
and leadership.  
  
By the time al-Baghdādī wrote the Tuḥfa, Islamic society had come to develop an 
increasingly sophisticated culture of investiture. During the Abbasid period, garments 
had not only come to be indicative of class and profession, but also religious 	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communities, marking non-Muslims from Muslims for example.531 A courtly culture of 
investiture was at least established in the early Abbasid era, as notable figures were 
honoured with robes and jewellery from at least the 8th century.532 The custom also 
came to mark the formal acknowledgement of the caliphal heir, becoming an integral 
part of the ceremonial transferal of authority within the royal house.533 The practice of 
investiture continued throughout the existence of the Abbasid caliphate up to the 
Mongol invasion of 656/1258, well into al-Baghdādī’s time.534  
 
Investiture ceremonies were not only limited to rulers however. The bestowal of robes 
and other garments as a means of acceptance, or as a sign of authorial legitimation 
became common amongst the developing institutions of the 12th and 13th centuries. By 
the 12th century, legal scholars and Sufis were associated with distinct styles of dress. In 
addition, the investiture practices of the futuwwa are likened to Sufi practices by Ibn 
Jawzi (d.1200).535  
 
Investiture therefore seems to spread along with the collapse of Abbasid power, helping 
to establish new self-governing networks of overlapping loyalty. This is certainly the 
case regarding Sufism and the futuwwa, the two institutions upon which the Caliph al-
Nāṣir relied to legitimate his rule. The increasing stratification within both of these 
institutions accompanies the fragmentation of political authority. Al-Nāṣir was initiated 
into a branch of the futuwwa and concentrated the power and authority of the group in 
himself.536 Eventually, he ordered that all chivalrous groups disband save his own, 
ensuring that no rival claims to authority derived from the futuwwa tradition could 
undermine him.  	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Why al-Nāṣir would resort to joining and becoming the leader of a futuwwa group 
cannot be fully understood without explaining the development of the tradition of 
futuwwa and its relationship to Sufism. By the time al-Nāṣir had ascended to the 
caliphate, an increasingly spiritual element had come to characterise futuwwa 
organisations.537 Already by the 10th and 11th centuries, writers such as Abd al-Raḥmān 
al-Sulāmī and Abu’l Ḥasan al-Kharqānī had begun to assert that these chivalrous 
organisations and practices were essential to Sufism. Kharaqānī had even begun to use 
the term Jawanmard as a sublime rank of spiritual wayfaring.538  
 
Furthermore these organisations had developed similarities to the emerging, 
increasingly institutionalised Sufi groups. Chivalrous groups had developed their own 
moral chains of authority stretching back to ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, their own manuals on 
behaviour and training at the hands of a master who was termed the jadd, and their 
own items of clothing which signified one’s status within the organisation. By ‘Umar al-
Suhrawārdī’s time, they also seem to have become associated with the practice of 
musical audition and tended to wear woollen garments. ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī asserted 
that the trousers of futuwwa were an essential part of the Sufi khirqa for example.539 
Hence, elements of chivalry were adopted into Sufism under al-Suhrawardī.540 The three 
institutions of caliphate, Sufism and chivalry came to be associated with each other 
under al-Suhrawardī’s tenure as shaykh al-shuyūkh as he stated that Sufism is a part of 
the caliphate and futuwwa is a part of Sufism.541 The futuwwa organisation therefore was 
closely associated with Sufism and intersected with it in order to create and maintain 
social cohesion which cut across boundaries of class and could act as a counterbalance 
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to ruling powers, offering a way for the marginalised to pursue their political 
interests.542 
 
By the time the Buyids supplanted the Abbasids, the former were able to disengage 
from government and its moral burdens by relying on a society that was able to 
maintain duties and obligations, replace some of the previous functions of government, 
and survive continual political upheavals.543 Thus the period leading up to the Mongol 
invasions saw a strengthening of these institutional bonds, so much so that the 
chivalrous and Sufi groups were able to survive the political fragmentation that took 
place with the Mongol conquests and the establishment of Ilkhanid rule.544 
 
As we have discussed, the reign of the Khwarazmshah ‘Alā al-Dīn Muḥammad, was 
frought with infighting with the Queen Mother Turkan Khatūn. In such a climate, 
Sufism played an important role in maintaining a sense of communal cohesion and 
continuity but it would also have faced a number of problems in managing the political 
goals of patrons whose competing interests intersected and manifested in religious 
institutions. Such difficulties were clearly very real dangers if we recall al-Baghdādī’s 
death at the hands of the Khwarazmshah ‘Alā’ al-Dīn due to his ever closer relationship 
with Turkan Khatūn. 
 
Hence the reliance of ruling powers on religious and chivalrous institutions is 
undoubtedly more pronounced in the case of the caliph al-Nāṣir’s relationship with 
‘Umar al-Surhawardī where there was more stability at court. Al-Suhrawardī who was 
sent on diplomatic missions by the caliph would invest regional governors and rulers 
with cloaks and incorporate them into his Sufi community which had become closely 
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associated to the caliphate. This is the clearest example of Sufism intertwining with 
secular rule. 
 
We cannot be sure however to what extent the Kubrawī communities were intertwined 
with chivalrous institutions. Kubrā himself refers to the term javanmardi as a psycho-
spiritual and ethical quality, and little information is given in the way of the practical 
role of a chivalric brotherhood.545 Al-Baghdādī does not mention the term in the Tuḥfa 
but does so once in a letter to Lālā, stressing that the chivalric code would bar the Sufi 
from using money obtained from an endowment improperly. In addition, the figure of 
‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib represents the archetypal chivalrous man, and the chain of authority 
of chivalrous groups extended back to him. Hence, al-Baghdādi’s discussion of the 
origins of the Sufi cloak could also be evidence of an overlap between the institutions in 
Kubrawī circles. While this general attachment to a chivalric ideals seems to have been 
part of Kubrawī Sufi culture, we cannot say for certain that there was an institutional 
overlap like that of al-Suhrawardī adopting the trousers of chivalry into the Sufi 
uniform.  
 
Perhaps this connection to chivalry is not stressed in al-Baghdādī’s case due to the 
context of Iran and Khwarazm where chivalrous institutions were not sought by the 
ruling classes as a means of establishing their authority. The Khwarazmshah’s had a 
large, powerful army and did not necessarily need to gain legitimacy as the caliph in 
Baghdād did, namely by maintaining patterns of loyalty through a number of 
institutions. For al-Baghdādī, relations with the ruling classes were strained, and 
institutional authority was a potential source of conflict as well as a source of 
legitimation. Anxiety over the correct relationship between Sufis and rulers can be seen 
in al-Baghdādī’s discussions of black clothing for instance. In the second chapter of the 
Tuḥfa al-Baghdādī says that the Sufis should not wear black:  	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Because it is the banner of the Abbasid caliphs and the Qara-Khitai Turks, avoid it out of 
reverence for the holy offices and for abandoning likeness to unbelievers.546  
 
The Khwarazmshah’s were vassals of the Qara-Khitai, and it was chiefly they, as well as 
the Abbasids, who had the potential to undermine the Khwarazmshah’s authority.547 
Both of these powers were distinguished by black clothing. Furthermore, this 
association of black turbans with secular authority seems to have survived well into the 
Mongol and Timurid period, as the much later Kubrawī biographical work, the Rawḍat 
al-Jinān of Ḥusayn al-Karbalā’ī al-Tabrīzī details an episode whereby the 14th century 
Kubrawī, Khoja Isḥāq Khuttalānī angered Timur by wearing a black turban in his 
presence.548  
 
In the 15th century the Kubrawī order split into the Ẓahabiyya and the Nūrbakhshiyya.549 
The latter developed into a messianic movement which saw Sayyid Muḥammad 
Nūrbakhsh (d. 1464) claim to be the Mahdī. Upon his capture, Nūrbakhsh was ordered 
to desist from wearing black turbans.550 It seems that al-Baghdādī’s clothing colour 
scheme was not maintained by these much later Sufis who claimed authority from the 
Kubrawī chain of Sufi masters and were much more hostile to the rulers of their day. 
Bashir notes that al-Hamadānī, the effective founder of the Kubrawiyya order as a ṭarīqa 
rather than a community in the Mongol period,551 had argued that Sufis should wear 
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black since it signifies the unknowable qualities of God, while white should be left for 
the common people.552 
 
Thus, we see in later Kubrawīs exclusivist and messianic claims which threaten secular 
rule, expressed through the adoption of black clothing. Although we cannot assume 
that the colour would cause the same tension between secular and Sufi authorities in 
al-Baghdādī’s time, it is clear that al-Baghdādī was aware of the association and sought 
to avoid this potential source of hostility by choosing white instead of black to 
represent colourlessness. Interestingly, black was also the colour that ‘Umar al-
Suhrawardī chose for the shaykhs.553 Al-Suhrawardī’s close association with the Abbasid 
caliph is relevant here, since al-Baghdādī points to distinction from the Abbasids as an 
important feature Sufis should maintain, in this assertion he is perhaps also consciously 
distinguishing his Sufi community from others who enjoyed close relations with rulers. 
All this points to the increasing political and social significance of Sufi investiture, and 
its relevance for the identity of the Sufi order. The material culture of Sufism was 
clearly a versatile vehicle for the expression of identity and loyalty. 
 
Mentioning the Qara-Khitay and the Abbasid caliphs together here is no coincidence 
and it seems that al-Baghdādī intends to navigate his volatile political climate by 
dissociating Sufi investiture from both of these groups and the historically 
revolutionary association of black garments. Hence, in contrast to his contemporary 
‘Umar al-Suhrawardī, al-Baghdādī is keen to avoid any association with secular 
authority by choosing white as the colour of the shaykh. This provides some 
explanation as to why colourless perfection is portrayed in white garments in al-
Baghdādī’s thought but is black in the case of his disciple Najm al-Dīn al-Rāzī who 
travelled to Anatolia and Iraq, met with al-Suhrawardī and had to attract patronage 	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through his Mirṣād al-‘ibād, in which the ultimate colourless vision was black.554 In Iran 
and Khwarazm the black colour could be construed as threatening, whereas in Iraq and 
Anatolia there was an increasingly interdependent relationship between Sufism and the 
caliphate. 
 
Furthermore, traces of central Asian investiture practices are also seen in some of al-
Baghdādī’s writings. In one of the dreams al-Baghdādī interprets for Sharaf al-Dīn 
Balkhī, the dreamer sees al-Baghdādī in the company of an unnamed shaykh. After 
advising al-Baghdādī, the shaykh ties a white cloth around al-Baghdādī’s waist and 
gives him an inscribed silver tablet.555 The fact that al-Baghdādī does not interpret the 
meaning of this investiture in his analysis of the dream suggests that it would have 
been understood by the dreamer. During the periods of Saljuq and Mamluk rule, central 
Asian investiture practices spread and Turkic items of clothing became popular with 
the Muslim population.556 Investing someone with a metal tablet could indicate the 
submission of the receiver, or could confer authority upon him, a practice which was 
common among the Qara-Khitai, the Mongols and other Turkic tribes.557  
 
Whether such tablets were used in al-Baghdādī’s own investiture practices is hard to 
say, however this illustrates that investiture was a prominent feature of the time, and 
that Sufis drew upon the prevailing cultures in their own investiture practices in order 
to bolster the centralisation of their authority. Practices of investiture were clearly 
powerful symbols and could occur in the hidden world of dreams and visions to 
legitimate Sufi authority. The association of the cloak with an institutional authority 
likened to kingship is therefore not surprising. The comparison is made even more 
explicit as al-Baghdādī explains:  	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Know that the true King’s of the hereafter, clothing their disciples who are under their 
authority with the khirqa, is like the practice of worldly kings. For it is the habit of 
worldly kings, that if a servant has tended to them for a time and has acquired great 
favour through good guidance, and when [Kings] see in him evidence of resourcefulness 
and uprightness, [they] confer unto him authority… [and they] honour him with a 
ceremonial robe (khil‘a) which is witnessed by those who are near and far [to the king], 
and by the enemy and ally. And they realise through that, the completeness of the 
king’s acceptance of his servant, as well as the servant’s vice-regency.558 
 
Al-Baghdādī’s focus on investiture as a marker of loyalty to the king of the hereafter 
refers to the Sufi shaykh. That the investiture is meant to be witnessed by enemies and 
allies is important here since it asserts the cloak as a symbol of a specific identity and 
attachment to a specific shaykh. Moreover, the inclusion of the term “enemy” seems to 
suggest an attempt to fortify the Sufi community against interference. That al-Baghdādī 
begins his discussion of the Sufi cloak with a discussion of Kingship is therefore 
indicative of the socio-political importance of investiture.  
 
Through al-Baghdādī’s comparison of Solomon and the prophet Muhammad the notion 
of true kingship is redefined as the complete human being who has attained “the 
fortunes of the hereafter and the realities of this world.” Al-Baghdādī then explains that 
those who are able to maintain a connection to the two worlds are the highest in rank 
because such a feat requires “strength” and supposedly a more perfect soul. The level 
below this is reserved for those who have realised their own weaknesses and have 
forbidden for themselves the enjoyment of the present world. This then leads al-
Baghdādī to prove that the Prophet Muhammad was the prime example of perfection, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
558 Al-Baghdādī, Tuḥfat al-barara, 32. 
	   291	  
adjoining (jam‘) the present and the hereafter.559 This leads al-Baghdādī to assert that 
the prophet Muhammad’s perfection in comparison to the more ostentatious image of 
Solomon, stating that Kingship has a form and a reality and while Solomon had greater 
kingship in form, Muhammad had a greater kingship in reality. He also explains that: 
 
The Prophet and Solomon, peace be upon them, were of those who had adjoined this 
world and the next. However, the Prophet preferred his hereafter-ness over his 
worldly-ness.560  
 
This argument seems to have become a well-known formulation as it appears in later 
Sufi works. Its inclusion here is telling since it tends to be employed in the context of 
tension between Sufism and secular rule. For example, the same argument emerges in 
Shams al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Aflākī’s (d.1360) biographical work describing the tension 
between Bahā’ al-Dīn Walad and the Khwarazmshah.561 Despite John O’kane’s assertion 
that Aflākī’s account of Bahā’ al-Dīn Walad’s life is replete with errors,562 it appears to 
have gained currency at least by Aflākī’s time, and the trope clearly had potential to 
subvert and challenge political authority. 
 
The implication here is that the Sufi shaykh has greater claims to authority in reality 
(ḥaqīqa) despite lacking authority in sensible forms (ṣūra). This reveals the mood of al-
Baghdādī’s Sufi community in a climate of fractious political leadership. Unlike ‘Umar 
al-Suhrawardī who represents a complimentary relationship between Sufism and 
political rule, al-Baghdādī was careful to tread a finer line in appeasing rulers and 
service to wider society. His conception of the image and reality of the cloak are 
employed for the purpose of establishing a distinction between the identity of his own 
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Sufi community and ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī’s. This distinction carries with it significant 
implications regarding the relationship between Sufis and political rulers and reveals 
the extent to which distinct Sufi identities were forming in this period. This distinction 
between the proto-Kubrawīs and early Suhrawardiyya is directly relevant to the 
political realities these communities faced. In order to explore this fully, we must turn 
to a comparison between the two communities and their investiture practices. 
 
5 .  Competing modes of investiture:  Majd al-D īn al-Baghdād ī  
and ‘Umar al-Suhraward ī  
 
Al-Baghdādī’s work represents the emergence of a self consciously distinct Sufi 
community and that this is paralleled by the development of notions of exclusivity and 
elitism which implies that the community surrounding al-Baghdādī and Kubrā were 
coming to think of themselves as the most appropriate path to psycho-spiritual 
completion. While we have outlined some of the evidence for this in al-Baghdādī’s 
attempts to centralise authority, and mark the various stages of the path, the tension 
and rivalry between his community and others is most explicit in the 7th chapter in the 
Tuḥfa regarding the origin and uses of the Sufi cloak or khirqa.  
 
Here al-Baghdādī explicitly criticises the traditions which ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī relies 
upon in his account of the origin of the Sufi cloak. Though al-Baghdādī only mentions 
al-Suhrawardī once in this discussion, much of the chapter seems to criticise practices 
which were characteristic of al-Suhrawardī’s rules regarding investiture. It seems clear 
that much of the discussion in this section of the Tuḥfa attempts to undermine al-
Suhrawardī’s methods of investiture, as well as dissociating the proto-Kubrawīs from 
al-Suhrawardī’s community. Al-Baghdādī clearly views al-Suhrwardī’s approach to 
investiture as incompatible with his theoretical framework. 
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In previous chapters we have shown how practice and theory were intimately bound in 
al-Baghdādī’s thought, and how this informed the structures of the Sufi community and 
its place within wider society. Debates over the origin and practice of the khirqa 
therefore are related to the wider concerns surrounding Sufism, including affiliation 
with wider society and political rulers. Al-Baghdādī’s systematisation of Kubrā’s 
thought served to address a number of theoretical and practical problems. Al-
Baghdādī’s systematisation also attempts to distinguish his community from other Sufi 
communities.  
 
A comparison between al-Baghdādī and ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī will serve as the most 
striking example of al-Baghdādī’s attempt to distinguish his Sufi community from 
others. This is evidence that Sufi institutions were not developing in isolation. Just as 
these particular Sufi communities were being shaped by the social and political realities 
of the 12th and 13th century, so did they exhibit theoretical frameworks and codes of 
practice in response to one another. This seems to have led to feelings of self-conscious 
differences between Sufi communities as witnessed in al-Baghdādī’s work.  
 
The emergence of self-conscious identities among competing Sufi institutions has 
usually been ascribed to a much later period in the history of Sufism which 
accompanied the rise of Sufi orders. 563  Acknowledging the emergence of a self-
conscious communal identity in the case of al-Baghdādī is therefore important for our 
understanding of the development of Sufism. In the later period of tarīqa Sufism, the 
rivalry between Sufi groups intensifies as sharper criticisms of competing Sufi theories 
and practices emerge with the aim of attracting patronage and gaining social and 
political influence.564 Our discussion is crucial as it reveals a degree of competition 	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between al-Baghdādī and al-Suhrawardī which we may not have expected from “pre-
ṭarīqa” Sufism.  
 
By analysing al-Baghdādī’s writings, and identifying instances which reveal a conscious 
attempt at dissociating his community from others, we see that even in this earlier 
period disagreements over correct theory and practice were coming to acquire a social 
and political significance. In this particular discussion, the argument encompasses the 
extent to which the Sufi community should extend its official affiliations beyond 
masters and disciples and among the wider populace. At the heart of this is a 
disagreement over the lax attitudes towards affiliation which were propagated under 
‘Umar al-Suhrawardī.  
 
Discussions concerning dispensations in the Tuḥfa are inseparable from discussions 
surrounding affiliations to the Sufi institution. Being able to dispense with obligation 
was vital to the spread of the Sufi community through by incorporating lay-affiliates 
and even political rulers into it. Both the issues of laxity in affiliations and intimacy 
with rulers are exemplified by al-Suhrawardī. Therefore, it will be necessary to 
compare the two thinkers’ attitudes towards relationships between Sufis and the ruling 
classes. This comparative analysis will focus mainly on al-Suhrawardī’s major work, the 
‘Awārif al-ma‘ārif. 
 
5.i .  Competing narratives of investiture 
 
It is important to note that both thinkers have much in common despite the differences 
which were forming between them and their communities. These commonalities may 
be rooted in their shared spiritual heritage, as both share a chain of spiritual authority 
through Abū Najīb al-Suhrawardī, the uncle of ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī, and therefore 
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share a number of ideas and practices. In al-Baghdādī’s case this lineage is not 
associated with a cloak of instruction, but with the cloak of blessing.  
 
Despite this, al-Baghdādī is clearly attached to this heritage. When distinguishing his 
dhikr formula of lā ilāha illā Allah from the repetition of the word Allah on its own, he 
emphasises that the former was chosen by Abū al-Najīb and al-Hamadānī, while the 
latter was preferred by Abū Sa‘īd and those who he describes as the “Turkic” shaykhs. 
He lists three reasons for choosing the former and among them is that it is more 
befitting to adhere to the teachings of “our shaykhs.”565 This is the same dhikr formula 
which ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī insists upon. Hence, there are examples of practices which 
are shared between the two communities which may be traced to their shared heritage. 
 
Yet, we should not take this as evidence that Abū al-Najīb’s thought was necessarily 
strictly adhered to by al-Baghdādī or ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī. ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī for 
example seems to differ from his uncle when it comes to the subject of dispensation, 
rukhṣa, for lay affiliates.566 Therefore while there are some similarities which might be 
traced back to Abū al-Najīb, other similarities are more difficult to account for. 
Salamah-Qudsi notes that both thinkers develop a notion of spiritual birth which occurs 
when the disciple is trained by the shaykh, and suggests that one may have influenced 
the other or that this may stretch back to Abū al-Najīb, but ultimately concedes that we 
cannot come to a clear conclusion regarding precedence, and the origins of this 
notion.567 Hence, it may also be that both thinkers were developing similar notions 
independently. The notion of rebirth certainly gains currency amongst Sufis in this 
period as ideas of belonging and lineage become more important.568  
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Yet while al-Baghdādī and al-Suhrawardī do share a number of concepts and practices, 
they are often employed to very differing ends. For example, in this particular example 
of rebirth al-Baghdādī develops the argument in order to assert a relationship of 
belonging between shaykh and disciple, in contrast to a relationship of education and 
training in the case of other shaykhs, and that this attempted to centralise the 
authority of the Sufi shaykh within his community. By contrast, al-Suhrawardī’s 
discussion is less developed and ends after making the point that some are qualified to 
propagate a lineage and others are not.569  
 
In this case al-Baghdādī’s discussion of spiritual birth is not only more developed, it 
goes further than that of al-Suhrawardī’s. It echoes the same idea of the fertility of 
some shaykhs and their ability to acquire disciples and the infertility of others, but adds 
another dimension of belonging throughout its discussion by distinguishing shaykhs of 
birth and training. The issue of precedence is not necessarily important for our 
purposes, rather we need only highlight that the two thinkers will draw on shared 
traditions which would have been familiar to them, and that they will develop and 
interpret these traditions in accordance with their notions of Sufi theory and practice. 
 
One of the main differences between the two thinkers is seen most obviously in the 
style of their writings. As stated, for al-Baghdādī theory, practice and the structure of 
the Sufi community are intimately linked, so much so that it is sometimes impossible 
for him to discuss one without the other. This intimacy between theory and practice is 
discernable in al-Baghdādī’s disciple, Najm al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s work as well. While theory 
and practice are also linked in al-Suhrawardī’s work, he tends to emphasise the 
practical and “apparent” aspects in his discussions. This contrast in approach is 
discernable even when comparing his work to al-Rāzī’s, in discussions of the attributes 
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of the shaykh for example.570 In fact the focus on the practical aspects of Sufism in al-
Suhrawardī’s text seems to have rendered it more accessible, and this is highlighted as 
one reason for its popularity and influence.571 
 
The intertwining of the discussions of practice with theory in the Tuḥfa itself 
accentuates the disparity between the two thinkers. When al-Baghdādī takes issue with 
al-Suhrawardī for basing his practices of investiture on a prophetic tradition he deems 
too weak, his criticism is not confined to the particular disagreement over the viability 
of the particular prophetic tradition, it also carries the weight of his psychological 
framework. This is seen clearly in the argument al-Baghdādī outlines: 
 
I have seen in the hand writing of the imām Shihāb al-Dīn Abī Ḥafṣ ‘Umar bin 
Muḥammad al-Suhrawardī, and he is considered [an authority] on this topic, in what he 
wrote to one of his disciples whom he had invested with a cloak… And al-Suhrawardī, in 
his exposition of the tradition of investiture, relied upon the tradition of Umm Khālid 
bint Khālid… But by my life it is better and more appropriate to rely upon the lineage of 
the cloak according to what we have mentioned than [to rely upon] the tradition of 
Umm Khālid… And the consensus of the authoritative shaykhs agree on the wearing of 
the cloak and its veneration… and it is not suitable for them with their high status in 
religion to venerate something which they invented and for which they did not find a 
precedence for in the tradition of the prophet. And with respect to reality, for it is the 
tradition of God never to extract something from the hidden things into the manifest 
world without the intermediary of a [physical] image.572  
 
This passage criticises two key principles which al-Suhrawardī relies upon in his 
discussion of the origins of the Sufi cloak. In the ‘Awārif, al-Suhrawardī argues that the 
tradition of investiture can be seen in the example of Umm Khālid but eventually 	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concludes that “the wearing of the cloak in the way that the shaykhs do in this time [al-
Suhrawardī’s time], was not found in the time of the Prophet of God”, and that it 
originates from the opinion (istiḥsān) of the shaykhs themselves. In other words, he 
conceives of it as something they had invented themselves.573 After dealing with the 
problem of relying on the tradition of Umm Khālid, the second point is made more 
forcefully. This defence of the tradition of investiture as part of the prophetic tradition 
is obviously aimed at al-Suhrawardī’s account of the cloak. Hence,  in order to further 
augment his position al-Baghdādī ties the discussion to his concept of the cloak as a 
physical intermediary. This references the comparison between Abū Hurayra and ‘Alī 
detailed above whereby the cloak acts as a physical intermediary for the transferral of 
knowledge from the Prophet to ‘Alī.  
 
While these explicit criticisms of al-Suhrawardī only appear in the 7th chapter of the 
Tuḥfa, they are nevertheless rather significant. In this passage al-Baghdādī undermines 
the entire basis of al-Suhrawardī’s notion of the origins of the Sufi cloak, not only 
questioning his authority, but also calling into question his practices of affiliation and 
therefore the appropriateness of the structure of his Sufi community as well. By 
referring to psychology and cosmology in connection to the origins of investiture 
which begin with ‘Alī, al-Baghdādī also implies that adherence to the Kubrawī 
theoretical framework as it is expressed in the Tuḥfa leads to more appropriate 
conclusions and practices, as it is not only adherence to the Prophetic tradition but the 
divine tradition of God who manifests hidden truths through bodily intermediaries.  
 
Al-Suhrawardī distinguishes between two types of cloaks; one of discipleship (khirqat al-
irāda) and one for anyone who wishes to be affiliated to the school termed the cloak of 
blessing (khirqat al-tabarruk), which was granted to the mutashabbih, literally meaning 
imitator but referring to lay-affiliates who accompanied Sufis and behaved like them 	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but were not officially initiated into its ranks. Al-Suhrawardī then explains that the 
former is given selectively, while the latter is given to anyone who desires it. And 
unlike the disciple, for the lay-affiliate there are no rules beyond adhering to Islamic 
law and keeping company with the Sufi community. 574 While this is not the ideal mode 
of affiliation, al-Suhrawardī suggests that after imitators receive a cloak they may be 
led to fully accept the Sufi path.575  
 
Furthermore with his focus on detailing the positions of khidma (servants of the Sufis), 
tashabbuh (imitating Sufi customs) and mutakhādim (imitating the servants), al-
Suhrawardī formalised a range of possible modes of affiliation with the Sufi institution. 
People were encouraged to become nominal servants to the lodge on the basis that this 
would be preparation for the possibility of their full initiation into discipleship though 
of course not everyone did so.576 He therefore provided a number of routes through 
which one could aspire to positions within the Sufi institution.  
 
This does not sit well with al-Baghdādī. His attribution of the origin of the cloak to ‘Alī 
and the Prophet’s family already emphasises the exclusive nature of investiture. Al-
Baghdādī however continues to warn of the dangers of leniency in investiture, stating: 
 
Some shaykhs have invested some of their disciples before their completion upon their 
exalted intuition that they should do so regarding the [disciple’s] outer aspect, 
according to the [shaykh’s] inner [perception]. For it is the tradition of God in training 
his servants, to start from the inner to the outer, so that the nurturing of the outer is 
the last of their concerns. And this is the way of the prophets and the purified, attracted 
of God’s friends. Do you not see that the perfection of the sharī‘a is attached to the 
manifest world, as it occurred for the Prophet, peace be upon him, at the end of his life? 	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According to the word of God, “today I have completed for you your religion.” Or they 
may begin from the outer to the inner, and this is also accompanied by the nurturing of 
the inner as God has said, “The Bedouins said we believe, say you do not believe but say 
that you have surrendered (aslamtū).” For the adornment of Islam is prior to the 
adornment of belief in their regard, and this is the case for most Muslims. And 
according to this tradition, they invest them with a cloak prior to their completion.577 
 
Here al-Baghdādī establishes a hierarchy between the two approaches of investiture. 
Those who receive the cloak only upon completion are of a higher class and are fit to 
become shaykhs and “friends of God” and to be equated with prophets, while those who 
receive cloaks before completion are not expected to achieve this elite status and do 
not achieve the same level of perfection. Al-Baghdādī then continues with a much more 
forceful tone. After repeating a well known tradition whereby Abū Muḥammad 
Ruwaym is rebuked by a girl for drinking water in the middle of the day, al-Baghdādī 
states: 
And this [cloak] is given to the mature shaykhs who are able to judge God’s servants [in 
times of] joy and tribulations from what they have been granted from God of his light, 
and what he has revealed to their hearts from the wells of his knowledge. And for 
others, the likes of which have emerged in our time, they are devoted to wearing the 
cloak to assert shaykh-hood, and for love of fame, and are devoted to amassing 
disciples… And calling [people] to the truth without God’s command [to do so] only 
nurtures lowly desires (hawā). And concerning the elevation (exclusivity) and lowliness 
(commonness) regarding the cloak, know that what is intended by the tradition of the 
elevated chain of authority is to reduce the possibility of deceit. Because as the number 
of men increases, so does the possibility of deceit. And what is intended by the cloak is 
an increase in the number of shaykhs in order to increase the lights of truth.578 
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Al-Baghdādī here turns his criticism upon those who seek to amass followers, fame and 
prestige. He argues that the cloak is not intended to create disciples out of the general 
populace who will never achieve the stations of God’s friends and prophets, but rather 
to create shaykhs and to limit forgery and deceit by limiting the number of disciples. He 
continues this argument by repeating a tradition whereby one Sufi dreams of a path 
which is lit by torches and realises that these lights are the souls of the shaykhs and 
that the path is the Sufi way. Al-Baghdādī then explains that as the number of shaykhs 
between the disciple and the Prophet increases so do these lights, and the path 
becomes easier, more refined and perfected. He then explains that when a disciple is 
accepted by a shaykh, he is accepted by all the prophets and shaykhs which stand in 
that shaykh’s chain of authority.579  
Here al-Baghdādī may be attempting to offer an alternative to the notion of  “ease” 
which accompanied the dispensations of receiving a cloak of blessing under al-
Suhrawardī. This offered the opportunity of investiture and the status of affiliation to 
all members of society without any obligations. Al-Baghdādī argues here that ease is to 
be found by the further refinement and development of the path under qualified 
shaykhs which makes it quicker for the disciple to traverse.  
 
Interestingly al-Baghdādī does not mention the cloak of blessing (khirqat al-tabarruk) at 
all, despite the existence of Kubrawī sources which refer to it. As we have stated, a 
letter from Kubrā to ‘Alī Lālā testifies to the existence of this cloak. The chain of 
authority for this cloak also includes some important figures such as ‘Ammār al-Bidlīsī, 
as well as Abū al-Najīb al-Suhrawardī and stretches back to Junayd al-Baghdādī.580 Yet 
these figures are absent from al-Baghdādī’s full account of his chain of spiritual 
authority in this 7th chapter: 
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And the perfection of their (the companions of the prophet) manifest being, is that the 
Prophet honoured them with his khirqa… and he (the Prophet) clothed ‘Alī, God be 
pleased with him, and ‘Alī… clothed Ḥassan al-Baṣrī with it…581 
 
The other chain of investiture which features in Kubrā’s letter to Lālā conferring upon 
him the cloak of blessing, is only very briefly hinted at by al-Baghdādī. After recounting 
this entire chain of authority in the Tuḥfa al-Baghdādī simply states that most cloaks 
are traced to Junayd al-Baghdādī.582 Lālā received cloaks from both al-Baghdādī and 
Kubrā which further confuses the matter since the two seemed to function as separate 
shaykhs in their own right despite the more senior position of Kubrā, however Lālā’s 
certification which qualifies him for instruction comes from al-Baghdādī and not 
Kubrā.583 Lālā also received a number of cloaks from non-Kubrawīs as well, however the 
attachment to al-Baghdādī may be evidence of his notion of the shaykh of birthright 
against the shaykhs of training being put into practice.584  
 
There may be an important underlying reason for this omission in al-Baghdādī’s text as 
it would dissociate his spiritual lineage from that of other Sufi communities including 
‘Umar al-Suhrawardī who shares the same lineage as the Kubrawī’s cloak of blessing.585 
The Tuḥfa gives the impression that there is only one type of cloak, and that it is the 
cloak of discipleship. This silence regarding the cloak of blessing is quite telling since al-
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Baghdādī avoids distinguishing between different types of investiture at all. This not 
only restricts types of investiture by leaving the cloak of blessing unacknowledged, it 
also distinguishes al-Baghdādī’s lineage from ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī’s and renders it 
more exclusive since “most” other cloaks are derived from Junayd al-Baghdādī. Clearly, 
the lineage of Kubrā’s cloak of blessing was made almost mundane through al-
Suhrawardī’s efforts. If we interpret al-Baghdādī’s statement that increasing the 
number of affiliates increases the potential for deception in light of this, al-Baghdādī’s 
discussion becomes a rather damning assessment of al-Suhrawardī’s system of 
investiture.  
5.i i .  Competing modes of affil iation 
 
Al-Baghdādī’s tone is surprising given that this relaxed attitude towards lay affiliates 
was developing some time before ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī. Al-Suhrawardī further relaxes 
rules of dispensation which were introduced by his uncle Abū al-Najīb al-Suhrawardī 
who avoids employing the term mutashabbih in a negative sense, and allows affiliates 
who receive the cloak of blessing to dispense with certain Sufi practices under certain 
conditions. 586  ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī does not stipulate any conditions regarding 
investiture with the cloak of blessing but there is clearly a precedent in the practices of 
his uncle. Furthermore al-Baghdādī is to some extent in agreement with Abū al-Najīb 
and ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī when he distinguishes those who are invested with a cloak of 
discipleship as part of the elite group of Sufis, from those who are invested with a cloak 
at the beginning of their training. ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī places the lay-affiliate at the 
lowest rank in the hierarchy of the community, and conceives of it as a way to attract 
potential disciples.587  
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Earlier Sufi literature indicates that shaykhs were always accompanied by informal 
affiliates who did not fully adhere to Sufi practices. However the tendency of previous 
thinkers was to argue that Sufis should remain exclusive. In this context, ‘Umar al-
Suhrawardī could be seen to be breaking with this earlier consensus more starkly than 
his uncle did.588 In light of this, al-Baghdādī’s criticism can be seen as a rebuke to an 
“innovation” and an appeal to return to the proper methods of investiture which were 
practiced by earlier Sufis. Hence, his attempt to define the nature of investiture 
through a prophetic tradition which privileges and preserves the exclusivity of the 
bond between the shaykh and his disciples in opposition to emerging practices of 
investiture which seemed too lenient. It is no coincidence that having concluded his 
discussion of colours, visions and clothing in the second chapter of the Tuḥfa, al-
Baghdādī turns to the topic of mixing (mukhālaṭa) with the general populace stating: 
 
Cultivating the light of the inner being (bāṭin) is not assured without removal of the 
causes of darkness. And the greatest and strongest cause of darkness, is mixing with 
others and keeping company with those who do wrong and who have no intention of 
changing their inner beings… And if the seeker has secured himself and no longer fears 
this machination, then it is for him to wear anything [he wishes to wear]… And the fact 
is such that the disciple’s states are changeable, so if he is within the training of a 
shaykh, it is not for him to decide anything.589 
 
Al-Baghdādī here is conscious that clothing functions as a means to mark Sufis from 
non-Sufis and that a Sufi’s interactions with wider society ought to be carefully 
considered. Yet, a high degree of flexibility is revealed here, clothing ultimately 
depends on the instruction of the shaykh and his assessment of the disciple’s 
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requirements in training. For example, we have seen previously that al-Baghdādī was 
ordered by Kubrā to keep company with non-Sufis as a test during his discipleship.590 
 
Al-Baghdādī lists other practices which mark out his school from wider society, 
prescribing shaving of the head and shortening the lengths of their clothes. These were 
practices were taken to extremes by antinomian groups who shaved off all their body 
hair and wore very little in rejection of social norms.591 This is in contrast to trends in 
Sufism which were veering to a more lax form of affiliation without the need to 
distinguish oneself from wider society, chiefly seen in the works of ‘Umar al-
Suhrawardī.592 This question is not at all entertained by al-Baghdādī who states quite 
plainly that one ought to remove themselves from the harmful effects of wider society 
at the beginning of the spiritual path.  
 
Here we seem to be presented with the paradoxical case of a Sufi community increasing 
in importance both socially and politically, while expressing exclusivist and elitist 
notions. However, we should not assume because of this exclusivity that al-Baghdādī 
advocated the ideal of an insular Sufi community. Unfortunately we can not know for 
sure how al-Baghdādī’s lodge was run on a day to day basis and to what extent non-
affiliates were involved in the activities there, yet given what we have already discussed 
regarding his prominence among political and religious figures, the fame he garnered, 
and the wealth of his lodge, it is highly unlikely that al-Baghdādī’s Sufi community was 
divorced from the wider community.  
 
We have also seen that al-Baghdādī defined reintegrating into society and calling 
people to God as the obligation (taklīf) of the advanced Sufi which he must undertake to 
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overcome the veils of the spirit. Furthermore al-Baghdādī’s writings do indicate the 
presence of lay affiliates around the Sufi community, for example he praises the 
practice of audition for attracting people to the path, indicating that these concerts had 
a wider audience than the master and his disciples.593 He therefore represents a Sufi 
institution which is heavily involved with wider society, stopping short of formalising 
the bond with lay affiliates through investiture. 
 
A number of passages in the Tuḥfa highlight that al-Baghdādī was able to create 
structures within the Sufi community which could allow its spread without 
compromising the exclusivity of the shaykh-disciple bond. This was seen for example in 
al-Baghdādī’s assertion that advanced disciples could train less advanced ones, or in the 
ritualisation of dreams and visions which allowed psychic communication between 
disciples and shaykhs over vast distances. These measures accommodate for the spread 
of the Sufi school and the increased propagation of committed disciples without 
formalising the bonds of those who accompany Sufis and partake in the more popular 
communal practices such as audition.   
 
Furthermore, al-Baghdādī’s certificate of instruction (ijāzat irshād) to ‘Alī Lālā 
commands Lālā to travel and call people to God, quoting the Qur’an [9:122].594 This gives 
us some insight into the way in which investiture was conferred among Kubrawīs and 
indicates that al-Baghdādī encouraged the spread of the community by encouraging his 
students to establish lodges elsewhere upon receiving their certifications of instruction. 
Of course, al-Baghdādī is not propagating an order to the extent that is seen in the case 
of ‘Alī al-Hamadānī, but this is evidence of a gradual shift towards the widespread but 
centralised structure of orders.595 We should therefore not read the exclusivity of 
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investiture in al-Baghdādī’s writings as an attempt to seclude the Sufi institution from 
wider society. Rather, this exclusivity should be seen in the context of centralising the 
Sufi community in light of socio-political disruption.  
 
In order to understand how investiture and clothing was connected to wider society, 
we must return to the question of dispensation, which was crucial for allowing the 
spread of the institution under al-Suhrwardī. In our discussion of antinomianism we 
argued that al-Baghdādī reinterpreted the notion of religious obligations or taklīf, so 
that it was not possible to remain a Sufi and dispense with acts of worship and Sufi 
practice. While this was one attempt to circumvent the potential for antinomianism 
within Sufism, it is also directly relevant to modes of affiliation. Al-Suhrawardī’s 
relaxation of affiliations undermines this by sanctioning dispensations to a wide range 
of members. Al-Baghdādī’s position on investiture is therefore consistent with other 
chapters of the Tuḥfa which only allow dispensation in the case of shaykh, binding 
dispensations to investiture which is restricted to the attainment of completion. 
Conceptions of investiture and dispensation also served to control affiliation to the 
community more generally. They are not detached from questions regarding the extent 
to which the Sufi community may affiliate with wider society and the ruling classes. 
 
Al-Baghdādī’s restriction of dispensation can be seen as an alternative to the type of 
investiture which suited al-Suhrawardī’s political aims and ambitions. Al-Suhrawardī 
acted as an ambassador on behalf of the Caliph al-Nāṣir and during his travels he would 
initiate regional rulers into chivalrous groups, and also bestowed the cloak of blessing 
upon at least one regional ruler.596 As the institutions of caliphate, Sufism and chivalry 
came ever closer under al-Suhrawardī and al-Nāṣir, these investitures were imbued 
with a political significance which established loyalty to the caliph through induction 
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into al-Suhrawardī’s Sufi community.597 The relaxation of rules of affiliation then was 
an important step towards allowing the Sufi institution to pursue a more explicit 
political role in service of the caliph. 
 
Al-Suhrawardī’s role as an ambassador of the caliph, as well as his popularity among the 
ruling classes, seems to have attracted criticism from his contemporaries. After 
returning to Baghdad from his mission to the Ayubids with the wealth and gifts he 
accumulated there, he was forced to defend himself against accusations of 
corruptability by stating that he only accepted gifts in order to distribute them 
amongst the Sufis of Baghdad. His reputation then suffered in 605/1208 as he lost the 
directorship of his lodges as well as his position as a preacher before returning to 
favour in 611/1214.598 al-Suhrawardī engagement with rulers then did earn him some 
critics and may have compromised his legitimacy for a brief period of time. Yet, we do 
not seem to have many written texts explicitly criticising al-Suhrawardī in this regard. 
Al-Baghdādī’s writings are important here since they reveal the extent to which Sufis 
may have disapproved of al-Suhrawardī’s investiture practices and argued for 
alternative modes of affiliation.  
 
The 10th chapter of the Tuḥfa addresses the topic of affiliation with wider society and 
rulers as well as questions surrounding audition. However, it must be said that the bulk 
of the chapter is dedicated to a discussion of audition while only a few passages discuss 
the Sufi’s relations to wider society. The chapter therefore provides us with very little 
detail regarding the extent to which the Sufi may keep company with Sultans and wider 
society. This in itself is an indication that al-Baghdādī intends to provide a somewhat 
ambiguous response to the question put to him regarding rulers, as he avoids giving a 
direct answer. However, drawing on what we know so far of al-Baghdādī’s attitude 	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towards rulers and wider society, we may be able to arrive at some important 
conclusions. The tone of the chapter is set at the outset as al-Baghdādī phrases the 
question as:  
 
Does frequenting the doors of Sultans and mixing with the oppressive and cursed ones 
reduce one’s spiritual rank? Or is it permissible for the [spiritually] mature to expand 
and relax [his practice] of keeping company with people, both elite and common, [in 
comparison with] the beginner and intermediate.599  
 
The negative view of rulers is established immediately, restricting al-Baghdādī’s 
framework from toleration of rulers at best and a complete rejection of accompanying 
them at worst. Al-Baghdādī then goes on to stress the harm that engaging with wider 
society can cause for the spiritual progress of disciples, and argues that they should 
seek the company of shaykhs instead. Here he makes the very forceful claim that 
“committing sins in defiance of the sharī‘a, which deserve punishment on the day of 
judgement, is for me, better than mixing with people in the case of the disciple.”600 
 
While this may seem a rather definite statement, it is important to note that al-
Baghdādī only asserts this with regard to the initiate, and not the intermediate disciple. 
The discussion here, as in other chapters of the Tuḥfa established a hierarchy which 
determines the extent to which a member of the Sufi community may serve wider 
society. Soon after this statement he begins to detail exceptions to this notion, 
emphasising that a shaykh may order the disciple to serve and accompany rulers or 
wider society, in order to overcome certain psycho-spiritual barriers such as excessive 
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attachment to seclusion. 601  Furthermore, al-Baghdādī does make space for fuller 
involvement with wider society as he states: 
  
As God has said to his prophet… “Abandon them with a gracious abandonment.” 
Meaning mix with them with respect to image and abandon them with respect to 
reality. And that is why the Prophet… said, “the believer who mixes with people and is 
patient with the harm [they do] is better than one who does not mix with people and is 
not patient with their harm. And if the disciple is within the shade of the authority of a 
shaykh and seeks protection with the cord of his training, then he is safe from the 
threat of these pitfalls. And [he must perform] whatever the shaykh requests him to 
perform. And the shaykhs devise tests which the alert disciple must undertake.602 
 
Al-Baghdādī then recounts the time when Kubrā ordered him to keep company with an 
unnamed sultan as a test. The initial tone of the passage is therefore misleading if taken 
out of context. Even the disciple may be engaged with wider society, but he does so on 
the orders of the shaykh. Al-Baghdādī’s aim therefore is not to ban the Sufi from 
engaging in wider society and cultivating relationships with ruling classes, but to 
control it and only authorise it through the institutional bond of shaykh and disciple. In 
fact, once al-Baghdādī begins to discuss the role of the more advanced Sufi in society, 
his tone seems to shift dramatically stating: 
 
And it has been confirmed, in the ḥadīth, that the Prophet peace be upon him said, “and 
God aids the servant as long as the servant aids his Muslim brother.” Therefore if he 
aids the people by mixing with them, then God aids him. And God’s aid is better for him 
than his struggles and worship. For the aid of God [comes from] the door of his 
attractions… and for that reason Abū Ḥusayn al-Nūrī preferred companionship over 
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isolation and used to say, “beware of isolation, for isolation is [like] keeping company 
with Satan, and companionship is incumbent upon you.”603 
 
By following the argument in the text, a clear hierarchical approach to engagement 
with society emerges. The initiate is not to be allowed to mix with wider society unless 
his shaykh asks him to do so whereas the intermediate and advanced must do so. By no 
means then is the Sufi expected to withdraw from society permanently. In fact given 
that al-Baghdādī states that training should be completed in three years, it is unlikely 
that even disciples would be removed from society for very long.604  
 
What is paramount for al-Baghdādī in this discussion is the need for a strong communal 
bond whilst working within wider society. This comes to the fore throughout the 
discussion as al-Baghdādī constantly reminds the reader that the Sufi must remain 
vigilant regarding his soul during his engagement with wider society, and if he is not 
yet complete he must have a shaykh in order not to regress in spiritual rank. Al-
Baghdādī explains that this is a requirement for the “changeable” intermediate. Only 
the completed Sufi shaykh has no restrictions upon his interactions with wider society. 
He then goes on to recite the story of Abū Sa‘īd’s acceptance of seemingly illicit money 
which we have previously detailed.605  
 
In our discussion of antinomianism we highlighted that this point in the text was the 
closest to which al-Baghdādī came to sanctioning some form of antinomianism within 
the Sufi institution. This exception to the otherwise staunch assertion of the 
impermissibility of breaking the sharī‘a along with the entirety of the 10th chapter of the 
Tuḥfa is proof that al-Baghdādī aimed to commit his community to involvement with 
wider society and the ruling classes. In light of this, the negative view of society which 	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defines its effects as inherently harmful and reinterprets a return to society and 
abandonment of seclusion for the advanced Sufi as an austerity is a necessary step in 
justifying engagement with wider society. If this negative view of society were not 
upheld, it would no longer be a test for the Sufi to maintain his spiritual progress, and 
could be considered an indulgence. This would make it more difficult for al-Baghdādī to 
argue for the reintegration of the Sufi into society. The main point of this discussion 
then is not to discourage the Sufi from engaging with society but to assert greater self 
control over the Sufi community’s interactions with rulers and the general populace, 
centralising the involvement of its members with non-Sufis in the authority of the 
shaykh who decides when a disciple should serve a ruler as al-Baghdādī was 
commanded to do so by Kubrā.  
 
The Tuḥfa shows that al-Baghdādī’s Sufi community developed very differently from al-
Suhrawardī’s. The liberal approach to investiture under al-Suhrawardī opened the 
possibility of affiliation, and the attainment of a higher status to the entirety of society. 
These affiliates could also be drawn upon as servants of the lodge, allowing Sufis to 
devote themselves to ritual devotions and training while the practicalities of day-to-day 
life were taken care of.606 This liberalisation also served the political function of 
incorporating rulers and governors into the community, and in doing so bound their 
loyalties to a network which was increasingly intertwined with the caliphate.  
 
By contrast, al-Baghdādī’s thought leaves little space for incorporating rulers and lay 
affiliates into an official bond with the Sufi institution due to his positions on 
dispensations and investiture. It was the ability to grant dispensations to lay-affiliates 
which allowed for the Sufi institution to expand under al-Suhrawardī, allowing people 
to maintain their societal bonds and belong to the Sufi community as well. The 
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relevance of these topics to antinomianism in the Tuḥfa therefore cannot be fully 
divorced from concerns regarding affiliations and society.  
 
Al-Baghdādī too makes a case for the expansion of the community, but this occurs more 
selectively, allowing advanced disciples to train initiates, or allowing long distance 
bonds to be maintained through visionary rituals. His insistence that the initiate ought 
to eschew companionship with non-Sufis then can exist alongside attending to societal 
obligations. This suits al-Baghdādī’s assertion that the practice of investiture intended 
to quickly and effectively create shaykhs rather than amass disciples.  
 
This may indeed have been successful. It is well known that later sources gave Kubrā 
the title of “sculptor of saints” due to the amount of notable Sufis who were seen to 
have owed their training to him.607 Some of these figures such as Najm al-Dīn al-Rāzī 
owed the bulk of their training to al-Baghdādī, so it may have been that this system of a 
central shaykh who deferred the training of disciples to their advanced disciples put 
forward in the Tuḥfa, was part of a conscious effort by the early Kubrawīs to create 
shaykhs more effectively. In that case we need to ask why it seemed more useful for the 
early Kubrawīs to structure their community in such a way and why the structure of al-
Suhrawardī’s community seemed disagreeable. 
 
Of course, it may be that al-Baghdādī believes that investiture should not be made a 
mundane affair for the purposes of affiliation, and that it should not be bestowed upon 
people in the hope to entice them to join the Sufi community more fully as disciples. 
This would explain his attempt to assert the theophanic and miraculous role of the 
cloak. He may also have been genuinely perturbed by al-Suhrawardī’s assertion that 
investiture had no clear basis in the prophetic tradition. However, in addition to these 
objections based on very firmly held beliefs, al-Baghdādī’s response also betrays that 	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Sufism in Iran and Central Asia did not benefit from developing as the early Suhrawardī 
community in Baghdad did. 
 
Since we do not have much information regarding the running of the Sufi institutions 
in Iran and Khwarazm in this period. However, the development of Sufi institutions was 
paralleled by the institutionalisation of the madrasa.608 It may therefore be helpful to 
look at the development of the madrasa and the challenges it encountered so that we 
may understand the primary issues religious institutions faced when dealing with 
competing political interests. It was in the interest of rulers to patronise and establish 
these institutions as endowments (waqf) in order to gain legitimacy, and this continued 
even into the early Mongol rule of Iran.609 However, increased competition between 
patrons could encourage hostilities between religious communities and institutions. 
 
As we have discussed, the emergence of institutions of learning reflected the need to 
develop alternative patterns of loyalty and leadership when faced with the breakdown 
of political power. Both the Sufi lodge and the madrasa seem to have emerged together 
in this context. Chamberlain notes in his investigation into the relationship between 
the madrasa and patricians in Damascus in the 12th, 13th and 14th centuries that the 
madrasa was a place where various powers intersected and competed for supremacy.610  
 
A number of factors compounded the competition which was played out through the 
madrasa, these ranged from the vast numbers being set up to protect the interests and 
property of elite families and the inability to determine what qualified someone to a 
post at a madrasa, which seems to have had no relation to the qualifications and 
certificates (ijāza) they may have obtained. All this allowed fierce competition over 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
608 Ephrat, Spiritual Wayfarers, 76. 
609 Lambton, ‘Awqāf in Persia’, 310. 
610 Chamberlain, Knowledge and Social practice, 106. 
	   315	  
posts between Ayubid and Mamluk sultans who interfered in the affairs of the madrasa 
where posts became prizes of political struggles. The inability of legal scholars to define 
the requirements for positions of teaching other than reputation and prestige, led to a 
rise in imitators who were unqualified but would dress like ‘ulamā’, exaggerating the 
features of their clothing.611 
 
Clearly the increased establishment of madrasas along with the inability of scholars to 
define the necessary qualifications for posts within the institution meant that scholars 
could not exert enough control over its structure, and their positions lacked stability as 
it was unlikely that one would last in his post for more than a few years.612 Though the 
context of the madrasa in the Levant differs from the context of the two Sufi 
communities under consideration here, the relationship between certification and 
socio-political struggles highlights the importance of investiture practices in 
establishing a relationship between religious institutions, wider society and patrons. 
Bulliet’s study of patronage in Nishapur in the 11th century also stresses the importance 
of defining a criteria for the certification of teachers and notes that certification was 
essentially the “collective will of the learned patricians.” 613  Anxiety over the 
relationship between Sufis and rulers can also be seen the example of Abū Ḥāmid al-
Ghazālī, who was keen to detach the Sufi institution from what Karamustafa has 
described as the “sycophantic” and “corrosive” competition which plagued the 
establishment of madrasas in his day where politics “seeped directly into the scholastic 
enterprise.”614 
 
And as we have highlighted, evidence points to a volatile relationship between the 
ruling classes and religious institutions during the political breakdown and increased 	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competition during the reign of the Khwarazmshahs. This is seen in the production of 
hagiographical material which focus on Abū Sa‘īd and his relationship with rulers and 
patrons. These represent the fact that Sufis at the time felt the need to articulate the 
ideal model of patronage which seems to have been lost.615  
 
In a context of political instability, al-Baghdādī’s strategy of centralisation along with 
exclusivising affiliation makes sense as it would fortify the institution against 
interference. The emphasis on producing shaykhs, along with the development of a 
clear qualification and definition of shaykh-hood as expressed through Sufi theory, as 
well as a hierarchical dress code, address all the areas which the example of madrasas 
in Damascus could not, limiting the potential for patricians to interfere and the scope 
for imitators to gain patronage without qualifications. By contrast the madrasas in 
Damascus at the time could not clearly define the qualification of scholars and affiliates 
to the institution, which allowed the propagation of a vast number of competing 
madrasas and instability within the institutions themselves.  
 
The exclusivity and centralisation within al-Baghdādī’s Sufism then is indicative of 
adaptation to new socio-political circumstances rather than a rejection of society. The 
realisation that interactions with wider society needed to be more carefully controlled 
is reflected in what we have presented in al-Baghdādī’s work. Al-Suhrawardī was also 
part of a process of institutionalisation and centralisation, however unlike al-Baghdādī 
it suited him to adopt a laxer attitude towards affiliation. Al-Suhrawardī could also 
pursue this due to the relative political stability of Baghdad at the time in comparison 
to Iran and Khwarazm.  
 
In this period the caliph al-Nāṣir expanded his power through calculated military 
expeditions and propaganda. During his reign, he was successful at managing, as 	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Ohlander puts it, “the overlapping locations of socio-religious authority.”616 The spread 
of the Sufi institution here was important for the formation of political and social bonds 
which reinforced the leadership of al-Suhrawardī and al-Nāṣir. Hence, al-Suhrawardī 
developed hierarchical structures and practices of investiture and certification in a 
context of political stability which did not require fortification against competing 
patrician interests. 
 
This was also a matter of asserting a proto-Kubrawī identity against that of the 
emerging Suhrawardiyya. There seems to have been particular interest in al-
Suhrawardī’s ideas in Khurasan. One of his treatises is entitled “Answers to the 
questions of some of the religious scholars of Khurasan.” In this work he addresses 
many of the same topics which the Tuḥfa also discusses.617 Unfortunately, the identity of 
the questioners is unknown to us, however that al-Baghdādī did seem to have access to 
al-Suhrawardī’s writings and responds to them directly indicates that, if he did not read 
the ‘Awārif, he might have had access to the Ajwiba, meaning that there was some 
correspondence between people in al-Baghdādī’s community and those within ‘Umar 
al-Suhrawardī’s.  
 
These questions were directly related to the construction of Sufi identities in the 
period. Salamah-Qudsi has argued that al-Suhrawardī’s work reveals a self-conscious 
Sufism, and an attempt to form solidarity and belonging through a unique form of 
collective life.618 Hence, this emerging communal identity which was predicated on 
practices which were distasteful to al-Baghdādī had to be dissociated from the proto-
Kubrawī community. From what we have presented here, it is apparent that al-
Baghdādī’s musters a number of defining features of Kubrawī thought, from theories of 
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visions, attributes, and microcosmology in order to distinguish the proto-Kubrawiyya 
from the nascent Suhrawardiyya.  
 
This also raises the question of competition between al-Baghdādī and al-Suhrawardī’s 
communities as the latter could spread more easily and was evidently very influential. 
It could very well be that al-Baghdādī felt that ‘Umar al-Suhrawardī’s articulation of 
Sufism presented a challenge to the Kubrawī way of life and its theoretical foundations. 
In response, al-Baghdādī sought to reassert the primacy of his community and a 
difference between those Sufis attached to himself and Kubrā and the emerging 
Suhrawardiyya at the time. In doing so, he crafts a proto-Kubrawī identity which relies 
on a coherence between the defining characteristics of Kubrawī thought and Sufi 
practice. Here, the visible markers of proto-Kubrawī identity such as the coloured 
hierarchy of positions within the institutions, and the status of the Sufi cloak of 
investiture as an intermediary between the hidden and manifest which signifies the 
perfected state of the soul distinguish the proto-Kubrawiyya from other Sufi 
communities, as well as marking a distinct spiritual lineage. Furthermore, these 
competing self-conscious identities, which distinguished one Sufi community from 
another, anticipate the rise of Sufi orders. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The importance of the Sufi cloak as a marker of identity is clear here. Attitudes towards 
investiture allow us to understand the changing dynamics between Sufis, political 
rulers and wider society. Questions regarding antinomianism, politics and society 
intersect in the subject of investiture in the Tuḥfa. Furthermore, the institutionalisation 
of Sufism which al-Baghdādī develops consciously differed from the institutionalisation 
of Sufism under al-Suhrawardī. The difference between the two communities is 
reinforced by the variance in theory and practice which al-Baghdādī cultivates 
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throughout his work. Here, theory crucially reinforces markers of identity which 
distinguish al-Baghdādī’s community from the emerging Suhrawardī community.  
 
While none of these disagreements are to the extent that we may expect from later 
tarīqa Sufis who were more forceful in their condemnation of competing Sufi 
institutions, this is a clear indication of the emergence of competition in a very nascent 
form. It reveals the gradual shift towards tarīqa Sufism in this period. Crucially this 
analysis has shown an important degree of self-consciousness in al-Baghdādī’s thought, 
indicating that the emergence of competing communal identities along with a 
transition to centralised and exclusive modes of affiliation and belonging were defined 
in opposition to rival forms of Sufi affiliation. 
 
Al-Baghdādī’s theoretical framework proves to be extremely useful and versatile, able 
to address a number of issues while drawing on a central core of conceptual doctrines 
and discursive tools. Hence, the theoretical framework of the Tuḥfa played a central 
role in the institutionalisation of the Sufi community and its centralisation around the 
shaykh, and also served to address problems of antinomianism and wider societal 
affiliations. It was crucial for distinguishing his Sufi community from other emerging 
forms of Sufism at the time.  
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Conclusion 
 
This study set out to analyse Majd al-Dīn al-Baghdādī’s Tuḥfat al-barara with the aim of 
accounting for a crucial period in the history of Sufism when Sufi communities were 
transitioning into orders. We have shown that al-Baghdādī’s work offers a wealth of 
information regarding this period in the history of Sufism. We have shown that al-
Baghdādī offers a coherent system of Kubrawī psychological theory. This is 
significantfor furthering our understanding of Sufi thought and the development and 
transition of Sufism from communities and loose networks of affiliation to the 
institutions which came to be called orders. Kubrawī theory has been shown to be 
central to al-Baghdādī’s attempts to stratify and centralise the Sufi community, which 
is crucial for the emergence of a distinct proto-Kubrawī Sufi identity the 12th and 13th 
centuries. All of this points to a system of thought which anticipates the rise of Sufi 
orders. 
 
In the beginning of this study, we stated that the suitability of using the term proto-
Kubrawī in describing al-Baghdādī’s thought would only be fully realised after we had 
seen through our analysis to the end. This proto-Kubrawī identity is seen in the Tuḥfa 
through its exposition of a set of shared beliefs, practices, symbols and structures of 
authority, as well as a self-conscious awareness of a distinction between the early 
Kubrawīs and non-Kubrawīs. This study has detailed al-Baghdādī’s account of the rules 
governing the Sufi master and his disciples, antinomianism, and investiture. And it has 
been shown that his particular articulation of ideas found in Kubrā’s thought has been 
central to each discussion. This connection of theory and practice binds the theoretical, 
discrusive and institutional elements of Sufism and is one of the most prominent 
features of al-Baghdādī’s work which itself does not attempt to distinguish between the 
theoretical and practical.  
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Al-Baghdādī consciously emphasised theory in order to argue for the superiority of his 
method over the practices of other Sufi communities in his discussion of investiture for 
example. From this, the image of a self-consciously distinct community emerges in the 
writings of al-Baghdādī, one whose practices and institutions, the vehicles by which 
this communal identity is maintained, are based on ideas which are characteristic of 
Kubrā’s thought. Though al-Baghdādī may not have applied the term “Kubrawī” to 
himself, all the evidence presented here justifies the assertion that al-Baghdādī’s work 
is representative of a proto-Kubrawī community. This term indicates the centrality of 
Kubrawī thought to the emergence of a communal Sufi identity in the Tuḥfa. 
 
Answering this question of how best to describe al-Baghdādī and his work has been 
central to this project since it depends on reaching a number of conclusions which 
prove the centrality of Kubrawī theory for the emergence of a distinct communal 
identity. Throughout, we have shown that al-Baghdādī provides an important 
systematisation and stratification of Kubrā’s work, and that this theoretical framework 
is intimately bound to changes in the nature of the Sufi community. From this we 
moved forward to establish that the interdependence of theory and practice in the 
Tuḥfa was employed to deal effectively with a number of concerns of the Sufi 
community. 
 
The theoretical framework offered al-Baghdādī the conceptual tools which facilitated 
the centralisation of the Sufi community and the establishment of hierarchies within it. 
It also offered an effective means by which al-Baghdādī could tackle the problem of 
antinomianism. Crucially, it also provided the Sufi community a distinct identity which 
differentiated it from other emerging centralised Sufi institutions through dress and 
oneirology. More generally, al-Baghdādī’s text is an important example of the role that 
Sufism played in shaping the realities of the day for the medieval Muslim, through its 
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reaction to political and societal changes. From dress to dream interpretation, the Tuḥfa 
shows the central role of Sufism in affecting the material culture of 12th and 13th century 
Muslim society.  
 
Kubrā’s thought has in past studies been presented as a purely abstract exposition of 
Sufi thought. While such studies have undoubtedly provided invaluable insight into 
Kubrā’s ideas, there is a danger that this focus on theory in abstraction neglects its 
relevance to the context of the day, and because of this many important aspects of 
Kubrawī thought have been overlooked. This study has shown that supplementing our 
knowledge of Kubrawī thought with al-Baghdādī’s Tuḥfa in order to place it within its 
specific context is necessary if we are to fully appreciate its significance. Al-Baghdādī’s 
Tuḥfa is one of the clearest examples of the ways in which Kubrawī ideas offered 
practical solutions to some very real problems facing the Sufi community at the time. 
The framework it offered was not only useful in a reactionary sense as a response to 
changes, but also offered Kubrawī shaykhs a wealth of ideas on which they could draw 
in order to actively shape their communities and wider society. 
 
Hence this study is not only important for our understanding of the period, figures and 
thought under consideration, but also for highlighting the need to approach the study 
of the Kubrawiyya and the development of early Kubrawī thought with its social, 
political and practical implications in mind. In the Kubrawī framework, the most 
seemingly personal experiences such as spiritual visions carry a number of 
significances beyond the soul which witnessed them. Early Kubrawī psychology was not 
only a theory which explained the truth of mental, spiritual and sensory experiences, it 
was also a framework through which Sufis structured their communities and interacted 
with the wider world. 
 
	   323	  
The legacy of this systematisation of thought and practice which al-Baghdādī 
undertakes in the Tuḥfa has also not been adequately understood, nor has al-Baghdādī 
been credited for his influence over later authors. Al-Rāzī’s Mirṣād al-‘ibād owes much of 
its psychological exposition and underlying micro-cosmological framework to the 
Tuḥfa. It also borrows from and builds upon the Tuḥfa in a number of important ways, 
from spiritual birth, prophetology, the notion of travelling within God, spiritual flight, 
and a system of coloured visions. The popularity of the Mirṣād throughout the Islamic 
world means that al-Baghdādī’s ideas were disseminated widely and influenced Sufism 
beyond Kubrawī circles, far away from Iran and Khwarazm. 
 
This study also provides an important comparative example to other Sufi writers. One 
telling difference between al-Rāzī and al-Baghdādī for example, is the latters overly 
negative view of rulers compared to al-Rāzī’s writings on kingship in the Mirṣād which 
are more similar to the mirror for princes genre, providing advice for good and 
effective rule. This makes sense given the circumstances al-Rāzī found himself in, 
having to look for patrons in Anatolia and Iraq while al-Baghdādī had to manage his 
relations with rulers who were in conflict with one another while the threat of violence 
loomed around him. This contrast only strengthens the case for serious study of the 
Tuḥfa in order to truly understand the history of Sufism in this period.  
 
Al-Baghdādī’s influence is evident in the works of Isfarā’inī and al-Simnānī as well. Like 
al-Rāzī, Isfarāinī’s psychology draws heavily on the micro-cosmology of the Tuḥfa. His 
student al-Simnānī further develops the metaphor of the heart as a mirror, as well as 
expanding on al-Baghdādī’s prophetology by positing that each faculty of the soul 
corresponds to a prophet, expanding the comparison of prophets to the rank of the soul 
from al-Baghdādī’s three to seven. 619  For al-Baghdādī, Moses, Jesus and Muhammad 
signified the soul’s progression from the ego, to the spirit and perfection, or from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
619 Elias, Throne Carrier, 74-76. 
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initiate, to the intermediate and to the complete respectively. 620 Al-Simnānī expands 
this for a more detailed prophetology along with a more intricate distinction of stages 
along the Sufi path to completion, which indicate an even more structured and 
stratified Sufi institution. And given that ‘Alī al-Hamadānī, one of al-Simnānī’s students 
is credited with establishing the Kubrawiyya as an order, it is likely that through al-
Simnānī, al-Baghdādī’s ideas contributed to the shape such institutions took.621 Hence, 
the influence of al-Baghdādī’s Tuḥfa was far reaching both in theory and praxis, having 
significant impact on the emergence of Kubrawī ṭarīqa Sufism.  
 
Throughout our discussion of al-Baghdādī’s psychology it has been shown that the 
reception of philosophical and theological ideas through al-Ghazālī provided al-
Baghdādī with the conceptual tools to further develop Sufi thought and practice. This is 
evident in a number of notable examples which we have discussed. His reliance on 
notions of thought impressions and the nature of the soul for example allowed the 
development of remembrance rituals which focused on communication with the soul of 
the shaykh. His usage of the term realities (ḥaqā’iq), allowed him to construct a 
particular understanding of man as a microcosm. Crucially, his collapse of the functions 
of perception and the command of the body into the metaphor of the heart as a mirror 
served to create an important symbiosis between visions, attributes and the Sufi path. 
This is evinced in his understanding of realities both as part of the composition of the 
human being as well as perceptible intelligibles which are imprinted onto the soul.  This 
attests to a hitherto under explored connection between Kubrawī and Ghazālian 
thought which is crucial in al-Baghdādī’s systematisation of Kubrā’s ideas.  
 
He also drew on Avicenna through al-Ghazālī to construct his notions of the inner 
senses and the role of beauty and explain the connection between the physical senses, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
620 Elias, Throne Carrier, 84-85. 
621 Deweese, ‘Sayyid ‘Alī Hamadānī’, 140. 
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spiritual senses and the soul to arrive at a theophanic conception of physical sensation. 
In addition, the Tuḥfa bears parallels to other figures such as ‘Ammār al-Biṭlīsī and 
Yaḥya al-Suhrawardī, raising the possibility of hitherto unexplored connections 
between these Sufi intellectual traditions. Al-Baghdādī’s ideas therefore reveal a wealth 
of information regarding the reception and development of Sufi thought. 
 
These advances in psychology were also crucial for the development of a coherent 
oneirology which is important in itself. Prior to Kubrā and al-Baghdādī most oneiric 
interpretations do not seem to have a coherent interpretive framework. While this 
coherence is present in Kubrā’s work, it is quite difficult to understand without 
supplementing it with a reading of the Tuḥfa which maps images onto a micro-
cosmological framework. Furthermore al-Baghdādī’s notion of the heart allows dream 
perception to be equated with the attributes of the soul. Hence the dream’s diagnostic 
value is understood in greater detail in the Tuḥfa.  
 
Al-Baghdādī’s oneirology also reveals an important advancement in dream science 
through the adoption of body-soul dualism. For al-Baghdādī, the soul was reserved from 
the descent of the body away from the presence of God. Its subsequent attachment to 
the body causes the soul to be inundated with the images and colours of dreams and 
visions from which it must free itself through purification and “voluntary” death. This 
allowed for a more coherently systematised oneirology based on a hierarchy of images 
which is determined by bodily complexity. In addition, a coherent oneiric system with 
body-soul dualism at its core was important for maintaining a sense of communal 
belonging and reinforcing the authority of the shaykh through the telepathic 
connection between him and his disciples. Hence, al-Baghdādī’s work is extremely 
important for understanding the significance of the reception of body-soul dualism in 
Kubrawī Sufism, and its relevance for the development of Sufi sciences. 
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The relevance of psychological theory to changes in the Sufi community go beyond 
oneirology however. Hence, al-Baghdādī attempts to centralise the authority of the 
shaykh and craft a more detailed hierarchy of masters, advanced disciples and initiates, 
was dependent upon a well-developed understanding of the Sufi path. Maintaining the 
structure of this arrangement was also dependent upon the important notion of 
“Travelling in God” where the potential to manifest the attributes of God became 
infinite, asserting the Sufi’s attachment to the shaykh even after completion. In his 
discussions of the role of the shaykh and disciple, al-Baghdādī also developed a number 
of influential concepts which had a role in the development of Sufi terms such as 
training (tarbiya) and (birthing) wilāda as well as companionship (ṣuḥba). His work is 
therefore indispensible for understanding the centralisation of the Sufi community. 
 
Al-Baghdādī’s discussion of antinomianism also contributes significantly to our 
understanding the rise of groups such as the Qalandariyya in this period and their 
relationship to Sufism. Here we saw that antinomianism was defined in opposition to 
institutionalised Sufism. In this framework dispensations from religious law became the 
sole prerogative of the Sufi shaykh and depended upon a notion of elitism. Al-Baghdādī 
was not terribly concerned with justifying even the most seemingly odd doctrines he 
held such as understanding the speech of God from physical sounds, the ability to 
translate birdsong, or the visions of coloured lights against accusations of heresy.  
 
Al-Baghdādī mainly tackles the issue through institutionalisation, characterising 
antinomians as incomplete and unfit for official offices in the Sufi institution, drawing 
heavily on psychological theory. This elitism and restriction to access to official 
positions within the Sufi institution is likely to have played a part in the rise of 
subversive mystical expressions which previously had found more room for 
accommodation in Sufism. Furthermore, notions of dispensations from the law were 
not only relevant to subversive behaviour, but also governed modes of affiliation and 
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interactions between Sufis and the wider populace. Hence, we have shown here that in 
order to fully understand the significance of discussions surrounding antinomianism, 
we must account for its relevance to the wider concerns of the Sufi community. 
 
In his most systematic defence of normative behaviour, al-Baghdādī stresses the 
theophanic role of the physical sensation and the interdependence between the body 
and soul. This is striking since theophany is commonly seen as a source of potential 
antinomianism, perhaps due to the prominence of controversies surrounding Ibn 
‘Arabī’s thought. Theophany as it was articulated in a Kubrawī framework, sought to 
temper antinomianism. Hence, potentially problematic notions were employed by al-
Baghdādī in an effort to uphold normative behaviour. 
 
These ideas also contributed to the emergence of a self-conscious identity. This is most 
vivid in al-Baghdādī’s discussion of dress and investiture as he detailed an exclusivist 
approach, distinct from the leniency in investiture which was encouraged by ‘Umar al-
Suhrawardī. In this example al-Baghdādī’s theories of psychology and prophetology 
were put to use in marking the distinction between his own Sufi community and other 
Sufi groups. Furthermore, this discussion was also implicitly tied to the topic of 
antinomianism as al-Suhrawardī’s more liberal approach to investiture required 
dispensations for those who received the cloak of blessing. We have therefore 
highlighted an important interconnection between psychological theory, the structure 
of the institution, antinomianism and investiture practices in the Tuḥfa. All these topics 
intersect to a remarkable degree in al-Baghdādī’s work, revealing the complexity of the 
Sufism of the day as the theoretical and institutional become evermore intrinsically 
linked.  
 
In conclusion, the Tuḥfa offers us an important insight into the development of Sufism 
in this crucial period of history. Al-Baghdādī’s work reveals the rise of a distinct proto-
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Kubrawī Sufism. He was clearly an important thinker in his own right, despite his 
relatively small written output, his thought echoes and reverberates in many other 
works, both during his time and well after his death. This study of Majd al-Dīn al-
Baghdādī and his Tuḥfa has shed light on the development of Kubrawī Sufism, yet there 
is undoubtedly more work to be done. We hope that this study will be of use to any 
student of Sufism and the Kubrawiyya wishing to investigate the historical realities of 
this Sufi community, or desiring to navigate its vivid world of images and symbols, 
populated with birds and beasts and illuminated by burning flames and shining lights. 
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